On
28 June 2007 the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission referred
Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi’s conviction of the Lockerbie bombing back to
the High Court of Justiciary for a further appeal. The case had been
under consideration by the SCCRC since September 2003 and its
statement of reasons (available only to Megrahi, to the Crown and to
the High Court) extends to over 800 pages, accompanied by thirteen
volumes of appendices. The Commission, in the published summary
of its findings, rejected submissions on behalf of Megrahi to the
effect that evidence led at the trial had been fabricated and that he
had been inadequately represented by his then legal team, but went on
to indicate that there were six grounds upon which it had concluded
that a miscarriage of justice might have occurred. Strangely
enough, however, only four of these grounds are enumerated in the
summary. They are as follows:
“A
number of the submissions made on behalf of the applicant challenged
the reasonableness of the trial court's verdict, based on the legal
test contained in section 106(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1995. The Commission rejected the vast majority of
those submissions. However, in examining one of the grounds, the
Commission formed the view that there is no reasonable basis in the
trial court's judgment for its conclusion that the purchase of the
items from Mary's House, took place on 7 December 1988. Although it
was proved that the applicant was in Malta on several
occasions in December 1988, in terms of the evidence 7 December was
the only date on which he would have had the opportunity to purchase
the items. The finding as to the date of purchase was therefore
important to the trial court's conclusion that the applicant was the
purchaser. Likewise, the trial court's conclusion that the applicant
was the purchaser was important to the verdict against him. Because
of these factors the Commission has reached the view that the
requirements of the legal test may be satisfied in the applicant's
case.
“New
evidence not heard at the trial concerned the date on which the
Christmas lights were illuminated in thearea of Sliema in which
Mary's House is situated. In the Commission's view,taken together
with Mr Gauci's evidence at trial and the contents of his police
statements, this additional evidence indicates that the purchase of
the items took place prior to 6 December 1988. In other words, it
indicates that the purchase took place at a time when there was no
evidence at trial that the applicant was in Malta.
“Additional evidence, not made available to the defence, which indicates that four days prior to the identification parade at which Mr Gauci picked out the applicant, he saw a photograph of the applicant in a magazine article linking him to the bombing. In the Commission's view evidence of Mr Gauci's exposure to this photograph in such close proximity to the parade undermines the reliability of his identification of the applicant at that time and at the trial itself.
“Other evidence, not made available to the defence, which the Commission believes may further undermine Mr Gauci's identification of the applicant as the purchaser and the trial court's finding as to the date of purchase.”
The implications for the verdict of guilty
“Additional evidence, not made available to the defence, which indicates that four days prior to the identification parade at which Mr Gauci picked out the applicant, he saw a photograph of the applicant in a magazine article linking him to the bombing. In the Commission's view evidence of Mr Gauci's exposure to this photograph in such close proximity to the parade undermines the reliability of his identification of the applicant at that time and at the trial itself.
“Other evidence, not made available to the defence, which the Commission believes may further undermine Mr Gauci's identification of the applicant as the purchaser and the trial court's finding as to the date of purchase.”
The implications for the verdict of guilty
The
reasons given by the Commission for finding that a miscarriage of
justice may have occurred in this case are not limited to the effect
of new evidence which has become available since the date of the
original trial and the non-disclosure by the police and prosecution
of evidence helpful to the defence. The prima facie miscarriage
of justice identified by the Commission includes the trial court’s
finding in fact on the evidence heard at the trial that
the clothes which surrounded the bomb were purchased in Malta on
7 December 1988 and that Megrahi was the purchaser. This was the
very cornerstone of the Crown’s case against him. If, as
suggested by the Commission, that finding in fact had no reasonable
basis in the evidence, then there is no legal justification
whatsoever for his conviction by the trial court.
The implications for the Scottish criminal justice system
The
present writer has always contended that no reasonable tribunal could
have convicted Megrahi on the evidence led at the trial. Here is
just one example of the trial court’s idiosyncratic approach to the
evidence. Many more could be provided.
A
vitally important issue was the date on which the goods that
surrounded the bomb were purchased in a shop in Malta. There
were only two live possibilities: 7 December 1988, a date when
Megrahi was proved to be on Malta and 23 November 1988 when
he was not. In an attempt to establish just which of these dates was
the correct one, the weather conditions in Sliema on these two days
were explored. The shopkeeper’s evidence was that when the
purchaser left his shop it was raining so heavily that his customer
thought it advisable to buy an umbrella to protect himself while he
went in search of a taxi. The unchallenged meteorological
evidence led by the defence established that while it had rained on
23 November at the relevant time, it was unlikely that it had rained
at all on 7 December; and if there had been any rain, it would have
been at most a few drops, insufficient to wet the ground. On
this material, the judges found in fact that the clothes were
purchased on 7 December.
On
evidence as weak as this how was it possible for the trial court to
find him guilty? And how was it possible for the Criminal
Appeal Court to fail to overturn that conviction? The
Criminal Appeal Court dismissed Megrahi’s appeal on the most
technical of technical legal grounds: it did not consider the
justifiability of the trial court’s factual findings at all (though
it is clear from their interventions during the Crown submissions in
the appeal that at least some of the judges were only too well aware
of how shaky certain crucial findings were and how contrary to the
weight of the evidence).
It
is submitted that at least part of the answer lies in the history of
the Scottish legal and judicial system. For centuries judges
have accorded a specially privileged status to the Lord Advocate. It
has been unquestioningly accepted that, though a political appointee
and the government’s (now the Scottish Executive’s) chief legal
adviser, he (now, of course, she) would at all times, in his capacity
as head of the prosecution system, act independently and without
concern for political considerations and would always place the
public interest in a fair trial above the narrow interest of the
prosecution in gaining a conviction.
This judicial vision of the
role of the Lord Advocate was reinforced by the fact that, until the
Scottish Judicial Appointments Board commenced operations in 2002,
all Scottish High Court Judges (and sheriffs) were nominated for
appointment to the Bench by the Lord Advocate of the day. This
meant that, in all criminal proceedings, the presiding judge owed his
position to the person (or one of his predecessors in office) who was
ultimately responsible for bringing the case before him, and for its
conduct while in his court.
The
behaviour of the Crown in the Lockerbie trial was certainly not
beyond criticism – indeed
casts grave doubt on the extent to which the Lord Advocate and Crown
Office staff can be relied on always to place the interest of
securing a fair trial for the accused above any perceived
institutional imperative to obtain a conviction. To illustrate this
in the context of the Lockerbie trial it is enough to refer to the
saga of CIA cables relating to the star Crown witness, Abdul Majid
Giaka, who had been a long-standing CIA asset in Libya and, by the
time of the trial, was living in the United States under a witness
protection programme.
Giaka’s
evidence was ultimately found by the court to be utterly unworthy of
belief. This was largely due to the devastating
effectiveness of the cross-examination by defence counsel. Their
ability to destroy completely the credibility of the witness stemmed
from the contents of cables in which his CIA handlers communicated to
headquarters the information that Giaka had provided to them in the
course of their secret meetings. Discrepancies between Giaka's
evidence-in-chief to the Advocate Depute and the contents of these
contemporaneous cables enabled the defence to mount a formidable
challenge to the truthfulness and accuracy, or credibility and
reliability, of Giaka's testimony. Had the information contained
in these cables not been available to them, the task of attempting to
demonstrate to the court that Giaka was an incredible or unreliable
witness would have been immensely more difficult and perhaps
impossible.
Yet
the Crown strove valiantly to prevent the defence obtaining access to
these cables.
At
the trial, on 22 August 2000, when he was seeking to persuade the
Court to deny the defence access to those cables in their unedited or
uncensored form, the then Lord Advocate, Colin Boyd QC, stated
that the members of the prosecution team who were given access to the
uncensored CIA cables on 1 June 2000 were fully aware of the
obligation incumbent upon them as prosecutors to make available to
the defence material relevant to the defence of the accused and, to
that end, approached the contents of those cables with certain
considerations in mind.
Mr
Boyd said: "First of all, they considered whether or not
there was any information behind the redactions which would undermine
the Crown case in any way. Secondly, they considered whether
there was anything which would appear to reflect on the credibility
of Mr Majid… On all of these matters, the learned Advocate Depute
reached the conclusion that there was nothing within the cables which
bore on the defence case, either by undermining the Crown case or by
advancing a positive case which was being made or may be made, having
regard to the special defence... I emphasise that the redactions have
been made on the basis of what is in the interests of the security of
a friendly power... Crown counsel was satisfied that there was
nothing within the documents which bore upon the defence case in any
way."
One
of the judges, Lord Coulsfield, then intervened: "Does that
include, Lord Advocate ... that Crown counsel, having considered the
documents, can say to the Court that there is nothing concealed which
could possibly bear on the credibility of this witness?"
The
Lord Advocate replied: "Well, I'm just checking with the
counsel who made that... there is nothing within the -- -- there
is nothing within these documents which relates to Lockerbie or the
bombing of Pan Am 103 which could in any way impinge on the
credibility of Mr Majid on these
matters."
Notwithstanding
the opposition of the Lord Advocate, the court ordered the unedited
cables to be made available to the defence, who went on to use their
contents to such devastating effect in questioning Giaka that the
court held that his evidence had to be disregarded in its
entirety. Yet, strangely enough, the judges did not see fit
publicly to censure the Crown for its inaccurate assurances that the
cables contained nothing that could assist the defence.
Beyond
the Lockerbie trial, the failure of the Crown to place the public
interest in a fair trial above the interest of the prosecution in
obtaining convictions is illustrated by the extent to which the Lord
Advocate has recently had to be dragged, kicking and screaming,
through the Privy Council in London before making available to the
defence material in the prosecution’s possession that no-one could
conceivably deny was of relevance and assistance in the accused
person’s defence: see Holland v
HMA 2005
SCCR 417; Sinclair
v HMA 2005
SCCR 446. So
much for the fairness of the trial being the Crown’s
primary and predominant motivation!
“When
I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought
as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things.” I
Corinthians xiii.11. It is high time for all involved in the Scottish
criminal justice system to put away childish things. All of us,
judges included, are surely too old to believe any longer in fairy
tales. Fairy tales can be convenient and comforting and can bolster
our self esteem. But, as in the case of the belief that the Crown can
uniformly be relied upon always to act selflessly in the public
interest, they can be dangerous and, if acted upon, work terrible
injustice.
It
is submitted that the Lockerbie case demonstrates just how necessary
it is, if public confidence is to be maintained, for the Scottish
Executive to institute a high-powered, independent, investigation
into all three aspects -- investigation, prosecution and
adjudication -- of the Scottish criminal justice system.
MISSION LOCKERBIE, 2012 (google translation, german/english):
ReplyDeleteThere is a new way to break into the Evidence- Fraud in the "Lockerbie Criminal Scene".
On the demand of the international legal assistance between the Swiss authorities and Lord Advocate of Scotland, Edwin Bollier and MEBO Ltd.- subject the evidence tampering of the MST-13 timer fragment under police label (PT-35; PT-35/b; DP-31/a). The matter was introduced already (4.July,'12) by the lawyer office Bosonnet & Wick (Zurich/Switzerland).
by Edwin and Mahnaz Bollier, MEBO Ltd. Switzerland. URL: www.lockerbie.ch
The Scottish Parliament tried in the "Lockerbie Crime Scene" on time play. Sad for the Scottish future...
ReplyDeleteI don't understand either of these comments.
ReplyDelete