Wednesday 25 August 2010

Shock! FBI think they got the right man!

[What follow are excerpts from an article in today's edition of The Christian Science Monitor.]

But to Richard Marquise, the lead FBI investigator into the bombing, the public doubts expressed about Megrahi, who was convicted by a tribunal of three Scottish judges in 2001, are puzzling and frustrating. In his 31 years at the FBI, Mr. Marquise said he's rarely seen a "stronger circumstantial case" than the one against Megrahi, who was also caught repeatedly lying to investigators and reporters. "There's nobody else that I'm aware of anywhere in the world that has such evidence pointing to their guilt," he says. (...)

Marquise says that "there were other people that we strongly believed were involved in terms of the planning process and ordering process.... Megrahi was the guy who was assigned to get it done. We think at least six were probably involved if you only had to make an intelligence case, but in terms of making a criminal case, we didn't have strong enough evidence." (...)

But many remain unconvinced -- though, as Marquise and others point out, there's no evidence to support any of a myriad of alternative theories about his guilt. One popular alternative theory, advanced most recently by The Herald newspaper of Scotland on Friday, is that Mohammed Abu Talb, an Egyptian convicted of carrying out other attacks in Europe in the early 1980s on behalf of a Palestinian group, carried out the bombing.

The Herald writes that the "Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) is understood to have uncovered new evidence that strengthens the case against Talb" without actually explaining how this is "understood" or what additional evidence, if any, exists to tie him to the murders. The article also asserts that Mr. Talb was "arrested in connection with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103" in 1989.

Marquise says that last assertion is false and that Talb's arrest in 1989 dealt with a different terrorism case. While Megrahi was proven to have traveled to Malta on a false passport (which he had originally lied about), and to [have] been there on the date that the explosive was placed on the plane, Talb was in Sweden at the time.

The key piece of evidence against Megrahi was a fragment of the timer used for the bomb at Lockerbie, which was of an unusual design. "There were maybe as many as 25 of these timers ever made -- 20 really with a couple of circuit boards left over," says Marquise. "All 20 were hand-delivered to Libyan intelligence."

Another theory floating about is that the British government squashed possibly exculpatory evidence about Megrahi at the time of his trial and has been hiding it ever since. The Guardian newspaper quoted a Scottish human rights lawyer last week as saying that there is a "secret intelligence report" that "is believed to cast serious doubts on prosecution claims that Megrahi used a specific Swiss timer for the bomb."

Again, it isn't clear who believes this or how they could possibly know such the contents of a "secret" document.

"I don’t know if some of these people are reading too many of these spy novels or what," says William Chornyak, another former FBI investigator. "But a lot of the people making these suppositions simply weren't there. It's easy to say, 'I'm going to assume there's some secret document' ... that proves Megrahi is innocent. But where is the document?"

Mr. Chonyak says he's "absolutely" convinced that Megrahi's conviction was accurate. "The evidence is pretty specific, the guy even admitted using a phony passport, and he was caught lying. If a guy is going to lie in one instance, and you have the documentation that proves he lied, he’s going to continue to lie."

"I feel bad for the families," says Marquise. "They got partial justice."

[Readers are invited to compare the above with Lockerbie: A satisfactory process but a flawed result and The SCCRC decision.

Caustic Logic's commentary on The Christian Science Monitor article can be read here on The Lockerbie Divide blog.]



    In "special" English language; if it is incomprehensible think it is coded...

    On 17. July 2009 informed Rt Hon Lord Trefgarne PC in a letter at Secretary of Justice Kenny MacAskill in the connection of Mr. Abdelbaset Al Megrahi's PTA the following text: "if the PTA is your preferred course then Mr. Megrahi will have to withdraw his appeal and notify the Court accordingly."

    Since the 9th July 2009 were "initiate" Persons in the context with its intended release informed about it, that Mr Al-Megrahi will drop his legal appeal before going home. It contradicts itself, however if secret fact is which on the stage,"National Security" to be should protected !
    The same "initiaten" Persons knew at this time from intelligence files, that Mr. Al-Megrahi nothing could have to do with the PanAm 103 Tragedy!
    From 9. July 2010 Kenny MacAskill was convinced of it and thus he was physically in a safe position, to carry the responsibility for the release of Mr. Al Megrahi, what it showed with its affected behaviour. The "show-accessories" with the doubtful physician certification served only as lightning conductor for attacks from media…

    Mr. Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi is 100% innocent, he and Libya have 100% nothing to do with the Lockerbie-Tragedy.

    by Edwin Bollier, MEBO Ltd., Switzerland


    The unsatisfactory investigations of the German Bundes-Kriminal Amt (BKA) are responsible for the wrong acceptance, one "Bomb Bag" was transferred from Air Malta flight KM-180 at the airport Frankfurt into PanAm 103/B!
    sorry only in german language:

    Die mangelhaften Untersuchungen des Deutschen Bundes-Kriminal- Amtes (BKA) sind verantwortlich für die falsche Annahme, am 21. Dezember 1988 sei ein "Bomben-Koffer" mit AirMalta Flug KM-180 am Airport Frankfurt auf PanAm PA-103/B transferiert worden !

    Diese Vorhaltung basiert auf der Zusammenfassung der "Lockerbie-Untersuchung" im BKA-Report ST-33 068507/88 vom 2. Juli,1990.
    verantwortlicher Kommissar Hans Jürgen Fuhl.

    Der "Phantom-Transfer" des "Bomben-Koffers" in Frankfurt, bleibt neben dem manipulierten MST-13 Timerfragment (PT/35) das massgebliche Kernstück, welches für das falsche "Lockerbie-Urteil", am Gericht in Kamp van Zeist, "kreiert" wurde!
    Dies, wurde zweckdienlich für die Behauptung des Staatsanwaltes, konstruiert, welcher einen "Tatbestad" brauchte, um den Link von Frankfurt nach Malta sicher zustellen!

    Es zeigt sich, dass die komplizierte Logistik im, (Flug und Baggage-Netzwerk, 1988), kriminell missbraucht wurde, um einen Ablauf im Gepäck-Transfer in Frankfurt, derart zu konstruieren, dass sich Lord Advocate und die hohen Richter vom angeblichen Transfer der AirMalta, (KM-180) auf PanAm, (PA-103/B) in (FRA), täuschen, bezugsweise überzeugen liessen und dementsprechend falsch urteilten!

    Durch nachweisliche Manipulationen und Veränderungen an entscheideten FAG-Dokumenten (Worksheets, FA-22 supply delivery Documents etc.) konnte die Darstellung derartig konstruiert werden, dass AirMalta KM-180 das "Bomb-Bag" nach Frankfurt transportierte und dort auf den PanAm Flug PA-103/B transferiert wurde !

    Es ist höchste Zeit diese falschen Fakts, welche zu einem "Miscarriage of Justice" führen müssen, zu Gunsten Mr. Al-Megrahi's und der Fluggesellschaft AirMalta, neu untersuchen zulassen.

    Nur diese Tatsachen können den US Senatoren Robert Menendez and Frank Lautenberg, endgültig den "Wind aus den Segeln" nehmen...

    Mr. Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi kann kein Gepäck am 21.Dezember 1988, am Luqa Airport auf AirMalta KM-180 eingeschleust haben !

    by Edwin and Mahnaz Bollier, MEBO Ltd., Switzerland

  3. "There's nobody else that I'm aware of anywhere in the world that has such evidence pointing to their guilt," he says.

    Abu Elias, aka Basel Bushnaq, of Herndon Virginia. Ring a bell, Dick?

  4. "If a guy is going to lie in one instance, and you have the documentation that proves he lied, he’s going to continue to lie."

    If you have to make that kind of extrapolation from one lie, that strongly suggests he was not "also caught repeatedly lying to investigators and reporters."

    Man, these conspiracy theorists have no shame.

  5. I notice he hasn't mentioned the $3million dollars paid to Gauci and his brother. Odd that. But then Richard doesn't like questions about the bribes.

  6. Mr Megrahi was not the only one in court at Zeist using a "false" name. Each of the judges at the original trial and the appeal did not sit using their baptismal names but a "nom de loi" for unknown professional purposes.

    This was not regarded as sinister, so why was Mr Megrahi's use of a pseudonym so regarded. Like much of the defence argument, which was very shallow on the difference of Arab and English customs and language this point was overlooked.

    A more notorious case is the use of "taggs" in the Fhimah diary. Anyone with the slightest knowledge of how Arabic writers write English knows it is virtually impossible to get Arabic students of English to use the double letter convention. Committee is invariably written as comite.

    And taggs was the only word in English in the diary. There is a perfectly good Arabic phrase for baggage tags and it is أمتعةبه

    Clearly the phrase was written into the diary by the CIA to alert the hopeless Scottish police that "this was a clue". And Mr Fhimah was meant to be a professional intelligence officer!

    Using an alternate name in the Arab world for different aspects of one's life is quite common and not at all sinister.

    And if anyone saw the reproduction of Mr Megrahi's Cardiff student card, his name in Roman transliteration is rendered as Al Magrahi and not Megrahi, a feature of Arabic were short vows are not written out. Hebrew has the same rule.

  7. This was not regarded as sinister, so why was Mr Megrahi's use of a pseudonym so regarded.

    The power of imagination! Einstein said it's more important than intelligence. This case fused to two brilliantly.

    There were too many errors in this crappy little article to deal with one-by-one, so I posted a retort.

  8. "There's nobody else that I'm aware of anywhere in the world that has such evidence pointing to their guilt"

    He is right! There is probably no convicted person in in country we half-way respect that has convicted anyone on such a basis.

    Of course, that is not what Mr. Marquise means. And he is FBI-expert, so he must know.

    Here I thought that "finger-prints", "DNA", "surveillance cameras", "recorded phonecalls", "monitored sting operations", "identifying traces", and "clear statements from witnesses" (who is not on the payroll from somebody having interests in a certain outcome) - yes, that's what I thought was even stronger evidence.

    I must be wrong, as none of it is available in the Lockerbie case.

    What evidence do we have?

    Well, where better to find it than in the verdict? I will take basis in the conclusion, part [88], as reading through the verdict itself has not provided further.

    I have taken out all statement which:
    - build on Tony Guaci, i.e. the 'identification' and the date of clothes purchasing.
    - are the judges own 'inferrals', i.e. their theories of what these things could mean, based on a belief that Megrahi was guilty.

    I have numbered each piece.

    Let me make my own summary of the [88], in quotes:

    "Megrahi was member of JSO and travelling on a false passport, stayed close to Mary's house and he knew Bollier. The two friends (him and Fhimah) visited a third friend in the evening, and Megrahi made a phonecall to Fhimah in the early following morning."

    "Such evidence!"

    Note, BTW, that Megrahi had routinely used the false passports for many years, strongly weakening any postulate that it was used for foul play in this particular case.

    Bollier is already established as a supplier to Libya, making it irrelevant whether Megrahi knew him personally or not. In fact, it was natural for Megrahi to seek contact with Mebo, as a link to a world from where embargoed goods would need to be acquired.

    How many persons in the world would equally well match some theory within which the Panam 103 could have been blown up? A theory as well/poorly substantiated (or 'substantiable ,if you do the work') as 'The plane left with the bomb from Malta'?

    Of course, any person related government services for any USA-unfriendly country, that might have been near an airport where luggage for Panam was handled.

    An estimate of how many that would be hard to provide.

    Even if we knew for certain that the 'Luqa-airport, Mebo timer bomb' scenario was correct (and we far from do) could we convict Megrahi?

    Of course not, or we could convict any mafia-member who was established to be on a fake ID in a certain area of the city where a murder was - somehow - committed.

    All in all - I'd not be surprised if this was the thinnest conviction in modern history.

    Unless, of course, I have overlooked something important.

    Did I?

    Next post shows what's left of [88], directly quoted, only removing as described.

    Read the original document

    and note, that the trial judges fills this paragraph with their own inferrals, all matching an a-priory theory that Megrahi is guilty.

    They have to, as the facts known are so far from speaking for themselves.

    Unlike what would be the case for so many other trials, where proper evidence is available.


    MEBO blames the decisive investigation report from the German Bundes- Kriminal- Amt (BKA police) responsible for the possibility of a false accusation:
    The "Bomb-Bag" transfered from Air Malta, flight KM-180 to PanAm flight PA-103/A at Frankfurt, was demonstrable untrue and a "political lie".

    The BKA and the FAA department for Europe at Rome have also overloocked, among other decisive things, for example that a FAG employee loaded at Frankfurt to PanAm flight PA-103/B, three (3) piece unknown unaccompanied inter-line *bag's from Kuwait, coming with Lufthansa, flight LH-631.
    *Tray Nr. B-4809, B-6001. B-7418 (mysteriously silent till now).

    To the passenger list C-140 V only 3 passengers check in or through
    each 3 luggage items. From the same flight Lufthansa, LH-631, therefore two times each 3 luggage items on PanAm PA-103/B was loaded!

    1) Passagier Nr. 143, T.Walker, Tray Nr. B-7056; B-9531;
    B-11366; (checking on main Counter).
    From the same flight Lufthansa, LH-631, therefore two times became 3 luggage items on PanAm PA-103/B was loaded !

    2) Passagier Nr. 99, K. Noonan, Tray Nr. B-3546; B-10773; B-10467;
    (check in via Counter V-3, 203, from ex flight LH-1453).

    3) Passagier Nr. 152, J. Waido, Tray Nr. B-3593; B-4120; B-11511, Tray (check in on main Counter)

    There was no suit-case transfer between air Malta KM-180 and PanAm
    103/B at the airport Frankfurt on 21 December 1988. Thus Mr Abdelbaset Al Megrahi could not smuggle in a "Bag" at Luqa airport on flight KM-180 !

    Only an immediate investigation ordered by the Scottish Justice can take the "wind from the sail" to US senators Robert Menendez and Frank Lautenberg...

    by Edwin and Mahnaz Bollier, MEBO Ltd., Switzerland

  10. Here are the points in
    with removals as described in last post.

    "1. He was staying at the Holiday Inn, Sliema, which is close to
    Mary’s House.

    2. We accept the evidence that he was a member of the JSO, occupying posts of fairly high rank. One of these posts was head of airline security.

    3. He also appears to have been involved in military procurement.

    4. He was involved with Mr Bollier, albeit not specifically in connection with MST timers, and had along with
    Badri Hassan formed a company which leased premises from MEBO and intended to
    do business with MEBO.

    5. On 20 December 1988 he entered Malta using his passport in the name of Abdusamad.

    5. First accused and the second accused together paid a brief visit to the house of Mr Vassallo at some time in the evening, and that the first accused made or attempted to make a phone call to the second accused at 7.11am the following

  11. If I could put one question to Mr Magrahi it would be "who invited you to go on a journey that required to spend the night of 20/21 December 1988 on Malta, so you were at the Airport on the morning of 21 December 1988.

    I'd hypothesise that that invitation to travel Mr Magrahi received would have ultimately come from the CIA.

  12. Christian Science? Now there's an oxymoron.
    This is the religion who don't believe in doctors and let their innocent children suffer when they are ill. And Mary Baker Eddy (founder)supported homeopathy (just as well Rolfe's on holiday or that would start her on a rant!).
    Let's not give them any credibility by taking anything they say seriously - even if they do rehash some quotes by Richard Marquise.

  13. The Press & Journal has decided Justice For Megrahi are fighting a "lost cause". Why? Because "whether or not he caused the fatal explosion is not [unresolved]". Right, but why? Because his "guilt is not in question". Yes, but wh - oh, never mind.

  14. Interesting link, Bensix. Article may end up on the blog. :-)

    Readers comments (that somehow seems to double) are so far all in support for Megrahi.

    I like the statement:

    "The Scottish legal system itself has called the safety of his conviction into doubt."

    Concise and correct. It's that simple.

  15. Nae muckle winner! Thi Aiberdeen P&J boys dinnae ken a bee fae a bull’s fit - an anither thing - their fer stickin up fer wee Alex because he's the high heid yin fae doon by. But we aw did’na come up wi the last load o hay, so thi shid haud thir bletherin, forbye thaer bleeterin's makin thaem sells black affrontit. A mannie fae tha paper shid haud the cat and play wit tha kitten. A canna say clairer than 'at.

  16. Charles:

    On naming customs, if you mean Arabs can have nick names, OK. But if you mean they actually have multiple passports with different names, etc., that wouldn't be true. In Libya, people without a connection to "security authorities" can't just go and get a second passport to use at will.

    There is some latitude in forming the official name by taking various cuts of a fuller sequence. Libyan security uses that to its advantage, e.g. under-identifying someone by a sequence of first names only, or using familial instead of a tribal surname and vice versa. But to go from Abdelbassit Ali el-Megrahi to Ahmed khalifa Abusamad is certainly not justified by any Libyan naming conventions.

    Megrahi cannot be an outsider to the security framework. And even his own arguments as I recall are self defeating. Being well known to Libyan airport authorities means Megrahi could not get through them with a totally fake name unless he had higher approval. Otherwise, he would be arrested for using a fake passport. The fact that he used a fake passport multiple times through the Libyan airport, where his real ID is known, says to me he was a security agent. Not necessarily a card-carrying agent of a specific bureaucratic structure, but definitely an agent. Some people here get too picky about this point, as if Libya were a place where power is institutionalized. The most powerful people in Libya have no official relation to the government. And people expect Libyan security agents to wear badges and carry ID cards?

    The translation of "baggage tags" to "أمتعة به" is what one gets from machine translators which often produce gobbledygook. The word "أمتعة" does mean "goods," "wares," or "belongings" and could be used in this context. But the second word is not even close to "tags," it is actually a prepositional clause meaning "in/by/with it/him." The phrase "baggage tags" is better translated as "بطاقات حقائب" and the key word in that is "بطاقات" which corresponds to "tags." The word by itself also means, and is commonly used to mean "cards" or "passes" as in ID cards or credit cards or boarding passes, etc. In the airline context "tag" is less ambiguous than "card," but in Arabic that advantage is lost.

    It is also quite common for Arabs to use foreign words in place of their "formal" Arabic equivalents. This mixing is especially common in international settings or areas based on technology or industries where the English language is a world standard, e.g. airlines.

    Finally, on the matter of doubling letters, I don't want to deny your experience, but there is more to the story. In written Arabic there is no explicit doubling, it is indicated by a diacritical. But the letter which bears that diacritical is in fact said to be "doubled." The single letter is considered as a contracted form of two instances of the same letter, each with its own movement (or short vowel), and this becomes evident in deriving words from their roots, verb conjugation, etc. Doubling is absolutely essential in Arabic, but not always visible or explicit.

    It is fair to ask why would Fhima double the "g"? Is it a random error or is there a systematic bias? I can only conjecture on that, based on accent of pronunciation and other cross-linguistic aspects. The word "tags" ends with two "still" consonants. Some Libyans might pronounce that with a little vowel inserted, so it ends up sounding like "taggiz," and from saying that to writing "taggs" is not a long hop. Also, in Arabic, as you might know, the "root" is the past-tense, third-person, singular (masculine) and for the verb "to tag" that is actually "tagged" with a double "g". I am not surprised at all by the misspelling "taggs."

  17. While I like the Doric, could you put it into more southern tones, especially for US readers. They will find it rather like reading Mr Bollier's more Swiss-Germanic efforts.

    I must tell you about the time at the FAI when the Sherriff asked the court reporter to read back the question (from an Edinburgh attorney), which the man from Pan Am had not understood in a broad SW Scotish accent. Killing.

    Do you understand English Mr X, to the Pan Am rep. So what is your answer?

  18. @Charles
    you wrote:
    "If I could put one question to Mr Megrahi it would be 'who invited you to go on a journey that required to spend the night of 20/21 December 1988 on Malta...' I'd hypothesise ... from the CIA"

    Do I understand you correctly? Are you suggesting that the framing of Megrahi started already before the disaster, and that the disaster was planned by CIA?

    OK, since the "Operation Northwoods"-plan nothing should surprise us, but let's not underestimate CIA. Such a job (involving the direct murder of hundreds of americans), and the needed framing, would have been done properly, so the result was convincing.

    Instead we have an acquitted Fhimah, and a conviction of Megrahi which needed excessive help from the 3 judges to go through.

  19. Yes sfm,

    Have a look at my theory at



  20. Mission Lockerbie:
    Mr. Richard Marquise refuses all examining of new Facts of evidence in the Lockerbie-Affair. This shows that he must keep up at its instructions of the manipulated evidences!

    in german language:
    Da sich Mr. Richard Marquise mit keinen neuen Tatsachen in der Lockerbie-Affäre befassen will zeigt, dass er bei seinen Vorgaben und den manipulierten Beweisen bleiben muss !

    by Edwin Bollier, MeBo Ltd.

  21. attn: sfm

    Their specified Facts under the points 1-6 is not in this case indications of proofs, since this Facts in designed conspiracy- war was abused against Libya

    in german language:
    Ihre aufgeführten Facts unter den Punkten 1-6 sind in diesem Fall keine Indizien Beweise, da diese Facts in einem konstruierten verschwörungs Krieg gegen Libyen missbraucht wurden.

    by Edwin Bollier

  22. sfm: I tend to agree with your assertions. Just looking at the prosecution case alone, and trying to ignore everything else, it looks more likely that the conspiracy threads were retro-fitted to the 'facts', as best as possible - the cover up being developed and refined over time. If it had been a premeditated operation, including the framing of certain individuals, they surely would have concocted a more convincing sequence of events and incontrovertible circumstantial evidence. For one, they would have put the 'smoking gun' firmly in the hand of Megrahi. Fhimah too - would now surely be locked away in HMP Greenock, the subject of an irrefutable conviction with others (not too distant).
    The whole affair is the most least clinical operation in the history of intelligence if it were deliberate.
    More rationally, the whole thing has come apart because it was all fabricated, ex post facto.

  23. I agree with ex post facto framing as opposed to pre facto (?), but early in the timeframe. I doubt they waited until the Gulf War, and the first big clue which (would eventually) uncannily suggests Megrahi (the Frankfurt printout) was in place by August 1989 at the latest.

    Suliman: I enjoyed your fascinating post above regarding language clues. In fact, with your permission, I might cite it in a post or two someday.

    I agree two Gs in "taggs" makes phonetic sense, and I'll take your word on the Arabic translations, and on naming conventions. I for one wouldn't contest that Megrahi was under a conscious alias, doing something secret for Libya, on Malta, the day of the bombing. Further, I feel that's why he was selected for framing and had the above-mentioned printout made up to point his way.

    Two questions I'd like your thoughts on,
    1) How much does the alias really say about Megrahi's role in the bombing, in your understanding? If you think it out, it all comes down to the suggestion of an unaccompanied bag from KM180, doesn't it? And that's suggested only by the printout and nothing else.

    2) Why did Fhimah chose to write out "taggs" in English in the first place? My theory is the Maltese printer he was taking these to, as a template for MedTours (?) tags, spoke English, and he'd picked up that word along the way in talking with him.

    It is not,in my opinion, very consistent with a Libyan terrorist secretly plotting to blow up a "British plane" (per Giaka) to write out a major clue in his non-destroyed diary, in English.

  24. Tagga appwaes in Fhimah's diary.

    I believe the word ws written there by the CIA as a mens of directing the Scottish police who found it in his office when they broke in to see it as a clue. If it had been in Arabic, and I'll try translatting baggage and tags again using Google, it would have been overlooked by the police as they would have said "Arab document" lots of these about, won't both to look at it, Taggs indicated to the Scots that this was an important document.

    أمتعة is the Arabic for baggage and not goods in my translater. (Get a better one Google is pretty good nowadays)

    Baggage and goods are quite similar as ideas, and Arabic does not have such a big vocabulary as English, which has half a dozen sysnonyms for baggage.

    به is tags.

    Taggs is a gross error by the CIA, I have explained before that Arabs find doubled letters very difficult and will happily spell committee as comite.

    I can guess who made the error, It was either X or Y.

    I do not accept the argument that because Mr Magrahi had a passport in an assumed name he was a member of the security services. It's a false conclusion. As a US sanctions breaker Mr Marahi was probably on some kind of US originated watch list and took the precaution of using an assumed name when he went out of the country, But that he did in no way automatically makes him a member of Libyan security services, and the Magrahi tribal affiliation makes it unlikely he was.

    Tribally it would be the Senussi and Gadaffi clans that would make up its memebers as they are the families in power,

    If you don;t understand that read Gadaffi's Green Book in which he classifies a oerson as belonging to a family, a tribe, and then the nation. Just beacuse Americans don't hav tribes, doesn't mean that it's the only way to organise a society, There are a large number of parochial American povs in some of these comments.

    Please read
    and you wouldn't come to these naive and silly conclusions.

    I have only been doing Lockerbie for nearly 20 years, over 6 times as long as Mr Marquise, so you can be assured I have thought through virtually all of the issues between a dozen and a hundred and more times.

  25. People who argue that the Fhimah diary oints to a plot against a British aircraft have rather in a rather indelicate English English phrase got their knickers in a twist,

    What would be the motive for blowing up a British plane?

    Motive mechanism and men are what is required in a good detective story. And everything has to fit, not one part.

    There may be a gap (and there has to be a good reason for it). I have gaps in my theory simply because it is not in the CIA's interest to tell us exactly what they really did. They are marketing a Libyan solution, by we are peering through the hype.

    You cannot believe anything you are told by a CIA man, whidh is why CIA-booster Seymour Hersh will never unstand Lokerbie, nor Clifford Adams in his book on MI5

  26. The sentence that caught my eye in the Christian science Monitor article was "though, as Marquise and others point out, there's no evidence to support any of a myriad of alternative theories about his guilt".

    Marquise was apparently quite happy to go along with the dubious logic by which Heathrow was wrongly "eliminated". It is the claim that the primary suitcase arrived of flight PA103A from Frankfurt that is unsupported by evidence.


    My article Lockerbie - Criminal Justice or War By Other Means?
    at also suggests the plan to frame Megrahi may have predated the bombing and that the US (and British) Governments had motive to collude in the bombing.

  27. Mr Marquise should realise that if he is a real detective with pipe of shag and deerstalker, the failure to demonstrate that other theories do not work does not prove Mr Magrahi's guilt and therefore he is guilty is not a logical process, and as a detective logic must be supreme. I do not yet know the extent of Mr marquise's guilt in Lockerbie but his Behbehani story taken in conjunction with the CBS/Hakakian/Baer/Stahl story can be analysed to show that Mr Marquise interviewed the wrong Mr Behbahani, someone who said his name was Behbahani, but in Mr Marquise's words was too young to have headed up the Iranian "terror" apparatus.

    But Mr Marquise in his damning autobiography of the case says there might have been another man called Behbahani, who was in charge.

    So Mr Marquise had his doubts, so how can he continue to alleged the case against Mr Magrahi is "cast-iron", that dreadful phrase so beloved of prosecuting lawyers.

    It's good to see Baz blogging again, but I hope he opens his mind this time to more imaginative and different theories.

    Have a look at

  28. Bensix mentioned the Press and Journal editorial headed "Lockerbie bomber's guilt not in question". Readers' letters challenging that view can be read at

  29. I meant to say

    Apologies to any of you who did not find it, as I misremembered on as of.

  30. Mr Marquise repeats - here preceded by the reporter's words "the key piece of evidence" - his assertion that all MST-13 timers went to Libya.

    The judges said at least two went to the Stasi.


    "This board was traced to timers, only 20 of which were ever made. All had been given to Libyan officials." [1]

    "...he had only made 20, had no more circuit boards which matched the first 20 and he had already given all these to Libyan officials. I believe in a free press but it should be responsible for ascertaining the facts are correct." [2]

    "There were maybe as many as 25 of these timers ever made -- 20 really with a couple of circuit boards left over...All 20 were hand-delivered to Libyan intelligence." [3]

    Trial judges:

    "What we do however accept is that ... the two prototypes were delivered by Mr Bollier to the Stasi..."

    "we cannot...exclude absolutely the possibility that more than two MST-13 timers were supplied by MEBO to the Stasi...we cannot exclude the possibility that other MST-13 timers may have been made by MEBO and supplied to other parties....we are unable to exclude the possibility that any MST-13 timers in the hands of the Stasi left their possession" [4]





  31. Fuller extracts:

    "[48] ...[Mr Bollier] accepted in evidence that he had said in a police interview conducted on 26 January 1994 that he had found in his desk drawer in Zurich in late 1993 an invoice dated 18 September 1985 indicating that seven MST-13 timers had been delivered to the Stasi in 1985. Recognising that this was a principal invoice and not, as one might expect, a copy, Mr Bollier sought to account for its presence in the drawer by saying that it had been put there by “the Secret Service”. In any event, he said it was typical of the type of false document which he carried with him on his business journeys in order to get through Customs. This was the first time that Mr Bollier mentioned that a delivery of an additional five timers had been made to the Stasi. We do not accept that the invoice which Mr Bollier said he had found was genuine. Indeed, not even Mr Bollier appeared to have acknowledged it to be genuine.

    [49] ....What we do however accept is that later in the summer of 1985 the two prototypes were delivered by Mr Bollier to the Stasi in East Berlin, whatever be the colour of their circuit boards. This is consistent with the evidence of Mr Wenzel who at the material time was a major in the Stasi and with whom Mr Bollier then dealt. Despite this evidence we cannot,however, exclude absolutely the possibility that more than two MST-13 timers were supplied by MEBO to the Stasi, although there is no positive evidence that they were,nor any reasons why they should have been. Similarly, we cannot exclude the possibility that other MST-13 timers may have been made by MEBO and supplied to other parties, but there is no positive evidence that they were. Equally, despite the evidence of Mr Wenzel that after the fall of the Berlin wall he had destroyed all timers supplied to the Stasi, we are unable to exclude the possibility that any MST-13 timers in the hands of the Stasi left their possession, although there is no positive evidence that they did and in particular that they were supplied to the PFLP-GC."

  32. Mr Marquise has also written, in the context of the strength of the case against Mr Megrahi, about other evidence which the judges did not accept. A Malta Today article by him is of that nature.

    Below is an initial summary of some points from that article with comments and other relevant information.

    Marquise: "Many, including some in Malta, doubt the strength of the evidence against Mr Megrahi and Libya. I hope to set that record straight..."

    Marquise: "a senior Libyan official asked a Libyan Arab Airline (LAA) employee about the feasibility of getting a “bag” onto an American or British flight leaving Malta."

    Judges: "we are quite unable to accept this story". [paragraph 43]

    "[43] ...A third matter on which the Crown founded was an account given by Abdul Majid of a conversation which the latter asked if it would be possible to put an unaccompanied bag on board a British aircraft...Once again, we are quite unable to accept this story when the information was supplied so belatedly....we are unable to accept Abdul Majid as a credible and reliable witness on any matter except his description of the organisation of the JSO and the personnel involved there."

    Marquise: "Evidence was elicited that the Station manager of LAA in Malta kept explosives in his desk..."

    Judges: "we are unable to place any reliance on this account"

    "...the details of this story only emerged some two and a half years after the initial
    account, and contained a number of inconsistencies with the first account....the details only emerged at a stage when it had been made clear to [Abdul Majid aka Giaka] that unless he came up with some useful information, he was liable simply to be returned to Malta. Even taken at its best, the whole story sounds improbable, and in view of the late introduction of very material detail we are unable to place any reliance on this account..."

    Marquise: "Frankfurt Airport records showed that a lone bag had been transferred from Air Malta Flight 180 to Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21..."

    MB: Did they show that in the sense of proving it definitively? Or is it more true to say that a document was presented which appeared to show a bag from the relevant coding station at a relevant time?

    Marquise: "This board was traced to timers, only 20 of which were ever made. All had been given to Libyan officials."

    Judges: "the two prototypes were delivered by Mr Bollier to the Stasi..."[continued as above].

    Marquise: "Megrahi, using false identification, came to Malta on December 20, 1988 with the former LAA Station manager who had made notation in his calendar to “get ‘taggs’ from Air Malta for Abdelbaset Abdul Salam."

    MB: The reference to tags in Mr Fhimah's diary was not part of the evidence used by the judges, as they made clear.

    Marquise: "He was described as carrying a “brown suitcase” similar to that which blew up Pan Am Flight 103..."

    Judges: "We are ... quite unable to accept the veracity of this belated account"

  33. Fuller extract:

    "Another matter upon which the Crown founded was that in July 1991 Abdul Majid told investigators that he had seen the first accused and the second accused arriving at Luqa off the Tripoli flight some time between October and December 1988. This comparatively innocuous statement gradually enlarged until by the time he gave evidence he said that he saw them at the luggage carousel, that the second accused collected a brown Samsonite type suitcase...We are therefore quite unable to accept the veracity of this belated account by Abdul Majid."

    Marquise: "Megrahi was found guilty by three Scottish judges who had the opportunity to ascertain the credibility of each witness..."

    MB: That is not true. They did not have an opportunity to ascertain that.

    They had an opportunity to assess it, which means come to an opinion. The word "ascertain", as its parts imply, means to discover for certain That is not the kind of thing that a court can possibly do when it considers credibility. Perhaps that is why they are called judges.

    Marquise: "No evidence of any other country or individual was ever found."

    MB: So why was Mr Fhimah described by the FBI as an armed and dangerous fugitive, one of the top ten most wanted?

    More seriously, why say this? The judges talked about motive and intention, not no evidence at all.

  34. Notes on statements and questions by Richard Marquise in email discussion between Mr Marquise and Ludwig de Braeckeleer, published 27 February 2008

    Marquise: "Lockerbie is indeed a mixed bag. What things initially looked like were determined not to be. We truly believed the PFLP-GC did it based on the intelligence as well as our own guesstimates.

    However, the evidence proved otherwise.

    How does Megrahi explain his presence in Malta on 12/20-21 -- after he denied it initially? He was there less than 24 hours."

    MB: How does that contribute in a strong way to proving

    a) guilt,

    b) that there was no miscarriage of justice or

    c) innocence of the PFLP-GC?

    Marquise: "Why did Fhimah have a notation in his calendar about getting Air Malta tags when he no longer worked at the airline?"

    MB: That evidence was ignored by judges as against the rules.

    In any case, maybe it was connected with his other entries about the printers, and his business. Again, how does this contribute to proof of a) to c)?

    Marquise: "What about Megrahi's connections to Bollier and Bollier's trip to the US Embassy in Vienna in early 1989 trying to pin the attack on Libya when the world was looking at the GC?"

    MB: The evidence on the trip was rejected by the judges.

    How does that rejected evidence form part of a proof that the PFLP-GC were not responsible, or a) or b)?

    Marquise: "There is more evidence to implicate Megrahi and Libya than anyone else. "

    MB: Not relevant to standard of proof in criminal court.

    How does that evidence fit into the overall proof that the PFLP-GC were innocent?

    "There was not one shred of evidence against anyone else. Not one!"

    MB: Is that true?

    How does that bear on the standard of proof in a criminal court?

    How does it fit into the proof that the PFLP-GC were not responsible?

    "I believe there is enough to keep the conspiracy theorists going for many years absent a confession."

    MB: Why?

    "It has been 20 years -- nearly -- why has no other credible (and provable) theory surfaced after all this time?"

    MB: Possibly in part because, if the defence were telling the truth to the judges, US agents would not answer questions about other possible perpetrators.


    An Investigation of the Belated Production of Documents
    in the Oklahoma City Bombing Case

    March 19, 2002
    Office of the Inspector General

    ...On May 8, 2001, one week before McVeigh's scheduled execution date, the Department of Justice and the FBI revealed to McVeigh's and Nichols' attorneys that over 700 investigative documents had not been disclosed to the defendants before their trials. The government acknowledged that it had violated a discovery order in the case, and the Attorney General stayed McVeigh's execution for one month in order to resolve the legal issues arising from the belated disclosure.

    Following the public revelation of the problem, and after finding and releasing more than 300 additional OKBOMB documents to the defense, the FBI came under severe criticism for its handling of the OKBOMB documents. Allegations were made that FBI personnel intentionally failed to disclose exculpatory information to the defense.

    ...In general, our investigation sought to answer the following questions:

    Why were discoverable items not produced before the McVeigh and Nichols trials?

    Did government employees intentionally conceal exculpatory information from the OKBOMB defendants?

    Did the FBI act appropriately and timely upon learning that items sent by FBI field offices to Oklahoma City in 2001 might not have been disclosed properly to the defense before the McVeigh and Nichols trials?

    ...Shortly after the documents problem became public, FBI Headquarters asserted that the primary reason the defendants did not receive materials to which they were entitled was because the FBI field offices had failed to send the material to the OKBOMB Task Force. We found in many instances that personnel in the field offices did fail to send OKBOMB material to the Task Force. We also found that in some instances these errors could have been caught and remedied if the field offices had conducted appropriate searches for OKBOMB material in their files as requested by the Task Force. Significantly, however, we also found that the Task Force lost or mishandled some of the material sent by the field offices. Therefore, both the field offices and the OKBOMB Task Force share responsibility for the incomplete document production.

  36. (continued)

    ...In every federal criminal trial, the defendants are entitled to have access to some, but not all, of the prosecution's files. After the OKBOMB defendants were indicted, the government decided to go beyond the discovery rules routinely used in federal criminal trials and agreed to provide the defense with all the FD-302s and inserts. The agreement was not formalized in writing, but we found no dispute about this obligation.

    As the OKBOMB investigation progressed in 1995 and 1996, the Task Force realized that it was not receiving all of the documents generated in the field offices. On many occasions, the Task Force sent sternly worded instructions to the field offices that all OKBOMB-related materials were to be sent to the Task Force and directed the field offices to search their offices for OKBOMB materials. At the same time, however, some field offices complained to the Task Force that they were receiving multiple requests from the Task Force for documents that the field offices had sent previously.

    ...A closer question was the inaction of Oklahoma City Special Agent in Charge Richard Marquise. In March and April 2001, Teater sent Marquise e-mails describing the activities of his squad. The e-mails reference the OKBOMB review project, although not in a particularly detailed or descriptive fashion. We concluded that under the unusual circumstances of this case, Marquise should have questioned Teater further regarding the review project and the meaning of his e-mails.

  37. (continued)

    ...These problems are not new. The FBI has known about many of them for some time, either because the OIG has discussed them in other reports or because the FBI has found them through their own reviews. But the FBI has not done enough to address these problems.

    As the tragic attacks of September 11 revealed, the FBI continues to be faced with cases of the scale and dimensions of OKBOMB, and the lessons learned from OKBOMB continue to be important. To adequately fulfill its responsibilities in major cases, as well as in smaller ones, the FBI must significantly improve its document handling and information technology. This requires a sustained commitment of resources and effort, but we believe the FBI must make this commitment if it is to avoid the serious problems that occurred in the OKBOMB case....

    Richard Marquise

    Marquise became SAC of the Oklahoma City Division in 1999. He told us that he was not aware of any of the issues regarding the documents until May 7, 2001. Yet, Marquise received e-mails from Teater indicating that there was a problem with the OKBOMB documents. Marquise told the OIG that although he read Teater's e-mails, he did not appreciate the problem that Teater was describing. He said he may have assumed that Teater was describing some issue that concerned the FBI's project for providing documents to the Oklahoma City District Attorney who was considering whether to prosecute Nichols on state charges. In his written response to the OIG following his review of the draft report, Marquise asserted that no one could have determined that Oklahoma City personnel were dealing with a serious discovery problem based on Teater's e-mails. Marquise also asserted that the Oklahoma City ASAC should have dealt with Teater and that a failure in communication between Teater and the ASAC led to the problem.

    We acknowledge that the import of Teater's e-mails may be somewhat different in light of subsequent events than they could have been interpreted at the time. Consequently, we had difficulty determining whether or how much criticism should be directed at Marquise. Nonetheless, because of the unusual circumstances of this case - an extremely high-profile matter with a defendant who was to be executed shortly - Teater's e-mails seem to provide enough information that should have caused a manager of Marquise's experience to at least question Teater, or to have the ASAC question Teater, about what was going on and to ensure, at a senior level, that someone was in full control of the problem and working to resolve it expeditiously. Marquise did not do this.

  38. (OIG report also says:)

    In a March 23, 2001, e-mail, Teater informed Marquise:

    ...there are numerous items of concern which are being checked thru the various data bases.

    ...Marquise told the OIG, however, that he did not learn about the problem with the OKBOMB documents until May 7, 2001. When showed the March e-mails from Teater, Marquise acknowledged that he probably read them. He stated that he obviously did not appreciate the significance of what Teater was discussing, and he therefore took no action in response. He said that it was possible that he thought that Teater was referring to the only OKBOMB project of which he was aware, getting OKBOMB material to the Oklahoma City District Attorney.71 In his written response following a review of the draft report, Marquise also stated that the e-mails should be put into context, specifically that the portions referenced were part of lengthy e-mails sent by Teater describing his squad's activities. Marquise noted that the e-mails did not make any reference to discovery or that information was being received in Oklahoma City that had not been disclosed to the defense.

    OIG Analysis

    We considered whether FBI personnel acted appropriately upon learning that discoverable items may not have been disclosed properly to the defense. We concluded that Defenbaugh and White failed to properly manage the problem. They failed to notify timely the OKBOMB prosecutors or even the FBI's General Counsel to receive legal advice on managing the issue. They also failed to set deadlines for accomplishing tasks and, as a result, the issue exploded just prior to McVeigh's execution. At that point, there was no time for adequate analysis of the issue. We also believe that Oklahoma City supervisors Teater and Marquise should have intervened more aggressively in the situation.

    We believe the failure of senior FBI managers to take timely action to resolve or report the problem of the belated documents was a significant neglect of their duties. They waited until the week before McVeigh's execution to notify anyone in FBI Headquarters or the Department of Justice about the problem.
    Although the managers did not commit intentional misconduct, we believe the FBI should consider disciplinary action for Defenbaugh and White, and to a lesser extent Teater, for their failure to handle this issue more timely and notify the prosecutors and FBI Headquarters about it sooner. The FBI should also evaluate whether Marquise's conduct warrants administrative action. By contrast, we recommend that Vernon and Richmond be commended for their efforts to report and resolve the issues related to the belated documents.

  39. I had never looked at Mr Marquise's subsequent career in Oklahoma as carefully as MB has done.

    It leads me to yet further doubts about his naivety over Lockerbie.

    I don't think he is naive at all. He is a professional who has spent his whole career upholding implausible claims, impossible accusations and incoherent cases, for political reasons.

    No wonder he chose not to appear before the Zeist court. He would have been torn to shreds by the defence.

    Thank you MB for alerting me to this evidence of this thoroughly unprincipled and wicked man.

    Attn. Matt Berkley:

    Eine sehr interessante Ansicht, aber ich muss Sie enttäuschen, das MST-13 Timer-Fragment (PT/35) stammte nicht von einem nach Libyen oder an die STASI gelieferten MST-13 Timer ab !


    1) Das original MST-13 Timerfragment (PT/35) stammte nicht von einem nach Libyen gelieferten MST-13 Timer ab, weil technische Merkmale zweifelsfrei zeigen, dass das originale Circuit Board (PT/35) von einem braunen Prototype MST-13 Circuit Board "concoct" wurde.
    (RARDE photo 334, Mr. Feraday, what does that show us? A- That's a photograph of fragment PT/35 as recovered in the laboratory. Q- Is that prior to the removal of any samples? A- That is correct).

    2) Das originale MST-13 Timerfragment (PT/35) würde zu den 2 Stück MST-13 Timer, 1985 an die "STASI" gelieferten Prototypen passen.
    Technische Merkmale zeigen aber eindeutig, dass auf dem originalen (PT/35) Fragment, niemals ein Relay angelötet gewesen war !
    Dieses (PT/35) Fragment muss von dem gestohlenen Prototype MST-13 Circuit Board abstammen, welches von offiziellen Personen concoct (manipulated) wurde. (see Eng. Lumpert's Affidavit, from 18th July, 2007).
    Das wird auch die Begründung sein, dass Dr. Hayes (RARDE) das Fragment (PT/35) nicht nach Explosions Powder untersucht hatte !
    Teorien over (PT/35) the fragment are redundant…

    by Edwin Bollier, MEBO Ltd., Switzerland. URL:

  41. I wIsh I understood Swiss German


    Which role played Ex-FBI Special AgenRichard Marquise in the
    Ex-FBI "Special" Agent and head of the Task Force in the "Lockerbie-Case", Richard A. Marquise, exposed himself with his own justifications! He is still defending and protecting FBI forensic expert Tomas Thurman, who was meanwhile convicted in the United States for having tampered with forensic evidence. Was he possibly the crucial perpetrator behind the conspiracy against Libya in the Lockerbie-Affair?
    The content in Marquise's doc.-book "Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation" leads to this conclusion!

    The fragment of a MST-13 timer fragment originated from a first handfabricated prototype not delivered to Libya. Top of form 1, bottom of form 2 for example, he confirms that the PT-35 = (MST-13) timer fragment descends from the first handfabricated prototype serie of 1985! ('Scotbom', Chapter 11)

    Original excerpt, under Chapter 11:
    After Lumpert's statement, Lumpert (ex-Engeneer at MEBO Ltd) was the first witness and after examining a photograph the PT-35, (MST-13 Fragment) testified the chip had come from a circuit board for a timer he designed and built in 1985 at the request of Bollier. ----------- He had learned one week prior to the hearing that this timer might have been used in a bomb.

    He believed the chip had come from one of the first timers made. He detailed how he had designed this circuit board, nothing the slight imperfections on PT-35. Once the master board was made, the imperfections showed up on the other circuit boards from that master.
    Important: Engineer Lumpert built only for 3 circuit boards (prototypes) the other 20 piece MST-13 timers circuit boards (for Libya)was mechanical manufactured by company Thüring.

    Why has ex-FBI Special Agent Marquise suppressed this most important proof in favour of Libya at the court in Kamp van Zeist?. Hello to the memory: The MST-13 timers supplied to Libya were not prototypes of the first serie!

    by Edwin Bollier, MEBO Ltd.,Switzerlan. URL:

  43. I thought Lumpert signed an affidavit saying he was a liar at the trial, if we can believe this? This reduces his credibility I would think. However, he can take comfort from the fact that he is not the only liar in this whole sorry saga. I am searching through my notes of the main characters to name one person involved who may not be a liar or have bent the truth or ignored the truth or demanded the truth...police, intelligence agents, forensic experts, airline personnel, ground staff, the accused, and nearly accused, Crown officials, politicians, witnesses, Lord Wiggy Opinions of Whereva ...
    Nope. Couldn't find one. The whole range is there; from 'pathological liar' through 'lying to save their skin' through to 'lied by omission' and 'going along with or not questioning a lie'. I think this is why the conspiracy is of epic proportions - and so painful or frustrating for the relatives of the victims.

  44. Charles:

    I am not questioning your beliefs about the CIA role or my making parochial American comments and arriving at silly and naive conclusions. I think the core of your argument above is that there is a single non-Arabic word in the diary, which could have been just as well written in Arabic. Whether the corresponding Arabic text is "أمتعة به" or "بطاقات أمتعة" or "بطاقات حقائب" is tangential--at least at face value. However, your elaboration(s) happened to be completely counterproductive. And you did that again now by mixing up tribal affiliations.

    You said that Megrahi's tribal affiliation makes it unlikely that he was a Libyan security agent. That alone places your expertise in serious doubt. And you removed all doubt by adding that Libyan security would be tribally made up of the Gaddafis and the Senoussis. You are likely misinformed by the name Abdallah Senoussi, the notorious security boss who "happened to be" driving away Megrahi upon his in/famous arrival in Tripoli last year. But Abdallah Senoussi's tribal affiliation is none other than al-Megarha tribe! He and Abdelbassit are tribal cousins. As I said, that only confirms the grossness of the error in distancing members of the Megarha tribe from Libyan security.

    Special thanks for referring me to Gaddafi's book to be educated on Libyan social structures. And your elaboration: "Just beacuse Americans don't hav tribes,..." I am a "naturalized" American citizen (i.e., American by lawful choice, not by reproductive happenstance.) I was born, raised and educated in Libya through high school before I came to America. My first language is Arabic. My grandfather was the administrative Imam (executive not religious) of a Libyan tribal coalition for 40 years. In my final high school year, the Gaddafi dictatorship inserted his green pamphlet into the required curriculum. And we were tested on it in the final national diploma exams.

    continued below...

  45. To Charles--continued

    I don't need to read Gaddafi's garbage to understand Libyan social structures, believe me, nor do I need a machine translator to know "tags" does not correspond, not even remotely, to the Arabic "به". Your and Google's translators are both dead wrong in saying the prepositional clause "به" means the same thing as the noun "tags." You don't have to take my word for it, anyone with elementary knowledge of Arabic can tell you that. And as I had agreed, "أمتعة" does mean, among other things, baggage. And yes, it does mean "goods" as in commercial goods and wares. It is the plural of "متاع", and the so-called plural of the plural is "أماتيع", the latter case is of course absent in the often-alleged wider expanses of English relative to other languages. Six synonyms you say? OK, "حقائب" "أغراض" "عفش" "حمل" "شنط" "حاجيات".

    [Having been exposed to conflicting claims of linguistic supremacy, I can honestly say now the notion is as entertaining a human concoction as language itself!]

    I can understand why you think being a "sanctions breaker" in Libya is separable from agency to the state security. And you might also think being in charge of security for the Libyan state airliner is a different matter from being in state security. And you might also think sanctions breakers in Libya are private citizens that operate completely independently of state security. Yeah, you have already told me that people from the Megarha tribe have a below-average probability of working in Libyan state security. Sure, and a Hitler Youth can't become Pope.

    to blogiston,

    You can believe! Lumpert was convicted later and he made himself punishable because of wrong testimonies at the court in Kamp van Zeist ! MEBO did not know initially that Lumpert produced 3 pieces prototype circuit boards ! (only 2 pieces for the Timer delivered to STASI)
    After insight into its statement at the police Lumpert could be convicted. From these facts the affidavit was developed. Also the police officer admitted the receive of
    1 piece MST-13 (emty) circuit board, he have fetched from MEBO Ltd. on 22nd June 1989.

    by Edwin Bollier, MEBO Ltd, Switzerland

  47. On a related note, former intelligence agents have likelwise shown solidarity behind the original case PLUS suspect in their spook instincts suggesting shady deals over the Libyan's release.

    “There have been few clear-cut issues where so many of us agree as we do on this one,” Poteat said by e-mail. “The decision triggering al-Megrahi’s release was a shock, and had a strong whiff of manipulation and back-room deals.”

  48. What about the really vicious backroom deal in Switzerland in the late summer and Autumn of 1988 when Richard Lawless met five Iranians four times at the small village of Glion, near Montreux.

    Mr Baer had arguably transferred from the Lebanon to Paris in the August (read See No Evil, very, very carefully, noting the copy-editing blunder) and realise that the Americans were only inter alia negotiating hostage releases with the Iranians, the official US explanation for the talks, who were far more interested in sorting out revenge for the downing of IR-655.

    The US government when it wishes to be is very, very wicked and quite cynical.

    That is why Pan-Am 103 was downed.

    Realpolitik does not become more real than this.

    I have checked recent Royal Naval history and I cannot find a crime so gross and otiose as the downing of IR-655

  49. Charles: Interesting ...

    Matt Berkley: Thanks much for the information on the OKC investigation follow-up. It's an aspect I've been meaning to look into someday, on hearing of Thurman's discreditation after it and knowing his role in PA 103 re: the Libyan timer. I've got this bookmarked.

    And on the rest, I'll review it later, but it looks good.

    Blogiston On fully honest witnesses:
    Nope. Couldn't find one. The whole range is there; from 'pathological liar' through 'lying to save their skin' through to 'lied by omission' and 'going along with or not questioning a lie'. I think this is why the conspiracy is of epic proportions - and so painful or frustrating for the relatives of the victims.
    I can't vouch for the zero finding, but well-put, Bloggy. I appreciate your input around here.

    On Mr. Lumpert's "admission" of "lying" to the court is to be believed, a number of weird things must be true.

    Suliman: When you're done with Charles, any chance of addressing my questions?
    1) How much does the alias really say about Megrahi's role in the bombing, in your understanding? If you think it out, it all comes down to the suggestion of an unaccompanied bag from KM180, doesn't it? And that's suggested only by the printout and nothing else.

    2) Why did Fhimah chose to write out "taggs" in English in the first place? My theory is the Maltese printer he was taking these to, as a template for MedTours (?) tags, spoke English, and he'd picked up that word along the way in talking with him.

    It is not,in my opinion, very consistent with a Libyan terrorist secretly plotting to blow up a "British plane" (per Giaka) to write out a major clue in his non-destroyed diary, in English.