[This is the title of an important article by Dr Davina Miller published earlier this month in the journal Defence & Security Analysis.
The following are excerpts. I sought permission from the copyright
holders, the publishers Taylor & Francis, to quote from the article
but was told that it would take ten weeks for them to consider the
matter. In the circumstances I have decided to proceed without formal
clearance, relying on the fair use and educational use provisions of
copyright law.]
Pan
Am Flight 103 was destroyed by an improvised explosive device (IED) at
19.03 whilst over the Dumfries and Galloway region of Scotland, 38
minutes after leaving Heathrow, on 21 December 1988. The IED, installed
in a Toshiba Bombeat RT-SF16 stereo cassette/radio player, was hidden in
a brown hard-shell Samsonite suitcase. All 259 passengers and crew were
killed together with eleven people in Lockerbie. More than anything,
the issue of responsibility matters to the families of those who died,
and the official narrative remains problematic for many.
A
number of conspiracy theories surround this awful event. This article
puts aside all allegations and speculation and relies only upon legal
and governmental papers to examine the evidence. It is in three parts:
first, it examines the official narrative that emerged in the course of
the prosecution and conviction of Libyan intelligence officer,
Abd-al-Basit al-al-Miqrahi (al-Megrahi) for the Lockerbie bombing;
second, it assesses the available evidence that the governments of the
US and Britain knew that Iran via the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) bore responsibility for the
outrage; and third, it investigates the plausibility of a deal between
the US and Iran over Pan Am 103. To reiterate, this article is not
definitive, but exploratory.
PAN AM FLIGHT 103: THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVE AND ITS PROBLEMS
According
to the Trial Court, the circumstantial case against al-Megrahi rested
upon four interlocking planks: the presence of an unaccompanied bag from
Malta to London; the identification of al-Megrahi as the buyer of the
Maltese clothing found in the brown Samsonite suitcase containing the
bomb; his presence in Malta under a false name at the time the bomb was
placed on a plane; and his association with both Edmond Bollier, the
manufacturer of the MST-13 timer, said to have been used in the IED, and
members of Libyan Intelligence who purchased such timers.[iv][4]
The
case against al-Megrahi depended upon the bomb having originated in
Malta (on Flight KM180) since that was where he was on 21 December 1988.
In contrast to the theory of the crime presented to the Trial Court,
the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, published
in May 1990, eighteen months into the investigation, determined that
the bomb “probably was placed aboard at Frankfurt”.[v][5] The
Trial Court, however, relied upon a Frankfurt airport dispatch record,
which could have shown the presence of an unaccompanied bag from Malta.
Nonetheless, it noted that, “the method by which the primary suitcase
might have been placed on board KM180 is a major difficulty for the
Crown”, given the “relatively elaborate security system at Luqa airport”
and that KM180’s baggage records show “no discrepancy”.[vi][6]
The
US Defence Intelligence Agency noted on 30 December 1991 that, “Malta’s
position on the Pan Am crisis supports Libya (i.e. Malta stated that it
can prove that all the luggage on Pan Am 103 belonged to passengers on the flight)” (emphasis as in the original).[vii][7] Air
Malta reached an out-of-court settlement with Granada Television in
1993 for its claim in a television documentary that the bomb had been
loaded in an unaccompanied bag at Malta.
Another
problem with the theory that the bomb began its journey in Malta
concerns a CIA document. On 30 August 1989, the station in Malta noted
intelligence from their Libyan agent, ‘Abd al-Majid Gaika, that there
had been an External Security Organisation (ESO) survey of Luqa
International Airport in 1986, which had found that controls there
“ruled out insertion of unaccompanied baggage containing explosives on
to onward flights”.[viii][8] In
short, and in spite of Libya’s close connections to Malta, Libyan
security had ruled out the very act of which it would be accused of
having committed just two years later.
[The next section of the article deals with the well-known problems surrounding the “identification” of Megrahi by Tony Gauci.]
The
third circumstantial plank of the case against al-Megrahi was his
presence in Malta on a false passport at the appropriate time for
placing the bomb on board a Maltese flight. Much was made of his use of a
passport in a different name. However, as the CIA noted in a contact
report on 21 January 1989, it was “common practice among ranking
officers wishing to conceal their movements through the use of passports
(ppts) bearing variations on their true names”.[xii][12] On
22 December 1988, the CIA reported that al-Megrahi had travelled
through Malta earlier, on 7 December. The fact that he was then also
travelling on a passport in an assumed name was reported without
comment. The CIA also identified al-Megrahi as a “technical
communications expert”. Further, its report went on to say that, “it is
likely that el-Megrahi (sic) was carrying technical
intelligence-gathering equipment with him” and was “involved in some
type of technical intelligence operation”.[xiii][13]
[The
next section of the article deals with the well known problems
regarding the Mebo MST-13 timer fragment and the evidence of Hayes and
Feraday.]
AN ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVE: THE PFLP-GC AND IRAN
Al-Megrahi’s
defence team presented evidence about the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Palestinian
Popular Struggle Front (PPSF). In its judgment, the Trial Court argued
that, while these organisations were engaged in terrorist activities
during the same period, there was not any reasonable doubt - in spite of
the Trial Court’s admission - that, “we cannot say that it is
impossible that the clothing might have been taken from Malta, united
somewhere with a timer from some source other than Libya, and introduced
into the airline baggage system at Frankfurt or Heathrow”.[xx][20]
On
26 October 1988, the Federal Criminal Police Office, or
Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), arrested members of a PFLP-GC cell in an
operation centred on Frankfurt and Neuss and known as ‘Autumn Leaves’. Inter alia,
the BKA found explosives, timers, barometric pressure devices, radio
cassette players, Lufthansa luggage tags and airline timetables,
including Pan Am’s. Most members of the cell, bar Haj Hafez Kassem
Dalkamoni, the right hand man of Ahmed Jabril, leader of the PFLP-GC and
Abdel Fatah Ghadanfar, a Palestinian associate, were released shortly
thereafter.[xxi][21] Improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) found later had pressure switches that would
trigger about seven minutes after takeoff and timing devices with time
elapsed between 35 and 45 minutes.[xxii][22]
Marwan
Khreesat, the PFLP-GC Frankfurt cell bomb-maker - and a Jordanian agent
- was interviewed on 12 and 13 November 1989 at the Headquarters of the
Jordanian Intelligence Service. Khreesat “does not think he built the
device responsible for Pan Am 103, as he only built the four devices in
Germany” and did not use models with two speakers.[xxiii][23] Only
three devices were recovered by the BKA. Khreesat had, however, seen “a
not very good” device (the alterations to the radio cassette player
could easily be discovered) that he believed Dalkamoni had taken to
Frankfurt and handed over to Abu Elias, the PFLP-GC’s security expert.
This he identified as being similar to a Toshiba RT-F423.[xxiv][24]
From
19-26 October 1988, Abu Talb, a member of the Palestine Popular
Struggle Front (PPSF) in Sweden, who had ties to the PFLP-GC cell in
Frankfurt, was in Malta as a guest of Abd El Salam (aka Abu Nada), a
Director of the Miska Bakery. Talb took home clothing from Hashem Salem,
Salam’s brother. He flew to Sweden on an open return ticket, but had no
intention, he told the Court, of returning; it was simply a cheaper
ticket than a single. He remained in contact with Abd El Salam.[xxv][25]
In
summary, from the evidence presented at the trial, at the time of the
bombing of Pan Am 103, there were two groups actively planning to attack
Western aircraft and with the capabilities to do so. In addition, both
these groups had links to Malta. (...)
Even
after the indictments of Libyan co-defendants Lamen Khalifa Fhimah and
al-Megrahi, intelligence documents continued to assert the involvement
of the PFLP-GC, though it was now linked to Libya, rather than Iran. An
information report dated 26 November 1991 assigned blame to Ahmed Jabril
“in training the perpetrators and in designing the bomb”. The report
goes on to assert that, “the luggage containing the bomb was purportedly
intercepted in London by al-Megrahi, who probably claimed the bag, set
the timer, then switched luggage tags to route it on to Pan Am flight
103”.[xxix][29] A
Defence Intelligence Terrorism Summary on 13 December 1991 also linked
Jabril with training the accused and in designing the bomb.[xxx][30]
It
is not clear exactly when or why the PFLP-GC and PPSF were dropped as
suspects post-1991 to leave a single focus upon Libya as the perpetrator
of the Pan Am 103 bombing. (...)
On
24 September 1989, the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), in a
secret information report not releasable to foreign nationals and
relying on information acquired through the National Security Agency
(NSA) at Fort Meade’ (i.e. through Foreign Signals Intelligence),
asserted that the attack on Pan Am Flight 103, “was conceived,
authorised and financed by Ali-Akbar (Mohtashemi-Pur)”, the former
Iranian Minister of the Interior. The execution of the operation was
contracted to Ahmad (Jabri’il), the PFLP-GC leader, for the sum of
$1,000,000. The report was highly detailed in describing the
organisation of the bombing and claimed that, “the flight was supposed
to be a direct flight from Frankfurt to New York, not Pan Am Flight
103”.[xxxii][32]
In
October 1989, a further DIA report noted that Iranian “radicals want to
be able to retaliate in less time than it took them to carry out the
Pan Am 103 bombing”.[xxxiii][33] The
CIA’s ‘Terrorism Review’ for 14 December 1989 also noted that liaison
between Iran and radical Palestinian groups “was most likely responsible
for the bombing of Pan Am 103”.[xxxiv][34] The
Defence Intelligence Agency in a brief in December 1989, titled “Pan Am
103: Deadly Co-operation” argued that, “Iran probably was the state
sponsor for the PFLP-GC attack on Pan Am 103”. The same report noted:
that the bomb was “a sophisticated, barometrically triggered explosive
device probably fabricated by the PFLP-GC”; that “DIA believes the
device was placed aboard...in Frankfurt”; and that, “analysis of
material confiscated from this PFLP-GC cell has provided strong
circumstantial evidence linking the cell to the bombing”. The report
further detailed the relationship between Iran and the PFLP-GC,
including the initial overtures, payment for Pan Am 103, and the
latter’s exploitation of Iran’s “established terror network in
Europe”.[xxxv][35]
A
Combined Message from the DIA on 22 December 1989 asserted that, “a
compelling body of evidence indicates the PFLP-GC placed a
sophisticated, altimeter-fused, radio-encased bomb aboard Pan Am flight
103”. The missing improvised explosive device (IED) from the Autumn
Leaves Operation was noted: “the fourth device was believed to be a
Toshiba radio/cassette player larger than the Bombeat 453” and “may
prove to be the bomb that destroyed Pan Am 103”. [xxxvi][36] In
January 1990, the DIA then argued that, “Iran probably was the state
sponsor for the PFLP-GC attack on Pan Am 103”.[xxxvii][37] (...)
A
Defence Intelligence ‘Terrorism Summary’, dated 15 September 1990,
summarised a discussion about Pan Am 103 and the PFLP-GC during a
meeting between the US Secretary of State, James Baker, and the Syrian
Foreign Minister. The Summary notes that, “although the US has provided
evidence of PFLP-GC complicity, the Syrian government has dismissed it
as insufficient”.[xl][40] A
Defence Intelligence Terrorism Summary on 16 November 1990 asserted
that, “The US has long sought Jibril’s expulsion for his role in the
bombing of Pan Am 103”.[xli][41]
(...)
in February 1991, eight months after the FBI had supposedly identified
the timer which led away from the PFLP-GC and Iran, in an Intelligence
Report for Multinational Forces, Desert Storm, the DIA noted Iran’s
Interior Minister, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi’s payment of $10 million for
“terrorist activities” and that he “was the one who paid the same amount
to bomb Pan Am Flight 103”.[xlii][42]
This
Report was published in the UK media on 24 January 1995. UK and US
officials insisted, however, that there was, “no credible evidence”
linking Iran to the bombing and denied the claims made. Libya saw the
report as, “exonerating” it of any involvement.[xliii][43] More
tellingly, in November 1991, DIA officials commented upon an earlier
report on Syria: “We found the article helpful. However ... the
statement that the PFLP-GC is accused of bombing Pan Am 103 directly
contradicts the recent announcement that Libya was behind the
act”.[xliv][44] The anonymous officials did not question the veracity of the assertion; their main concern was about its being leaked.
While
US intelligence services were asserting Iranian complicity, they ruled
out Libyan and Syrian involvement. As the December 1989, “Pan Am 103:
Deadly Co-operation” Defense Intelligence brief noted, the “DIA
continues to discount Libyan or Syrian involvement in the bombing of Pan
Am 103 because there is no current credible intelligence implicating
either”.[xlv][45] This
was consistent with the conclusions contained in other DIA and CIA
reports throughout 1989. (...) Both before and after the indictments,
there was no discussion in US intelligence records of how to prevent
similar future acts of Libyan terrorism.
CHOOSING ONE’S ENEMIES
The United States’ Potential Motives
Given
the concerns around the safety of al-Megrahi’s conviction, the evidence
pointing to the PFLP-GC and PPSF, as well as the US intelligence
community’s apparent conclusion that Iran orchestrated the bombing of
Pan Am 103, it is worth examining the circumstantial evidence as to the
possibility of a decision, or a deal, to overlook Iranian potential
guilt.
The most popular conspiracy theories attribute such a decision to
the exigencies of Middle Eastern politics around the period of the
first Gulf War of 1990-1. The investigation began to focus on Libya,
however, at a much earlier time in September 1989, a year before Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait. While investigators sought to link Libya to the
PFLP-GC, US government agencies retained and adhered to the original
theory of the crime. For example, at least until late 1990, the State
Department pressed Syria for Jibril’s expulsion, because of his alleged
involvement in the bombing of Pan Am 103. Moreover, US intelligence
documents continued to speak of PFLP-GC and Iranian involvement long
after the public focus upon Libya. (...)
A
deal between the US and Iran that involved the issue of Pan Am 103 is
not an unreasonable hypothesis, given previous US behaviour and British
and French ‘deals’ with Iran for the release of hostages. For example,
on 21 March 1991, the CIA criticized Britain for having deported
Mehradad Kokabi, an Iranian charged in connection with a bomb attack.
While this would, “help Rafsanjani by using an issue used by hardliners
to argue against the release of hostages”, it would also reinforce the
view in Tehran that, “Washington, like London, will strike a deal
favourable to Iran”. Equally, the CIA complained that the French
government had earlier done a deal with Iran for the release of nine
hostages between 1986 and 1988.[li][51]
Even
as the US was contemplating in early 1989 that Iran had a hand in the
bombing of Pan Am 103, it was still signalling the hope for a deal with
Iran on the hostage issue as expressed in President Bush’s inaugural
address. As he said, “There are today Americans who are held against
their will in foreign lands and Americans who are unaccounted for.
Assistance can be shown here and will be long remembered”.[lii][52]
(...)
US/UK
indictments of the two Libyan suspects were announced on 13 November
1991. On 16 November 1991, Iranian radio declared that the indictments
of Fhima and al-Megrahi represented, “the start of a new psychological
and propaganda war by Washington against Libya”.[lviii][58] A
DIA report on 23 November, from intelligence acquired from Fort Meade,
(that is, from Foreign Signals Intelligence) noted, however, that the
“Iranian President voiced his pleasure in seeing the recent press
attribute the blame to Libya for the 1988 Pan Am flight 103
bombing”.[lix][59]
On
18 November 1991, the American, Thomas Sutherland, and the Briton,
Terry Waite, were freed by Islamic Jihad in Beirut.[lx][60] Later
that month, there was a comprehensive exchange of hostages and human
remains on one side and, on the other, prisoners in Israeli jails. On 2
December, the US also paid compensation to Iran some $278,000,000 for
weapons confiscated in 1979.[lxi][61] On
10 December, a UN report found that Iraq’s invasion of Iran on 22
September 1980, and the occupation of Iranian land that followed, were
unjustified and illegal.[lxii][62]
While
many elements comprised the hostages deal, it could be argued that Pan
Am 103 was necessarily part of the comprehensive settlement that
involved, inter alia,
money, prisoners, and international judgments about the Iran-Iraq War.
It was necessary because, as the CIA commented on 1 June 1989, the
Iranians “believe that the presence of Western hostages in Lebanon will
help deter retaliation” for the bombing of Flight 103.[lxiii][63] It
follows that Iran could not feel safe from US retaliation for Pan Am
103 (whether the retaliation was justified or not) if the hostages were
freed without some guarantee. Thus, the eventual indictment of a rival
state, it could be argued, provided that guarantee and was thus the
necessary condition for the deal that followed.
Even
before the final settlement, it is possible to argue that the US and
Iran reached a tentative agreement about Pan Am 103. If Mohtashemi were
the architect, as US intelligence seemed firmly to believe, using the
back channels already established through ‘Irangate’, and relying on the
policy of searching for moderates with whom to do business, it is
possible that the US sought the isolation of Mohtashemi in exchange for a
policy of non-retaliation. (...)
CONCLUSION
This
article is not definitive. Rather, given the persistence of
counter-narratives, it seeks to explore the available reliable evidence.
That there remain some problematic issues around the conviction of
al-Megrahi is evidenced in the referral of his case to a further appeal
by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission in 2007. That appeal
was never heard because of al-Megrahi’s release on compassionate grounds
in 2009. The Crown’s case rested upon four inter-locking circumstances,
each and all of them problematic. Security at Luqa was ‘a major
difficulty’ for the Crown’s case that the bomb originated in Malta.
Moreover, Libyan intelligence, according to CIA reports, seemed to have
ruled Luqa out as an airport for the insertion of IEDs because of said
security.
The
identification of al-Megrahi as the purchaser of the clothes found in
the bomb case was, as the Trial Court acknowledged, ‘not absolute’.
Subsequently it has been revealed that Gauci was paid for his evidence.
Al-Megrahi’s presence in Malta on a false passport does not seem to have
caused the CIA concerns in the late 1980s. A false passport was common
among Libyan security personnel and the CIA had defined al-Megrahi as a
‘technical communications expert’. Finally, in terms of the bomb and its
timer, the Trial Court noted problems in the evidence chain and
subsequently the central US and British forensics staff involved have
been discredited.
Turning
to the defence’s theory of the crime, it is known that the PFLP-GC and
PPSF had both the intention and capability for an attack on an airliner.
In addition, they can be connected to Malta. Looking at the
investigation, the PFLP-GC continued to be suspects, but with attempts
from 1989 to link them to Libya. US intelligence spoke of “a compelling
body of evidence” that “the PFLP-GC placed a sophisticated,
altimeter-fused, radio-encased bomb aboard Pan Am flight 103” in
December 1989 and the US was lobbying Syria, at Secretary of State
level, for Jabril’s expulsion for Pan Am 103 in late 1990. The
conviction that the PFLP-GC committed the bombing seems to have been
widely held and long-lasting within the US government. Why there was an
attempt first to link the PFLP-GC to Libya and then to abandon the
“compelling evidence” against this group are interesting questions.
Given the attack on [sic; presumably "by" is meant] the USS Vincennes,
less than six months before the bombing of Pan Am 103, Iran had, on the
one hand, an obvious motive for retaliation against the US – and,
indeed, US intelligence anticipated such action. On the other hand,
Libyan motives were unclear, given that the anticipated date for an
attack against the US was April (the anniversary of the Tripoli bombing
in 1986). It is well known that the West had both a history of, and
reasons for, backchannel deal-making with Iran, chief among those
reasons the hostages held in Lebanon by pro-Iran groups. Given the
belief by some factions that the hostages were deterring US retaliation
for Pan Am 103, it would be necessary for any hostage deal to entail a
guarantee on said retaliation. It is possibly telling both that
Rafsanjani took private pleasure at the Libyan indictments and that US
intelligence reported it. (...)
Given
the current mix of circumstances in the Middle East and South Asia, it
has never been more important that the West gets its policy towards Iran
right. It is equally important for democratic politics and the human
rights of those who must live under such regimes that there is honesty
about the foreign policy choices that the West is making.
This article and its references are the copyright of Taylor and Francis, which must be acknowledged ©Taylor and Francis 2011.
NOTES
[iv][4]
In the High Court of the Justiciary at Camp Zeist, Case No. 1475/99,
Opinion of the Court, delivered by Lord Sutherland in causa Her
Majesty’s Advocate v Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and Al Amin
Khalifa Fhimah, paras.87-89, http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/library/Lockerbie/docs/lockerbiejudgement.pdf, 18 July 2010.
[v][5] Report to the President by the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, GPO, Washington DC, May 1990, p. ii.
[vi][6] I n the High Court of the Justiciary at Camp Zeist, Case No. 1475/99, Opinion of the Court, delivered by Lord Sutherland in causa Her Majesty’s Advocate v Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, paras.38-39, http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/library/Lockerbie/docs/lockerbiejudgement.pdf, 18 July 2010.
[vii][7] Defence Intelligence Agency, Combined Message, 30 December 1991, http://www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[viii][8] Central Intelligence Agency, Contact Report, 30 August 1989, http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp, 9 July 2010.
[xii][12] Central Intelligence Agency, 20 January 1989, http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp , 13 July 2010.
[xiii][13]
Central Intelligence Agency, ’Travel of Libyan External Security
Organisation Officers through Malta in December 1988’, 22 December 1988, http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp, 9 July 2010.
[xx][20] In the High Court of the Justiciary at Camp Zeist, Case No. 1475/99, Opinion of the Court, delivered by Lord Sutherland in causa Her Majesty’s Advocate v Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, para.82, http:/www.scotcourts.gov.uk/library/Lockerbie/docs/lockerbiejudgement.pdf, 18 July 2010.
[xxi][21] In the High Court of the Justiciary at Camp Zeist, Case No. 1475/99, Opinion of the Court, delivered by Lord Sutherland in causa Her Majesty’s Advocate v Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, paras.73-4, http:/www.scotcourts.gov.uk/library/Lockerbie/docs/lockerbiejudgement.pdf, 18 July 2010.
[xxii][22]
In the High Court of the Justiciary at Camp Zeist, Case No. 1475/99,
Her Majesty’s Advocate v Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and Al Amin
Khalifa Fhimah, Evidence, Rainer Gobel, physicist, BKA, pp. 8793-8796.
[xxiii][23]
In the High Court of the Justiciary at Camp Zeist, Case No. 1475/99,
Her Majesty’s Advocate v Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and Al Amin
Khalifa Fhimah, Evidence, Edward Marshman, FBI Special Agent, p. 9268
and p. 9298.
[xxiv][24]
In the High Court of the Justiciary at Camp Zeist, Case No. 1475/99,
Her Majesty’s Advocate v Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and Al Amin
Khalifa Fhimah, Evidence, Edward Marshman, FBI Special Agent, p. 9300.
[xxv][25] In the High Court of the Justiciary at Camp Zeist, Case No. 1475/99, Opinion of the Court, delivered by Lord Sutherland in causa Her Majesty’s Advocate v Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, paras.78-9, http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/library/Lockerbie/docs/lockerbiejudgement.pdf, 18 July 2010.
[xxix][29] Defence Intelligence Agency, Information Report, 26 November 1991, http:/www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[xxx][30] Defence Intelligence Agency, Terrorism Summary, 13 December 1991, http://www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[xxxii][32] Defence Intelligence Agency, Information Report, 24 September 1989, http://www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010
[xxxiii][33] Defence Intelligence Agency, Information Report, 7 October 1989, http://www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[xxxiv][34] Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Terrorism Review, 14 December 1989, http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp, 19 March 2010.
[xxxv][35] Defence Intelligence Agency, Defence Intelligence Brief, ‘Pan Am 103: Deadly Co-operation’, December 1989, http:/www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[xxxvi][36] Defence Intelligence Agency, Combined Message, 22 December 1989, http:/www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[xxxvii][37] Defence Intelligence Agency, January 1990, http:/www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[xl][40] Defence Intelligence Agency, Terrorism Summary, 15 September 1990, http://www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[xli][41] Defence Intelligence Agency, Terrorism Summary, 16 November 1990, http://www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[xlii][42] Defence Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Report, February 1991, http://www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[xliii][43] Keesing’s Record of World Events, Vol. 41, January 1995, Libya, p. 40380.
[xliv][44] Defence Intelligence Agency, Memorandum, November 1991, http://www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[xlv][45] Defence Intelligence Agency, Defence Intelligence Brief, ‘Pan Am 103: Deadly Co-operation’, December 1989, http://www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[li][51] Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Terrorism Review, 21 March 1991, http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp, 19 March 2010.
[lii][52] President George bush, Inaugural Address, 20 January 1989, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/, 20 March 2011.
[lviii][58] Keesing’s Record of World Events, Vol. 37, November 1991, Libya, p.38599
[lix][59] Defence Intelligence Agency, Information Report, 23 November 1991, http://www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[lx][60] Defence Intelligence Agency, Information Report, 19 November 1991, http:/www.dia.mil/foia/panam103.pdf, 18 March 2010.
[lxi][61] Keesing’s Record of World Events, Vol. 37, December 1991, Lebanon, p.38694.
[lxii][62] Keesing’s Record of World Events, Vol. 37, December 1991, Iran, p. 38697.
[lxiii][63] Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Terrorism Review, 1 June 1989
