Mandela presses for neutral-nation trial of Lockerbie suspects

[This is the headline over a report published in The New York Times on this date in 1997. It reads in part:]

President Nelson Mandela of South Africa pressed Britain today to let two Libyans accused of blowing up an airliner over Scotland stand trial in a neutral country.

Justice cannot be done if Britain insists on trying the suspects in Britain or the United States, he said at a news conference during a meeting of Commonwealth leaders here.

Mr Mandela set off controversy this week by visiting Libya en route to Scotland to support Libya's plan for the two men to stand trial in a neutral country.

Britain and the United States are demanding the extradition of the pair, suspected of killing 270 people in the bombing of a Pan Am airliner over the Scottish town of Lockerbie in 1988. The United Nations has imposed sanctions on Libya for more than four years to force compliance.

Mr Mandela said he had not raised the matter with Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, but he added: ''I have never thought in dealing with this question that it is correct for any particular country to be the complainant, the prosecutor and the judge at the same time. Justice cannot be said to be done in that situation.''

He noted that British relatives of Lockerbie victims backed a trial in a neutral country, as do some American relatives, as well as the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, the Islamic Conference and the Nonaligned Movement.

British officials were adamant that there was no question of accepting the Mandela proposal, even if a foreign court abided by Scottish law. ''We believe they should be brought to justice here or in the United States,'' one said.

He said the Government took the views of the relatives seriously but saw ''formidable obstacles'' to a trial in a neutral country. The International Court of Justice in The Hague has been mentioned as one possibility.

It would be necessary for the British Parliament to pass primary legislation, and any third country would struggle to find the expertise in Scottish law needed at short notice to permit a meaningful trial, the officials said.

They said Foreign Secretary Robin Cook had underlined Britain's determination to insure a free trial by inviting representatives of African and Arab countries to come to Scotland to study its legal system and observe the trial.

''We wholly reject any suggestion that it would be an unfair trial,'' Mr Cook told ITN news on Friday. ''Scotland was where the murders took place. Scotland is the place where the trial should happen.''

But Mr Cook will come under further pressure when he meets Jim Swire, the father of one of the victims, on Sunday. ''I will be telling Mr Cook that we should have a trial in a third country under Scots law and that he has been badly advised in his opposition to this,'' Mr Swire told The Scotsman newspaper.

[What follows is an excerpt from an account that I wrote several years ago about the UK Government’s objections to my neutral venue proposal:]

On my return to the United Kingdom [from Libya in January 1994] I submitted the relevant documents [about my neutral venue proposal and Libyan agreement to it] to the Foreign Office in London and the Crown Office (the headquarters of the Scottish prosecution service) in Edinburgh.  Their immediate response was that this scheme was impossible, impracticable and inherently undesirable, with the clear implication that Professor Black must have taken leave of what few senses nature had endowed him with. That remained the attitude of successive Lord Advocates and Foreign Secretaries for four years and seven months.  During this period the British government's stance remained consistent: United Nations Security Council Resolutions placed upon the government of Libya a binding international legal obligation to hand over the accused for trial to the UK or the US authorities.  Nothing else would do.  If Libyan law did not currently permit the extradition of its own nationals to stand trial overseas, then Libya would simply have to alter its law (and, if necessary, its Constitution) to enable it to fulfil its international duty.

Over the years British government sources put forward six specific objections to my proposal. 

(...)

Objection 2

There would be formidable technical difficulties in implementing the proposal to set up a non-jury court applying Scottish criminal law and procedure but sitting outside Scotland, for example in the Netherlands.

I had always accepted that my proposal would involve the necessity of amending the law. As the law stood, a Scottish High Court judge had no authority to preside over a sitting of the court anywhere outside Scotland.  Nor, assuming the trial resulted in a conviction, were Scottish prison governors entitled to incarcerate in their institutions persons other than those committed by the warrant of a duly-constituted UK court.  However, I contended that it was not beyond the competence, capabilities and expertise of Scottish parliamentary draftsmen, in consultation with the Crown Office (the body responsible for the running of the Scottish criminal prosecution system) and the officials of The Scottish Office Home Department’s Criminal Justice Division (the Government Department then responsible for criminal law and policy in Scotland) speedily to draft primary or secondary legislation constituting such a court and providing that it should apply all the rules of evidence and procedure applicable to High Court trials in Scotland, save only those relating to the presence and functions of the jury.  I also argued that, if such legislation were promoted, it would be unlikely to meet with serious opposition in either House of Parliament; and that both the United Nations and the Netherlands would be willing to cooperate if such a court were established.  That I was right about all these matters can be seen from the ease with which, in 1998, the Scottish Court in the Netherlands was eventually set up.

The only two nations in the civilised world rejecting Lockerbie compromise

[What follows is a report on a meeting held on 16 April 1998 in Cairo between officials of the Arab League, including the Secretary-General Dr Esmat Abdel-Meguid, and Dr Jim Swire and me:]

The Scottish lawyer Robert Black said on the 16th of April in Cairo after the talks with Abdel Maguid, that his latest proposal to end a dispute between Libya, Britain and the United States over the trial of two Libyan suspects in a 1988 airliner bombing would be his last. Black gave no details on the modifications in the more recent proposal. But he said there was “fine-tuning” to make it more acceptable to the British and Americans.

“What we are hoping for is that continued pressure on these two governments will cause them to see the error of their ways,” Black said.

Robert Black told a news conference he was “51 percent sure” the Libyans would accept the modified proposal. He would not give details, but Black and Swire are suggesting the suspects be tried under Scottish law in a neutral venue by an international panel of judges, without a jury. But Robert Black, a legal expert advising the victims' families, said there was little hope the United States would accept the proposal, although international pressure might succeed in winning Britain's support. “One simply has to give up on the American government,” Black said. “They are unmovable.”

“It's now plain that the United States and the United Kingdom as far as I know are the only two nations in the civilised world which are not saying 'this is a sensible compromise solution, accept it',” Black said after meeting the head of the Cairo-based Arab League. “What I am hoping is that the United Kingdom can see the error of its ways if it is given an opportunity marginally to save face. They have to find a solution. If this proposal does not work, then I suspect that this may very well be the end of the line.

“I can't very well go on drafting scheme after scheme, that are accepted by one side but rejected outright by the other. All three are going to have to accept something with which they are not 100% happy in order for there to be a compromise,” he said. "If they are prepared to do that then there is a remote possibility of progress. But I wouldn't put it above saying there is a slight chance. But any chance is better than no chance."

Swire slammed the British government for not moving fast enough to end the crisis. “For six years, I have been waiting for the men charged with the brutal murder of my daughter to be put on trial but on March 20, the permanent representative of my country in the United Nations was busy telling the Security Council that the sanctions they imposed on Libya were not working.

“Why have you kept us waiting for six years when they are not working? They are demolishing the thing they invited us to depend on and if that doesn't make you angry, then it should.”

Jim Swire, who acted as representative for British victims of the bombing, said Abdel-Meguid would pass the new proposal to the Libyans.

[RB: Just over four months later the UK and USA accepted the solution of a Scottish court in a neutral venue.]

UK and US only two nations rejecting Lockerbie compromise

[What follows is a report on a meeting held on 16 April 1998 in Cairo between officials of the Arab League, including the Secretary-General Dr Esmat Abdel-Meguid, and Dr Jim Swire and me:]

The Scottish lawyer Robert Black said on the 16th of April in Cairo after the talks with Abdel Maguid, that his latest proposal to end a dispute between Libya, Britain and the United States over the trial of two Libyan suspects in a 1988 airliner bombing would be his last. Black gave no details on the modifications in the more recent proposal. But he said there was “fine-tuning” to make it more acceptable to the British and Americans.

“What we are hoping for is that continued pressure on these two governments will cause them to see the error of their ways,” Black said.

Robert Black told a news conference he was “51 percent sure” the Libyans would accept the modified proposal. He would not give details, but Black and Swire are suggesting the suspects be tried under Scottish law in a neutral venue by an international panel of judges, without a jury. But Robert Black, a legal expert advising the victims' families, said there was little hope the United States would accept the proposal, although international pressure might succeed in winning Britain's support. “One simply has to give up on the American government,” Black said. “They are unmovable.”

“It's now plain that the United States and the United Kingdom as far as I know are the only two nations in the civilised world which are not saying 'this is a sensible compromise solution, accept it',” Black said after meeting the head of the Cairo-based Arab League. “What I am hoping is that the United Kingdom can see the error of its ways if it is given an opportunity marginally to save face. They have to find a solution. If this proposal does not work, then I suspect that this may very well be the end of the line.

“I can't very well go on drafting scheme after scheme, that are accepted by one side but rejected outright by the other. All three are going to have to accept something with which they are not 100% happy in order for there to be a compromise,” he said. "If they are prepared to do that then there is a remote possibility of progress. But I wouldn't put it above saying there is a slight chance. But any chance is better than no chance."

Swire slammed the British government for not moving fast enough to end the crisis. “For six years, I have been waiting for the men charged with the brutal murder of my daughter to be put on trial but on March 20, the permanent representative of my country in the United Nations was busy telling the Security Council that the sanctions they imposed on Libya were not working.

“Why have you kept us waiting for six years when they are not working? They are demolishing the thing they invited us to depend on and if that doesn't make you angry, then it should.”

Jim Swire, who acted as representative for British victims of the bombing, said Abdel-Meguid would pass the new proposal to the Libyans.

[RB: Just over four months later the UK and USA accepted the solution of a Scottish court in a neutral venue.]

The Lockerbie agreement between UK and Netherlands

[On this date in 1998 a treaty was concluded at The Hague between the governments of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands providing for a Scottish court to sit in the Netherlands to try the two Libyans accused of the Lockerbie bombing. The treaty can be read here. What follows is from an article written by me some years ago:]

The details of the arrangement -- the fine print -- are to be found in two documents: a British Order in Council (SI 1998 No 2251), made on 16 September 1998, conferring the necessary legal authority for Scottish criminal proceedings against the two Libyan suspects to be conducted in the Netherlands, and an international agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the United Kingdom, concluded on 18 September 1998, making the diplomatic arrangements necessary for the "neutral venue" trial to take place. (...)

Although the British proposal was announced in late August 1998, it was not until 5 April 1999 that the two suspects actually arrived in the Netherlands for trial before the Scottish court.  Why the delay?  The answer is that some of the fine print in the two documents was capable of being interpreted, and was in fact interpreted, by the Libyan defence team (now chaired by Mr Kamel Hassan Maghur as successor to Dr Legwell) and the Libyan government as having been deliberately designed to create pitfalls to entrap them.  And since the governments of the United Kingdom and United States resolutely refused to have any direct contact with either the Libyan government or the Libyan defence lawyers -- their attitude being that the scheme had been advanced on a “take it or leave it basis” and that no negotiations would be entered into -- these concerns could be dealt with only through an intermediary, namely the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (or, in practice, the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Hans Corell).   This meant that issues that could have been thrashed out and settled in a matter of a few hours in a face-to-face meeting took weeks and months to resolve.  The US government, particularly the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, took every available opportunity to accuse the Libyan government and lawyers of stalling and trying to wriggle out of the assurances they had given over the years to support a “neutral venue” trial.  My own clear impression, however, through my continuing contacts with the Libyans, was that if anyone was looking for pretexts to avoid a trial ever taking place, it was the US and UK governments.

Between 20 and 22 September 1998, Dr Jim Swire and I were again in Tripoli and were able to provide to the Libyan government and the Libyan defence team a measure of reassurance regarding some of the points that concerned them.  However, it was we who had to inform the Libyan government that the chosen location in the Netherlands for trial was Kamp van Zeist, a former NATO base to which the air force of the United States still had extant treaty rights of access.  This information was faxed to me (in Dutch, which I can read  -- with difficulty -- through my knowledge of Afrikaans) at my hotel in Tripoli by a Dutch journalist who had developed an interest in Lockerbie and who had heard it from an official at The Hague.  Dr Swire and I discussed whether we should inform our Libyan government contacts of the intended venue and came to the conclusion that we should do so.  One compelling reason for doing so was to preserve the trust that the Libyan government appeared to have developed in us.  Another was our assumption -- which may or may not have been justified -- that all our communications in Libya were monitored and that the Libyan authorities would have the information anyway as soon as they could arrange for a copy of the fax to be translated from Dutch into Arabic.

I anticipated that the news about the proposed location would cause the Libyans to renounce the "neutral venue" concept in high dudgeon and complain of the lack of good faith demonstrated by the British Government in selecting, or agreeing to, such a site.  But they did not do so.  When we raised the issue at our next meeting, the Libyan officials were remarkably relaxed about the matter.  This, more than anything else, convinced me that the Libyan government and the Libyan defence lawyers genuinely wished a trial to take place and that the concerns they had expressed regarding details of the scheme now on offer were genuine concerns, not merely a colourable pretext for evading their earlier commitment to such a solution.

On 22 September Dr Swire and I had a further meeting with the Leader of the Revolution.  On this occasion the meeting took place not in Tripoli but 400 kilometres to the east in a genuine (not reinforced concrete) Bedouin tent in a desert location inland from the town of Sirte.  We drove most of the way in the usual government black Mercedes, transferring into a 4 x 4 only for the last few off-road miles.  When at the tent nothing could be seen but sand and sky; but out of sight just beyond the nearest dunes was a lengthy convoy of communications vehicles, ambulances, canteen vehicles and troop carriers. 

Surrounded by the sand dunes and by noisily ruminating camels, Colonel Gaddafi, Dr Swire and I discussed the details of the British scheme.  He accepted my assurance that at least some of the concerns that Libyan government lawyers had raised were unwarranted and that it would be worthwhile to continue to seek clarifications and reassurances through the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the remaining issues. 

Steps on the path towards Zeist

[What follows is a short excerpt from an article written by me some years ago:]

Although the British proposal [for a trial in the Netherlands] was announced in late August 1998, it was not until 5 April 1999 that the two suspects actually arrived in the Netherlands for trial before the Scottish court.  Why the delay?  The answer is that some of the fine print in the two documents* was capable of being interpreted, and was in fact interpreted, by the Libyan defence team (now chaired by Mr Kamel Hassan Maghur as successor to Dr [Ibrahim] Legwell) and the Libyan government as having been deliberately designed to create pitfalls to entrap them.  And since the governments of the United Kingdom and United States resolutely refused to have any direct contact with either the Libyan government or the Libyan defence lawyers -- their attitude being that the scheme had been advanced on a “take it or leave it basis” and that no negotiations would be entered in to -- these concerns could be dealt with only through an intermediary, namely the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (or, in practice, the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Hans Corell).   This meant that issues that could have been thrashed out and settled in a matter of a few hours in a face-to-face meeting took weeks and months to resolve.  The US government, particularly the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, took every available opportunity to accuse the Libyan government and lawyers of stalling and trying to wriggle out of the assurances they had given over the years to support a “neutral venue” trial.  My own clear impression, however, through my continuing contacts with the Libyans, was that if anyone was looking for pretexts to avoid a trial ever taking place, it was the US and UK governments.

Between 20 and 22 September 1998, Dr Jim Swire and I were again in Tripoli and were able to provide to the Libyan government and the Libyan defence team a measure of reassurance regarding some of the points that concerned them.  However, it was we who had to inform the Libyan government that the chosen location in the Netherlands for trial was Kamp van Zeist, a former NATO base to which the air force of the United States still had extant treaty rights of access.  This information was faxed to me (in Dutch, which I can read  -- with difficulty -- through my knowledge of Afrikaans) at my hotel in Tripoli by a Dutch journalist who had developed an interest in Lockerbie and who had heard it from an official at The Hague.  Dr Swire and I discussed whether we should inform our Libyan government contacts of the intended venue and came to the conclusion that we should do so.  One compelling reason for doing so was to preserve the trust that the Libyan government appeared to have developed in us.  Another was our assumption – which may or may not have been justified -- that all our communications in Libya were monitored and that the Libyan authorities would have the information anyway as soon as they could arrange for a copy of the fax to be translated from Dutch into Arabic.

I anticipated that the news about the proposed location would cause the Libyans to renounce the "neutral venue" concept in high dudgeon and complain of the lack of good faith demonstrated by the British Government in selecting, or agreeing to, such a site.  But they did not do so.  When we raised the issue at our next meeting, the Libyan officials were remarkably relaxed about the matter.  This, more than anything else, convinced me that the Libyan government and the Libyan defence lawyers genuinely wished a trial to take place and that the concerns they had expressed regarding details of the scheme now on offer were genuine concerns, not merely a colourable pretext for evading their earlier commitment to such a solution.

*(1) Order in Council (SI 1998 No 2251), made on 16 September 1998, conferring the necessary legal authority for Scottish criminal proceedings against the two Libyan suspects to be conducted in the Netherlands, and (2) an international agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the United Kingdom, concluded on 18 September 1998, making the diplomatic arrangements necessary for the "neutral venue" trial to take place.

His life had never been the same after Lockerbie

[What follows is excerpted from an obituary of Lord Coulsfield that appears in today’s edition of The Herald:]

John Taylor Cameron, Lord Coulsfield, who has died aged 81, was one of the three judges who picked through the evidential wreckage of Pan Am flight 103, blown up by terrorists over Lockerbie on December 21, 1988, with the total loss of 270 people on the plane and in the quiet Scottish border town.

As a Scot, a friend of the United States and a humanitarian in general, Lord Coulsfield had to bury his own pain to do his objective job – to determine what exactly had happened, who had carried out the atrocity and bring judgement down upon them. He played a major and historic part in trying to do so, even though questions still remain and possibly always will over the tragedy.

At the time of the disaster, still grieving, it was hard for all of us, both here and in the US, to understand the legal labyrinth the case entailed, why it moved from Scotland to the Netherlands for example. Despite the protests of the late Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi*, it was decided to hold the case in a neutral country rather than Scotland or the US – where most of the victims came from. The fact that the trial was held in a disused former US Air Force base, Camp Zeist near Utrecht, added to the poignancy since the camp was a Nazi transport centre for Jews, taken over during the Cold War by the Americans.

For the trial, Camp Zeist was declared Scottish soil, beholden to Scots Law. That law was broken in September 2000 when Lord Coulsfield's bicycle was stolen despite tight security around the Camp Zeist judges.

In January 1991 [sic; actually 2001], after a nine-month trial, Lord Coulsfield and his two fellow Scottish judges found the Libyan agent Abdelbaset al-Megrahi guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment for murder. A second Libyan, Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah, was acquitted.

Al-Megrahi was jailed in Scotland until, after various defence appeals which said he had prostate cancer, he was freed by the Scottish government "on compassionate grounds" and put on a flight to Libya. On his arrival home, a pro-Gaddafi Libyan rent-a-mob waved a giant Scottish flag as he stepped from his aircraft in Tripoli. To foreign news services such as CNN, it seemed to apply some sort of Scottish collusion, which was most certainly not the case.

Edinburgh and Oxford-educated Lord Coulsfield was chosen as one of three Scottish judges – along with presiding judge Lord Sutherland and Lord MacLean, with Lord Abernethy as a non-voting associate judge – to peruse the intricate, complex evidence and rule on the case. Scots Law remaining historically distinct from its English equivalent, a specially-convened Scottish Court was set up at the disused Camp Zeist. That court would become a world news focus for nine months until Lord Coulsfield and his two colleagues found al-Megrahi guilty of murder by organising the downing of PanAm 103. (...)

Lord Coulsfield married Bridget Sloan in 1964. They had no children. He retired in 2002, admitting his life had never been the same after Lockerbie. He died after a short illness.

*[RB: There were no such protests from Gaddafi. Indeed, the neutral venue scheme was formulated to meet Libyan objections to a trial in Scotland (objections that emanated from the Libyan defence team, not the Libyan Government). The true sequence of events is set out in the blogpost The neutral venue proposal.]

'This is a sensible compromise solution, accept it'

[On this date in 1998 Dr Jim Swire and I had a meeting in Cairo with Dr Esmat Abdel-Meguid, the Secretary-General of the Arab League. What follows is a report on the meeting:]

The Scottish lawyer Robert Black said on the 16th of April in Cairo after the talks with Abdel Maguid, that his latest proposal to end a dispute between Libya, Britain and the United States over the trial of two Libyan suspects in a 1988 airliner bombing would be his last. Black gave no details on the modifications in the more recent proposal. But he said there was “fine-tuning” to make it more acceptable to the British and Americans.

“What we are hoping for is that continued pressure on these two governments will cause them to see the error of their ways,” Black said.

Robert Black told a news conference he was “51 percent sure” the Libyans would accept the modified proposal. He would not give details, but Black and Swire are suggesting the suspects be tried under Scottish law in a neutral venue by an international panel of judges, without a jury. But Robert Black, a legal expert advising the victims' families, said there was little hope the United States would accept the proposal, although international pressure might succeed in winning Britain's support. “One simply has to give up on the American government,” Black said. “They are unmovable.”

“It's now plain that the United States and the United Kingdom as far as I know are the only two nations in the civilised world which are not saying 'this is a sensible compromise solution, accept it',” Black said after meeting the head of the Cairo-based Arab League. “What I am hoping is that the United Kingdom can see the error of its ways if it is given an opportunity marginally to save face. They have to find a solution. If this proposal does not work, then I suspect that this may very well be the end of the line.

“I can't very well go on drafting scheme after scheme, that are accepted by one side but rejected outright by the other. All three are going to have to accept something with which they are not 100% happy in order for there to be a compromise,” he said. "If they are prepared to do that then there is a remote possibility of progress. But I wouldn't put it above saying there is a slight chance. But any chance is better than no chance."

Swire slammed the British government for not moving fast enough to end the crisis. “For six years, I have been waiting for the men charged with the brutal murder of my daughter to be put on trial but on March 20, the permanent representative of my country in the United Nations was busy telling the Security Council that the sanctions they imposed on Libya were not working.

“Why have you kept us waiting for six years when they are not working? They are demolishing the thing they invited us to depend on and if that doesn't make you angry, then it should.”

Jim Swire, who acted as representative for British victims of the bombing, said Abdel-Meguid would pass the new proposal to the Libyans.

[RB: Just over four months later the UK and US governments finally accepted the solution of a Scottish court sitting in a neutral country.]

Libyan acceptance of neutral venue trial reaffirmed

[What follows is an item headed Breaking of deadlock in Libya? posted on Safia Aoude’s The Pan Am 103 Crash Website and based largely on a report published by the Libyan Jana news agency on this date in 1998:]

Jim Swire held talks in Libya on Saturday with the justice minister about the trial for two suspects in the attack, Libya's official news agency reported on the 19th April. [Dr] Swire, and victims' legal adviser Robert Black met Justice Minister Mohammed Belgasim al-Zuwiy [more often anglicised as Zwai] after arriving in Tripoli.

They discussed suggestions by Swire and Black “concerning reaching ... a fair and just trial of the two suspects in a neutral country,” Libya's official news agency, JANA, reported. Swire and Black drove 215 miles from Tunisia to the Libyan capital Saturday, Swire's spokesman, David Ben-Ariyeh [Ben-Aryeah], said in London. Swire told Ben-Ariyeh he was grateful for the “efficient and warm welcome” they received.

Black and Swire held talks in Tripoli this week with [the suspects’ lawyer Ibrahim] Legwell and Libyan foreign affairs and justice officials. They also met Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in a bid to gain support for a trial plan formulated by Black. The most important meeting was held with the Libyan lawyer for Fhima and Megrahi in Tripoli, Dr Ibrahim Legwell.

Ibrahim Legwell said he told Scottish lawyer Robert Black and Jim Swire, that his two Libyan clients were ready to stand trial under Scottish law in a neutral country.

“We agreed on several basic points and details,” Legwell told Reuters in a telephone interview from the Libyan capital Tripoli. “I confirmed to them, as I have done previously, that my clients would stand for trial before such a court, which will be set not in Scotland nor the United States, but in a neutral country,” he added. “We also agreed that it would be established with an international panel of judges to be agreed upon and presided over by a senior Scottish judge. The court would operate under the criminal law and procedures of Scotland,” he added as well.

“We also are very concerned about how to ensure the safety, the security and the rights for our clients pending, during and after the trial,” he said.

Legwell said Libya's Justice Minister Mohamed Belgacem Zwai, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Abdel Ati al-Obeidi, and Libya's representative at the UN, Abouzid Omar Dourda [Dorda], attended part of his meetings with Black and Swire when these issues were discussed.

Zwai said he expected a settlement of the dispute over where to hold the trial. “We expect we will reach a solution that satisfies all parties before the World Court issues its decision,” he told reporters in Cairo late Monday. Black and Swire also met Libyan Foreign Affairs Minister Omar Mustafa al-Montasser in Libya and then Gaddafi Monday at the end of their visit. The Libyan revolutionary leader had in the past said he would support whatever the suspects' lawyers accepted.

Black and Swire left Tripoli Monday for Cairo, where they were to submit their proposal and results of their talks in Tripoli to Arab League Secretary General Esmat Abdel Meguid and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) chief, Salim Ahmed Salim, Legwell said. Zwai met Abdel-Meguid Tuesday, officials in Cairo said. Black and Swire also undertook to persist in their efforts to persuade the British government to join Libya in accepting the proposal, he added.

Legwell said the plan was that if Black's proposal was accepted by Britain, regional groupings such as the Arab League, the OAU and the European Union would submit to the Security Council a text approving the plan ahead of suspending the sanctions.

Jim Swire arrived in Cairo on the eve of the 21st April, and he told Reuters by phone, that Libya had agreed to surrender the two suspects to the Netherlands for trial. “I think the importance probably of what we've done is they (the Libyans) have renewed that undertaking and they have reinforced it,” he said. “This (proposal) was given the blessing of the leader subsequently,” Swire said of his 40-minute meeting with Gaddafi.

“The problem of course is, will the west set up the court that is required? I don't know what else the Libyan government can do to prove that they mean it when they say they would come.”

The path towards a Lockerbie trial

[What follows is the text of an Associated Press news agency report issued on this date sixteen years ago:]

The issues delaying the trial of two Libyan suspects in the 1988 bombing of a Pan Am jet could be resolved "in a matter of weeks," two Britons said today after meeting with Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi.

Jim Swire, who speaks for some British families, and Robert Black, a law professor at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, said their talks Tuesday with Gadhafi in Tripoli were constructive and they will soon submit new proposals to UN officials to speed up the trial. They refused to give details.

"If we can reach agreement over certain technicalities which have been holding up the process, then the trial could be under way within weeks," Swire told The Associated Press. He spoke from the Tunis airport, where the men were waiting for a flight home.

The United States and Britain propose to try the suspects in the Netherlands by Scottish judges under Scottish law. Libya has accepted the proposal but continues to argue about specifics.

Swire said the Libyans offered no assurances that they will soon surrender the suspects. "But we are definitely more confident now than when we left for Tripoli," he said.

Libya has agreed in principle to accept the US-British compromise plan, but Gadhafi has demanded guarantees for the legal rights and safety of the men.

The US-British proposal calls for the Libyan suspects, if convicted, to serve their prison time in Britain. Libya has said they should serve any sentence in Libya.

For their part, British families are concerned that officials and lawyers should have full, unfettered access to all relevant witnesses and evidence, wherever they are, said Swire, whose daughter Flora died in the attack over Lockerbie, Scotland, that killed 270 people.

The United Nations imposed sanctions in 1992 to try to force Gadhafi to hand over the suspects for trial. The sanctions ban air travel to and from Libya, freeze foreign assets and bar the sale of some oil equipment.

The UN Security Council has passed a resolution saying that the sanctions will be lifted when the suspects are turned over for trial in the Netherlands. 

[In fact it was not a matter of weeks but another six months before the hurdles were overcome, largely through the good offices of the UN Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel, Hans Corell. Here is my brief account of this stage in the Lockerbie saga:]

From about late July 1998, there began to be leaks from UK government sources to the effect that a policy change over Lockerbie was imminent, and on 24 August 1998 the governments of the United Kingdom and United States announced that they had reversed their stance on the matter of a "neutral venue" trial. (...)

Although the British proposal was announced in late August 1998, it was not until 5 April 1999 that the two suspects actually arrived in the Netherlands for trial before the Scottish court.  Why the delay? The answer is that some of the fine print in the two documents was capable of being interpreted, and was in fact interpreted, by the Libyan defence team and the Libyan government as having been deliberately designed to create pitfalls to entrap them.  And since the governments of the United Kingdom and United States resolutely refused to have any direct contact with either the Libyan government or the Libyan defence lawyers, these concerns could be dealt with only through an intermediary, namely the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

Between 20 and 22 September 1998, Dr Swire and I were again in Tripoli and were able to provide to the Libyan government and the Libyan defence team a measure of reassurance regarding some of the issues that concerned them.  However, it was we who (having received the information hot off the presses from a journalist in The Hague) had to inform the Libyan government that the chosen location in the Netherlands for trial was Kamp van Zeist, a former NATO base to which the air force of the United States still had extant treaty rights of access.  I anticipated that this information would cause the Libyans to renounce the "neutral venue" concept in high dudgeon and complain of the lack of good faith demonstrated by Her Majesty's Government in selecting, or agreeing to, such a site.  But they did not do so.  This, more than anything else, convinced me that the Libyan government and the Libyan defence lawyers genuinely wished a trial to take place and that the concerns they had expressed regarding details of the scheme now on offer were genuine concerns, not merely a colourable pretext for evading their earlier commitment to such a solution.

On 22 September we had a further meeting with the Leader of the Revolution.  On this occasion the meeting took place not in Tripoli but 400 kilometres to the east in a genuine (not reinforced concrete) Bedouin tent in a desert location inland from the town of Sirte.  Surrounded by sand dunes and noisily ruminating camels, Colonel Gaddafi, Dr Swire and I  discussed the details of the British scheme.  He accepted my assurance that at least some of the concerns that Libyan government lawyers had raised were unwarranted and that it would be worthwhile to continue to seek clarifications and reassurances through the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the remaining issues.