The AAIB technical investigation

[What follows is excerpted from a long and detailed article by K P R Smart, AAIB Chief Inspector of Air Accidents, entitled The Lockerbie Investigation: Understanding of the Effects of the Detonation of `Improvised Explosive Devices’ on Aircraft Pressure Cabins that was published on this date in 1997:]

At 19:03 hrs UTC on 21 December 1988 Pan American World Airways Flight PA 103 from London, Heathrow to Kennedy Airport, New York was receiving its oceanic clearance from Shanwick Oceanic Control. Seconds later the secondary radar return disappeared from the controller’s screen and multiple primary radar returns were seen to fan out in an easterly direction for a considerable distance.

An improvised explosive device (IED) had detonated in the forward baggage compartment of the Boeing 747 at station 700. The structural damage to the aircraft forward fuselage caused the forward section of the aircraft to detach and pivot to the right around the window belt on the right side. The nose section of the aircraft struck the No 3 engine intake causing the engine to detach from its pylon. This element of the structural break-up was complete within three seconds of the detonation of the device. The aircraft then entered a steepening descent path with the forward fuselage structure detaching until it reached a vertical descent at some 19,000 feet over the town of Lockerbie. At about this time the tail surfaces of the aircraft started to disintegrate, probably by a flutter mode, and as a consequence the rear fuselage started the break-up. A large section of cabin floor and baggage hold from the rear fuselage together with three landing gear units fell onto a residential area in Lockerbie. The main wing structure struck the ground a short distance away, destroying a bungalow and creating a huge crater in the ground. There was a very strong westerly wind at the time of the accident (115 knots at the aircraft’s cruising altitude of 31,000 feet). These winds produced a wreckage trail that stretched from Lockerbie in the south west of Scotland to the east coast of northern England, some 80 miles away. The recorded primary radar returns showed debris falling over the east coast of northern England more than one hour after the initiating event. All 259 passengers and crew on board the aircraft were killed and 11 residents of Lockerbie lost their lives as the wreckage fell onto the town.

At the time of the disaster it was dark and the initial emergency service response was concentrated in and around the town of Lockerbie. The area to the east of Lockerbie is sparsely populated and includes one of the largest manmade forests in Europe, the Kielder Forest. The police had initially identified some seven major wreckage sites in or near the town and the rescue teams set about the task of recovering bodies whilst at the same time preserving essential evidence for the criminal and technical investigations. Increasingly it became clear that wreckage was being discovered at greater and greater distances from Lockerbie and the eventual wreckage and evidential trail was established to have covered an area of 840 square miles.

From the start of the investigation into the causes of the Lockerbie disaster, the police and the AAIB were considering two possible scenarios. The first involved sabotage, which would obviously have resulted in the police conducting a criminal investigation. The second, that the aircraft had been destroyed by defects in the aircraft structure, which would have resulted in the AAIB taking the lead in an investigation under the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents) Regulations. On 26 December a small section of baggage container was recovered from the open countryside to the east of Lockerbie. This piece of wreckage showed evidence of being in the vicinity of detonating high explosive. Forensic examinations conducted on 26/27 December confirmed the initial  findings and the world was notified of these facts in a press release on 28 December. At that time the AAIB decided that the technical investigation, conducted under the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents) Regulations, required clear boundaries to ensure that no conflict arose with the criminal investigation. It was decided that the AAIB investigation would determine the position of the device within the aircraft, the sequence of structural failures that led to the break-up of the Boeing 747, and consider what safety action could be recommended to provide the aircraft with enhanced protection against explosive devices. The technical investigation was therefore able to concentrate on the aviation safety aspects arising out of this disaster whilst at the same time assisting and supporting the criminal investigation being conducted by the police.

The initial AAIB team of ten accident investigators arrived in Lockerbie at 01.30 hrs, some six hours after the accident occurred. Over that first night they started to assess the task ahead and co-ordinate their activities with the police. In the days that followed the disaster the numbers of agencies and personnel increased to peak at around 2000 personnel working on the accident site. On the day after the disaster the AAIB arranged for the Royal Air Force to fly a series of photographic reconnaissance missions in an attempt to establish the boundaries of the wreckage trail. It quickly became clear that there were in fact two wreckage trails. One, the `northern trail’ , was bounded at its western end by the town of Lockerbie where a number of large sections of aircraft structure and three of its engines fell. This trail extended to the east by some 15 km. The second trail, `the southern trail’ , was far longer and stretched from the site of the initial explosion, south of Lockerbie, to the east coast of northern England some 80 miles away. These very long wreckage trails were a result of the upper level winds on the evening of 21 December which were from the west at 115 knots at flight level 310 (31000 feet), the cruising altitude of the aircraft prior to the explosion taking place. The first priority for the technical investigation was to identify and record the position of all the items of wreckage over the very long wreckage trail. This was done with the aid of military photographic interpreters and large teams on the ground who examined, identifed and recorded each piece of wreckage.

Lockerbie: Heathrow break-in revealed

[This is the headline over a report published in The Independent on this date in 2001. It reads as follows:]

New evidence relating to the bombing of the Lockerbie jumbo jet was revealed today.

A former security guard at Heathrow airport says he discovered a break-in at a Pan Am baggage facility early on the day that 270 people died in the bombing of the New York-bound flight.

Ray Manly, 63, was quoted in The Mirror as saying he was surprised that the incident was not mentioned during the trial of two Libyans for the bombing.

The Scottish Office, the government executive office in Scotland, would not comment on the report because an appeal is pending.

Manly said that anti-terrorist police questioned him after the bombing, but the report was not mentioned in the trial that led to the 31 January conviction of Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, a Libyan intelligence agent. A co-defendant, Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, was acquitted.

Prosecutors alleged that the bomb had been hidden in a suitcase and put aboard an aircraft in Malta. It was then alleged route through Frankfurt to London and the Pan Am flight.

Manly's statement suggested the possibility that the bomb was sneaked into a luggage area in London.

In sworn affidavits, he said he had found a padlock had been cut from a door that led to Pan Am's baggage about 18 hours before Flight 103 took off, The Mirror said.

"I believe it would have been possible for an unauthorized person to obtain tags for a particular Pan Am flight then, having broken the ... lock, to have introduced a tagged bag into the baggage buildup area," Manly was quoted as saying.

The Mirror reported that Al-Megrahi's lawyers may use the new information in an appeal scheduled to begin on 15 October at Camp Zeist, a former US air base in the Netherlands where the initial trial was held.

If the appeal is rejected, al-Megrahi, 48, will serve his life sentence in a Scottish prison. Judges recommended a minimum term of 20 years.

During the proceedings, defense attorneys suggested a bomb could have been introduced into the inter-airport luggage system, either in Frankfurt or London. The defense also tried to throw suspicion onto two Palestinian groups.

The New York-bound Pan Am flight was over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21 December in 1988 when it exploded, sending 259 passengers and crew to their deaths. Eleven people were killed on the ground.

[RB: The concealment from Megrahi’s defence team of the evidence relating to the Heathrow break-in is the subject of one of Justice for Megrahi’s allegations of criminal misconduct in the Lockerbie investigation, prosecution and trial that are currently under investigation by Police Scotland.]

Many felt uneasy as the proceedings were played out

[On this date in 2009 the late Margo MacDonald MSP contibuted an article headlined No need to hide politics behind Megrahi release to Edinburgh’s evening newspaper, the Evening News. It reads in part:]

When Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi was tried for the murder of 270 people at the Scottish Court in the Netherlands, the usual process was amended. (...) [H]is trial was conducted without a jury, with the verdict and sentence being decided by three Scottish High Court judges. (...)

A few people at his trial, whose numbers have grown over the years, harbour suspicions that the changed procedures served to protect the security interests of these states, and others, at least as much as al-Megrahi's safety. But allowing for the compromises in procedure, there was still the intention that justice should be the overriding factor.

Many people felt uneasy as the jury-free proceedings were played out in public, in the presence of victims' relatives. But they trusted in everything else being done according to the book. It's now known the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission has turned up evidence withheld from al-Megrahi's defence lawyers at the trial, pertinent enough to have the SCCRC advise that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. You can bet your bottom petro-dollar that if there was any manipulation of evidence, it was down to diplomatic, and not judicial considerations.

This being the case, why should anyone find it an unthinkable departure from the paths of righteousness for Kenny MacAskill to have taken notice of the multiplicity of state interests involved with his decision on whether to agree to al-Megrahi's request to be allowed to end his days in Libya? Legal considerations doubtless influenced and guided the justice secretary's decision. But it beggars belief that in meetings between civil servants from Edinburgh and London, transatlantic phone calls between the American State Department and Scotland's Justice Ministry, and meetings and communications between Arab, Scottish and UK governments there were no exchanges of views on what should happen to al-Megrahi.

Apart from anything else, people who were not directly affected by the atrocity can address the issue buffered by the 20 years that have passed. In the same way as many other wicked cruelties have come to be accommodated by their victims as the world has moved on and new relationships have developed, so the realpolitik of 2009 is different from that of 1988. The Berlin Wall was still in place, the world was divided between states under the influence of either Moscow or Washington. In the Middle East, internal civil war all but destroyed Lebanon, Iran and Iraq had pursued a long, destructive war, other Arab countries were unable to exert influence or power in defence of their interests because of internal tensions, and Libya was a pariah state. (...)

Nelson Mandela's was the name invoked by the supporters of the decision to let al-Megrahi go home. Twenty years ago, he was still a convicted terrorist. It's ironic that should have been his legal status when he was released from prison, and nobody even thought to ask about the legal niceties. (...)

The details of such things may have blurred in the public mind, but experience and common sense ensures understanding of all the pressures on the justice secretary when the Libyans and al-Megrahi applied for release.

The Scottish government and the justice secretary would have saved themselves a load of angst if they'd admitted this up front. For the record, I agreed with the decision, but thought the stated reasons for it didn't ring totally true.

[RB: Earlier this week a portrait of Margo MacDonald was gifted to the Scottish Parliament. It can be viewed here.]

His long-awaited appeal would have confirmed his innocence

[What follows is an extract from an article by John Pilger that was published on the Information Clearing House website on this date in 2011:]

Gone from the Murdoch press are pejorative "insurgents". The action in Libya, says The Times, is "a revolution... as revolutions used to be". That it is a coup by a gang of Muammar Gaddafi's ex cronies and spooks in collusion with Nato is hardly news. The self-appointed "rebel leader", Mustafa Abdul Jalil, was Gaddafi's feared justice minister. The CIA runs or bankrolls most of the rest, including America's old friends, the Mujadeen Islamists who spawned al-Qaeda.

 

They told journalists what they needed to know: that Gaddafi was about to commit "genocide", of which there was no evidence, unlike the abundant evidence of "rebel" massacres of black African workers falsely accused of being mercenaries. European bankers' secret transfer of the Central Bank of Libya from Tripoli to "rebel" Benghazi by European bankers in order to control the country's oil billions was an epic heist of little interest.

The entirely predictable indictment of Gaddafi before the "international court" at The Hague evokes the charade of the dying "Lockerbie bomber", Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, whose "heinous crime" has been deployed to promote the west's ambitions in Libya. In 2009, al-Megrahi was sent back to Libya by the Scottish authorities not for compassionate reasons, as reported, but because his long-awaited appeal would have confirmed his innocence and described how he was framed by the Thatcher government, as the late Paul Foot's landmark expose revealed. As an antidote to the current propaganda, I urge you to read a forensic demolition of al-Megrahi's "guilt" and its political meaning in Dispatches from the Dark Side: on torture and the death of justice (Verso) by the distinguished human rights lawyer, Gareth Peirce.

The truth was inconvenient

[On this date in 2007 I reproduced on this blog a long article by Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer published the previous day on OhmyNews International. What follows is an excerpt:]

Back to Square One

Let us give Lord Sutherland, Lord Coulsfield and Lord Maclean some credit. After hearing 230 witnesses and studying 621 exhibits during 84 days of evidence, spread over eight months, the three judges of the Lockerbie trial almost got the date of the worst act of terror in the UK correct.

In the first line of the first paragraph of the most expensive verdict in history (￡80 million), they wrote: "At 1903 hours on 22 December 1988 Pan Am flight 103 fell out of the sky." As a matter of fact, Pan Am Flight 103 exploded on Dec 21.

Michael Scharf is an international law expert at Case Western Reserve University in Ohio. Scharf joined the State Department's Office of the Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence in April 1989. He was also responsible for drawing up the UN Security Council resolutions that imposed sanctions on Libya in 1992.

"It was a trial where everybody agreed ahead of time that they were just going to focus on these two guys, and they were the fall guys," Scharf wrote.

"The CIA and the FBI kept the State Department in the dark. It worked for them for us to be fully committed to the theory that Libya was responsible. I helped the counter-terrorism bureau draft documents that described why we thought Libya was responsible, but these were not based on seeing a lot of evidence, but rather on representations from the CIA and FBI and the Department of Justice about what the case would prove and did prove."

"It was largely based on this inside guy [Libyan defector Abdul Majid Giaka]. It wasn't until the trial that I learned this guy was a nut-job and that the CIA had absolutely no confidence in him and that they knew he was a liar."

The Magic Luggage

According to the Lockerbie verdict, the bomb was hidden in a Toshiba radio, wrapped in clothes and located in luggage that was mysteriously boarded in Malta.

The court has examined this allegation in depth and the matter occupies 24 paragraphs of the final verdict (§16 to §34). After reviewing all the evidence and testimonies, the three judges came to the following conclusions:

"Luqa airport had a relatively elaborate security system. All items of baggage checked in were entered into the airport computer as well as being noted on the passenger's ticket. After the baggage had passed the sniffer check, it was placed on a trolley in the baggage area to wait until the flight was ready for loading.

"When the flight was ready, the baggage was taken out and loaded, and the head loader was required to count the items placed on board. The ramp dispatcher, the airport official on the tarmac responsible for the departure of the flight, was in touch by radiotelephone with the load control office. The load control had access to the computer and, after the flight was closed, would notify the ramp dispatcher of the number of items checked in. The ramp dispatcher would also be told by the head loader how many items had been loaded; and if there were a discrepancy, the ramp dispatcher would take steps to resolve it.

"In addition to the baggage reconciliation procedure, there was a triple count of the number of passengers boarding a departing flight, that is there was a count of the boarding cards, a count by immigration officers of the number of immigration cards handed in, and a head count by the crew.

"The records relating to KM180 on 21 December 1988 show no discrepancy in respect of baggage. The flight log (production 930) shows that 55 items of baggage were loaded, corresponding to 55 on the load plan.

"On the face of them, these arrangements seem to make it extremely difficult for an unaccompanied and unidentified bag to be shipped on a flight out of Luqa.

"If therefore the unaccompanied bag was launched from Luqa, the method by which that was done is not established, and the Crown accepted that they could not point to any specific route by which the primary suitcase could have been loaded.

"The absence of any explanation of the method by which the primary suitcase might have been placed on board KM180 is a major difficulty for the Crown case."

An internal 1989 FBI memo indicates that there is no indication that unaccompanied luggage was transferred from Air Malta to Pan Am. Law authorities from Malta and Germany came to the same conclusion.

And yet, without any explanation, the judges wrote in the conclusion of the verdict that: "the absence of an explanation as to how the suitcase was taken into the system at Luqa is a major difficulty for the Crown case, but after taking full account of that difficulty, we remain of the view that the primary suitcase began its journey at Luqa." (§ 82)

The Maltese Storekeeper

According to the verdict, Megrahi bought the clothes in which the bomb was wrapped in Sliema, a small town of Malta in the Mediterranean Sea, including the "cloth" in which the fragment was "discovered" by Hayes. At first sight, the "cloth" appears to be part of a Slalom shirt sold in a little shop -- Mary's House -- located on the island.

However, upon closer examination, the "cloth" raises a series of issues. Firstly, the color of the label is incorrect. A blue Slalom shirt label should have blue writing, not brown.

Secondly, the breast pocket size corresponds to a child shirt, not the 16-and-a-half-sized shirt allegedly bought by Megrahi, for the pocket would have been 2 centimeters wider.

Thirdly, German records show the shirt had most of the breast pocket intact, while the evidence shown at Zeist had a deep triangular tear extending inside the pocket.

Lastly, the storekeeper initially told the investigators he never sold such shirts to whoever visited him a few weeks before the Lockerbie tragedy.

Storekeeper Tony Gauci's testimony was pivotal in the case against Megrahi. Gauci gave a series of 19 statements to the police that are fully inconsistent. Yet, the judges found him trustworthy. Allow me to disagree.

On Jan 30, 1990, Gauci stated, "That time when the man came, I am sure I did not sell him a shirt." Then, on Sept 10, 1990, he told the investigators, "I now remember that the man who bought the clothing also bought a Slalom shirt." And to make things worse, two of his testimonies have disappeared.

When Were the Clothes Bought?

According to the verdict, Megrahi bought the clothes on Dec 7, 1989. Gauci remembered that his brother had gone home earlier to watch an evening football game (Rome vs Dresden), that the man came just before closing time (7 pm), that it was raining (the man bought an umbrella) and that the Christmas lights were on.

The game allows for only two dates: Nov 23 or Dec 7. The issue is critical for there is no indication that Megrahi was in Malta on Nov 23, but he is known to have been on the island on Dec 7.

The chief meteorologist of Malta airport testified that it was raining on Nov 23 but not on Dec 7. Yet the judges determined the date as Dec 7. This rather absurd conclusion from the judges raises two other issues.

The Dec 7 Rome-Dresden game was played at 1 pm, not in the evening. What is more, Gauci had previously testified that the Christmas lights were not up, meaning that the date had to be Nov [23].

On Sept 19, 1989, Gauci stated, "The [Christmas] decorations were not up when the man bought the clothing." Then, at the Lockerbie trial, Gauci told the judges that the Christmas lights were on. "Yes, they were … up."

Who Was the Mysterious Buyer?

"We are nevertheless satisfied that his identification, so far as it went, of the first accused as the purchaser was reliable and should be treated as a highly important element in this case," wrote the judges.

In fact, Gauci never identified Megrahi. He merely stated that Megrahi resembles the man to whom he had sold the clothes, but only if he were much older and two inches taller. Gauci, however, had identified another man: Abu Talb.

Talb was a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GL), the terrorist group led by Jibril.

In late October 1988 the senior bomb maker of the PFLP-GC, Marwan Khreesat, was arrested in Frankfurt in the company of Hafez Dalkamoni, the leader of the organization's German cell.

Dalkamoni had met Talb in Cyprus and Malta the week before. In the car the two men used, police found a bomb hidden in a Toshiba radio. Khreesat told the police that he had manufactured five similar improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Each device Khreesat had built was triggered by a pressure gauge that activated a timer -- range 0 to 45 minutes -- when the plane reached a cruising altitude of 11,000 meters. The timers of all recovered bombs were set on 30 minutes. It takes about 7 minutes for a 747 to reach cruising altitude. Pan Am 103 exploded 38 minutes after take-off from London.

German police eventually recovered four of the IEDs Khreesat had built. No one seems to know what happened to the fifth one, which was never recovered. When police raided Talb's apartment in Sweden, they found his appointment notebook. Talb had circled one date: Dec 21.

Contrary to Jibril's statement, and surely he must know better, a bomb triggered by a pressure gauge set at 11,000 meters would not have detonated during the Frankfurt to London flight as the airliner does not reach cruising altitude on such a short flight.

Then again, such a device would not have detonated at all if it had been located in the luggage area, as the hold is at the pressure of the passengers' zone and never drops below the pressure equivalent of 2,400 meters.

This is why when the judges were presented with the undisputable and undisputed evidence that a proper simulation of the explosion -- taking proper account of the Mach stem effect -- would locate the explosion outside the luggage hold they simply decided to dismiss the existence of a scientifically well-established fact.

"We do not consider it necessary to go into any detail about Mach stem formation," the judges wrote.

Had the judges deemed it "necessary to go into the details regarding Mach stem formation," they would have been forced to acknowledge that the position of the bomb was fully incompatible with the indictment. That magic unaccompanied luggage went mysteriously through airport security was "plausible." That it jumped on its own out of the luggage hold at London airport was a little too much to believe.

In truth, a proper simulation of the explosion locates the bomb just a few inches away from the skin of the plane, a position fully consistent with the very specific damages left by the explosion.

The truth was inconvenient. The three judges had to dismiss it in order to justify a verdict that had been decided more than a decade before the first day of the Zeist trial.

Shame on those who committed this horrific act of terror. Shame on those who have ordered the cover-up. Shame on those who provided false testimony and those who suppressed and fabricated the evidence needed to frame Libya. And shame on the media, whose silence made it an accomplice.

Legal opinion openly and publicly expressed grave doubts

[On this date in 2009 an article headlined Malta and Lockerbie by Dr George Vella, now Malta’s Minister of Foreign Affairs but then in opposition, was published in The Malta Independent on Sunday. It reads as follows:]

The role that Malta played helped resolve the question of sanctions on Libya, and to seek a fair trial of the two persons suspected of the crime.

The recent release of Abdel Basset al Megrahi from a Scottish jail on humanitarian grounds, and the controversy which has erupted on the decision of the UK and the Scottish authorities to grant such an amnesty, has once again brought the issue of the disaster at Lockerbie to world attention.

I do not intend going into the merits or demerits of such a decision, but have to register my disappointment at the fact that Mr Megrahi, for reasons unknown, decided to, or was made to, abandon an appeal against the court sentence that had incriminated him as the person responsible for the Lockerbie disaster.

Over the past few years there has been mounting respected legal opinion that openly and publicly expressed grave doubts as to how correct the decision of the Scottish Court was that had found al-Megrahi guilty.

Serious doubts also emerged as to how reliable and how truthful certain witnesses were. Everything was pointing in the direction of a new trial, which most probably would have exculpated Mr al-Megrahi.

In all probability it would also have shattered, once and for all, the theory that the luggage containing the bomb that caused the disaster had been loaded at Malta airport.

I do not see how Malta can clear its name in this Lockerbie issue, now that the appeal has been abandoned.

This is very unfair, because there is mounting compelling evidence that the bomb could not have been loaded in Malta.

Besides, it is doubly unfair because we only got bad publicity.

There is little if any recognition of the fact that whatever was happening in Libya was impacting negatively on our daily lives in Malta… socially, economically and politically.

The 1992 UN-imposed air and arms embargo, and the application of selective sanctions, bore heavily on the quality of life of the Libyan population, and brought about hardship and suffering… and Malta became the main exit point for Libyans who had to travel to anywhere in Europe and beyond. The daily ferry trips from Tripoli brought to Malta an ever increasing number of Libyans, both the well intentioned who came for business, for healthcare or for onward travel, as well as less sedate and more rowdy youngsters dead bent on having a good time in Malta’s entertainment spots.

One could say that what financial loss we experienced from tourists who kept away from our shores because of Malta’s proximity to Libya, was made good by the increase in business generated by large numbers of Libyans arriving daily by sea, as well as by the increased revenue from the use they made of Air Malta flights.

For Malta, the whole Lockerbie saga also had interesting political aspects.

While sanctions lasted, both the Nationalist (1992-1996) and Labour (1996-1998) governments had to find the right balance between maintaining the best of relations with Libya, (while condemning without any reservations the terrorist act and whoever mandated it), and at the same time observing in the most scrupulous of manners the spirit and the letter of the UN-imposed sanctions.

We set up a Sanctions Monitoring Committee, and were continuously under the scrutiny of western countries to ensure that nothing that was against the sanctions, or other “dual use” materials or equipment, passed through our ports en route to Libya.

It stands to reason that the most vigilant countries were the USA and the UK.

In spite of our limited resources, we managed to retain effective control and maintained the best of relations with everyone.

When I was entrusted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996, four years after the imposition of sanctions, the situation in Libya was becoming alarming and worrying.

It was becoming evident that the UN sanctions were having disastrous effects on the civilian population, not least in the fields of healthcare and medical services, while leaving the regime at the top unscathed. Such “wide” sanctions were not targeting particular sectors, and they were not being monitored as to whether they were achieving the desired results.

I always tended to agree with J Kenneth Galbraith when he opined that in modern times sanctions, boycotts, and embargoes tend to have “minimal effect”. He says that sanctions “are thought to be an attractive design for bringing recalcitrant governments to heel. Instead what occurs is a reallocation of resources and a sacrifice of nonessentials”. He concludes: “With sanctions hope is great, disappointment endemic”.

I expressed these opinions and concerns on all occasions when meeting other politicians. Undoubtedly, the most fruitful meeting was the one I had with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in Geneva in late April 1997, where, during a leisurely lunch I explained the whole situation to him, my concerns, and the way Malta was being affected. Mr Annan needed little persuasion to understand the situation, and agree that the general population in Libya was suffering unduly. He promised to follow it up with concrete measures.

As a matter of fact, he entrusted Deputy Secretary General Vladimir Petrovsky, with whom I also had had discussions, to make arrangements for a fact-finding mission to Libya, and to report back his findings for onward transmission to the Security Council.

Petrovsky and his delegation were in Libya between 13 and 18 December, and by the beginning of February presented a report that confirmed, without any shadow of doubt, the disastrous effects sanctions were having on the general population.

The report was factual, but the unwritten message was that when United Nations member states introduce sanctions they also have to shoulder the responsibility of ensuring that such sanctions do not prejudice the economic and social well-being of the general population.

A week after publishing his report, Mr Petrovsky, in recognition of the role we played in highlighting the humanitarian situation in Libya, came to see me in Malta and we gave a press conference together at which he spoke about his mission, his findings, and his recommendations.

Following Petrovsky’s report, the UN General Assembly, on 20 March, embarked on an open debate on the effectiveness of sanctions. Malta participated in this debate and we took the opportunity to explain clearly our views on the subject.

During all this time the USA and the UK kept insisting that Libya hand over to them for trial, in either the USA or Scotland, two men – Abdel Basset al-Megrahi and Lamin Kalifah Phimah, described as Libyan intelligence agents – who were to be charged with the planting of the suitcase bomb that caused the Lockerbie disaster.

Libya always insisted that these suspected Libyan citizens would never get a fair trial in either of these countries.

The standoff continued as both sides would not budge from their entrenched positions.

Libya repeatedly stated that it would accept a trial before a Scottish court sitting in a third country. Libyan Foreign Minister Omar Montasser, in a letter to the President of the Security Council in January 1998, wrote that Libya “accepted the proposal of the League of Arab States that the two suspects should be tried by a court in a neutral country and that they should be tried at The Hague by Scottish judges and in accordance with Scottish law”.

When I visited the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in his traditional tent in a military complex in Sirte on 7 March 1998 at the end of a long meeting, during which no reference was made to the Lockerbie stalemate, he asked me whether I could do him the favour of relaying a message to the UK Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, who he knew I was to meet in London in a few days’ time.

He asked me to convey to the British Foreign Secretary his solemn commitment that if the Libyan proposal to have a trial in a neutral third country under Scottish law was accepted by the UK and USA, he would be willing to hand over the suspects,

On 26 March, I was at the UK Foreign Office in London meeting Robin Cook.

My acquaintance and friendship with Robin, through party relations, went back to well before he became Foreign Minister. Even so I must say I was at a loss as to how to broach the subject of Lockerbie in our discussion, as after years of stalemate and Libyan intransigence, it had become a sore topic to discuss. Luckily it was Robin himself who provided the opportunity by asking me how my meeting with Muammar Gaddafi had gone.

When I passed on Gaddafi’s message and promise, Robin Cook seemed pleasantly surprised, acknowledged the commitment expressed and promised to work on it, as he wished to get this issue out of the way as soon as possible. He asked me whether he could count on us as a go-between if need be, and wanted to know where the suspects would spend their prison term if found guilty.

I told him I had to refer back for an answer, but informed him that the Libyan Foreign Minister Montasser had qualified Gaddafi’s commitment by saying that they would only accept a trial under Scottish law, as this did not include the death penalty; that during the trial no extra charges against the suspects would be contemplated; and that if found guilty the suspects would not be sent to a US jail.

We informed the State Department of these recent developments through our Embassy in Washington, and got the impression that whereas they were happy with developments, they would rather let the UK take the initiatives. This attitude is also expressed in Madeline Albright’s autobiography, when explaining the pressure she was under from the families of the Lockerbie victims to take effective action.

I know for a fact that the British started exploring the possibility of changing their stance and, apart from doing further research on the Libyan proposal through their contacts, also started exploring the possibility of enacting legislation so that a Scottish Court could hold a trial under Scottish law in The Hague.

With Robin Cook’s knowledge, I had separate meetings in April with Belgian Foreign Minister Derycke in Brussels, as well as with the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in Bonn, who were both enthusiastic about the prospects of a breakthrough.

In the same month I had two other meetings with Robin Cook, one in Palma de Majorca and the other in Brussels, during which he briefed me on developments, and I renewed our commitment to be of help if needed.

On 19 May I had a scheduled meeting with Libyan Foreign Minister Montasser in Cartghena, Columbia where we were both attending a meeting of the non-aligned countries. Mr Montasser brought me “au courant” on what was happening through discreet diplomatic contacts, and reiterated Libya’s commitment to keep its promise if the UK and the US accepted the notion of a trial held in a neutral third country under Scottish law.

On 21 July the information reaching the Maltese Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Middle Eastern Affairs Section of the State Department was that a deal had not yet been done, but it looked as if it was going to go through, as the US had agreed, together with the UK, to try the Lockerbie suspects under Scottish law in The Netherlands with a senior Scottish judge and a panel of international judges but no jury.

Concerns were expressed as to whether Gaddafi would keep his promise and let the suspects go to trial. Malta’s help was again solicited, if the need arose.

These views and doubts as to whether Gaddafi would keep his word were expressed in the press. The Guardian wrote about “New Move to Force Trial of Lockerbie Bomb Suspects”, and another piece entitled “Lockerbie: the West takes a gamble”, reflected the lack of faith the West had in Libya’s credibility.

That same evening, following the speculation in the press, Ceefax reported that Rosemary Wolf, the representative of the American relatives of the Lockerbie victims, said she had been told by Madeline Albright that a trial under Scottish law, but not on Scottish soil was being explored, which sparked off a lively debate on the whole issue during adjournment time in the House of Commons.

This was the 15th adjournment debate on Lockerbie, but contrary to the others this debate was one that saw hope in finding a way out of the impasse. As one member put it, “This adjournment debate is really a plea of encouragement for such a course of action.”

The next day the world press headlines were all about the possible “softening” of the US and UK stance on Lockerbie; the possibility of the Pan Am 103 Trial moving to The Hague; Madeline Albright being reported lobbying American relatives of the Lockerbie victims to accept a trial of the Libyan suspects under Scottish law in The Hague and other headlines expressing general agreement and praising the breakthrough.

In the meantime, I was asked to ascertain once again the Libyan position, in view of the imminent decision that was to be taken by the UK and the US.

On the morning of 22 July I once again contacted Libyan Foreign Minister Omar Montasser by phone.

Mr Montasser asked me to pass on the following information – that the Libyan government was standing firm in its intention to accept a trial of the suspects in a third country, a neutral country. He mentioned The Hague, but he even mentioned Malta. He told me that Libya was ready to discuss details if there was a UN Security Council Resolution providing for this option and that Libya would accept a trial under Scottish law, with a whole bench of Scottish judges, or with a Scottish Chief Justice and a bench made up of other international judges. As to where the alleged suspects were to spend their time in jail if found guilty, Montasser told me that Libya was ready to discuss this and come to an agreement before the trial. Asked whether Libya would accept extradition of condemned suspects to another country in which to spend their sentences if found guilty, Montasser replied that this would be discussed and decided on at Security Council level.

I informed Montasser that I was going to convey his message to Robin Cook, and that I would keep in contact, were I to have any replies or further questions.

That same day this message was relayed to both the British Foreign Office as well as to the US State Department. To this message we added that, for our part, we felt that this commitment from Libya was useful in helping them form an opinion and come to a decision, and secondly we conveyed our feeling that with this option, the Libyans, according to our reading, “will play ball”.

That same day a message was sent by the US State Department to all the US Embassies around the world, explaining the US position on the matter, in view of the fact that “Although no decision has yet been made to pursue the case in another venue, that option is now being actively considered.”

On 24 August, a month later, the UK and the US sent a joint letter to the UN Secretary General, informing him of the agreed arrangements, outlining the parameters within which the trial was to be held, and detailing what they expected of the Libyan authorities by way of cooperation. They informed Kofi Annan that the initiative they were presenting was a sincere attempt “… to resolve this issue, and is an approach which has recently been endorsed by others, including the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Non Aligned Movement, and the Islamic Conference.”

The letter from the UK and the US ended by expressing trust “that Libya will respond promptly, positively and unequivocally by ensuring the timely appearance of the two accused in the Netherlands for trial before the Scottish Court…”

Two days later, the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation in Libya expressed general agreement with the terms outlined in the letter from the US and the UK to the UN Secretary General.

A draft UN Resolution, covering the agreement and the modalities within which the trial was to be held, was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 27August 1998.

Our only remaining task then was to exhort the Libyan authorities to keep their promise and abide by the resolution. This the Libyan authorities did without fail.

As the saying goes, “The rest is history”!

As a footnote to this rather lengthy explanation as to why Malta should not be made to carry the burden of a negative image because of any involvement in the Lockerbie tragedy, it has to be said that, on the contrary, Malta has to be commended for undertaking such an onerous diplomatic task and for contributing in its small way to the solution of a political issue that could have had far worse consequences, had it been left to continue indefinitely for years.