The search for justice goes on and William Barr's actions are unlikely to help

[This is part of the headline over a long article by Kim Sengupta in The Independent. It reads in part:]

With great fanfare, on the anniversary of the Lockerbie bombing, the US has announced charges against the supposed bomb maker who blew up Pan Am flight 103, the worst act of terrorism in this country, with 270 lives lost.  

One of William Barr’s final acts as Donald Trump’s Attorney General, a deeply controversial tenure, is supposed to fit one of the final pieces of the jigsaw in the hunt for the killers.  

There are historic links between the Lockerbie investigation and the current, turbulent chapter of American politics. Barr was also the Attorney General in 1991, in the George W Bush administration, when charges were laid against two Libyans, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, and Lamin Khalifa Fhimah, over the bombing. The inquiry was led at the time by Robert Mueller, the head of the Department of Justice’s criminal division.  

Mueller, of course, became the Special Counsel who examined if Trump was the Muscovian candidate for the White House. Barr was the Attorney General, in his second term in the post, accused of distorting the findings of Mueller’s report to protect Trump from accusations of obstruction of justice, which he denies.  

The charges which have been laid against Abu Agila Mohammad Masud, another Libyan, are intrinsically connected to Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, who is the only person to have been found guilty by a court of the bombing.  

Megrahi is now dead. There are good reasons to hold that the investigation, trial and verdict which brought his conviction were flawed and a miscarriage of justice has taken place. This is a view shared by bereaved families, international jurists, intelligence officers and journalists who had followed the case.  

Last month, an appeal hearing began at the High Court in Edinburgh to posthumously clear Megrahi’s name. This was the third appeal in the attempt to prove that the verdict against him was unsound, with his legal team focusing on the veracity of the prosecution evidence at his trial. 

Much of the case against Masud, a former Libyan intelligence officer, now charged, comes from an alleged confession he made in jail, where he had ended up after the fall of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. Masud, according to the FBI, named Megrahi and Fhimah as co-conspirators, who had together manufactured an explosive device using Semtex during a trip to Malta. Masud has said that he had bought the clothing which had been wrapped around the bomb, hidden in a radio-cassette player, before being placed in a Samsonite suitcase which was put on the flight.  

There are two points which are immediately relevant. The same trial which convicted Megrahi had acquitted Fhimah of all charges. And one of the key allegations against Megrahi, which the judges said made them decide on the verdict of guilt, was that it was he who had bought the clothing put around the explosive device.  

These contradictions are among many, big and small, which have marked the official narrative presented by the US and UK authorities of what lay behind the downing of the airliner.  

I went to Lockerbie on the night of the bombing, attended the trial of the two Libyan defendants, and met Megrahi at his home in the Libyan capital, Tripoli, where he had been allowed to return after suffering from cancer. I have followed the twists and turns of the case throughout.   

Soon after the downing of the Pan Am flight, American and British security officials began laying the blame on an Iran-Syria axis. The scenario was that Tehran had taken out a contract in revenge for the destruction of an Iranian civilian airliner, Iran Air Flight 655, which had been shot down by missiles fired from an American warship, the USS Vincennes, a few months earlier. The theory went that the contract had been taken up by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), which specialised in such operations.  

But the blame switched to Libya, then very much a pariah state, around the time Iran and Syria joined the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War. Robert Baer, the former American intelligence officer and author, was among those who held that the Iranian sponsored hit was the only plausible explanation for the attack. This was the firm belief held “to a man”, he stated, by his former colleagues in the CIA.  

After years of wrangling, Megrahi, the former head of security at Libyan Airlines and allegedly in the Libyan security service, and Fhimah, allegedly a fellow intelligence officer, were finally extradited in 1999. (...)

The two men were charged with joint enterprise and conspiracy. Yet only Megrahi was found guilty. (...)

So, deprived of finding a partner in crime for Megrahi, the prosecutor switched to claiming, and the judges accepting, that he had conspired with himself.  

The prosecution evidence was circumstantial; details of the bomb timer on the plane were contradictory; and the testimony of a key witness, a Maltese shopkeeper, extremely shaky under cross-examination. Five years on from the trial, the former Lord Advocate, Lord Fraser of Carmville – who had been responsible for initiating the Lockerbie prosecution – described the witness, Tony Gauci, as “an apple short of a picnic” and “not quite the full shilling”. Gauci was, however, flush in dollars: the Americans paid him for his testimony.  

The performance and evidence of a supposedly prime “CIA intelligence asset”, Abdul Majid Giaka, codenamed “Puzzle Piece” who turned up in a Shirley Bassey wig, was widely viewed as risible. It emerged later that important evidence had not been passed on to the defence lawyers. Ulrich Lumpert, an engineer who testified to the validity of a key piece of evidence, admitted later in an affidavit of lying to the court.  

It has also emerged that Giaka had been described by his CIA handler, John Holt, in an official report as someone who had a “history of making up stories”.

Holt was denied permission to appear at court. Earlier this month he reiterated in an interview that, like his CIA colleagues, he believes the Libyan connection was a concocted red herring and culpability lay with PFLP (GC). "I would start by asking the current Attorney General, William Barr, why he suddenly switched focus in 1991, when he was also Attorney General, from where clear evidence was leading, toward a much less likely scenario involving Libyans”, he said.  

The observer for the UN at the trial, Hans Kochler severely criticised the verdict. Writing later in The Independent, he described a case based on “circumstantial evidence”; the “lack of credibility” of key prosecution witnesses who “had incentives to bear false witness against Megrahi”; the fact that one was paid cash by the Americans; and that “so much key information was withheld from the trial”.    

Robert Black, a law professor born in Lockerbie, who played an important role in organising the Camp Zeist proceedings, later became convinced that a great injustice had taken place, as have many other eminent jurists.  

Some who were in Lockerbie on that terrible night and dealt with the aftermath also felt the same way. Father Patrick Keegans, the parish priest at the time, joined the “Justice for Megrahi” campaign after meeting the convicted man’s family and has backed appeals to clear his name.  

Many members of the bereaved families feel that justice has not been done, among them Jim Swire, who lost his daughter Flora in the bombing and became a spokesman for “UK Families 103”.  

When there were objections to the severely ill Megrahi being allowed to return to Tripoli, he pointed out “the scandal around Megrahi is not that a sick man was released, but that he was even convicted in the first place. All I have ever wanted to see is that the people who murdered my daughter are brought to justice.”  

After the charging of Masud, Dr Swire said: “I'm all in favour of whatever he's got to tell us being examined in a court, of course I am. The more people who look at the materials we have available the better.”  

He wanted to stress: “There are only two things that we seek, really. One is the question of why those lives were not protected in view of all the warnings and the second is: what does our government and the American government really know about who is responsible for murdering them.”  

Some bereaved families have criticised the presentation and motivation of the US move. The State Department had sent an invitation for livestreaming of the event.  

Reverend John Mosey, who lost his 19-year-old daughter Helga in the bombing, said the “timing and particularly the choice of this specific day, which is special to many of us, to be bizarre, disrespectful, insensitive and extremely ill considered”. He added: “Why exactly, when the Attorney General is about to leave office, has he waited 32 years to bring charges?”  

Behind the controversy over who carried out the attack, the political manoeuvres and legal actions, lay the human tragedy of Lockerbie, a scene which is difficult to forget, even after three decades, for many of us who went there.  (...)

There is also the memory of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, at his home in Tripoli in 2012. He lay in his bed attached to a drip, on red sheets stained by dark splashes of blood he had coughed up. An oxygen mask covered his skeletal face; his body twitched as he drifted in and out of consciousness. He was in the advanced stages of cancer: medicine he desperately needed had been plundered by looters; the doctors who had been treating him had fled. He died a few months later.  

The bitter accusations and recriminations over Lockerbie are unlikely to cease. But the search for justice for this terrible act of violence which took so many lives, and caused so much pain and grief, continues to remain elusive among the secrets and lies. 

There are good reasons to believe that the conviction of Megrahi was a shameful miscarriage of justice

[What follows is excerpted from an article by Kim Sengupta published today on the website of the Belfast Telegraph (and a week ago behind a paywall on the website of The Independent):]

Abdelbaset al-Megrahi lay in his bed attached to a drip, on red sheets stained by dark splashes of blood he had coughed up. An oxygen mask covered his skeletal face; his body twitched as he drifted in and out of consciousness. He was in the advanced stages of cancer: medicine he desperately needed had been plundered by looters; the doctors who had been treating him had fled.

This was in Tripoli in the winter of 2011, in the turmoil of Libya's civil war and the chaotic aftermath of the fall of Muammar Gaddafi. It was a time of great violence. A dozen bodies were piled up beside a roundabout a half-mile from where I had seen Megrahi lie slowly dying. They were corpses of black men, lynched by the rebels because they were supposedly mercenaries fighting for the regime. In reality, they were victims of a xenophobia against African migrants which had accompanied the uprising.

Megrahi himself had been convicted of a dreadful massacre; of being responsible for 270 deaths on December 21, 1988, when Pan Am Flight 103 blew up over the town of Lockerbie in Scotland. A bomb - 12 ounces of Semtex in a Toshiba radio-cassette player - had been secreted in the luggage of the plane carrying passengers to the US, many returning home for Christmas.

After spending eight years in Scottish prisons following his conviction, Megrahi had been returned to Libya on compassionate grounds following a diagnosis of prostate cancer. After a few months in prison in Tripoli, unable to walk and bedridden, he was allowed to return to his family home.

There was vengeful anger expressed by some in Britain, and more so in the US, at Megrahi's return to Libya. He had faked his illness, it was claimed, and even if that was not the case, he had escaped justice by not actually dying in a cell.

The charge of subterfuge was reinforced by the perception that his release was part of the many dodgy deals between Tony Blair's government and Colonel Gaddafi's regime.

Yet there are good reasons to believe that the conviction of Megrahi was a shameful miscarriage of justice and that, as a result, the real perpetrators of one of the worst acts of terrorism in recent history remained free. That certainly was the view of many, including international jurists, intelligence officers, journalists who followed the case, and members of bereaved families.

Among the latter group was Jim Swire, who lost his daughter, Flora, in the bombing. Dr Swire, a man of integrity and compassion, who became a spokesman for UK Families 103, stressed that "the scandal around Megrahi is not that a sick man was released, but that he was even convicted in the first place. All I have ever wanted to see is that the people who murdered my daughter are brought to justice".

Megrahi died in May 2012, a few months after I had seen him. Yet a campaign Dr Swire had helped set up, Justice for Megrahi, continues to help the Libyan's family to seek a new appeal against the sentence in their efforts to posthumously clear his name.

Certainly, the chronology of the original investigation into the bombing is strange, raising serious questions about the official narrative.

Soon after the downing of the Pan Am flight, American and British security officials began laying the blame on an Iran-Syria axis. The suggested scenario was that Tehran had taken out a contract in revenge for the destruction of an Iranian civilian airliner (Iran Air Flight 655), which had been shot down by missiles fired from an American warship (the USS Vincennes) a few months earlier.

The theory went that the contract had been taken up by the PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command), which specialised in such operations.

The blame switched to Libya - which was then very much a pariah state - around the time Iran and Syria joined the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf war.

Robert Baer, the former American intelligence officer and author, was among those who held that an Iranian-sponsored hit was the only plausible explanation for the attack. This was the firm belief held "to a man", he stated, by his former colleagues in the CIA.

After years of wrangling, Megrahi, the former head of security at Libyan Airlines and allegedly a Libyan intelligence officer, was finally extradited in 1999 - along with another man named as a suspect over the bombing, Lamin Khalifa Fhimah, also allegedly employed by Libyan intelligence. (...)

I covered their trial at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands, which took place in a specially constituted court, with a panel of Scottish judges but without a jury, under Scots law. The two men were effectively charged with joint enterprise - conspiracy - yet only Megrahi was found guilty. (...)

The prosecution evidence was circumstantial, details of the bomb timer on the plane were contradictory, and the testimony of a key witness, a Maltese shopkeeper, was extremely shaky under cross-examination.

Five years on from the trial, the former Lord Advocate, Lord Fraser of Carmville, who had been responsible for initiating the Lockerbie prosecution, famously described the witness, Tony Gauci, as "an apple short of a picnic" and "not quite the full shilling".

The performance and evidence of a supposedly prime CIA intelligence asset, Abdul Majid Giaka, codenamed Puzzle Piece, who turned up in a Shirley Bassey wig, was widely viewed as risible. It emerged later that important evidence had not been passed on to the defence lawyers. Ulrich Lumpert, an engineer who testified to the validity of a key piece of evidence, admitted later in an affidavit of lying to the court.

The observer for the UN at the trial severely criticised the verdict, as did many lawyers. Robert Black, a law professor born in Lockerbie, who played an important role in organising the Camp Zeist proceedings, later became convinced that a great injustice had taken place. (...)

Fr Patrick Keegans had just been appointed as parish priest in Lockerbie and was looking forward to his first Christmas there at the time of the crash. His tireless work with the traumatised community drew wide praise and is remembered with gratitude.

He reflected: "For those of us who experienced Lockerbie, the story will never come to an end. Lockerbie lives with us, we are part of Lockerbie and Lockerbie is part of us... the horror, the tragedy, the sadness, the grief, the support and the love that was shown - all of that stays with us."

Fr Keegans, who is now retired, joined the Justice for Megrahi campaign after meeting the convicted man's family and is now backing the call for a fresh appeal.

"I can't live with myself being silent," he explained, "when I'm truly convinced that this man has been unjustly convicted. Lockerbie is an unfinished story as far as the legal aspects are concerned."

Megrahi died at his home in Tripoli, still protesting his innocence. He thanked Dr Jim Swire and others who had believed in him.

In his final days, he said: "I pray for all those who died every day. I shall be meeting my God soon, but the truth will come out.

"I really hope the truth of what really happened will come out one day."

Lockerbie: The question that has not been asked

[This is the headline over an article that appeared in The Herald on this date in 1994. It reads as follows:]

One of the bloodiest terrorist attacks ever, the explosion of the PanAm jumbo above Lockerbie in 1988, has never been solved. Two Libyans,according to the early version, allegedly carried out the crime alone. This report, by Der Spiegel journalists, following a trail that took them to Berlin, Budapest, Geneva, and Moscow, unearths new leads leading to Germany. The key figure, a Swiss businessman, turns out to have been in the pay of the East German security service for almost 20 years -- and possibly worked for the CIA as well. KGB officials say they knew of the connection -- and are astonished that the Americans have yet to ask them about it.

A colour photo, magnified 15 times, reveals only a scorched fragment of a chip of green synthetic resin smaller than a fingernail. Only magnification allows one to see the soldering typical of an electronic circuit board.

Nor does the picture of a two-part plastic housing reveal much at first glance. The upper and lower part are held together by a wire. Not visible from the outside are two dials mounted on the plastic. Electronics experts say the dials were used to set a timer, necessary for the precise detonation of a bomb.

Secretive men have been presenting such photos for months to investigators in Berlin. Swarms of secret agents from the intelligence services of all the world are here; it is as if the Cold War had never ended and Berlin was the spies' capital.

For German investigators, this is a ''home game''. Officials of the Federal Office for the Defence of the Constitution, colleagues from the State Security Service, investigators from the Federal Criminal Investigation Agency, and public prosecutors from Berlin and Frankfurt are trying to solve the toughest political crime puzzle of recent years: the history of the timer.

One question is: whose hands held the clock? Terrorists may have used such a timer to detonate the bomb that ripped apart the PanAm jumbo. All 259 aboard, most of them US citizens, were killed, along with 11 people on the ground.

Many people thought the case was officially closed. American and Scottish authorities claimed in November 1991 that two Libyan secret agents, Amin Khalifa Fuheima, then 35, and Abdel Bassit Ali el-Mikhrahi, then 39, were behind the Boeing 747 outrage. Once again, the hand of Libya's chief of state, Moammar Gaddafi, was seen lurking behind Arab terrorism.

The US Justice Department demanded the extradition of the two suspects -- in vain. The United Nations decreed an embargo of Libya as a result, and tightened it last November.

But new facts have emerged that cast serious doubt on the hypotheses pieced together so far. Investigators and agents speak of a ''German trail'' -- and it is hot.

Lockerbie, according to Scotland Yard, was ''the most expensive piece of detective work in criminal history''. Fifteen thousand witnesses were interviewed, 20,000 names checked, 35,000 photos analysed, 180,000 pieces of evidence evaluated.

One German trail was discovered almost from the beginning: in all likelihood, the deadly luggage came from Frankfurt. According to investigators, the suitcase bearing the bomb reached the German airport on the morning of December 21, 1988, on an Air Malta flight and was transferred to the PanAm jet as unaccompanied luggage. Around 1.07pm, a computer gave the bronze-coloured Samsonite suitcase the code number B-8849. Then, between 3.12 and 4.50, it was loaded, unchecked, on to flight 103 to London, a stopover on the transatlantic flight.

But there is a new German trail. It leads to East Berlin and the former Ministry for State Security, the Stasi. Prominent names from the ministry have recently been added to a list of witnesses to be interrogated. Not only former Politburo members but Egon Krenz, who succeeded East German leader Erich Honecker, have been named. Everything revolves around one question: when was the timer given to whom, and for what purpose?

No-one is saying that Lockerbie was the Stasi's direct work but it seems Stasi officers may have provided key assistance to an Arab state or terrorist group. It has been discovered that detonators of the Lockerbie type were in the possession of the ministry.

From the beginning, the key to the Lockerbie puzzle was a piece of the tape player that investigators found after an exhaustive search of the crash site. It was found burned into a shirt collar belonging to one victim, Karen Noonan.

In weeks of painstaking work, the Scottish specialist Thomas Hayes was able to identify the plastic fragment, production number PT 30, as part of the detonator. That indicated that the Lockerbie bomb was of the same type as one built two months earlier by a group of militant Palestinians in the German city of Neuss. The explosive used in both cases was Semtex H; in both cases, a lump of it was hidden in a Toshiba radio recorder.

The Palestinian group in Neuss used a barometric detonator, which would set off a bomb explosion after a change in air pressure -- for example, when an airplane had reached a certain altitude. As a result, the Neuss terrorists, operating under Syrian sponsorship, were long considered leading suspects in the Lockerbie attack.

However, when it became absolutely clear that the explosives on flight PanAm 103 were set off by a simple timer, the investigation took another direction.

CIA analysts led investigators to the Mebo AG firm in Zurich. It deals with electronic devices of all sorts. The timer was part of one it had produced -- Type MST-13 -- in 1985 for use by Libyans in desert warfare. It was both dust and water-tight.

According to the CIA, one of these timers was used in 1986 in a bomb attack on the American Embassy in Togo. In February 1988, two Libyans were arrested in Senegal in connection with that attack; they had 10 kilograms (22lbs) of plastic explosives and two MST-13 timers in their possession. Though the name of the manufacturer had been scratched off, lab technicians were able to make it out: Mebo.

Fewer than two dozen of the timers were produced, all of them apparently for Gaddafi's people. Mebo officials told the CIA, as well as American and British Lockerbie investigators, that the timers were sold only to Tripoli and to the Libyan People's Bureau, or embassy, in East Berlin. The charges against the two Libyan suspects rest largely on this evidence.

Yet the Mebo version turned out to be a cover story. Edwin Bollier, 56, one of Mebo's top two executives, claims to have suddenly remembered six months ago that there was a second client: ''the Institute for Technical Research or something like that'' in East Berlin. In fact, that institute, ITU for short, served as a highly-specialised workshop for the Stasi, making specialist tools such as listening devices and miniature transmitters for its agents.

At first, investigators believed that the Libyans had bought off Bollier to exonerate themselves. Investigators also paid close attention to the fact that in January, during a Geneva meeting between US President Bill Clinton and the Syrian head of state, Hafez Assad, in the President Hotel, an intriguing group was in attendance: the so-called Libyan defence team, including London lawyer Stephen M. Mitchell and the American defence attorney Frank Rubino.

Even Bollier found his way to Geneva, where he recounted further details on the sale of Mebo timers to East Berlin. It is known that, in 1985, the Stasi acquired MST-13 timers. State prosecutors say Bollier sold as many as seven of them to the East Germans. This number comes from a copy of a bill Bollier suddenly ''found''.

Some former Stasi buyers have since admitted ordering MST-13-type timers. A former Stasi colonel, questioned by the Federal Criminal Investigation Agency in Munich, has said that his ministry played no direct role in the Lockerbie explosion but that it was entirely possible that it had passed along such a timer.

Meanwhile, the Stasi has been linked to other murderous attacks. Not long ago, its anti-terrorism specialist Helmut Voigt was sentenced to four years in prison for passing on the explosives used in the 1983 bombing of the Maison de France in Berlin (one dead, 22 injured). This all raises questions about the earlier theory that the Libyans acted alone.

Bollier may have worked for the East Germans as an unofficial collaborator of the Stasi, providing sensitive materials for decades. At Stasi headquarters, he was registered under file number 2550/70. Bollier tells Der Spiegel he had no idea he had been given a code name.

In the late 60s, the East Germans had enormous need for electronic spying devices. The Stasi created a special unit whose mission was to listen in on the West German telephone network. Its name: Department III.

Meeting in a Berlin hotel, the department's head, Horst Mannchen, quickly reached agreement with Bollier. The Swiss would provide the Stasi with special antennas, coders, police radios, and data terminals. Mannchen wanted radio equipment for 3000 spies.

The Stasi paid Bollier in cash, hard West German marks. ''Bollier,'' says one former Stasi official, ''did well over a million marks business with us.''

Bollier's firm also had surprising contacts within the Western services. Bollier was thus able to obtain a device that was then a closely guarded American secret: the ''Mark'' voice analyser. The device, which works like a lie detector, registers subtle changes in the voice. Stasi's top man, Markus Wolf, wanted it to test the loyalty of his agents.

However, the Stasi people became suspicious of the ease with which Bollier was able to obtain the machine. They decided to try to find out who he really worked for.

Bollier travelled so much and was so active that Stasi agents were unable to keep a tail on him, and never proved anything but the suspicion grew that Bollier was also working for a Western service, probably the CIA, according to one internal report.

Is it possible that a man in the service of the CIA was even indirectly responsible for the horrible disaster over Lockerbie? German prosecutors aren't ready to provide a final answer to that. However, one former Stasi man told investigators: ''A man like Bollier had hidden protectors in the West.'' When asked by Der Spiegel about CIA contacts, Bollier said simply: ''No comment.''

Mr Joachim Wenzel, a brilliant technician for Stasi, says Bollier delivered timers to him in 1987, in his offices on Ferdinand Schultze Street in East Berlin. The Stasi people there had close contacts to militant Arab groups and also to the Red Army Faction of West Germany.

The timers have since disappeared. It is not clear whether they were destroyed in the chaos surrounding the end of communist rule, or whether they found their way into the world of international terrorism. There were many possible takers. The Stasi's connections to Arab terrorist groups formed a web with many spiders. The Stasi, for example, delivered to the security division of the Palestine Liberation Organisation around 5000 hand grenades, explosives, and 1000 detonating devices in 1980 alone.

Many splinter groups of the Palestinian movement also found a new base in East Germany. The terrorist Carlos, sought around the world for his part in a series of murderous attacks, spent time in the Palast Hotel on East Berlin's Unter den Linden boulevard. The fighters of the infamous Abu Nidal took a three-month course at Stasi headquarters in 1985, including training with rocket and grenade launchers.

Only months later, the group killed 16 people in an attack on Rome airport and four in Vienna.

Abu Daoud, who was linked to the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, lived in Berlin in the 80s, at Prenzlauer Allee 178.

But who was behind the Lockerbie attack? Was it the Iranians, furious over the shooting down of an Airbus full of civilians by the destroyer Vincennes over the Strait of Hormuz in 1988? Did the Syrians help?

The KGB is not convinced by the theory that the Libyans acted alone and although the Russians are well-placed to have information on both the Arabs and the Stasi, they have not been contacted by American investigators. One former head of Soviet foreign intelligence said: ''They haven't asked us a single question.''

Lockerbie bombing: This ‘new’ evidence on the atrocity offers no new answers

[This is the headline over an article in today’s edition of The Independent by Kim Sengupta, the paper’s Defence Correspondent. It reads as follows:]

The news that new evidence has been uncovered about the Lockerbie bombing should have raised hopes that the truth about this terrible atrocity may at last be revealed and, at the same time, a shameful miscarriage of justice corrected.

But that is not the case. Little has emerged that is new, and what has emerged is highly questionable. The avenue being taken by the British and American authorities continues to be predicated on the basis that the Libyan Abdelbaset al-Megrahi was responsible for the deaths of 270 people, on the plane and at the crash site. But many of those touched by the events believe that his conviction was unjust, and that the authorities are covering up their mistakes.

I saw Megrahi in the winter of 2011 in Tripoli, where he had been sent from his prison in Scotland after being diagnosed with terminal cancer. He was lying in bed attached to a drip, oxygen mask on his skeletal face, drifting in and out of consciousness. The medicine he needed had been plundered by looters in the chaotic aftermath of the fall of the Gaddafi regime; the doctors treating him had fled.

The vengeful pursuit of Megrahi, the feeling that he had escaped justice by failing to die in a cell, persisted among those who were adamant that he was guilty. He was faking his illness, they claimed; there were demands that the post-revolutionary Libyan government should arrest and extradite him.

Megrahi died a few months later. Members of some of the bereaved families, such as Dr Jim Swire, who lost his daughter, Flora, in the bombing, have long been convinced that his conviction was unsafe. Their appeal to clear his name was turned down by the Appeal Court in Edinburgh three months ago because the law was “not designed to give relatives of victims a right to proceed in an appeal for their own or the public’s interest”.

The campaigners had just cause to have misgivings about what happened to Megrahi. I reported from the specially constituted Scottish court at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands where he and his fellow Libyan defendant, Lamin Khalifa Fhimah, were tried. The two men were charged with what amounted to joint enterprise, yet only Megrahi was found guilty. The prosecution evidence was circumstantial and, at times, contradictory. Key prosecution witnesses were shaky under cross-examination. The evidence of a supposedly prime “CIA intelligence asset”, Abdul Majid Giaka, codename “Puzzle Piece”, who turned up in a Shirley Bassey wig in an attempt to hide his identity, was widely viewed as risible. It emerged later that important evidence had not been passed to the defence lawyers.

There was scathing criticism from international lawyers about the proceedings. Professor Hans Köchler, a UN appointed legal adviser, described them as “ inconsistent, arbitrary and a spectacular miscarriage of justice”. The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission identified six grounds where it believed “a miscarriage of justice may have occurred”.

So what are the new leads being pursued by the US and Britain? They focus on Abdullah al-Senussi, who was both Muammar Gaddafi’s chief of intelligence and also his brother-in-law, and on Mohammed Masud, a regime agent. Both are being held in prison, on unrelated charges, in Tripoli, by one of Libya’s two rival administrations.

But, in fact, both men have been scrutinised by Lockerbie investigators in the past. Scottish police announced in 2013 that they were looking at information that Masud was in Malta, where prosecutors claimed the bomb was placed on the flight, at the same time as Megrahi. But Fhimah, cleared by the Camp Zeist court, was in Malta as well.

Robert Black, a law professor born in Lockerbie who played a key role in organising the Camp Zeist proceedings, later became convinced that there had been a miscarriage of justice. He warned in 2013 that British officials were trying to retrospectively buttress the case against Megrahi by implicating Masud. “It looks like the Crown Office is trying to shore up the Malta connection, which is pretty weak,” he said.

Some of the impetus for the new inquiry has come from an American documentary, My Brother’s Bomber, by Ken Dornstein, whose brother was among the victims. Most of the information for this came from a former Libyan agent, Musbah Eter, who has implicated both Megrahi and Masud.

Eter, however, has had a chequered life. He was convicted of the bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin in 1986, an attack which prompted Ronald Reagan to bomb Libya, with some of the warplanes flying from British bases. A German TV investigation subsequently revealed that Eter was a CIA “asset”. We do not know why it took him more than two decades to come forward with the Lockerbie information, or what influence his relationship with US intelligence played in this.

Might Masud and Senussi end up in another Camp Zeist-type trial over Lockerbie?  One reason for the Gaddafi regime allowing the extradition of Megrahi and Fhimah  was that it was seeking rapprochement with the West at the time. The current Islamist government in Tripoli is not recognised by the West. During my recent visit to Libya I discovered some in the administration who were very keen for that recognition and the better relations, including investment, it may bring.

So, handing over the two men to Britain and America may not be an impossible scenario in the future. Senussi has already been sentenced to death on other charges and may, indeed, welcome being sent abroad. We may yet see another CIA operative, Eter this time, doing a court turn in a Shirley Bassey wig. It will not, however, bring us nearer to the truth about the Lockerbie massacre.

A smear on the quality of Scottish justice

[Miscellaneous media comments from 21 May 2012, the day following the death of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi:]

Alex Massie in The Spectator

Despite what the Prime Minister says, Megrahi’s guilt is not certain. As Ian Smart suggests, there is little consensus even amongst those best informed about the case. This was not a "slam-dunk" case. Far from it. The evidence for guilt or innocence is a close-run thing whichever side of the argument you choose to take. Moreoever, it is possible to be convinced the Libyans were responsible for Lockerbie while also suspecting that the evidence against them was only barely strong enough to secure a conviction. Indeed the layman might reasonably conclude that if ever a case made an argument for the Not Proven verdict, Lockerbie is that case. (The various appeals, remember, are a test of the evidence against Megrahi not of his actual guilt.)

Even so, one should not assume that the Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission’s report would have led to Megrahi’s conviction being overturned. This too makes Megrahi’s cancer as unfortunate as it may have been darkly convenient. Though Lockerbie is still, as the First Minister pointed out yesterday, a live case the prospects of getting a fully persuasive resolution to the bombing of Pan-Am 103 seem pretty bleak.

Kim Sengupta in The Independent

The vengeful pursuit of Megrahi, the feeling that he has somehow escaped justice by not actually dying in a cell, is the result of a genuine belief by some that he was guilty, allied to anger that his release was part of the many dodgy deals between the British government and Muammar Gaddafi's regime. Yet there are cogent reasons why so many others, including members of bereaved families such as Dr Jim Swire who lost his daughter Flora in the bombing, have been convinced that Megrahi's conviction was a miscarriage of justice.

Soon after the destruction of Pan Am flight 103 American and British officials were busy laying the blame on the Iran Syria axis. However, after Iran and Syria joined the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War the same officials switched the blame to Libya, at the time very much a pariah state.

The trial of Megrahi and his fellow Libyan defendant Lamin Khalifa Fhimah at a specially constituted Scotttish court at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands came under criticism from international jurists. The two men were effectively charged with joint enterprise, yet only Megrahi was found guilty. The prosecution evidence was circumstantial; details of the bomb timer on the plane contradictory and the testimony of a key witness, a Maltese shopkeeper, shaky under cross-examination.

The evidence of a supposedly prime "CIA intelligence asset", codenamed "Puzzle Piece" who turned up in a Shirley Bassey wig, was widely viewed as risible. It emerged later that important evidence had not been passed on to the defence lawyers.

Professor Hans Köchler, a UN appointed legal observer, described the proceedings and a subsequent failed appeal by Megrahi as "inconsistent, arbitrary and a spectacular miscarriage of justice".

Editorial in The Herald

The Libyan's second appeal was on the basis of new evidence, after the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission ruled that there were six grounds for appeal. Details from the report have been printed in The Herald and the full report has been published online by our sister title the Sunday Herald. The grounds raise serious doubts about much of the forensic evidence on which the conviction relied as well as the veracity of the key witness, Tony Gauci, a Maltese shopkeeper, who is said to have been paid a substantial reward for his assistance in the investigation. Crucially, evidence that might have helped clear Megrahi was not shared with the defence. The second appeal was withdrawn when he was released on compassionate grounds in 2009, following his diagnosis of terminal prostate cancer. Regardless of whether he is innocent or guilty, there are grounds for a conclusion that he should not have been convicted and that a second appeal would have come to that conclusion.

Megrahi's death must not end the search for the truth. One option appears to be the possibility of one of the bereaved relatives taking up the appeal. Another would be for the Scottish or UK government to institute a judicial inquiry. This would be long and expensive but we cannot put a price on justice. A country can be judged by the quality of its judicial system. This case leaves a smear on the quality of Scottish justice that needs to be either contradicted or belatedly put right.

The example of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry shows that even long after the event, it is possible to put together a detailed narrative of an event that answers many outstanding questions and brings a measure of closure to the relatives of those who lost their lives. Even if Megrahi was guilty, he cannot have acted alone. If it is possible to identify those involved, they must be brought to justice. Those who in the name of some perverted political ideology would massacre innocent civilians need to know that they can run but they cannot hide.

Of course, part of the problem is that several foreign governments and groups may have had a hand in this atrocity and without regime change in those countries, they are unlikely to come clean. Early evidence pointed to a Palestinian group and both Iran and Syria have been suspected of involvement. After all, they had a motive: retaliation for the shooting down of an Iranian passenger jet by the American warship USS Vincennes in July 1988. That is no reason for not attempting to get to the bottom of what happened. In the short term, the most likely source of new information is Libya itself, where the new government has a vested interest in exposing the sins of the Gaddafi regime and any international links with other sponsors of international terrorism.

There are clear reasons why many believe the Lockerbie trial was a miscarriage of justice

[This is the headline over an article by Kim Sengupta published today on the website of The Independent.  It reads as follows:]

Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, his face skeletal, could barely move. He was attached to a drip, his face covered by an oxygen mask, drifting in and out of consciousness. The medicine needed for his treatment had been plundered by looters; the doctors had fled.

That was how I found the man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing in Tripoli last Autumn, the reminder of the controversy surrounding an atrocity 24 years ago. His brother Abdelnasser asked "Why do they want so much to drag him back to suffer in prison? You are looking at a man who is very close to dying."

The vengeful pursuit of Megrahi, the feeling that he has somehow escaped justice by not actually dying in a cell, is the result of a genuine belief by some that he was guilty, allied to anger that his release was part of the many dodgy deals between the British government and Muammar Gaddafi's regime. Yet there are cogent reasons why so many others, including members of bereaved families such as Dr Jim Swire who lost his daughter Flora in the bombing, have been convinced that Megrahi's conviction was a miscarriage of justice.

Soon after the destruction of Pan Am flight 103 American and British officials were busy laying the blame on the Iran Syria axis. However, after Iran and Syria joined the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War the same officials switched the blame to Libya, at the time very much a pariah state.

The trial of Megrahi and his fellow Libyan defendant Lamin Khalifa Fhimah at a specially constituted Scotttish court at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands came under criticism from international jurists. The two men were effectively charged with joint enterprise, yet only Megrahi was found guilty. The prosecution evidence was circumstantial; details of the bomb timer on the plane contradictory and the testimony of a key witness, a Maltese shopkeeper, shaky under cross-examination.

The evidence of a supposedly prime "CIA intelligence asset", codenamed "Puzzle Piece" who turned up in a Shirley Bassey wig, was widely viewed as risible. It emerged later that important evidence had not been passed on to the defence lawyers.

Professor Hans Koechler, a UN appointed legal observer, described the proceedings and a subsequent failed appeal by Megrahi as "inconsistent, arbitrary and a spectacular miscarriage of justice".

Anonymous CIA officers say was evidence that supported fantasist Giaka

[What follows is excerpted from a report published today on the website of The Sun:]

CIA agents have revealed evidence that could have helped the controversial Lockerbie bombing prosecutions was withheld from trial, The Sun Online can reveal.

The revelation comes in an internal memo written by agents involved in the case following the 1988 bombing over Scotland that killed 270 people.

Campaigners say the document provides further evidence the plot was carried out by Libya and that the bomb was placed on the jet in Malta – not in Heathrow, as some have claimed.

It comprises interviews with seven anonymous CIA officers reflecting on the case and was published for one of the agency’s internal publications.

Much of it centres on Abdul Majid Gialka, a prosecution witness in the trial who had been nicknamed the CIA’s “Libyan asset” and “Puzzle Piece” because of his ability to link aspects of the plot.

Majid was a double agent who defected to the US from the Libyan intelligence service and leaked top secret information to the Americans.

His work with the CIA helped point the finger towards Abdelbaset al-Megrahi as the man who planted the bomb.

This was despite trial judges ruling they were “unable to accept Abdul Majid as a credible and reliable witness on any matter”.

But the CIA memo reveals there were further intelligence cables not shown in trial that could have supported his testimony.

It states: “[REDACTED] the court didn’t believe Majid on a lot of his points because the justices never saw a second, more extensive, batch of redacted cables, which would have confirmed much of what he said in court.”

It does not specify which of his claims could have been supported but suggests the reason for this could have been an attempt to protect CIA methods and US state secrets.

Today controversy continues to swirl around the guilt of al-Megrahi. Some claim he was innocent, while others say the bomb could have been placed on the jet in London and not Malta, where he operated.

The memo also notes a number of CIA operatives were denied the opportunity to give evidence – this time a strategic decision taken by the lead prosecutor – in support of Majid’s claims.

It states: “We all felt that it was unfortunate that they did not testify. They felt frustrated that they did not appear, because, had they appeared, they probably would have been able to bolster Majid’s credibility.

“They would have been able to corroborate and expand on a number of things that Majid had testified about but on which he had been badgered and belaboured and picked apart by the defence.”

Kenny MacAskill, the Scottish MP who made the decision in 2009 to free al-Megrahi back to Libya on compassionate grounds, told The Sun Online Majid had been rejected by the court as a “supergrass”.

“That he was, but it was clear he was telling the truth about a lot of what was going on by Megrahi and his co-accused.”

MacAskill, the author of the book The Lockerbie Bombing: The Search for Justice, added: “Moreover, it shows that the CIA had other informants not just in Libya but at the airport in Malta.

“That has never been put before the courts. All this shows Libya was responsible and Megrahi had a role in it.”

John Ashton, the author of a book that suggests al-Megrahi was innocent of the bombing, told The Sun Online the note about additional cables was “interesting, but I have trouble believing it”.

He added that Majid “was such a problematic witness that the CIA would have been keen to disclose anything that supported his testimony”.

[RB: It does not surprise me that CIA officers should try now to contend that the disaster that Giaka was for the prosecution case was not their responsibility and that, notwithstanding what his CIA handlers said about him in the notorious cables to Langley HQ, there was material that supported him. It does surprise me (but, alas, only slightly) that Kenny MacAskill should seek to lend weight to this blatant CIA self-justification attempt.]

BBC Scotland revisits Lockerbie bombing

[What follows is the text of an item published today on The Highland Times website:]

One of Scotland’s most enduring and controversial criminal investigations is returning to the spotlight in a new BBC Scotland podcast series examining fresh evidence surrounding the Lockerbie bombing.

The six part series, Lockerbie, follows journalist Myles Bonnar as he revisits the investigation into the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103, which claimed the lives of 270 people in December 1988.

The series launches at a significant moment, with alleged bomb maker Abu Agila Masud due to stand trial in Washington DC.

Masud denies the allegations against him, while American prosecutors believe the trial could reveal new details about how the bombing was planned and carried out.

Produced by BBC Scotland for Radio 4’s Intrigue strand and BBC Sounds, the series explores the evidence gathered over nearly four decades, while examining why questions and competing theories have continued long after the original conviction.

Abdelbaset al Megrahi remains the only person convicted of the bombing, although he maintained his innocence until his death in 2012 and doubts surrounding the investigation have persisted ever since.

Throughout the series, Bonnar speaks with Scottish investigators, intelligence officers, journalists, legal experts, campaigners and relatives of those who died in the disaster.

Among those interviewed is Dr Jim Swire, whose daughter Flora was killed in the bombing and who continues to argue that the original investigation reached the wrong conclusion.

The podcast also examines intelligence gathered from a Libyan double agent known as “Puzzle Piece” and explores the so called Senussi Files, documents recovered from the ruins of Libya’s intelligence headquarters following the 2011 uprising.

Those files are said to raise fresh questions about Megrahi and other alleged conspirators.

As the new trial begins in the United States, the series asks whether the latest evidence could finally answer some of the questions that have surrounded the Lockerbie bombing for almost forty years.

Myles Bonnar said: “Lockerbie remains a story filled with questions, extraordinary characters and profound human loss.

“As new developments bring renewed attention to the case, this series explores the evidence, the controversies, and the enduring search for answers.”

Lockerbie will be available on 22 July when all episodes will be made available on BBC Sounds.