First sitting of High Court at Camp Zeist

[On this date in 1999 a High Court judge sat for the first time in the Scottish Court in the Netherlands at Camp Zeist. The following are extracts from two reports to be found here and here in The Guardian:]

1.   The prosecution today won the first skirmish in the Lockerbie trial when a Scottish judge ruled that the two Libyan suspects in the Pan Am bombing should stand on conspiracy to murder charges.

In a significant victory for the prosecution ahead of next year's trial, presiding judge Lord Ranald Sutherland rejected a defence motion that the conspiracy to murder charges must be dropped because the December 1988 bombing which killed 270 people had not been planned on Scottish soil.

"I am satisfied that on the basis of what is set out in Charge 1, Scottish courts do have jurisdiction," judge Sutherland said. "When ... a crime of the utmost gravity has been conspired abroad, it appears to me quite illogical to say that we cannot put the conspirators on trial in Scotland, even though the conspiracy has been entered into abroad."

The judge also rejected a defence argument that that the suspects' alleged membership in the Libyan intelligence service was irrelevant to the case, saying "there is sufficient connection" to the men's background and the charges against them. (...)

The defence also wanted the description of the men as Libyan intelligence agents struck from the indictment, asserting that it casts doubt on the character of the defendants in violation of Scottish judicial procedures. The lead prosecutor, Scottish solicitor general Colin Boyd, rejected the notion that the court lacks jurisdiction and said the defendants' alleged membership in the Libyan intelligence agency was "the glue that holds the conspiracy together".

Mr Boyd also maintained that while the plan to blow up the jet was formed in Europe and north Africa, it was a "continuing crime" that ended only at the moment of the explosion over Scotland.

Legal experts said that despite the prosecution's weak showing on Tuesday, when Mr Boyd fumbled in rebutting defence arguments, there was a strong enough legal basis to support the court's authority to hear the conspiracy charges.

2.  Presiding over a pre-trial hearing at a specially-constituted court in the Netherlands, Lord Sutherland struck a serious blow at defence efforts by dismissing arguments that the two men should not face a count of conspiracy.

But he agreed to delay the start of the trial until May 3, and warned that witnesses appearing for the prosecution of Abdel Basset al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fahima could not be heavily disguised, despite fears for their safety.

Colin Boyd QC, solicitor-general for Scotland, had referred to the need to protect serving CIA officers as well as former officers of the East German ministry of state security - the Stasi - and a Libyan defector and witness named Abdul Majid Abdul-Salam Giaka, now believed to be living in the US.

Also included in the prosecution request were a Swedish intelligence officer, a Maltese woman translator, and a member of the British security services - "Mr A".

William Taylor QC, for Megrahi, complained: "It would be a travesty of justice and inevitably restrict the court's examination of those individuals."

Lord Sutherland said: "'The court must have regard to the demeanour of a witness, including facial expressions."

Granting the defence request to put back the start of the trial, originally due to start on February 2, the judge said: "It is abundantly clear from the nature of the indictment ... that preparation of the defence case is one of exceptional difficulty."

Over 1,100 witnesses and more than 2,300 documents are expected to be considered in the case against the two Libyans, accused of murder, conspiracy to murder and contravention of the aviation security act for their alleged role in the bombing of PanAm Flight 103 on December 21, 1988.

7 December or 23 November 1988?

In my article Lockerbie: A satisfactory process but a flawed result I set out, and comment upon, the nine pieces of evidence upon which (and upon which alone) the trial court convicted Abdelbaset Megrahi. Here are three of them:]

4. The suitcase which contained the bomb also contained clothes and an umbrella bought in a particular shop, Mary’s House, in Sliema, Malta.

5. Megrahi was identified by the Maltese shopkeeper as the person who bought the clothes and umbrella.

Commentary. The most that the Maltese shopkeeper, Tony Gauci, would say (either in his evidence in court or at an identification parade before the trial or in a series of nineteen police statements over the years) was that Megrahi “resembled a lot” the purchaser, a phrase which he equally used with reference to Abu Talb, one of those mentioned in the special defence of incrimination lodged on behalf of Megrahi. Gauci had also described his customer to the police as being six feet [183 cms] tall and over fifty years of age. The evidence at the trial established (i) that Megrahi is five feet eight inches [173 cms] tall and (ii) that in late 1988 he was thirty-six years of age. On this material, the judges found in fact that Megrahi was the purchaser.

6. The purchases were made on 7 December 1988, a date when Megrahi was proved to be on Malta and not on 23 November 1988 when he was not.

Commentary. By reference to the dates on which international football matches were broadcast on television on Malta, Tony Gauci was able to narrow down the date of purchase of the items in question to either 23 November or 7 December. In an attempt to establish just which, the weather conditions in Sliema on these two days were explored. Gauci’s evidence was that when the purchaser left his shop it was raining to such an extent that his customer thought it advisable to buy an umbrella to protect himself while he went in search of a taxi. The unchallenged meteorological evidence led by the defence established that while it had rained on 23 November at the relevant time, it was unlikely that it had rained at all on 7 December; and if there had been any rain, it would have been at most a few drops, insufficient to wet the ground. On this material, the judges found in fact that the clothes were purchased on 7 December.

[RB: Here is what the SCCRC had to say about this in its press release announcing that it had referred Megrahi’s conviction back to the High Court:]

A number of the submissions made on behalf of the applicant challenged the reasonableness of the trial court's verdict, based on the legal test contained in section 106(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 [that, on the evidence, no reasonable court could have reached the conclusion that the trial court reached]. The Commission rejected the vast majority of those submissions. However, in examining one of the grounds, the Commission formed the view that there is no reasonable basis in the trial court's judgment for its conclusion that the purchase of the items from Mary's House, took place on 7 December 1988. Although it was proved that the applicant was in Malta on several occasions in December 1988, in terms of the evidence 7 December was the only date on which he would have had the opportunity to purchase the items. The finding as to the date of purchase was therefore important to the trial court's conclusion that the applicant was the purchaser. Likewise, the trial court's conclusion that the applicant was the purchaser was important to the verdict against him. Because of these factors the Commission has reached the view that the requirements of the legal test may be satisfied in the applicant's case.

A highly personal smear campaign

[What follows is the text of an item originally posted on this blog on this date in 2009:]

Lockerbie doubters branded ‘Holocaust deniers’

[This is the headline over a report in today's Scottish edition of The Sunday Times. It reads as follows:]

A representative of families of American victims of the Lockerbie disaster has likened those questioning the guilt of the convicted Libyan bomber to “Holocaust deniers”.

Frank Duggan, an official spokesman for Victims of Pan Am Flight 103, described those who believe Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi is innocent as a “shameless band of conspiracy mavens”.

Those criticised include Christine Grahame, the nationalist MSP, her researcher Mark Hirst, Robert Black, the Edinburgh-based legal expert who helped broker Megrahi’s trial in the Netherlands and Gareth Peirce, the London-based human rights lawyer.

In an email sent to Richard Marquise, a former FBI official who headed the investigation, Duggan said Grahame, Hirst, Black and Peirce were “no worse than Holocaust deniers who will not accept the facts before their faces”.

Grahame, who believes that Iran, not Libya, was behind the 1988 bombing, which claimed 270 lives, said Duggan’s comments were ludicrous. “My father and the fathers and grandfathers of many of the other people who are seeking the truth about who attacked Pan Am 103 were fighting the perpetrators of the Holocaust for three years before the US saw fit to get involved,” she said.

Hirst accused Duggan of a “highly personal” smear campaign against those who doubted the safety of Megrahi’s conviction.

The row reflects anger among the families of the American victims at the decision by Kenny MacAskill, the justice minister, to free Megrahi on compassionate grounds. Megrahi, who has terminal prostate cancer, has outlived his three-month prognosis. Last week, MacAskill defended his decision to a Holyrood inquiry into the handling of Megrahi’s release, insisting that the medical advice was “quite clear”.

US intelligence files published last week claim Megrahi was involved in buying and developing chemical weapons for Libya.

Black declined to comment and Peirce was unavailable for comment.

[I declined to comment since I was unwilling to descend into the gutter with Mr Duggan.

The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission which, on six grounds, found that Mr Megrahi's conviction may have amounted to a miscarriage of justice, no better than Holocaust deniers, forsooth!

According to The Chambers Dictionary "maven" or "mavin" is US slang, from Yiddish, for pundit or expert.

The full e-mail exchange between Mr Duggan, Richard Marquise and Mr Hirst can be read here.

An interesting commentary (in German) on The Sunday Times article can be found on the Austrian Wings website. A more general article on the Lockerbie affair on the same website by Editor in Chief Patrick Radosta can be read here.]

The Helsinki warning

What follows is an excerpt from the Wikipedia article Pan Am Flight 103 (footnotes omitted):]

On 5 December 1988 (16 days prior to the attack), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a security bulletin saying that, on that day, a man with an Arabic accent had telephoned the US Embassy in Helsinki, Finland, and told them that a Pan Am flight from Frankfurt to the United States would be blown up within the next two weeks by someone associated with the Abu Nidal Organization; he said a Finnish woman would carry the bomb on board as an unwitting courier.

The anonymous warning was taken seriously by the U.S. government, and the State Department cabled the bulletin to dozens of embassies. The FAA sent it to all US carriers, including Pan Am, which had charged each of the passengers a $5 security surcharge, promising a "program that will screen passengers, employees, airport facilities, baggage and aircraft with unrelenting thoroughness"; the security team in Frankfurt found the warning under a pile of papers on a desk the day after the bombing. One of the Frankfurt security screeners, whose job was to spot explosive devices under X-ray, told ABC News that she had first learned what Semtex (a plastic explosive) was during her ABC interview 11 months after the bombing.

On 13 December, the warning was posted on bulletin boards in the US Embassy in Moscow and eventually distributed to the entire American community there, including journalists and businessmen.

The Swedish-language national newspaper Hufvudstadsbladet reported on the front page of its 23 December 1988 issue — two days after the bombing — that a State Department spokesperson in Washington, Phyllis Oakley, confirmed the details of the bomb threat to the Helsinki Embassy. The newspaper writes that, "according the spokesperson, the anonymous telephone voice also stated that the bomb would be transported from Helsinki to Frankfurt and onwards to New York on Pan-Am's flight to the USA. The person transporting the bomb would not themselves be aware of it, with the explosives hidden in that person's luggage." The same news article reports that the US Embassy in Moscow also received the same threat on 5 December, adding that Finland's foreign ministry has found no evidence in its investigations of any link to the Lockerbie crash. "The foreign ministry assumes that an Arab living in Finland is behind the phone threat to the US Embassy in Helsinki. According to the foreign ministry's sources, the Arab has phoned throughout the year with threatening calls to the Israeli and US embassies [in Helsinki]," wrote the paper. "The man who rang the embassies claimed to belong to Abu Nidal's radical Palestinian faction that has been responsible for many terrorist actions. The man said that a bomb would be placed on board a Pan-Am plane by a woman." The article continues, "This has led to speculation that a Finnish woman placed the bomb aboard the downed aircraft. One of Abu Nidal's highest operative leaders, Samir Muhammed Khadir, who died last summer in a terrorist attack against the ship City of Poros, had lived outside Stockholm. He was married to a Finnish-born woman."

[RB: Perhaps the most detailed analysis of the Helsinki warning is to be found here (Part 1), here (Part 2), here (Part 3), here (Part 4) and here (part 5) on Caustic Logic’s website The Lockerbie Divide.]

No Libyan national was involved in planning or executing

[What follows is the text of a notarised deposition by Susan Lindauer dated 4 December 1998, as reproduced here on the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin website:]

My name is Susan Lindauer. I reside in Silver Spring, Maryland, one of the suburbs outside the District of Columbia in the United States of America. At the time these events took place, I was living inside the District of Columbia, at 1002 C Street NE on Capitol Hill.

In offering this deposition, I hereby inform the court and all interested parties at the United Nations that I have never accepted any financial compensation from any of the individuals, or governments involved in this case, in any form of cash or non-cash payment. Furthermore, I have never solicited nor received promise of future payments in exchange for this testimony. My reasons for coming forward reflect my own deepest personal values, and my sense of obligation to the cause of international peace and security. I remain deeply persuaded that justice must never be confused with convenience or political scapegoating, and that the issues of this case, including the prosecution of terrorist activities and the imposition of sanctions that seek to isolate an entire Arabic population, are too important in this contemporary age for a lie to stand unchallenged. And so let it be understood by the court: I make these statements of my own free will, out of respect to my own conscience and sense of obligation as a world citizen.

This deposition pertains to my direct and immediate knowledge of an American named Dr Richard Fuisz, and unequivocal statements by Dr Fuisz directly to me that he has first hand knowledge about the Lockerbie case. Dr Fuisz has told me that he can identify who orchestrated and executed the bombing. Dr Fuisz has said that he can confirm absolutely that no Libyan national was involved in planning or executing the bombing of Pan Am 103, either in any technical or advisory capacity whatsoever. He has also made direct statements to me describing harassment that he has suffered for trying to provide this information to the families of Pan Am 103 and prosecuting authorities in the United States government.

I first met Dr Richard Fuisz in his business office in Chantilly, Virginia in the United States of America. The date was September, 1994. I had been invited to meet Dr Fuisz by a mutual acquaintance because of my position as press secretary to former Congressman Ron Wyden (a Democrat from Oregon), and because of my known longstanding interest in the Middle East. Wyden is now a United States Senator, and I have continued my career in TV journalism and public affairs. For the record, my relationship with Dr Fuisz has remained purely professional, and based strictly on my respect for his integrity and incredible, indepth knowledge of the Middle East.

Dr Fuisz told me in September, 1994 that he had lived in Syria during the 1980s, and that he maintained close ties to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East overall. Mutual friends and associates have confirmed this. He was vague as to what capacity he was working, but after our conversation, I concluded by myself that he must have been feeding US intelligence efforts. He told me that he had infiltrated a network of Syrian terrorists tied to the Iranian Hezbollah, who, at the time of his residence in Damascus, were holding Americans hostage in Beirut. Dr Fuisz impressed on me that he had identified the organizers behind the hostage crisis, and that he had actually located the streets and buildings where those Americans were being held captive, at tremendous personal risk, in order to try to orchestrate a rescue. This information was later confirmed by a third party source.

We talked a great deal about how the sale of heroin/opium from the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon is financing terrorist activities on a global scale. I must add, the rise of heroin in street markets all over the U.S. is a most insidious trend with enormous human costs, which has further motivated my determination to stay involved in this question of Pan Am 103. (The bombing of Pan Am 103 was intended to strike drug enforcement agents of the United States, in reprisal for their aggressive efforts.)

As further evidence of his deep infiltration of terrorist circles, occasionally Dr Fuisz pointed to photographs on his wall that showed individuals engaged in social activities at private homes. He said they were some of the "most famous terrorists in the Middle East," to use his words. Obliquely he told me they might be household names in the United States.

Dr Fuisz asked for my help as a congressional staffer because he said he had a problem. After testifying before a congressional committee about an American company that supplied Iraq with SCUD mobile missile launchers, he complained of being seriously harassed in lawsuits and by the US Internal Revenue Service. Efforts by his attorneys to stop this harassment had been answered with warnings from the highest levels that he should never have talked about US arms supplies to Iraq, and that he should stop trying to contact families tied to Pan Am 103.

In fact, this was the context for how the Pan Am bombing came up in our conversation. He said to me, gosh, [note to MEIB: he used much stronger language and profanities that I did not think would be appropriate for a deposition] I could be providing so much more information about Middle Eastern terrorists, except the United States government doesn't want anybody talking about Syria. Then he jumped into the Lockerbie case by way of example of unsolved bombing cases that he said has the immediate capability to resolve. He complained that he was getting shafted for trying to assist a cause that American leaders profess to care very much about. In essence, he insisted the messenger was getting shot for delivering the message.

Dr Fuisz made it very clear that he knows a great deal of insider knowledge about this case. Because of his Syrian ties, he told me he "was first on the ground in the investigation," to use his words. At one point, I said to him, "Oh yeah, everybody knows Syria did it, and the US repaid them for supporting us during the Iraqi War by shifting the blame to Libya."

Immediately he cut me off.

"Susan, ­do you understand the difference between a primary source and a secondary source? Those people in Virginia are analysts. They're reading reports from the field, but they don't have first-hand contact with events as they're happening on the ground. Or first hand knowledge about what's taking place. So they don't actually know it, even if they think they do."

"I know it, Susan. I know it. That's the difference. Because of my Syria contacts, I was the first on the ground in the investigation. I was there. They're reading my reports." (His emphasis. Then he laughed sarcastically.) "In this case, they're reading them and destroying them." (And he threw up his hands.)

He continued on:

"Susan, if the (United States) government would let me, I could identify the men behind this attack today. I could do it right now. You want a police line up? I could go into any crowded restaurant of 200 people, and pick out these men."

"I can identify them by face, by name." He started gesticulating, and counting off on his fingers. "I can tell you the address where they work, and what time they arrive at their office in the morning. I can tell you what time they go to lunch, what kind of restaurants they go to, and what time they leave their offices to go home for the day. I can tell you their home addresses, the names of their wives if they're married, the names and ages of all their children. I can tell you about their girlfriends. I can even tell you what type of prostitutes they like."

"And you know what, Susan? You won't find this restaurant anywhere in Libya. No, you will only find this restaurant in Damascus. I didn't get that from any report, Susan." Dr Fuisz started shaking his head. "I got it because I was investigating on the ground, and I know. Do you understand what I'm saying to you now? I know!"

To which I answered. "For God's sakes tell me, and I'll get my boss to protect you."

Then he got really mad. "No, no ­ It's so crazy. I'm not even allowed to tell you, and you're a congressional staffer." Then he repeated his story about the Terex lawsuit against both him and New York Times reporter Seymour [Hersh], (the famous Pulitzer Prize winner), whose only crime was reporting Dr Fuisz testimony at the congressional hearing.

This was how I learned that Dr Fuisz is covered by the Secrets Act, which severely restricts his ability to communicate information about Pan Am 103. Though he says freely that he knows first hand that Libya was not involved in any capacity whatsoever, it's my understanding that he can provide no further details regarding his part in the investigation, or details identifying the true criminals in this case.

This is tragic on two accounts. First, the accused Libyans are effectively denied the right to a fair trial where they might bring forth witnesses in their own defense, which could immediately exonerate them of all charges. And secondly, the families are denied the ability to close this terrible wound, and experience the healing that would be gained from discovering the complete truth and facts surrounding this case.

On both accounts, I cannot be silent. I suspect my disclosure will grieve the families with the horrible revelation that US government officials have behaved so cynically and despicably as to withhold evidence in this case. And yet such a cynical and desperate act must be condemned by civilized society. I dare say Libya is entitled to financial compensation for the economic harassment her people have endured because of these blatantly false accusations, and the deliberate efforts to mislead potential judges, and victimize potential witnesses by a policy of aggressive harassment and punishment for speaking out. Meanwhile, the true culprits have literally gotten away with murder.

For shame on all of you!

This ends my deposition.

Signed this 4th Day of December, 1998 In the presence of a notary public.

(Lindauer's signature and the crest of the notary stamp)

Lockerbie: Unanswered questions

[The current (December 2015) issue of the excellent iScot magazine contains an article entitled “Lockerbie: Unanswered questions”, the first in a series by Dr Morag Kerr. It reads in part:]

Most people in Scotland probably know that, some quarter of a century ago, a Jumbo Jet with the name Maid of the Seas painted on her nose-cone fell out of the sky on to the Dumfriesshire town of Lockerbie.  Many people still harbour grave doubts about the safety of the conviction, twelve years later, of the so-called “Lockerbie bomber” Abdelbaset al-Megrahi.  Few retain a detailed recollection of the circumstances, but “Wasn’t the key witness paid millions to implicate him?” is a common refrain.  

Abdelbaset al-Megrahi died in May 2012, but the doubts linger.  Efforts to secure a third appeal against his conviction received a setback last month when the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission refused to proceed unless his family, virtually incommunicado inside war-torn Libya, provided them with a specific document which doesn’t actually exist under Sharia law.  Quite separately, however, a major police investigation is underway into formal allegations of wrongdoing against individuals involved in both the original investigation and the later court proceedings.  A third strand is public petition PE1370 calling for an independent inquiry into the Lockerbie affair, laid before the Scottish parliament in October 2010.  Only two months ago the disaster was once again in the headlines as the Lord Advocate revealed that he was on the trail of two of Megrahi’s alleged accomplices – but was that story quite what it seemed?  This month, with further revelations likely in the near future, we look back on the chain of events that began in 1988. (...)

A terrorist attack was immediately suspected, and senior police insisted the crash site be treated as a crime scene.  Detectives reviewing the case in 2015 have remarked that even today it’s unlikely the evidence-gathering could be handled any better, and it’s hard to argue with that.  Meticulous records of where every item was recovered yielded a detailed picture of how the plane broke up and what caused it.

What caused it turned out to be a small improvised explosive device disguised as a radio-cassette recorder, packed into a suitcase with some items of clothing. The baggage container carrying the exploding suitcase was identified as one containing only transfer luggage – luggage belonging to passengers connecting from other flights.  The bomb hadn’t been checked in at Heathrow.  The relief of the British investigators when they discovered this seems to have been immense.

After that, things got murkier.  While most of the luggage in that container was transferred from a single flight (a feeder from Frankfurt also designated PA103), a few items from other flights were also present.  The Frankfurt luggage was security-screened in Germany and shunted directly across the tarmac, but the other cases had been collected in Terminal 3 and were supposed to have been screened there.

When the fragments of the container were reassembled the explosion proved to have been about ten inches from the floor.  The Heathrow interline cases had been loaded first and covered the bottom, and everything from the second layer upwards was from the feeder flight.  The forensic scientists believed the bomb suitcase had been on the second layer, and so attention focussed on Frankfurt.

The German police joined the inquiry, and they had news for the Scottish investigators.  Two months before Lockerbie they had busted a terrorist gang in Düsseldorf, making bombs obviously designed to destroy aircraft in flight.  The gang was a cell of a hard-line Palestinian group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command, or PFLP-GC.  Unfortunately the suspects had been released by the German authorities, and it was feared they had regrouped and completed their mission.

A picture began to emerge.  On 3rd July 1988 an Iranair passenger flight carrying pilgrims travelling to Mecca had been shot down over the Persian Gulf by an American cruiser.  The aftermath of the disaster was appallingly mishandled by the US authorities and Ayatollah Khomeini vowed revenge.  Money appeared to have changed hands, and the suspicion was that Iran had employed proven sabotage experts to do its dirty work.

There was a catch to all this, which the Germans tried to point out to the British investigators.  The type of device the PFLP-GC was known to be making, launched from Frankfurt, would have exploded somewhere over Belgium.  These devices were triggered by the drop in internal pressure that occurs shortly after take-off, and would detonate about half an hour after that.  An IED like that, exploding over Lockerbie, must have been loaded at Heathrow.  The forensics team discounted this and remained wedded to their belief that the bomb had flown in from Germany.

By March 1989 Paul Channon, the UK Transport Secretary, was talking about imminent arrests.  However, no arrests were forthcoming.  The case receded from public consciousness until the autumn, when it emerged that a new lead had been uncovered.  Investigators were now certain the bomb had arrived in Frankfurt on a third aircraft, flight KM180 from Malta. (...)

The investigators secured one big breakthrough.  Scraps of burnt clothing believed to have been packed with the bomb were traced to a Maltese manufacturer, and from there to a small retailer in the Maltese town of Sliema, only three miles from the airport – and the shopkeeper Tony Gauci remembered selling some of the items to a customer in late 1988.  He described the man and his purchases, even remembering the bill and the amount of change given. Detectives set out to try to identify this mystery shopper.

However, as 1989 became 1990, the case went cold again.  The clothes purchaser was elusive, and nobody could figure out how Air Malta’s security precautions might have been breached.  Once again the story faded from the news until in the autumn of 1990 another change of tack hit the headlines.  Iran and the PFLP-GC were no longer suspected.  Iran had taken a “bum rap”, according to US President George Bush Snr.  The new suspect was Colonel Gaddafi’s Libyan regime, and the motive was retaliation for the US bombing of the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi back in 1986.

Events moved quickly after that.  By January 1991 the police had a suspect, a Libyan national named Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, and on 13th February Tony Gauci picked Megrahi’s passport photo out of a photo-identity parade.  Some time later it was discovered that Megrahi had been at Malta airport on the morning of 21st December 1988, travelling under an assumed name.  Case closed, or so it seemed.  In November 1991 simultaneous indictments were issued in Scotland and the USA against Megrahi and his colleague Lamin Fhimah for the murder of 270 people at Lockerbie.

Megrahi and Fhimah, however, were in Libya, protesting their innocence. Gaddafi offered to try the pair in Libya, if he was provided with the relevant evidence.  This was correct procedure under the Montreal Convention, but unsurprisingly the offer was rejected.  Stalemate.  Britain and the USA approached the UN complaining that Gaddafi was sheltering terrorists from justice, and as a result punitive sanctions were imposed which heavily impacted the Libyan economy.  In the years that followed the damage multiplied, and eventually the two accused agreed to surrender themselves for trial to secure an end to the blockade.

It was agreed that the trial would be held in a neutral venue.  A disused US air base in the Netherlands, Camp van Zeist, was decreed to be Scottish territory for the duration and converted into a court facility.  The trial began on 3rd May 2000, and on 31st January 2001 the verdict was announced.  Megrahi was found guilty, but Fhimah was not guilty.

The controversy began immediately.  How could one conspirator be guilty but not the other?  It was Fhimah who was alleged to have put the bomb on the plane, so how had Megrahi managed it without Fhimah’s assistance?  The defence had destroyed the prosecution’s star witness, a Libyan CIA informer called Abdul Majid Giaka, and without his testimony was there really enough evidence to convict beyond reasonable doubt?  In late January the Foreign Office had been briefing in the expectation of a double acquittal.  Many people, including UN-appointed observer to the trial Dr. Hans Köchler, believed there was an enormous amount of entirely reasonable doubt.

An appeal was heard at Camp Zeist in early 2002.  The defence had new evidence.  A Heathrow security guard revealed details of a security breach airside in Terminal 3, the night before the disaster.  A door padlock had been broken, apparently from the landward side, not far from the shed where the ill-fated container was parked the following afternoon.  The appeal judges heard his evidence, but dismissed it on the grounds that the trial court recognised that Heathrow security was poor, and knowing there had been an actual breach wouldn’t have altered their conclusions.  Megrahi was sent to Barlinnie to begin a life sentence for mass murder.

In 2003 he applied to the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission for leave to mount a second appeal.  In its 2007 report the Commission identified six grounds on which a miscarriage of justice might have occurred.  These centred round the disputed fingering of Megrahi as the man who bought the infamous Maltese clothes, and without the eye-witness identification the case was expected to collapse.

Megrahi’s second appeal came to court in spring 2009, by which time he had received what turned out to be a death sentence – a diagnosis of advanced prostate cancer.  The following August his application for compassionate release was granted by Kenny MacAskill, three days after Megrahi had formally abandoned his hard-fought-for appeal.

The appeal could have continued despite the release of the applicant.  Was Megrahi pressurised into withdrawing it?  His advocate Maggie Scott said that he was.  Kenny MacAskill has consistently denied it.  Professor Robert Black has a more nuanced take on the matter, suggesting that Megrahi was poorly informed about the options available to him and open to pressure from Libyan officials anxious to get him back home.

Whatever the rights and wrongs, the appeal was swiftly forgotten in the universal stampede to condemn the Scottish government for releasing a mass murderer.  Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, Jack Straw, David Cameron, Jack McConnell, Barack Obama, Robert Menendez and others, who before Megrahi’s release had breathed not a hint of opposition (because of course they were all heartily glad to see Megrahi back in Libya and the obstacle to trade and oil deals with Gaddafi removed), turned on Kenny MacAskill and Alex Salmond and monstered them.

Others were dismayed for a different reason.  The abandoning of the appeal torpedoed the chance to have the case reviewed again in court and the doubts and uncertainties examined.  Was it possible, or likely, that Megrahi had bought these clothes?  Did the bomb really start its journey on Malta, as the investigators believed?  And what was all that about a fragment of printed circuit board, widely alleged to be a fabricated plant?

Subsequent articles in this series will examine these contentious issues.  How much reasonable doubt surrounds Megrahi's guilt?  Was the evidence tampered with?  Might we, indeed, suggest that his innocence can be proved beyond reasonable doubt?