[This is the headline over an article in today's edition of The Independent on Sunday. It claims that, as early as December 2003, the UK and US Governments were involved in negotiations designed to lead eventually to the repatriation of Abdelbaset Megrahi. What was sought in return was Libya's renunciation of its nuclear weapons programme, not trade or oil exploration concessions. The article reads in part:]
Tony Blair will be thrust into the controversy over the release of the Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi with questions in Parliament over a secret meeting the then Prime Minister orchestrated that brought Libya in from the cold.
MPs are set to demand the minutes of an extraordinary cloak-and-dagger summit in London between British, American and Libyan spies held three days before Mr Blair announced that Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was surrendering his weapons of mass destruction programme.
At the time of the secret meeting in December 2003 at the private Travellers Club in Pall Mall, London – for decades the favourite haunt of spies – Libyan officials were pressing for negotiations on the status of Megrahi, who was nearly three years into his life sentence at a Scottish jail.
Whitehall sources said the issue of Megrahi's imprisonment was raised as part of the discussions, although it is not clear whether Britain or America agreed to a specific deal over his imprisonment, or a more general indication that it would be reviewed.
MPs are to investigate what was promised by Britain at the talks on 16 December, and the role that Mr Blair played in the affair. Until now, the controversy over Megrahi's release last month has centred on discussions between Gordon Brown's government and the Scottish executive and Libya since 2007, with Mr Blair apparently not involved in any way.
It has also focused on claims that the deal was related to oil deals, with Jack Straw admitting yesterday that BP's interests in Libya played a "big part". But authoritative sources said the seeds for Megrahi's release were sown in 2003, when Libya made the historic agreement to end its status as a pariah, and that the focus on oil and trade was a "red herring".
Yesterday the Libyan Foreign Minister, Musa Kusa – who himself was present at the Travellers Club meeting – told The Times that Megrahi's release was "nothing to do with trade".
Two days after the meeting Mr Blair and Col Gaddafi held direct talks by telephone; and the next day, 19 December, the historic announcement about Libyan WMD was made by Mr Blair and President Bush. (...)
Nine top-level MI6, Foreign Office, CIA and Libyan officials were present for the negotiations at the Travellers Club. The revelation that two senior American officials were present risks causing embarrassment to the White House, as Washington has made clear its criticism of the release of Megrahi by the Scottish government last month. (...)
Last night, a spokesman for Mr Blair could not be drawn on the December 2003 meeting. In fact, The Independent on Sunday has established that Mr Blair's involvement with the Travellers Club meeting was at arm's length, via his then foreign affairs envoy, the current ambassador to Washington Sir Nigel Sheinwald. (...)
Sir Nigel was in Downing Street and was kept informed of negotiations. He in turn kept the Prime Minister up to date. Full details of the meeting, and the identities of those present, have not been revealed until now.
Mr Kusa, the Libyan head of external intelligence, was at the time banned from entering Britain after allegedly plotting to assassinate Libyan dissidents. But because of his closeness to Col Gaddafi, he was essential to the talks and was given safe passage to London. Also in the Libyan delegation was Abdulati [al-Obeidi], now the minister for Europe, who extracted the assurance from Foreign Office minister Bill Rammell this year that Mr Brown did not want Megrahi to die in a Scottish jail. Mr [al-Obeidi] said last week: "In my negotiations with the British and the Scottish, I didn't mention anything about trade relations."
For the Americans, Stephen Kappes, the CIA deputy director of operations, and Robert Joseph, counter-proliferation chief, led the talks. Britain was represented by William Ehrman, Foreign Office director general for defence and intelligence, and David Landsman, then the head of counter-proliferation at the Foreign Office. A CIA source said last night that a Lebanese businessman, while not at the meeting, was the key go-between, bringing together Libyan officials and British and US spies. The same businessman also put together a team of private investigators on Lockerbie to undermine the case against Megrahi.
An official with knowledge of the talks said of the Travellers Club meeting: "That was where the real negotiations were made."
[The same newspaper also publishes a leading article on the subject entitled "Megrahi: a small piece in the game".]
The excellent leading article in The Independent On Sunday concludes:
ReplyDelete"Like any good story, you have to hear the start of it to make sense of the ending. Once it is realised that the story began in 2003, the puzzling parts of last month's chapter fall into place. It explains why, although the Americans were angered by Megrahi's release, administration officials and President Obama did not sound properly outraged; they sounded as if they were reading from a script. It is doubtful whether the US would ever have been reconciled to Megrahi's transfer as a price worth paying for Libyan engagement, but the Bush administration was certainly closely involved in the broader policy of reconciliation. Partly because both Mr Obama and Mr Brown were acting out parts assigned to them by their predecessors, the feeling that a game is being played has been inescapable in the past few weeks.
"Once again, it is as if Mr Blair has got away with something – he is like a mischievous schoolboy who has rung the doorbell and run away, leaving his friend Gordon on the doorstep, taking the flak. Yet, once we have cut through the hypocrisies of diplomacy, the basic policy objective of drawing Libya into the international community was a justifiable one. Whether Megrahi's release was a price worth paying for that objective is a question that changed when it emerged that he had only a short time to live.
"But let that argument be contended on the basis of a clear-eyed understanding of what 'the deal' really was. And let us not be distracted by red herrings from the bigger picture of Megrahi's release – and from the pursuit of the more elusive truth of what happened over Lockerbie in 1988."
Our best hope of uncovering the more elusive truth of what happened must surely be by means of a United Nations Inquiry into the death of UN Commissioner, Bernt Carlsson, in the 1988 Lockerbie bombing (cf. http://petitions.number10.gov.uk/UNInquiry/).