Saturday 21 March 2009

Crown's account of 12th procedural hearing

[The Crown Office (headquarters of the Scottish prosecution system) provides relatives of those killed aboard Pan Am 103 with accounts of proceedings in court in connection with the current Lockerbie appeal. I am grateful to one of these relatives (who, for the avoidance of doubt, is not Dr Jim Swire or, indeed, any of the UK relatives) for supplying me with the appended notes distributed by the Crown Office following the twelfth procedural hearing this past week.]

Petition for recovery of documents

On the 17th of March 2009 the Court granted an order of recovery in relation to a number of calls where they sufficiently related to the grounds of appeal and where the Court was persuaded that recovery will serve a proper purpose.

Call 1 in the appellant's petition sought material from 20 December 1988 to date showing ortending to show: (i) contact between police officers and other investigators (whether British, Maltese, German or American) and the witness Tony Gauci; and (ii) contact between prosecutor and those acting on their behalf and the witness Tony Gauci.

The Court refused to order recovery in relation to Call 1 on the basis that it was too wide and that it was not sufficiently related to any ground of appeal or any identifiable ground of appeal. The same remarks were made in relation to the refusal to grant any order for calls 1B (1.4) and 9. Call 1B (1.4) sought material relating to any US personnel contact with Tony Gauci. Call 9 sought material showing or tending to show information relating to the identity of the appellant was disclosed by the prosecuting authorities to journalists and other members of the press.

Where the Court did grant orders for recovery these were in relation to calls which were lessgeneral and more specific.

This specification was amended during the course of the hearing in February by the appellant's legal team. Some of you may have noticed reference to Call 1A and call 1B in the Opinion issued by the Court. These calls were added by the appellant during the proceedings.

In order to provide you with as much information as possible we thought it would be useful toprovide you with further detail in relation to the calls where recovery was granted by the Court.

•Call 1B (with the exception of 1.4) This call sought material relating to 21 specific areas which were listed in the appellant'spetition. For example material relating to the showing of photographs to Tony Gauci on specific dates and information on the preparation of photospreads shown on specific dates. In our note of the 23rd of February we provided a list of these calls which run from 1.1 to 1.21. These were granted with the exception of 1.4 as explained above.

•Call 1A This call sought all documents including photographs and videos showing or tending toshow the image of Abo Talb shown to Gauci on 2 October.

•Call 2 This call sought material showing or intending to show the enquiry in relation to the "potential" witness David Wright.

•Call 3 This call sought material from 5 September 1990 showing or tending to show policeactions and enquiries relating to the Feast of the Immaculate Conception (8 th December1988).

•Call 4 This call sought material showing or tending to show the conduct of the identification parade which took place on 13 April 1999 attended by the witness Tony Gauci.

Just because an order has been granted does not mean that the Crown holds any moreinformation than has already been provided to the defence. However it does require the Crown to check the material in its possession or the possession of the police forces subject to its directionto ensure that all material relating to the above calls is provided. If there is further material then this will be provided to the appellant's legal team unless there is a plea of public interest immunity by either the Crown or the UK Government.

Any material held by the Crown, which has not previously been provided to the defence and is covered by the calls granted by the Court, will require to be provided to the defence by Tuesday 9th June 2009.


Procedural Hearing 17th – 18th March 2009

People
The hearing called before three Judges - Lord Justice General, Lord Kingarth and Lord Eassie.

Counsel for the Crown are Ronald Clancy QC, Nick Gardiner and Douglas Ross

Counsel for the appellant are Maggie Scott QC, Jamie Gilchrist QC, Shelagh McCall and Martin Richardson.

Alan Summers QC appeared on behalf of the Advocate General for Scotland.

Hearing Grounds 1 and 2

The appeal hearing on Grounds 1 and 2 (Insufficient Evidence and Unreasonable Verdict) of theGrounds of Appeal is due to begin on Tuesday the 28th April 2009. The Court was addressed byMaggie Scott QC in relation to a lengthy written submission prepared by the appellant and lodged in the afternoon of the 17th March 2009. She wished to reassure the Court that the “bulk” of papers were made up of productions and authorities. She advised that the document was 298 pages long but that there were no new issues raised within the paper other than Ground 1 had subsumed into Ground 2. She did accept that there was considerably more information thancontained within the grounds of appeal.

Ronnie Clancy QC addressed the Court in relation to his concerns on the note lodged. The Crown had two weeks as of Tuesday 17th March 2009 to lodge a response to the appellant’s note and only received the 298 page document on the 17th March 2009. The Crown had only a limited opportunity to survey the note prior to the hearing but already observed that the note contained factual and legal arguments which were not contained in the original grounds of appeal. Ronnie Clancy QC indicated to the Court that of the list of 82 authorities, lodged with the note, 45 ofthose do not feature in any previous lists of authorities. There is a list of 99 productions which includes transcripts of evidence of 47 trial witnesses. Of these witnesses only 8 are mentioned in Grounds of Appeal 1 and 2. Thus there are 39 transcripts that the Crown could not reasonably have anticipated would feature in the note of argument. Moreover it is only when the note gets topage 100 that it starts to bear any resemblance to the grounds of appeal. There are detailed submissions within the note that are not mentioned in the grounds of appeal. The structure of the note does not follow the structure of the grounds of appeal which in practical terms will require the Crown to restructure their own already prepared argument to address the arguments now advanced.

Ronnie Clancy QC advised the Court that the effect of the note was such that the Crown will require to reserve its position on whether the note contains material that is outwith the scope of the grounds. In practical terms the Crown were not suggesting a requirement for an application to discharge the hearing fixed for April but the Crown would require further time to address the detailed ‘fresh’ arguments in the note. He advised the Court that it would be physically impossible to absorb all the new material in the 300 page note and prepare a response in such a short timescale.

The Court stated it was satisfied the Crown should have further time to provide a response, “in sofar as is practically possible”, to tailor its argument to the note lodged by the appellant. The Court allowed the Crown a further 2 weeks to lodge a response. This now gives the Crown until Tuesday 14th April 2009.

Hearing Grounds 3.1 – 3.1

Maggie Scott QC requested that the Crown provide further specification to the answers lodged to Grounds 3.1 to 3.3. She advised that before the appellant could consider whether the Grounds of Appeal required any adjustment further specification was required from the Crown. In addition the appellant could not decide whether any evidence should be led at the appeal before the requested specification was provided.

Ronnie Clancy QC advised the Court that the answers provided by the Crown were full and comprehensive. The Crown does not accept the principle that the appellant requires further specification because these grounds are accepted as being final grounds of appeal. He also did not accept that the Crown required to provide any further information to allow the appellant to decide whether they should lead any evidence. That was entirely a matter for them to decide. However the Crown, for its own purposes, wishes time to adjust the answers to 3.1 to 3.3. Although the Crown does not intend to provide answers to all the specific queries raised by the appellant we will address a number of them. The Crown wishes time to adjust these answers inlight of the reports recently lodged with the Court from the appellant’s trial lawyers and Counsel.

The Court allowed the Crown until Tuesday 9th June 2009 to adjust their answers to Grounds of Appeal 3.1 - 3.3. The Court stated that any adjustments to the Grounds of Appeal sought by the appellant will require leave of the Court and that any proposed adjustments should be intimated by Tuesday 23 June 2009.

The Court intimated that there will be a further procedural hearing in the week beginning the 29th June 2009. At this hearing the Court will consider the timing and further arrangements for grounds 3.1 to 3.3. No date has yet been fixed to hear these grounds. Maggie Scott QC urged the Court to fix a date for this hearing. Despite an initial estimate of 8 weeks both the defence and the Crown agreed that 12 weeks was a more realistic estimate of time required to address grounds 3.1 to 3.3. The Lord Justice General raised the possibility of splitting the hearing into segments. There was no opposition to this suggestion by any party.

Outstanding Petitions for Disclosure

There are two outstanding matters in relation to petitions for disclosure in the case. The first is formaterial in the non-prioritised grounds of appeal which fall into calls which were not argued at the February hearing. The second is in relation to a petition for recovery of scientific evidence which again relates to a non-prioritised ground of appeal. Parties agreed that given the argument in February the Court would only require to be addressed on matters specific to these petitions and this would substantially cut down the time required to argue. The Court will fix a 2 day hearing in the week beginning the 29th of June to deal with the two outstanding petitions for recovery.

Additional Information

In the course of the hearing Maggie Scott QC intimated to the Court that the appellant will not be present in Court for the appeal hearings. Apparently provisions are being made to allow the appellant to view the proceedings from Greenock prison.

7 comments:

  1. Open letter to Tony Gauci
    Zurich, March 12, 2009 English translation

    Dear Mr Tony Gauci

    Additionally to our call from Saturday I sent you as promised the following documents and fotos for expertise.
    This letter is not an accusation for your testimony against Mr Abdelbaset al Megrahi at Kamp van Zeist.
    It is obvious that your statement was influenced by the official investigation and yours and others testimony was turned around against the defendant.
    I have already visited you twice in your Boutique "Marys House" concerning this case, last time in early 2008. We are private investigators (MEBO) in the Lockerbie-case and had the same problems with the investigation authorities as you had.

    As I have told you the new appeal for Mr Abdelbaset al Megrahi will take place on April 27, 2009 in Edinburgh Scotland, (Photo Q14). In at least six points Abdelbasset al Megrahis second appeal was refered to the High Court because of a possible miscarriage of Justice.

    Today it is obvious that the photo from Magjid Giaka was not shown to you by police officer, Harry Bell, so you could not compare it with other persons. So you could only give an unappropriate description of the buyer who bougt clothes in your shop on Dezember 7, 1988.
    Your description of the buyer of the clothes had fatal consequences for Mr Megrahi. He was jailed for 27 years and sits until today, probably innocent, since 9 years in a Scottisch prison !

    Today it can be shown that the purchase of the clothes did not take place on Dezember 7, but on November 23, 1988 ! All indications point to this date. Mr Megrahi was not in Malta on November 23, therefore he can not be the buyer.

    It looks like you and other persons have been used for political macchinations in the Lockerbie case.

    Today we know that the buyer was the Libyan CIA agent Abdul Majgid Giaka, who was since August 1988 on the payroll of the CIA and had received in 1991 political asylum in the USA and lives there under a new identity.

    For comparison I sent you the photo of Magjid Giaka (Q13) who most probably bought the clothes. This photo was deliberately not shown to you by police officer Harry Bell !

    You find the following pictures attached: a robot drawing (Q12); a photo (Q13) of Giaka Magjid; a photo (Q11) of Abu Talb; and a photo (Q14), of *Abdelbaset al Megrahi (*Visafoto (1988) from the Swiss police).

    Dsiputable remains why the robot drawing (Q12) of the alleged buyer of the clothes was drawn during the same days when Mr Megrahi was in Malta (Dezember 7-9, 1988) !
    At the police questionings you, Mr Gauci, have always explained that Mr. Megrahi looked similar to the buyer of the clothes. Probably you was not 100 percent sure yourself?
    I can only hope today that with God's help you will recognize the real buyer of the clothes on photo (Q13). Your statement as witness against Mr Megrahi, father of five children, has great importance at the High Court in Edinburgh and is decisive if Mr Megrahi gets his freedom and honour back ...

    Link to the images Q11- Q14 on URL: www.lockerbie.ch

    With kind regards
    Edwin and Mahnaz Bollier, MEBO Ltd, Zurich, Switzerland

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  2. After newest proofs, Libya and its official, Mr. Abdelbaset Al Megrahi, have the right for truth and justice, immediately. Reminder of an unbelievable precondemnation!

    Do not to forget the Daily Press Briefing of the US Department of State no.168 from Thursday, November 14, 1991, Mr. Boucher:

    "Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Again, thank you for your patience and for waiting. I want to run through some basic facts about the bombing Pan Am 103 and how it was organized. I want to make some things clear from the outset:

    The bombers were Libyan Government intelligence operatives.

    This was a Libyan Government operation from start to finish."

    Spring, 2009:
    The Leader of Libya and Chairman of the African Union (AU) Muammar al-Gadhafi seeks to change the reputation of Libya on the world stage. Libya and all other victims in the Lockerbie case wait since years for a clear result in a revised judgement of the Scottish Appeal Justice. Libya and its Official have nothing to do with the PanAm 103 attack.

    Documents indicate that originally the CIA and an other western intelligence service planned also to involve Edwin Bollier (MEBO Ltd.) together with Mr. Abdelbaset Al Megrahi into the PanAm 103 plot!

    Edwin Bollier was told at the check-in at Tripoli airport that his already booked direct flight with Swissair to Zurich on December 20,1988 was fully booked and he should travel via Malta to Switzerland on the same day - the same flight on which Abdelbaset Al Megrahi was booked (*flight KM 107, on December 20, 1988 from Tripoli to Malta).
    According to a new statement Megrahi did not know that Bollier was planned to travel on the same flight as he was !

    Bollier was suspicious because he didn't see many people on the airport and went to the Swissair Station Manager who told him that there were many empty seats on the Swissair flight to Zurich. So he took the direct flight to Zurich on December 20, 1988. Only Abdelbaset Al Megrahi (alias Ahmed Khalifa Abdusamad) traveled with flight KM 107 from Tripoli to Malta on December 20, 1988.
    Therefore Bollier was not in Malta on the same day as Abdelbaset Al Megrahi. The CIA was confronted with a new situation and the same intelligence people decided to involve the station manager of ' Libyan Arab Airways' , Mr. Lamin Khalifa Fhimah, into the complot.

    *Al Megrahi was instructed by his boss Ibrahim Bishari (alcoholic, also allegedly a CIA defector) to travel to Malta on December 20, 1988 for a security order (not in connection with the bombing of PanAm 103) ...

    On September 14, 1997 former foreign minister, Ibrahim Bishari, died in a car crash in Egypt ...

    by Edwin Bollier, MEBO Ltd. Switzerland

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  3. Important Facts, March 24, '09

    Quintessence in the "Lockerbie-Scenario":
    All persons for example
    Magjid Giaka and its chief Dave, Tony Gauci, police officer Harry Bell and others, like the police cadre FBI, Scottish police, Swiss police and Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigations BKA, which involves in the "Lockerbie Scenario" gave no support for the PanAm103 assassination attempt and had nothing to do with the Lockerbie-Tragedy!

    Some known persons and organisations used the Lockerbie-Tragedy only for a conspiracy against Libya.

    Edwin and Mahnaz Bollier, MEBO Ltd, Switzerland

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  4. I thought Herr Bollier's second comment concerning the attempt to divert him to Malta on the 20.12.88 was really interesting. (I found his third comment quite unintelligible!) Somebody told me this story the previous day but I had never heard it in the previous twenty years.

    I am curious as to why these good folk would try to implicate a harmless gentleman such as Herr Bollier in a horrid act of mass murder or (unless they were involved
    in planning the atrocity) how they would know that flight PA103 on the 21.12.88 was targetted for destruction.

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  5. Professor Black, I find it interesting (but not surprising), that you, being one allegedly well versed in law would publish this information, considering the following, which is included in all communications to family members from the Crown - This e-mail (and any files or other attachments transmitted with it) is intended solely for the attention of the addressee(s). Unauthorised use, disclosure, storage, copying or distribution of any part of this e-mail is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient, please destroy the e-mail, remove any copies from your system and inform the sender immediately by return.

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  6. Assuming, as you wrongly do, that this injunction was included in the copy of the document that I received, precisely what legal obligation do you suggest that it imposed on me?

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  7. Edwin Bollier's comment above has led me to reappraise who might have been behind the Lockerbie bombing.

    Mr Bollier said: "Documents indicate that originally the CIA and another Western intelligence service planned also to involve Edwin Bollier (MEBO Ltd) together with Mr Abdelbaset Al Megrahi into the PanAm 103 plot! Edwin Bollier was told at the check-in at Tripoli airport that his already booked direct flight with Swissair to Zurich on December 20,1988 was fully booked, and he should travel via Malta to Switzerland on the same day - the same flight on which Abdelbaset Al Megrahi was booked (*flight KM 107, on December 20, 1988 from Tripoli to Malta). According to a new statement, Megrahi did not know that Bollier was planned to travel on the same flight as he was! Bollier was suspicious because he didn't see many people at the airport and went to the Swissair Station Manager who told him that there were many empty seats on the Swissair flight to Zurich. So he took the direct flight to Zurich on December 20, 1988. Only Abdelbaset Al Megrahi (alias Ahmed Khalifa Abdusamad) travelled with flight KM 107 from Tripoli to Malta on December 20, 1988. Therefore Bollier was not in Malta on the same day as Abdelbaset Al Megrahi. The CIA was confronted with a new situation and the same intelligence people decided to involve the station manager of ' Libyan Arab Airways', Mr Lamin Khalifa Fhimah, into the complot. Al Megrahi was instructed by his boss Ibrahim Bishari (alcoholic, also allegedly a CIA defector) to travel to Malta on December 20, 1988 for a security order (not in connection with the bombing of PanAm 103) ...On September 14, 1997 former foreign minister, Ibrahim Bishari, died in a car crash in Egypt..."

    To which another correspondent, 'Baz', commented: "I thought Herr Bollier's second comment concerning the attempt to divert him to Malta on the 20.12.88 was really interesting. (I found his third comment quite unintelligible!) Somebody told me this story the previous day but I had never heard it in the previous twenty years. I am curious as to why these good folk would try to implicate a harmless gentleman such as Herr Bollier in a horrid act of mass murder or (unless they were involved in planning the atrocity) how they would know that flight PA103 on the 21.12.88 was targeted for destruction."

    In the light of the above Bollier/Baz exchange, I am now revising my theory that apartheid South Africa was solely responsible for the Lockerbie bombing: British intelligence and the CIA must have been intimately involved. My modified theory proceeds as follows:

    In a 1989 interview on Australian TV, uploaded in January 2008 to 'YouTube' (see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wvaa2topM6E), Father Patrick Ryan is shown to have been a quartermaster for the IRA during the 1980s. Fr Ryan admitted obtaining 'memo park timers' as well as more sophisticated devices for the IRA, and to have had links with Gaddafi's Libya. A 'YouTube' commentator remarked: "33 years ago he was arrested in Switzerland and found to be carrying electronic timing devices". [Were these Mebo timers?]

    The Brighton bombing took place on 12 October 1984. Targeted on PM Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet, the IRA bomb was planted in room 629 at the Grand Hotel over the weekend of 14-17 September 1984. It was triggered by a long-delay electronic timer. [Was this a Mebo timer?]

    If Mebo had indeed supplied the IRA with timers or other bomb-making equipment (either directly or via Libya), British intelligence would be certain to take a keen interest in Edwin Bollier. Following the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 in July 1988 by the USS Vincennes, Iran insisted that inevitable revenge would be exacted against the United States. Western intelligence (comprising CIA, MI5 and MI6, Mossad and South African Military Intelligence) might have concluded that, since sooner or later an American aircraft was going to be downed as a result, they might therefore just as well select their own US aircraft, and then blame Libya for it.

    I continue to believe that UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, was the prime target on Pan Am Flight 103 (see http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/22/world/un-officer-on-flight-103.html). Carlsson was an obstacle to the way that the apartheid régime would relinquish its control of Namibia. He was a confirmed socialist for Ollie North and the CIA, a 'supporter' of terrorism (the ANC) for the Thatcher administration and, for the Mossad, a believer in the two-state solution in the Middle East. Thus the whole of Western intelligence would have been pleased to see the back of him.

    In my opinion, the bomb arrived at Heathrow on 21 December 1988 on board the South African Airways flight bringing Pik Botha and his high-level South African delegation (including Defence Minister, Magnus Malan, and Military intelligence chief, C J Van Tonder) from Johannesburg. Direct air links were banned between South Africa and U.S. airports (under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 1986). So, Botha and five of his 23-strong team cancelled their bookings on PA103 and travelled on the morning Pan Am Flight 101 from Heathrow to New York. The remainder of the party skidaddled back to Johannesburg on SAA.

    Of the 259 victims who died on board PA 103, Bernt Carlsson was the most prominent. Please see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PatrickHaseldine3.jpg and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PatrickHaseldine3B.jpg).

    I rest my case.

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