The United States Empire

[What follows is excerpted from a long article by Washington DC attorney Bruce Fein headlined The United States Empire which was published yesterday on the website of The Washington Times:]

If the United States is not an empire, the word has lost all meaning.

No sparrow falls in the forest that does not provoke a national security assessment and response.

At present, we are employing military force in six countries — Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.

In 2011, we reduced Libya to rubble after Muammar Gaddafi did our bidding in abandoning weapons of mass destruction and in paying more than $1 billion to compensate for the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. (...)

We dot the planet with hundreds of military bases.

We police the oceans with aircraft carriers, submarines and battleships.

We dominate the skies with spy satellites, stealth aircraft, and hundreds of fighters and bombers.

We have outstanding economic sanctions against 20 nations for bad behavior.

We control cyberspace with the ubiquitous collection, retention, and search of electronic communications of friend and foe alike.

We expend $1 trillion annually on national security, a sum more than the collective defense expenditures of the rest of the world.

We honor secrecy more than transparency, a quest for a risk-free existence more than liberty.

We bedeck the presidency with the trappings of a Roman emperor, including a bloated Pretorian Guard and a White House staff approaching 500. Roads are closed and traffic stops whenever the president travels. (...)

In sum, the United States has become a full-fledged empire.

Acknowledging this truth is the first step to curing the disease. Otherwise, self-ruination will be our fate. As Abraham Lincoln presciently lectured: “At what point then is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it ever reach us, it must spring up amongst us. It cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen, we must live through all time, or die by suicide.”

More than a miscarriage of justice - a judicial scandal

[I have only today become aware of a long article on the Swiss INFOsperber website which was published in March 2011. It gives the views of, and includes a verbatim interview with, the distinguished Swiss lawyer Dr Dieter Neupert on the Lockerbie trial and is headlined Der Justiz-Skandal nach dem Lockerbie-Drama (The Judicial Scandal after the Lockerbie Drama). The article is in German, but Google Translate does a reasonably good job of providing an English-language version. Here is one paragraph, translated by me:]

On 31 January 2001 the surprising verdict was delivered: Fhimah was acquitted, while Al Megrahi was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. This was "a miscarriage of justice," says the prominent Scottish jurist Robert Black, in chorus with other legal scholars. The internationally renowned Swiss law professor Stefan Trechsel sees in the Lockerbie case "more than just a miscarriage of justice." It was a "judicial scandal as a result of an opaque intrigue, a real swamp," says Trechsel. (Am 31 Januar 2001 erfolgte das überraschende Urteil: Fhimah wurde freigesprochen, Al Megrahi hingegen für schuldig befunden – und zu lebenslanger Haft verurteilt. Dies sei «ein Fehlurteil», sagt der prominente schottische Jurist Robert Black, im Chor mit anderen Rechtsgelehrten. Der international bekannte Schweizer Rechtsprofessor Stefan Trechsel sieht im Fall Lockerbie «mehr als nur einen Justizirrtum». Es sei ein «Justiz-Skandal als Folge einer undurchsichtigen Intrige, ein richtiger Sumpf», sagt Trechsel.)

Lockerbie Lies & Libya

[This is the headline over an article published yesterday by writer Dean Henderson on his Left Hook website. Although interesting, it places excessive reliance on Juval Aviv’s Interfor Report and the Charles McKee/Monzer al-Kassar theory. Here is one paragraph from the article:]

Both the US and Britain have engaged in a cover-up of the facts. Columnist Jack Anderson reported a telephone conversation between President Bush Sr and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher after the crash in which both agreed that the investigation should be limited so as not to harm the nations’ intelligence communities.  Paul Hudson, an Albany, NY attorney who heads the group Families of Pan Am 103/Lockerbie, lost his 16-year-old daughter in the crash.  “It appears that the government either has the facts and is covering them up, or doesn’t know all the facts and doesn’t want to know”, says Hudson.  In April 1990, the group’s British counterpart UK Families-Flight 103 sent angry letters to both Bush and Thatcher which cited “entirely believable published accounts… Both of you have decided to deliberately downplay the evidence and string out the investigation until the case can be dismissed as ancient history.”

Material that would have exonerated Megrahi

What follows is taken from an item published on this blog on this date five years ago:

More Megrahi materials released

A second batch of materials has been released on Abdelbaset Megrahi’s website. These take the form of Grounds of Appeal numbers 3.1 to 3.3 (which would have been argued at the second stage of the – now abandoned – appeal that had been due to start on 2 November 2009) along with two expert reports and the US Department of Justice publication Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement.

These materials relate principally to the evidence emanating from Malta.

1. The credibility and reliability of the evidence of “identification” of Megrahi by Maltese shopkeeper, Tony Gauci, is challenged by reference to (a) new evidence about the circumstances in which Gauci’s various “resemblance” statements came to be made, including improper conduct by investigators; (b) failure by the Crown to disclose to the defence statements by Gauci that undermined or contradicted his “identification”; (c) failure to disclose to the defence the existence of, and a police statement by, a witness who may have been present when the purchase of the clothes in Gauci’s shop took place; (d) the expectation of money from US official sources on the part of Tony Gauci and his brother, Paul, and its subsequent payment to them; (e) evidence from two leading psychologists and experts on facial recognition of the unreliability of Gauci’s “identification” of Megrahi.

2. The Lockerbie court’s acceptance of 7 December 1988 as the date of purchase of the clothes and other items in Tony Gauci’s shop is challenged. Even on the material before the court at Zeist, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission had concluded that it was strongly arguable that no reasonable court could have reached the conclusion that this was the date. The materials released today disclose the existence of new evidence that confirms that the date of purchase was not 7 December 1988 (and hence that the purchaser was not Abdelbaset Megrahi).

The importance of this is, of course, that if the court at Zeist had not decided that Mr Megrahi was the purchaser of the clothes in Malta, they would not in law have been entitled to convict him.

The psychology of the USS Vincennes incident

A fascinating long extract from cognitive psychologist Viki McCabe’s recent OUP book Coming to Our Senses: Perceiving Complexity to Avoid Catastrophes has just been published on the UTNE website. The extract is headed Structural Perception in the USS Vincennes Incident and deals with the errors in perception by the captain of the ship that led to the shooting down of Iran Air flight 655, and what caused those errors. The following are brief extracts, but the whole piece deserves to be read:]

At 9:54 am on July 3, 1988, the US Navy cruiser Vincennes mistakenly shot down Iran Air’s Flight 655, killing all 290 people on board. It was the ninth worst incident in aeronautical history and to make it even worse, the decision that led to these deaths was based on a theory of the situation rather than on supporting evidence. (...)

When this incident began, the Vincennes was in Iranian territorial waters in violation of international law and had been mixing it up with several Iranian gunboats. At 9:47 a.m., a distant blip—an airplane lifting off from Bandar Abbas airport—was picked up by the Vincennes’ radar, whose crew responded immediately with a standard Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) query. They received a Mode 3 Commair response, which indentified the plane as a commercial airliner. But during the gunboat fracas circumstances on the Vincennes had become chaotic, and in the confusion the crew ended up providing mixed messages—one speculating that the blip could be an enemy F-14 fighter jet and another insisting the blip was a civilian plane.

“In the cramped and ambiguous combat environment of the Persian Gulf…the captain chose to rely on his own judgment.” He reportedly ran a simulation of the situation in his mind where he tried “to imagine what the pilot was thinking, what the pilot’s intent was.” His belief—that without direct evidence, we can nonetheless deduce what someone whom we do not know and cannot see is planning to do—could qualify as magic thinking. Yet without checking further, the captain developed the theory that the plane was an F-14 fighter and that it was diving directly at the Vincennes.

A simulation is not the situation itself. It is only a theory of the situation. A key point is that no one else actually saw this theorized threat. In fact, a crew member standing right behind the captain later “testified that he never saw indications that the aircraft was descending.” Further, the commander of a nearby frigate, the USS Sides, reported that his radar showed an ascending, not a descending plane. That plane was not only much larger than a fighter jet, but it was also flying in Iranian airspace over Iranian territorial waters on its regularly scheduled twice-weekly flight from Tehran, Iran to Dubai, United Arab Emirates via Bandar Abbas, Iran. The radar-tracking systems of the Sides and the Vincennes both covered that same airspace. When the record of the Vincennes’ tracking system was later reviewed, the information it showed was found to be identical to the one from the USS Sides. How was it that the captains of these two ships reported seeing such different situations? (...)

University of Michigan psychologist Richard Nisbett testified before Congress that both the Vincennes’ captain and his crew suffered from “expectancy bias.” Expectancy bias occurs when people expecting something to happen allow this to distort their view of what is actually happening to match their expectations. Nisbett proposed that because the Vincennes’ crew believed the blip was a hostile plane, they failed to see the ascending Airbus. Instead they apparently imagined a descending enemy fighter. But expectations, like simulations, are similar to theories. All three are mental versions of situations as opposed to perceptions that reveal the situations themselves. In other words, by pointing the finger at the people involved and their possible propensities to see what they expected to “see” instead of what was actually there, Nisbett overlooked the more basic role that substituting a cognitive for a perceptual process—a theory for actual evidence—played in promoting this event. We often forget that our cognitive processes lack windows on the world. They receive their information about what goes on outside ourselves from our perceptual systems. They then translate that complex intelligence into simpler symbolic forms that are often influenced by our preconceptions, theories, beliefs, and general worldview. Without such a theory to set the stage, the captain’s and the crew’s expectancy bias would have no ground upon which to play out.

The Navy compounded the situation by creating false videos to cover up what actually happened. The Iranians were enraged at such a maneuver and accused the United States of a “barbaric massacre” and “vowed to avenge the blood of their martyrs.” There have been unconfirmed rumors that to retaliate, the Ayatollah Khomeini retained a hit man who, on December 21, 1988, blew up Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. On November 16, 2003, the International Court of Justice concluded that the actions of the Vincennes in the Persian Gulf were unlawful. The most important fact to take away from this dismal tale is that the outcome would have been very different if the captain and crew of the Vincennes had simply put their theories aside and paid more attention to the information on the radar screen. That information revealed the true structure of this complex event in which the location of the blip, the commercial airspace on the radar, and the ascending Airbus in the sky were linchpin components.

Redeeming Scotland's reputation for justice and humanity

What follows is taken from an item posted on this blog four years ago on this date:

Doubts remain over Megrahi’s guilt because of payments made to ‘star’ witnesses

[This is the heading over a letter from Dr Jim Swire in today's edition of The Herald. It reads as follows:]

There has been widespread condemnation from the United States, in particular, of Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill’s decision to release Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi on compassionate grounds.

This condemnation must presuppose that the man was, indeed, guilty of playing a part in the Lockerbie atrocity, yet America is silent concerning the findings of Scotland’s Criminal Cases Review Commission, which indicated that there may have been a miscarriage of justice.

It may be an uncomfortable exercise for the senators, but perhaps they should don their reading glasses and look a lot closer to home. If they will examine the website of their own Rewards for Justice Program in Washington DC, they will find Megrahi’s name among those brought to “justice” by disbursement of RfJ funds.

If they will then look at the website set up on behalf of Megrahi by his defence team, they will find extracts from a policeman’s diary kept during the investigations into Lockerbie on the island of Malta.

These extracts show that the policeman knew that the shopkeeper Tony Gauci, who later claimed haltingly to identify Megrahi in court as the buyer of the clothes, (remains of which were found at the crash site), was increasingly aware of, and excited by, the offer of substantial reward for him if he would give evidence leading to the conviction of Megrahi. All this, of course, long before Mr Gauci actually did give his evidence in court.

If the proprietor of a small Glasgow clothing store, struggling to feed his family, were to be told that if he gave evidence that he had seen a certain individual buy clothes from his shop some years before, he would receive a gift of $2m, would you trust his evidence? The senators might also like to look at the material surrounding a witness known as Giaka, alleged, in the run up to the trial, to be a “star” witness, but who was shown in court to have been on the payroll of the CIA from before Lockerbie and whose evidence was, therefore, seen as suspect by the court. They might also demand a sight of the suite of CIA cables surrounding this man.

Nor need Westminster feel virtuous. Why did the Metropolitan Police investigation into the break-in at Heathrow the night before Lockerbie remain hidden until after the verdict had been reached? The Crown Office has told me it knew nothing about this until after the verdict.

Why did Lady Thatcher write in 1993 in her memoirs, The Downing Street Years, that, following her support for the USAF bombing of Tripoli and Bengazi in 1986 (two years before Lockerbie) “… there was a marked decline in Libyan-sponsored terrorism in succeeding years”.

We see that Scotland, to whom the solemn task of trying the accused was passed, was on the receiving end of external political interference in what should have been a purely criminal case.

If the senators want to know the truth about this appalling atrocity, let them throw their weight behind the need for a process to be set up within Scotland, objectively to review the case against Megrahi.

Only we ourselves, in the absence of Megrahi’s appeal, can redeem our country’s reputation for justice and humanity, and ensure that our own citizens are protected by a wise and independent judicial system.

Inherent improbability of Malta ingestion of Lockerbie bomb

[What follows is an article by Maltese journalist, author and lawyer Joe Mifsud published in September 2000, while the Zeist trial was in progress, on TheLockerbieTrial.com, a website edited by Ian Ferguson and me. In it he points out the inherent improbability of Malta’s being the place of ingestion of the Lockerbie bomb.]

A terrorist, like any other criminal, will do what he can to cover his tracks.  The Maltese origin of clothing in the bomb suitcase does not establish that either the suitcase or the bomb was once in Malta.

The clothing in the bomb suitcase, which was identifiable as having been manufactured in Malta, bore labels to this effect, enabled Royal Armament Research and Development (RARDE) to determine the country of origin as Malta.  So these labels had not been removed by the terrorists.

The Lockerbie investigators established that six items of the clothing and an umbrella, which originated in Malta were new and had been purchased new from the same shop in Malta on the same occasion.

These items of clothing had been purchased from Mary’s House in Sliema, weeks not days before 21st December 1988.  The prosecution is claiming that the clothes were bought on the 7th December, while the defence is suggesting the 23rd November 1988 as the date.

In my opinion the facts and matters set out above are consistent with an attempt by the terrorists to distract the attention of the investigating authorities away from Frankfurt or Heathrow to Malta in the event of the bomb being detected or as in fact happened of the bomb exploding above land and debris from the bomb and the bomb suitcase being recovered.

It is inherently unlikely that terrorists would have tried to place the bomb suitcase on board Air Malta KM 180 on the 21st December 1988 for the following four reasons.

1.  Terrorists do not expose themselves and their plans to any unnecessary risk of detention or of error.

2.  Accordingly the terrorists responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103 would not have routed the bomb suitcase through Frankfurt and chosen to run the risk of it passing undetected through the security systems of three different airports on two different airlines when Air Malta during that period flew only three flights each week to Frankfurt but ten flights each week to Heathrow.

3.  Further if the bomb consisted of a timer device, terrorists would not have run the unpredictable risk of the passage of the bomb suitcase being delayed in one or more of the following ways:

a)  on the ground at Luqa as a result of mechanical failure, poor weather, security alert, air traffic control or any other reason;

b)  by being diverted away from Frankfurt for any of the reasons at above;

c)  above Frankfurt as a result of air traffic control delays for incoming flights (as in fact happened);

d)  by missing the interline connection at Frankfurt as a result of the bomb suitcase being lost, mishandled or detected in the course of x-ray or baggage reconciliation procedures;

e)  on the ground at Frankfurt for any of the reasons at (a) above;

f)  by being diverted away from Heathrow for any of the reasons at (a) above;

g)  above Heathrow as a result of air traffic control delays for incoming flights;

h)  by missing the interline connection at Heathrow for any of the reasons at (d) above;

i)   on the ground at Heathrow as a result of the connecting transatlantic aircraft being delayed, mechanical failure, poor weather, security alert or any other reason.

4.  Further if the bomb consisted of a barometric pressure device triggered by altitude which itself triggered a timer, terrorists could not have avoided (alternatively would not have risked) the bomb being prematurely triggered on board KM 180 or on board Pan Am 103A from Frankfurt to Heathrow, and then detonating on board either of these flights or on the ground at Frankfurt or at Heathrow.

No terrorist could have predicted in advance the exact altitude at which either flight would have flown or, if such a prediction had been made, no terrorist could have guaranteed that the aircraft would have remained at that altitude and would not have been ordered away from it by air traffic control.  The bomb on board Pan Am 103 exploded approximately 35 minutes after take-off from Heathrow.

It is not clear for me why the Lockerbie investigators choose to blame Malta and Air Malta in this case, when it is so clear that we are the scapegoats for others that lacked security at their airports.

Joe Mifsud is currently following the Lockerbie Trial at Camp Zeist for ONE News and Kullhadd.

The winding path towards a Lockerbie trial

[On this date sixteen years ago a letter from me was published in The Scotsman. It read as follows:]

Your report ("Lockerbie suspects' lawyers sacked", 24 September [1998]) claims the new Libyan defence team had been appointed by the Libyan Government (or by Colonel Gaddafi).  What evidence is there for this?

I met five members of the team in Tripoli last Monday.  The chairman, Kamel Hassan Maghur, said he and his colleagues (who include the present President of the Tripoli Bar Association and the most senior past-President) had been appointed by the two suspects themselves; that their sole concern was with representing the interests of their clients;  that those interests did not necessarily coincide with the wishes or interests of the Libyan Government; and that if the Government sought to interfere in their work or to influence in any way the advice which the lawyers might render to their clients, they would not hesitate to publicise this fact in the international media.

Mr Maghur (who as well as being a former Foreign Minister, is also a retired Libyan Supreme Court judge) said nothing to indicate that his team wished to dispense with the services of Alistair Duff, the Edinburgh solicitor who for many years has represented the two suspects in Scotland: indeed, quite the reverse.

If, as you state, Dr Ibrahim Legwell is claiming (a) still to represent the suspects and (b) that the new team has been foisted on them without their consent, then this conflict should be speedily resolved by direct consultation with the accused themselves.  I was deeply impressed by the professionalism, commitment and independence of the Libyan lawyers. If they do indeed now represent the suspects, I am convinced that their interests are in capable hands.

[This letter appears no longer to feature in The Scotsman’s online archives. It, and other material relating to the change in Megrahi and Fhimah’s Libyan legal team, can be found here.]

Criminal acts and the Lockerbie evidence

What follows is the text of an item posted on this blog four years ago on this date:

Angiolini tells Parliament “no evidence of any criminal act” in Pan Am 103 evidence chain

[This is the headline over a news item just published on the website of Scottish lawyers' magazine The Firm. It relates to the written answers given by the Lord Advocate to questions submitted by Christine Grahame MSP. The news item reads in part:]

The Lord Advocate has told the Holyrood Parliament that “there is no evidence of any criminal act having been carried out in relation to any of the forensic evidence in the Lockerbie investigation.” 

Elish Angiolini was responding to a Parliamentary question from MSP Christine Grahame (...)

Grahame asked Angiolini if she was aware of the reported comments of former FBI scientist Frederic Whitehurst implying that the FBI laboratory in Washington DC may constitute an additional crime scene in the case. 

Former Lord Advocate at the time of the trial, Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, has stated publicly in a television interview for Dutch television in 2009 that he was not aware that the timer fragment known as PT35 was sent to the United States of America for examination by FBI officials, and that he would have opposed such transportation of this fragment on the basis of concerns that it might be lost in transit or provoke accusations that it had been tampered with. 

Angiolini said in her Parliamentary answer that she was aware of this information, and confirmed that the fragment was taken to the United States of America by Scottish police officers and a British forensic scientist in June 1990 as part of the investigation into the Lockerbie event. 

"There is no evidence of any criminal act having been carried out in relation to any of the forensic evidence in the Lockerbie investigation," she said.

“The fragment remained in the custody and control of the Scottish police officers and the British forensic scientist during the visit to the United States and was subsequently identified as having come from an electronic timer manufactured by a Swiss company, MEBO, to the order of the Libyan intelligence service,” she said. 

In July 2007, one week after the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the case back to High Court for Megrahi’s appeal, former MEBO employee Ulrich Lumpert swore an affidavit stating that he had personally manufactured the fragment, and that it had been introduced falsely into the Crown’s evidence chain. He said that he handed the fragment to authorities investigating the case on 22 June 1989, and admitted committing perjury in the Zeist trial, citing fear of his life if his testimony reflected what he narrated in his affidavit. (...)

Angiolini's answers did not narrate what investigations may have been undertaken within the Crown Office or in Scottish police forces to reach the conclusion that there was no evidence of criminal acts.

This is not the first time the conduct of the trail and its handling has been considered a crime. On 14 October 2005, UN Special Observer Hans Koechler concluded that the conduct of the trial of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmend Al Megrahi had concerned him to the extent that a crime may have taken place at Camp Zeist to manufacture the conviction of Megrahi. 

“The falsification of evidence, selective presentation of evidence, manipulation of reports, interference into the conduct of judicial proceedings by intelligence services, etc. are criminal offenses in any country,” Koechler's office said in a statement. 

“In view of the above new revelations and in regard to previously known facts as reported in Dr. Koechler’s reports, the question of possible criminal responsibility, under Scots law, of people involved in the Lockerbie trial should be carefully studied by the competent prosecutorial authorities.”

[RB 2014: While the Lord Advocate in 2010 may have believed that there was no evidence of any criminal act having been carried out in relation to any of the forensic evidence in the Lockerbie investigation, no such belief can be honestly held today in the light of the revelation that PT35 had a metallurgical profile entirely different from the circuit boards in the timers supplied by MEBO to Libya. And, since the Crown knew this long before 2010 (indeed before the Zeist trial in 2000-2001) but did not disclose it to the defence, it is perhaps permissible to be somewhat sceptical that that belief was honestly held within the Crown Office in 2010. This issue features among the allegations of criminal conduct in the Lockerbie investigation, prosecution and trial that are currently under investigation by Police Scotland.]

US Attorney General resigns

Eric Holder has submitted his resignation as Attorney General of the United States. His interventions in the Lockerbie case can be followed here. At least as far as the Lockerbie case is concerned, his tenure was not a distinguished one.

Greenock, Musselburgh and Edinburgh perfomances of Lockerbie - Lost Voices

[There are to be performances of Lee Gershuny’s play Lockerbie: Lost Voices at the Beacon Arts Centre in Greenock on Friday 3 October 2014; at The Brunton in Musselburgh on Saturday 11 October; and at the Scottish Storytelling Centre, Edinburgh on Friday 7 and Saturday 8 November. The play was first performed, to considerable acclaim, at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival in 2013. What follows is from an article published yesterday on the Inverclyde Now website:]

A play that looks at the Lockerbie plane bombing from the viewpoint of six hypothetical passengers comes to The Beacon, Greenock, next week.

Lockerbie – Lost Voices is being staged by The Elements World Theatre, an Edinburgh based new writing company. The play premiered to great acclaim during the 2013 Edinburgh Fringe.

It comes to the Beacon Studio Theatre on Friday 3 October at 7:30 pm. Tickets are £10 (£8 concessions), available online or from the box office on 01475 723723.

The play gives voice to six hypothetical passengers both before and after flight Pan Am 103 explodes over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988.

It takes them out of the anonymity of a statistic and reveals courage, love and humour in their real family relationships just moments before they die. Their personal conflicts draw the audience into the intimate, thought-provoking issues raised in the characters’ personal lives, making the actual explosion even more shocking.

In the final scenes, the dead passengers honour the lives they have lived while presiding over their own funeral and creating an opportunity for the audience to participate in a dramatic requiem. Speaking from the neutrality of death, the characters also give voice to those whose published reports challenged the official version of the disaster.

Many Scots feel that Megrahi was unjustly convicted

[What follows is an excerpt from an article published on this date in 2009 in The New York Times and reproduced on this blog:]

In Scotland, opinion polls show a mixed reaction to the Megrahi release. A BBC poll found the majority were opposed to the decision. But polls in local newspapers found heavy majorities applauding it, and in an Internet poll conducted by The Firm, a magazine for lawyers, judges and others in the legal profession, some 69 percent of responders said they supported the release.

And, as a complicating factor, many Scots — including influential members of the legal establishment — feel that Mr Megrahi was unjustly convicted and should never have been imprisoned in the first place.

Among them are Robert Black, the lawyer who helped broker the deal to hold the Lockerbie trial in the Netherlands rather than in Scotland; and Hans Koechler, the United Nations observer at the trial, who called the guilty verdict “inconsistent” and “arbitrary,” and has been a harsh critic of Scottish justice.

Mr Megrahi has always maintained his innocence. His first appeal failed, but an influential group called the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission then referred his case back for another appeal, saying that it believed he “may have suffered a miscarriage of justice.”

Mr Megrahi dropped the appeal in August, a tactic that he thought would help his chances of being released early, his lawyer said. But he has begun publishing on the Internet the legal arguments he had planned to use, as a way toward establishing his innocence.

In the Scottish Parliament, Kenny MacAskill, Scotland’s justice secretary, defended his decision to release Mr Megrahi on compassionate grounds, saying that humanity “is viewed as a defining characteristic” of Scotland.

In fact, releasing terminally ill prisoners is fairly standard practice in Scotland. Since 1997, 31 prisoners, including Mr Megrahi, have applied for compassionate release. Twenty-four have had their applications granted; the remaining seven did not meet the medical criteria, in which, generally, the prisoner is deemed likely to die within three months.

“Our justice system demands that judgment be imposed but compassion be available,” Mr MacAskill told Parliament. “Our beliefs dictate that justice be served, but mercy be shown.”