UK and US only two nations rejecting Lockerbie compromise

[What follows is a report on a meeting held on 16 April 1998 in Cairo between officials of the Arab League, including the Secretary-General Dr Esmat Abdel-Meguid, and Dr Jim Swire and me:]

The Scottish lawyer Robert Black said on the 16th of April in Cairo after the talks with Abdel Maguid, that his latest proposal to end a dispute between Libya, Britain and the United States over the trial of two Libyan suspects in a 1988 airliner bombing would be his last. Black gave no details on the modifications in the more recent proposal. But he said there was “fine-tuning” to make it more acceptable to the British and Americans.

“What we are hoping for is that continued pressure on these two governments will cause them to see the error of their ways,” Black said.

Robert Black told a news conference he was “51 percent sure” the Libyans would accept the modified proposal. He would not give details, but Black and Swire are suggesting the suspects be tried under Scottish law in a neutral venue by an international panel of judges, without a jury. But Robert Black, a legal expert advising the victims' families, said there was little hope the United States would accept the proposal, although international pressure might succeed in winning Britain's support. “One simply has to give up on the American government,” Black said. “They are unmovable.”

“It's now plain that the United States and the United Kingdom as far as I know are the only two nations in the civilised world which are not saying 'this is a sensible compromise solution, accept it',” Black said after meeting the head of the Cairo-based Arab League. “What I am hoping is that the United Kingdom can see the error of its ways if it is given an opportunity marginally to save face. They have to find a solution. If this proposal does not work, then I suspect that this may very well be the end of the line.

“I can't very well go on drafting scheme after scheme, that are accepted by one side but rejected outright by the other. All three are going to have to accept something with which they are not 100% happy in order for there to be a compromise,” he said. "If they are prepared to do that then there is a remote possibility of progress. But I wouldn't put it above saying there is a slight chance. But any chance is better than no chance."

Swire slammed the British government for not moving fast enough to end the crisis. “For six years, I have been waiting for the men charged with the brutal murder of my daughter to be put on trial but on March 20, the permanent representative of my country in the United Nations was busy telling the Security Council that the sanctions they imposed on Libya were not working.

“Why have you kept us waiting for six years when they are not working? They are demolishing the thing they invited us to depend on and if that doesn't make you angry, then it should.”

Jim Swire, who acted as representative for British victims of the bombing, said Abdel-Meguid would pass the new proposal to the Libyans.

[RB: Just over four months later the UK and USA accepted the solution of a Scottish court in a neutral venue.]

Westminster slammed over Megrahi release criticism

[What follows is excerpted from a report published on the STV News website on this date in 2011:]

Alex Salmond said he would “take no lectures” from Westminster politicians after former Conservative leader Michael Howard demanded he apologise for the release of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi.

Appearing on the BBC’s Question Time programme, the SNP leader said the decision to free the only man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing was taken only "on the basis of Scots law".

Mr Salmond also claimed that "prominent" UK politicians had advocated to the Scottish Government that Megrahi should be released "on the grounds of trade, business and oil".

Megrahi was released from jail in August 2009 on compassionate grounds after the Scottish Government was told he had only three months to live.

Former home secretary Mr Howard had earlier said the decision to allow Megrahi to return to Libya was "a very mistaken decision" and called on Mr Salmond and Scottish Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill to apologise.

But Mr Salmond criticised the UK's policy towards Libya and its head of state Colonel Gaddafi.

He said: "Over the past few years two British prime ministers have been seen hugging him in desert tents, and Britain has been selling arms to Libya.

"And incidentally, Michael, some of your prominent colleagues advocated to the Scottish Government that Mr al-Megrahi should be released not on the grounds of law, but on grounds of trade business and oil.

"I represent an administration, whether you agree or disagree with our decisions, which has taken its decision on the basis of Scots law. I'm not going to take any lectures from Westminster politicians who have been up to their eyes in arms deals and oil and trade and a variety of other dirty affairs."

A completely circular argument

What follows is an item originally posted on this blog on this date in 2011.

Masking justice with “mercy”

[This is the title of an article by barrister David Wolchover in the current issue of Criminal Law & Justice Weekly. Over nine pages it painstakingly dissects the evidence relating to the conviction of Abdelbaset Megrahi. The following is just one short section of the article:]

Although the trial court found that the Samsonite bag had been carried from Luqa on KM180 they did not find that al-Megrahi had been instrumental in getting it on board. Nor did they find that he brought bomb components to Malta on December 20, and they rejected the Crown’s contention that he had access to explosives in Malta. But they found that he was involved as some sort of accessory on the basis of a package of assumptions: (i) the MST-13 timer was a type which had been supplied, though apparently not exclusively, to the Libyan military/JSO; (ii) al-Megrahi was a member of the JSO; (iii) he bought the clothes in the suitcase from Mary’s House on July 7; (iv) using a false passport for unexplained purposes he made a flying visit to Malta on December 20, returning to Tripoli next day at virtually the same time as KM180 flew out; (v) although there was no evidence as to how the bag could have been placed on board KM180 at Luqa, the Frankfurt evidence was consistent with the possibility that it was.

Having regard to al-Megrahi’s membership of the JSO and the supply of MST-13 timers to Libya, they were able to find that the bag had been put on board KM180 on December 21 because al-Megrahi (a) was the purchaser of the clothes on December 7, (b) was in Malta on December 21, using a false passport with no explanation and (c) was, as they found, therefore “connected,” in some unspecified way with the planting of the bomb. How could they be sure he was the purchaser of the clothes on the basis of mere resemblance to the purchaser and his brief presence in Sliema on December 7? Oh, because the bomb had been flown out of Luqa on December 21, when he was at the airport (using a false passport) and he was therefore “connected” with planting it. But, wait. How could they be sure it had started on its way from Luqa on the 21st? Ah, because he was found to have bought the clothes.

The argument was completely circular. The trial Judges professed to apply the principle of circumstantial evidence, an exercise which normally involves weaving together a number of disparate strands of evidence, reasonably well established or even undisputed though in themselves capable of proving very little, to wrap the accused in a net so tight as to permit no escape from a judgment of guilt. But the actual principle the court applied was petitio principii: assuming what is to be proved as a component of the would-be proof. Thus, a fundamental corruption of basic logic intellectually bankrupted the whole exercise.

The circle is dependent on the soundness of the finding that al-Megrahi was the purchaser. If that finding is wholly unsustainable the circle is broken and the other components prove nothing. The case against al-Megrahi depends therefore on the question whether there is a substantial case for contending that he was the purchaser. There is not.

The identification process was totally and utterly flawed

[On this date in 1999, Abdelbaset Megrahi took part in an identification parade at Camp Zeist. The Maltese shopkeeper Tony Gauci picked him out with the words “Not exactly the man I saw in the shop 10 years ago, but the man who look a little bit like exactly is the number 5". The trial judges were satisfied on this evidence (and a somewhat similarly qualified courtroom identification) that Gauci had identified Megrahi as the purchaser of the clothes that accompanied the bomb in the brown Samsonite suitcase. This “identification” would have been seriously challenged had Megrahi’s second appeal not been abandoned.

What follows is excerpted from an article in the Scottish Sunday Express on 21 August 2011:]

A dossier for Megrahi’s appeal – which was dropped days before his release – claims the ID parade in April 1999 “fell short of what was fair”. Gauci, who sold clothing that was later packed in a suitcase with the bomb, said he could not be sure if any of the men were the same individual who had visited his shop a decade earlier.

Eventually, he picked out Megrahi as the one who “looked a little bit like exactly” the purchaser.

The report claims the parade was carried out after “an extraordinary length of time” using “stand-ins” who were not “sufficiently similar”.

It also points out that Megrahi’s photograph had been widely published. Police reports from the parade are described as “incomplete and confusing”.

Professor Steven Clark, Professor of Psychology at the University of California, states: “At no time did [Gauci] ever clearly and definitively assert that Mr. Megrahi was the man who came into his store.

“Rather, in each identification procedure, he stated that Mr. Megrahi was ‘similar’ or ‘resembled’ the man.” 

Another eyewitness identification expert, Professor Tim Valentine, of Goldsmiths University of London, said: “I do have concern of the quality of the identification evidence. I wouldn’t want to be convicted on identification evidence of that quality.”

Scottish campaigner Iain McKie, a member of the Justice for Megrahi committee,  added: “The identification process of Megrahi was totally and utterly flawed and wrong. Yet the conviction rests on that identification. The whole process was rotten.”

[Professor Steve Clark’s report on the “identification” of Megrahi can be read here (paragraphs 77 to 90 deal particularly with the ID parade).  Professor Tim Valentine’s report can be read here (paragraphs 8.18 to 8.30 and 9.2 are particularly relevant).]

Lockerbie trial personnel

What follows is excerpted from an item originally posted on this blog on this date in 2008:

Where are they now?

[I]t has been reported that Megrahi's junior counsel at the Zeist trial, John Beckett, has been appointed a sheriff (a judge in Scotland's lower court system). Beckett became a QC in 2005 after the trial, and served briefly as Solicitor General for Scotland (deputy to the Lord Advocate, the chief Scottish Government law officer and head of the prosecution system) in 2006 to 2007. See http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2008/04/10100308

As far as the other lawyers involved in the trial are concerned, most remain in practice but two of the prosecutors, Alastair Campbell QC and Alan Turnbull QC, have become judges of the Scottish supreme courts (the Court of Session and the High Court of Justiciary); Megrahi's solicitor, Alistair Duff, has become a sheriff; and Richard Keen QC, the senior counsel for the acquitted co-accused, Lamin Fhimah, has been elected Dean of the Faculty of Advocates (leader of the Scottish Bar). The then Lord Advocate, Colin Boyd QC (later Lord Boyd of Duncansby) has taken the highly unusual step of resigning from the Faculty of Advocates and becoming a solicitor. He is now a partner in a large Edinburgh law firm.

The three judges who presided at the trial, Lords Sutherland, Coulsfield and MacLean, have all now retired from the bench.

[RB: Sheriff Alistair Duff is now Director of the Judicial Institute for Scotland; Richard Keen QC is now Baron Keen of Elie and Advocate General for Scotland; Colin Boyd QC is now a judge of the Court of Session and High Court of Justiciary; Lord Coulsfield died in March 2016.]

Victims' families “unduly influencing US policy”

What follows is an item originally posted on this blog on this date in 2011:

Libya: Britain told US not to intervene in Lockerbie bomber release

[This is the headline over a report in today's edition of the Daily Telegraph. It reads in part:]

The British ambassador to the US told America it should not intervene to stop the release of the Lockerbie bomber from a Scottish prison, according to leaked diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks and passed to the Daily Telegraph.

Nigel Sheinwald told James Steinberg, the US Deputy Secretary of State, that he was "concerned" that the demands of victims' families were unduly influencing US policy.

His comments came during critical negotiations over whether Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, who was convicted of the murder of 270 passengers on Pan Am Flight 103, should be switched to a Libyan jail to serve the remainder of his sentence.

Sir Nigel was Tony Blair's foreign policy adviser between 2003 and 2007 and played a key role, alongside the Libyan Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa, in bringing Colonel Muammar Gaddafi back into the international fold. He was at Mr Blair's side for the first meeting with Colonel Gaddafi in 2007 that resulted in a substantial BP oil contract. [RB: Sheinwald was at Blair's side throughout the negotiations that resulted in the "deal in the desert".]

The cable, obtained by WikiLeaks and passed to the Daily Telegraph, is dated February 2009. It states: "Sheinwald asked that the US continue to consult with the UK in the possible transfer of ailing Pan Am bomber Abdel-Basset al-Megrahi from the UK to Libya. Specifically, he said HMG supported the discussions this week between UK and US officials to define a common strategy.

"Sheinwald cited concern that the Pan Am victims' families were asking for direct US intervention to stop the transfer. He asked that the United States delay "for a few days" any intervention with the Scottish authorities, who will ultimately decide on the transfer." [RB: At this stage, only repatriation under the UK-Libya prisoner transfer agreement was in issue. No application for compassionate release was made by Megrahi until several months later.]

He was firmly rebuffed by Deputy Secretary Steinberg. The cable states: "The Deputy said the UK government needed to understand the sensitivities in this case, and noted he was acutely aware of the concerns of Lockerbie victim's groups from his previous time in government."

Mr Megrahi was controversially released on compassionate grounds seven months later after being diagnosed with cancer.

Last night the victim's families were furious that British diplomats actively lobbied to stop the US intervening in Megrahi's release.

Kathleen Flynn, whose son John Patrick died in the bombing, said: "It is disgraceful that the British were complicit in his release. This man was a killer who took 270 innocent lives but was allowed go free and live the life of riley in Tripoli."

Sir Nigel Sheinwald also reportedly gave Gaddafi's son, Saif, help with his PhD thesis. The doctorate awarded him by the London School of Economics was already thought suspect because he followed it with a £1.5 million donation. Mr Sheinwald denied the allegation, saying he met Saif Gaddafi while he was writing his thesis but had not helped him. (...)

Senior Labour Cabinet ministers always denied being involved in any backstairs deals over the release in August 2009, yet a secret Foreign Office memo referred to a "game plan" to facilitate Megrahi's move to Libya.

Sir Gus O'Donnell, the cabinet secretary, said in an analysis of the papers: "Once Megrahi had been diagnosed with terminal cancer in September 2008, (government) policy was based upon an assessment that UK interests would be damaged if Megrahi were to die in a UK jail."

A Foreign Office spokesman said: "We do not comment on leaked documents."

An easy target required as some kind of scapegoat

[What follows is excerpted from an article headlined Kill 290 innocents: Get an award for bravery posted today on Peter Biddulph and Dr Jim Swire’s Lockerbie Truth blog:]

How do you kill 290 innocent people: men, women, including 66 children?

And how do you get a medal for bravery in action against America's imagined enemies?

July 1988.  This is how you do it.  See the maps, the paranoia, the stupidity. America called it an unfortunate mistake. Yet they gave the captain a medal for bravery in action against an enemy.

This was the reason for the December 1988 Lockerbie bombing, which killed 290 innocent people.  At least, that's what CIA classified reports said for almost two years.

After that, America needed Syrian and Iranian support in the 1991 Gulf war. So an easy target was required as some kind of scapegoat. Those CIA reports were quietly shelved, and in November 1991, out of the blue, came evidence against Libya. (...)

The waiting game of Lockerbie

[This is the headline over an article that appeared in the Melbourne newspaper The Age on this date in 1999. The following are excerpts:]

The Lockerbie trial in the Netherlands will be neither brisk nor easy for lawyers or the accused, writes Sonia Harford.

The accused wear their own clothes and receive visitors. Part of the bustle in and out of the camp gates is catering staff who provide meals in strict accordance with the Libyans' Muslim requirements. A prayer room has also been provided with a compass indicating the direction of Mecca.

Up the road in Soesterberg proper, the Dutch locals are characteristically phlegmatic. They notice and quite enjoy the barrage of media passing through, but become more enthusiastic when remarking on how the presence of the Scots will boost local business.

The Americans abandoned Camp Zeist four years ago, and with them went many guilders spent in the town on food and other supplies. "The Americans bought lots of fruit," said Toft the Groenteman (vegetableman) from his fruit and , vegetable shop in Rademakerstraat. "When they were here, everyone from the petrol station to McDonald's benefited."

Bartender Rob Westra, having an off-duty beer at the Het Wapen van Soesterberg bar, had a different form of self-interest. "You have to be careful with the drinking now, because the whole village is full of police."

About 100 Scottish prison service staff and police are assigned to guard the camp at any given time, housed in dormitories inside the gates. When the trial begins, the converted buildings will also house legal teams and witnesses.

Anyone expecting an air of menace at the prison compound will be disarmed by the site's tranquility. Local residents walk or cycle past, just metres from the camp gates. And, nearby, visitors continue to arrive at the aviation museum, a popular collection of old planes and jets dotted around the flat ground.

Depending on their cell's location, it's not impossible that the two Libyan suspects could hear the chatter and laughter of children playing outside the prison grounds.

The detention of the two men comes after a decade of US and British legal and diplomatic manoeuvering to force Libya to hand over the suspects for trial before a Scottish court.

In 1991, Britain and the US said investigations into the crash had unearthed evidence that pointed towards Tripoli. But Libya's President, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, refused to surrender the prime suspects, claiming they would not receive a fair trial outside Libya, frustrating the US and British authorities and the hopes of the victims' families.

The Netherlands is regarded as having sound experience, having hosted the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague. Gaddafi continued to delay, and, in February, the US laid down a deadline, demanding the suspects surrender within a month. By March, Gaddafi finally agreed. The two men would be handed over.

The men are described as airline officials for Libyan Arab Airlines, but are believed to be intelligence agents. Both have denied the charges. It has been alleged that a more senior agent, perhaps even Gaddafi, was behind the bombing, but he has denied any involvement.

The surrender has long been sought by the British, and the week's Government statements had a subtle air of triumph. "There can be no question of prejudging the outcome, but the very fact that the trial will now take place represents real and significant progress," said the Secretary of State for Scotland, Donald Dewar.

Immediately after the suspects' arrival at the renamed HM Prison Zeist, the UN suspended its sanctions against Libya, leading this week to speculation that European oil companies, sensing an oil boom, will soon renew investment links with the country. However, Washington is expected to continue sanctions it imposed independently in the '80s when terrorist incidents forced Americans to leave Libya.

A Scottish Office spokeswoman said the level of international cooperation at Camp Zeist was unprecedented. "Never before has there been a Scottish trial taking place on foreign ground," she said. It was also likely to be the longest and most expensive Scottish trial ever.

In the week that Scotland began an historic election campaign for its own Parliament, the legal procedures begun at Camp Zeist also came under scrutiny. The Lockerbie bombing trial will be heard by a panel of three Scottish judges no jury, as it is believed to be almost impossible to find Scottish residents not prejudiced by reporting of the Lockerbie bombing. Most observers believe the trial could be a long process for the legal teams and the victims' families, and could last up to a year.

Scottish law requires that those charged with murder must be tried within 110 days, but it is widely believed in the Lockerbje case that the defence , lawyers will ask for an extension to examine investigations going back over 10 years.

If convicted, the men will serve their sentences at the high-security Barlinnie Jail in Glasgow, monitored by UN observers. The trial is not expected to begin for several months. For now, the prisoners are on remand.

Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, 46, and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, 42, were this week handed over to Dutch authorities and charged with mutder and conspiracy in connection with the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. Their arrest marks the culmination of years of intense international efforts to bring the men" to trial.

The two are accused of planting a bomb, concealed in a cassette recorder, that destroyed Pan Am flight 103 from London to New York on 21 December, 1988, killing 270 people on board the plane and on the ground in the Scottish town of Lockerbie.

On Monday, the two Libyan suspects left Tripoli seven years after they were indicted by Britain and the US. The next day they made their first appearance before a Scottish sheriff, Graham Cox QC, in a makeshift courtroom in the Netherlands. Officials read out the warrants for their arrest in English and Arabic and, in a brief hearing, the suspects made no plea.

As the Libyans settle in, their arrival focuses world attention on Soesterberg, a quiet Dutch town outside the city of Utrecht. Under an extraordinary, UN-brokered diplomatic deal, the Netherlands has ceded a small patch of its territory to Scotland for the term of the trial to satisfy Libya's demands that the charges be heard in a neutral country.

In a matter of months, Camp Zeist, a former US air base, has been refitted to provide a secure prison and courtroom under Scottish jurisdiction. As a result, Scottish prison staff and Dutch police share guard duties at the camp's front gate, beyond which lie 40 hectares deemed to be Scottish soil.

In the past week, residents of Soesterberg have become accustomed to a large media pack descending on their community, and police and military vehicles making regular convoys through their homely streets. Camp Zeist is reached at the end of a long, straight road lined with quaint brown cottages. Over a freeway bridge, on a grassed heath, the former base is a surprisingly pleasant place ("not when it rains" mutters a Scottish guard), ringed by forest and trees blossoming in the European spring.

The two-metre front gates, covered in plastic, appear hastily erected at what is regarded as a temporary facility, which is surrounded by a long perimeter fence. The front gates swing open regularly as armed police, and catering staff enter the camp.  

In 1992 the United Nations tried to force Libya's hand by imposing sanctions, banning air travel to and from Libya, and prohibiting trade in equipment used in the nation's vital oil industry. Intense international pressure followed, including the tireless efforts of one victim's father, Jim Swire, who represented the other families, and whose patient, lined face became a moving symbol of their struggle for justice.

Last year, after South Africa's President Nelson Mandela had helped mediate, Britain made some headway in bringing the suspects to trial. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook suggested the Netherlands as an impartial third party.

A classic mix of incompetence ... and deviousness

[What follows is the text of an article about Iran Air flight 655 that appeared on The Trusty Servant website on this date in 2014 (maps and graphics omitted):]

It was an Airbus A300 on a flight from Tehran to Dubai shot down by USS Vincennes on 3 July 1988 using guided missiles. All 290 people on board (16 crew, 274 passengers, including 66 children) were killed.

It was a classic mix of incompetence leading to the accident, and deviousness in trying, and eventually failing, to cover up what actually happened.

At first sight the shooting was hard to believe. The flight had a stop-over at Bandar Abbas. It took off normally from there at UTC 06:47, 27 minutes late. It flew normally down the commercial air corridor Amber 59, a 20-mile wide direct route to Dubai airport. It followed the normal flight plan of climbing steadily, aiming to reach 14,000 ft, then cruise briefly, then descend to Dubai. Its transponder was broadcasting the regular civilian code (“Mode III”, easily distinguishable from the military “Mode II”). When it reached 10 miles from the Vincennes still climbing, it was shot down on the basis that it must be an Iranian F-14 descending on its final attack run.

The Vincennes was at lat 26.513056N, long 56.015833W, 10.8 miles from the nearest point of the Iranian coast (the little island of Hengam, just south of Qeshm), inside Iranian territorial waters, and was in the process of attacking small Iranian gunboats which it had lured out with a decoy “Liberian ship” the Stoval. It was neither a ship, nor Liberian, but essentially just a transmitter to fool the Iranians into coming into range of the Vincennes’ helicopters and various other US ships that were in the area.

Indeed it turned out that the US had been engaged in a secret naval war in the Gulf for some while, a war for which it did not wish to seek authorisation under the War Powers Act.

The Vincennes had all the latest kit, known as Aegis.

This was a complex computer system linked into umpteen radars, intelligence feeds and other systems, designed to allow the ship to engage up to a hundred air or surface threats simultaneously.

It performed flawlessly.

The snag was apparently that the crew did not believe the information it was giving them. They expected the plane to be a hostile Iranian plane rushing to defend the gunboats, so that is what they managed to see.

There was also a classic time-zone mix-up. The ships clocks were on UTC + 4hrs, whereas Bandar Abbas was on UTC +3.5 hrs. So although the crew knew all about the IA655, they knew it could not be the plane on the radar, because the timing was wrong.

But part of the problem was that the Vincennes had too much information. All kinds of people were intercepting, real-time, the communications between IA655 and the Bandar Abbas control tower: GCHQ and NSA (with listening stations in Oman, including Goat Island), an AWACS plane (a Grumman E2-Hawkeye) above the Gulf.

All this information may not have been much help to the captain of the Vincennes faced with only a few minutes to make a decision as the plane closed on his position at about 6.5 miles/minute. Having said that, I am not inclined to be particularly sympathetic. There was precisely one scheduled flight out of Bandar Abbas that morning, IR 655, due to depart at 09:50 local time = 06:20 UTC. It was flying direct to Dubai, which would take it directly over the Vincennes. Clearly, avoiding downing that flight was a priority.

But the information was certainly a problem afterwards. Aegis provided a flawless audit trail. It showed that the crew had imagined things when they thought the flight was descending. It did nothing but ascend. There followed a lengthy period of giving out a mixture of flat untruths and heavily redacted truths, but the truth did emerge several years later.

Full details, and amusingly commented original documents etc, are available on Charles Harwood’s site.

Rewriting history

I have detected a recent trend among American political commentators to describe President Ronald Reagan’s bombing raid on Tripoli and Benghazi as retaliation for the attack on Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie. The most recent example is this sentence from an article headlined Is President Trump’s strike on Syria constitutional? by Amber Phillips yesterday in The Bulletin:

“President Ronald Reagan didn’t seek congressional approval when he bombed Libya in retaliation for a bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland.”

The bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi took place on 15 April 1986. Pan Am 103 was destroyed over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988.

The same article by Amber Phillips appears on the website of The Washington Post. But there the article has now been updated to correct the faux pas.