Did Israel just settle Lockerbie’s oldest score?

[This is the headline over an article by barrister David Wolchover published today on the website of Jewish News. It reads in part:]

As the Iran conflict intensifies, fresh scrutiny is falling on the true architects of the Pan Am bombing, which killed 270 people aboard Flight 103 and 11 Lockerbie residents, and on Israel’s long-delayed reckoning with them

With the world focused on the joint US/Israel war against Iran, this may be a timely moment to recall an episode years ago which has had an intriguing outcome in the new conflict.

At the tail end of the Iran-Iraq War, American warships were engaged in protecting tanker movements in the Persian Gulf. On 3 July, 1988, the missile cruiser USS Vincennes was involved in hostile exchanges with Iranian Boghammer fast patrol boats when an IranAir Airbus on flight IR655 took off from Bandar Abbas and was ascending on route to Dubai.

The facts are complex, but by a combination of computer and human error, the airliner’s profile and trajectory were misinterpreted as that of two Iranian F-14A Tomcats descending towards the cruiser. A missile was launched, and all 290 passengers and crew aboard the Airbus died.

The next day, President Reagan referred to the terrible human tragedy but provocatively added that it was a “proper defensive action”, and Vice President Bush subsequently rubbed further salt in the wound. As revealed by contemporary American and Israeli intelligence gained from telecommunications intercepts and mole infiltration, the Iranians were so enraged that they resolved to take revenge.

To do so, they enlisted Ahmed Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command) to destroy an American airliner using a bomb of the kind the faction had perfected and used previously. Such bombs were typically detonated by an ingenious barometric device triggered by the drop in air pressure as the aircraft gained altitude.

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1988, Israel had incurred Whitehall’s wrath when Israeli agents were found to be treating the UK as their own private intelligence fiefdom and four diplomats were expelled. Then, in November, Israel tipped off MI6 that, as security was lax at Heathrow during the reconstruction of Terminal 3, the airport had been chosen by terrorists to plant a bomb on board an American airliner in revenge for IR655.

The tip-off was dismissed as a facile attempt by Israeli intelligence to worm its way back into Britain’s good books, but it proved to be disastrously prescient.

On 21 December, Jibril’s nephew Marwad Bushnaq flew into Heathrow aboard an IranAir freighter, bringing a suitcase containing a small barometric bomb. He was able to place the bag in a portable luggage container due to be loaded into a Pan American Airways 747 designated for flight 103 to New York JFK, positioning it precisely where it would need to be, up against the hull, to blast a hole in the fuselage.

The bomb detonated over the Scottish town of Lockerbie with the loss of all 270 passengers and crew and 11 Lockerbie residents.

In the months which followed, there was little doubt as to the identity of the conspirators – highly placed members of Iran’s government and their agents, the PFLP-GC – but priorities moved on. The US government was under pressure to secure the release of American and other Western hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon. A scapegoat for Lockerbie had to be found, and these were the Libyans Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi and Lamin Fhima. American indictments were obtained against them in November 1991, and within days, the hostages were released.

The case against the Libyans, which culminated in their trial before a special Scottish judge-only tribunal in the Hague in 2001, was utterly ludicrous. It was contended that the suitcase containing the bomb travelled as unaccompanied luggage from Malta to Frankfurt, where it was transferred to a Pan Am feeder flight to Heathrow.

There, it was alleged, it was hurriedly transferred by innocent baggage handlers on the tarmac to the doomed aircraft, where it happened to end up quite by chance in the exact position necessary to avoid its going off like a damp squib.

The prosecution had to get around the awkward facts (a) that the bomb exploded after exactly the time from take-off at a normal climb rate, which a typical PFLP-GC barometric device would have detonated, and (b) that such a device would have anyway detonated on the first leg. So they alleged the perpetrators used an electronic timer. Yet with the vagaries of pre-Christmas scheduling, that might well have resulted in detonation between flights, a complete waste of effort.

Furthermore, the microchip fragment of a timer, which featured as a key plank in the prosecution’s case, has been decisively exposed as a fake, probably planted at a later date to prop up the Malta origin story. The British were only too delighted to go along with the charade because it got them off the hook for ignoring the Israeli tip-off and exonerated Heathrow.

The Iranian conspirators responsible for commissioning the PFLP-GC included a number of prominent officials, but overall executive responsibility for authorising the atrocity rested with the then president of Iran. It may be some consolation for the Lockerbie victims’ families that he was none other than Ali Khamenei, later Supreme Leader, who finally got his comeuppance courtesy of an Israeli air strike on 28 February.