Serious problem of fairness and impartiality

[What follows is the text of a statement issued on this date in 1998 by a Committee of Legal Experts established by the International Progress Organization:]

Vienna, 3 September 1998/P/K/16104c-is

The Committee of Legal Experts on UN Sanctions Against Libya was established at the initiative of the International Progress Organization in 1992 and presented several proposals for the settlement of the dispute between the USA, the UK and Libya in conformity with international law. The Committee was the first international group to propose, in its Declaration of 23 May 1992, the setting up of an international crinrinal tribunal to judge the Lockerbie suspects. A delegation of the Committee held consultations with the President of the Security Council after its meeting in New York on 2 December 1994. The initial Memorandum of the International Progress Organization on the legal aspects of the Lockerbie dispute was circulated as official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly (Doc A/46/886, S/23641 of 23 February 1992). The Committee today issued the following Statement on the Security Council resolution of 28 August 1998 concerning the trial of the suspects in the Netherlands:

1. As stated in its Geneva Declaration of 23 May 1992, the Committee of Legal Experts considers the Security Council's sanctions resolutions against Libya as ultra vires. Judicial matters such as those of individual criminal responsibility are beyond the competence of the Security Council. This relates to the Council's initial resolution 731 (1992), to the sanctions resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993), as well as to the recent resolution of 28 August 1998 calling for a trial in the Netherlands.

2. In its New York Declaration of 1 December 1994, the Committee of Legal Experts stated that the two suspects "have a basic human right under international law to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal."

3. In the same Declaration, the Committee of Legal Experts furthermore suggested to submit the question of criminal responsibility to an ad hoc international criminal tribunal or to a criminal tribunal of Scottish judges meeting at the seat of the International Court of Justice (as proposed by the League of Arab States).

4. The Security Council's resolution of 28 August 1998, apart from being ultra vires, is not in conformity with the basic requirements of a fair trial before an impartial tribunal.

5. As called for repeatedly by the Committee of Legal Experts, a criminal tribunal on this case should either be international in its composition or should operate in an international framework such as that of the International Court of Justice. The procedural details should be worked out on the basis of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and not through bilateral agreements between the governments of the UK and the Netherlands as stipulated in Art 3 of the Security Council resolution.

6. The Scottish legal system is undoubtedly up to international standards of due process and fair trial. There is no reason to doubt the report (Doc S/1997/991) of the independent experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Scottish judicial system. The real issue is not whether Scottish law is applied or not, but whether a tribunal exclusively consisting of Scottish judges can meet the requirement of impartiality.

7. The two Libyan suspects have already been publicly convicted in the United States and in the UK in violation of basic requirements of due process of law and the presumption of innocence. Under the present circumstances, it is hard to see how Scottish judges should be completely independent of this public conviction in their own country. Only an international composition of the tribunal could provide remedy to this serious problem of fairness and impartiality.

8. In conformity with basic legal standards, it is inadmissible that an Agreement concerning the exercise of jurisdiction over the two suspects and the functioning of the Court in the Netherlands is worked out exclusively between the governments of the accusing states and the Netherlands, deliberately excluding Libya. On the basis of the provisions of the Montreal Convention of 1971 (which is undoubtedly applicable in this case) Libya could still claim the right to try the suspects on its own territory.

9. As Libya has agreed to the trial of the two suspects on the territory of a neutral country (outside the territory of the US or the UK), an agreement on procedures of the Court, detention of the suspects etc. must be reached between all parties concerned.

10. Under Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 14 (1) of the International Covenant an Civil and Political Rights (1966), in the version of the 1966 Covenant, "everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law..." The US, the UK as well as Libya are parties to this Covenant and have an obligation to make sure that the two Lockerbie suspects receive a trial by an independent and impartial tribunal. It is clear from the above described facts that such a fair trial is not possible in the highly politicized framework as established by the Security Council resolution of 28 August 1998. Only an international tribunal under the auspices of the International Court of Justice might be able to guarantee due process of law in this highly political case in which the Security Council, contrary to basic rules of international law, has arrogated a competence which it does not possess.

[RB: In his report on the appeal proceedings at Camp Zeist dated 26 March 2002, Professor Hans Köchler stated:]

...the undersigned would like to recall the reservations expressed by the International Progress Organization’s Committee of Legal Experts on UN Sanctions against Libya, in a declaration dated 3 September 1998, concerning Security Council resolution 1192 (1998): “The Scottish legal system is undoubtedly up to international standards of due process and fair trial. There is no reason to doubt the report (Doc S/1997/991) of the independent experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Scottish judicial system. The real issue is not whether Scottish law is applied or not, but whether a tribunal exclusively consisting of Scottish judges can meet the requirement of impartiality. … The two Libyan suspects have already been publicly convicted in the United States and in the UK in violation of basic requirements of due process of law and the presumption of innocence. Under the present circumstances, it is hard to see how Scottish judges should be completely independent of this public conviction …. Only an international composition of the tribunal could provide remedy to this serious problem of fairness and impartiality.” The IPO Committee further stated that “a criminal tribunal on this case should either be international in its composition or should operate in an international framework such as that of the International Court of Justice. The procedural details should be worked out on the basis of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and not through bilateral agreements between the governments of the U.K. and the Netherlands as stipulated in Art 3 of the Security Council resolution.” The undersigned regrets to admit that, contrary to his hopes at the beginning of the trial in May 2000, the above-expressed reservations – in the formulation of which he had participated as coordinator of the Committee of Legal Experts – were proven justified in the course of events.

I have a burning desire to clear my name

[What follows is excerpted from an article headlined The Megrahi dossier: why he was set free that was published in The Herald on this date in 2009:]

The Greenock visit

One question mark that remains relates to Mr MacAskill's decision to visit Megrahi in Greenock Prison. An eight-page document by a senior civil servant in the justice department advises the minister: "Mr Megrahi, as a subject of the transfer request, should be given opportunity to make his own representation on the proposal."

That advice concludes with the recommendation: "The groups and individuals identified should be offered short meetings with you to present their representations."

That Mr MacAskill inferred from this that he should go to meet the prisoner at Greenock is still being challenged by opponents, but the advice appears sufficiently robust to entitle him to say he was acting on advice.

There are then two documents relating to the meeting at HMP Greenock on August 6 - the official minute from the government side and Mr Megrahi's own handwritten note of his presentation to the meeting. (...)

The minute records, in dry official language, the prisoner's insistence that he had been unjustly convicted and his sympathy for the "terrible loss" of the victims' families. The minute adds, as Megrahi told The Herald in Tripoli last week: "He feels there is little prospect that his appeal will be concluded before his death, and that his dreams of returning home cleared no longer exist."

While the minute records Mr MacAskill advising Megrahi that prison transfer could only take place if there were no court proceedings ongoing, there is no specific mention that compassionate release would not require this. However, aides pointed out last night that the meeting was specifically about prisoner transfer, not compassionate release.

The handwritten note from Megrahi states: "I'm a very ill person. The disease that I have is incurable. All the personnel are agreed that I have little chance of living into next year. The last report which I received some weeks ago from consultant reaches the view that I have a short time left. I have a burning desire to clear my name. I think now that I will not witness that ultimate conclusion."

And in words that echoed Mr MacAskill's later reference to a "higher authority", he stated: "As I turn now to face my God, to stand before him, I have nothing to fear." (...)

Holyrood-Westminster relations

The big question for UK ministers arising from documents released yesterday is simply this: Did UK ministers tell the Libyans that Gordon Brown did not want Megrahi to die in a Scottish jail?

According to the minute of a meeting in Glasgow with Libyans on March 12 this year, Abdulati Alobidi [RB: the normal English transliteration of this name is al-Obeidi], minister for Europe, spoke of a visit to Tripoli the previous month by Foreign Minister Bill Rammell at which it was pointed out that if Megrahi died in custody it would have "catastrophic effects" on Libyan-UK relations.

Mr Alobidi was minuted as saying: "Mr Rammell had stated that neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Secretary would want Mr Megrahi to pass away in prison but the decision on transfer lies in the hands of the Scottish Ministers."

That remains a clearer statement of the Prime Minister's opinion than Mr Brown has since been prepared to offer in public.

[RB: The accuracy of Mr al-Obeidi's statement was confirmed by David Miliband in a radio interview. According to a report on The Times website:

"The Foreign Secretary admitted that it was true that Bill Rammell, a Foreign Office minister, had told his Libyan counterpart back in February that the Prime Minister did not want Abdel Baset Ali al-Megrahi to pass away in Greenock prison."]

Gauci brothers rewarded

[What follows is the text of an item posted today on the Lockerbietruth.com website run by Dr Jim Swire and Peter Biddulph:]

On this day, 1st September 1989, the sole identification witness in the Lockerbie trial, Maltese shopkeeper Tony Gauci, met with a police investigation team headed by Detective Chief Inspector Harry Bell.

At this first meeting Gauci offered a vague account of a customer who had come into his shop to buy an assortment of clothes. In no way did it resemble the convicted Libyan al-Megrahi.

Gauci's next two interviews were on the 14th and 26th of that month. Neither indicated that al-Megrahi was the purchaser of the clothes.

Two days later on the 28th of that month, Bell wrote in his police diary that "The US Department of Justice are prepared to offer unlimited money to Tony Gauci, with $10,000 available immediately."

The purpose of the "immediately available" $10,000 was clear. Gauci could draw on it for his immediate use. There can be no other interpretation.

These three interviews would be the first of many extending over two years, each interview adding more and more detail. Only in February 1991 did Gauci finally say "he resembles the man a lot".

Every discussion at which money was mentioned was recorded in Bell's diary. But he concealed this diary from the trial judges and the defence team. It was discovered in 2007, six years after the conclusion of the trial and a subsequent appeal.

At the conclusion of the trial Tony Gauci was paid $2 million and his brother Paul Gauci $1 million.

But what did Tony have to do to get the money to be shared between himself and his brother? In the words of the US Department of Justice, "only if he gives evidence".

Since the original 1991 indictment against al-Megrahi was substantially based on eye witness evidence by Tony Gauci it was clear what that evidence would be. It would prove that al-Megrahi was guilty.

Eyewitness testimony in the Lockerbie bombing case

[1 September 1989 was a crucial date in the Lockerbie investigation. What follows is excerpted from an important article written by Professor Elizabeth Loftus, doyenne of US psychologists of memory and identification:]

Al-Megrahi had allegedly purchased trousers, pyjamas, and other clothing from Mr Gauci at Mary’s House in November or December of 1988. Those items were thought to be packed in the Samsonite suitcase that contained the explosives which themselves were hidden in a Toshiba radio cassette player.

Mr Gauci was first interviewed on 1 September 1989, nearly 9 months after the clothing purchase (...). The police reports reveal that, upon being shown pyjamas with a distinct pattern, Gauci recalled that one day in winter 1988 he had been working alone in the shop when a man came in shortly before the 7 pm closing time. The man did not seem to care what he bought, saying that the items were not for him. The shopper paid in cash, about 56 Maltese pounds. He walked out of the shop with his umbrella opened as it was raining. The man returned, and then the two of them brought the purchases out to a taxi. Gauci described the shopper as six feet or more in height, big chest, large head, clean shaven, wearing a dark-coloured two-piece suit, and speaking Libyan. Gauci couldn’t remember the day or date but thought it was a weekday. He went on to say that he thought he would be able to identify the man.

Less than 2 weeks later, on 13 September 1989, Gauci went to the police headquarters and tried to make a photofit likeness of the shopper. After viewing the photofit created by the office, Gauci felt the hair and forehead were close, as were the nose, mouth, shape of face, and thickness of neck. The shopper’s eyes were a bit bigger than in the photofit. Gauci said that the shopper was about 50 years old and the man in the photofit looked to be between 45 and 50. The photofit construction is shown in Figure 1a.

Later that same day Gauci worked with a police artist to produce a sketch, which he felt was slightly better than the photofit. Later he said the artist sketch looked quite like the shopper, with exactly the same hair, nose, and eyebrows. That sketch is shown in Figure 1b.

A day later, on 14 September 1989, Gauci again went to police headquarters and looked at two cards of photos, containing a total of 19 photos. He identified one man as similar but said that he was too young to be the shopper. If only older by 20 years, the man in that photo would look like the shopper. The photo that Gauci selected was in the second card, top row, #2, shown in Figure 2.

[RB: The photographs and sketches referred to above can be viewed here. The concluding section of Professor Loftus’s article reads as follows:]

My analysis identified a number of areas in which Gauci changed his testimony from one point in time to another. More specifically, the statements he gave relatively early on (9 months after the crime) before Al-Megrahi was a suspect differed in many respects from what Gauci would recall later, after Al-Megrahi was a suspect. While the defence attorney did, at trial, point out some of the changes, it might have been useful to compile them and show the entire collection. Since one of the major reasons why someone’s testimony changes from one point in time to another is that they have been supplied with new details, it would have been important to try to discover the new details to which Gauci had been exposed. After investigators began to look for Libyans, and began to suspect Al-Megrahi, what kind of information did Gauci receive, either deliberately or inadvertently?

This information, and more, was presented to the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, a commission that reviews cases post-conviction and did so in this case. The Commission is an independent public body, which was established in 1999 and bears the responsibility for reviewing alleged miscarriages of justice in Scotland. The Commission has the power to refer to the High Court of Justiciary any conviction regardless of whether appeals of that conviction have been heard previously. The Commission refers cases when it believes that a miscarriage of justice might have occurred. In Al-Megrahi’s case the Commission expressed deep reservations about the conviction and concluded that it might have been a miscarriage of justice (...). Much of the world knows less about this development, but much more about a different development, namely that Al-Megrahi was released from prison in 2009 and sent back to Libya on compassionate grounds because of advancing cancer. Public outrage was sparked. Al-Megrahi lived with his cancer for a few years and, as noted earlier, died in 2012. One cannot help but wonder whether the outrage over his release might be tempered if those angry individuals were to seriously examine the suspicious eyewitness testimony that led to Al-Megrahi’s conviction in the first place. My examination has led me to seriously wonder: Is the Lockerbie bomber still out here?

We had to play with words

[On this date in 2008 The Conspiracy Files: Lockerbie was broadcast on BBC Two. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was interviewed for the programme and said, amongst other things, the following:]

Q - Does Libya accept responsibility for the attack on Lockerbie?

A - Yes. We wrote a letter to the Security Council, saying that we are responsible for the acts of our employees, or people. But it doesn’t mean that we did it, in fact.

Q - So to be very clear on this, what you’re saying is that you accept responsibility, but you’re not admitting that you did it.

A - Of course.

Q - That’s… to many people will sound like a very cynical way to conduct your relationship with the outside world.

A - What can you do? Without writing that letter, you will not be able to get out of the sanction.

Q - So this statement was just word play. It wasn’t an admission of guilt.

A - No. I admit that we play with the words. And we had to. We had to. There was no other… solution.

The dead cannot cry out for justice

[What follows is excerpted from a long article published on this date in 2009 in the Malta Independent:]

The outrage expressed when the release of al-Megrahi was announced should not overshadow the memory of the trial that condemned and sentenced him.

Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi has never stopped reiterating his innocence and non-involvement in the blowing up of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988. (...)

As Ian Ferguson, author of the book The Hidden Scandal of Lockerbie, points out: “From the start, there was a determination to try to prevent the appeal being heard. It opened but never got off the ground, with stall after stall, as each month al-Megrahi weakened with the cancer that was killing him. There was rejoicing in the Crown Office in Edinburgh when he was released and the appeal abandoned.”

In this regard, it should be ensured that beyond any hindrance or censorship, all assistance and co-operation should be extended to al-Megrahi to enable him to deservedly affirm his innocence.

The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) had already granted him a second appeal. His legal team has been trying to see the secret papers, which they believe could help overturn his conviction. However, Foreign Secretary David Miliband has signed a public interest(?) immunity certificate, claiming that making the document public could cause “real harm” to national security and international relations. Of course, and stopping a convicted man from proving his innocence! Is this intended to thwart any redress or amends by al-Megrahi?

When only selected evidence is available and the defence does not even get to see parts of it, then the conviction becomes unsound. (...)

It was more than nauseating to note how some dazed or perhaps swayed media played upon the trumped-up assumption of “worldwide condemnation” at his release. Oh no, nothing of the sort! What we see here is just a cynical US condemnation and filthy politics. Playing politics in this matter is the politics of the gutter!

The UK and the US have their differences regarding law and justice that they may not agree on. The elaborate and shadowy politics behind the Lockerbie trial, including these same American families that are complaining about al-Megrahi’s release, also took blood money from Ghaddafi in a $2 billion dollar settlement.

Do you not remember that US military personnel, responsible for the shooting down of Iran Air flight 655, which killed all 290 passengers including 66 children, received a medal? What remuneration did the families of the victims receive? (...)

So, US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton reiterated her opposition and condemnation to the release of the alleged Lockerbie bomber in a strongly-worded message to the Scottish government. She stressed that it was “absolutely wrong” to release Megrahi. What is she afraid of? Could it be the absolute truth?

Here I would dare to suggest two main reasons why the US administration is highlighting its opposition to this release.

Firstly, it is more than apparent to the world at large that America cannot accept a decision not in line with its policy and made by another country and is prepared to spout its wrath against it.

Secondly, according to Al-Megrahi’s lawyer, he ran the “very real risk” of dying before his appeal was heard, after a judge’s illness caused further delay in the case. It was evident that his release would eliminate this immediate danger and raise the possibilities for a final honest outcome of this affair.

Perhaps we in Europe ought to ask if the USA is indeed our ally any more. It is not customary for allies to boycott each other when they disagree.

On the other hand, high profile supporters, including Nelson Mandela and Michael Mansfield QC among others, strongly maintain that al-Megrahi is innocent.

What did the Americans want? Perhaps that he should be left to die in prison and to have the dead body handed to the US so that it could “execute” it?

Although the political furore over the release of al-Megrahi mainly centred around three countries, namely Britain, the US and Libya, there may well have been covert dealings, until now kept secret, which had been hatched in other countries. New and compelling evidence has now been released which could now well prove his innocence.

In a memo dated 24 September 1989, and reproduced in the appeal submission, the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) states: “The bombing of the Pan Am flight was conceived, authorised and financed by Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur, Iran’s former Interior Minister. The execution of the operation was contracted to Ahmad (Jibril), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC) leader, for a sum of $1 million.”

The prosecution case was that al-Megrahi took the bomb, wrapped in clothes bought from a shop in Malta, to the island’s Luqa airport, where it was checked in and then transferred on to Pan Am flight 103.

A key witness against al-Megrahi was Maltese shopkeeper Tony Gauci, who owned Mary’s House from where the police say the garments were bought.

Also, central to al-Megrahi’s conviction was the evidence of this Maltese shopkeeper, who claimed that al-Megrahi had bought clothes from him allegedly found in the suitcase bomb. Lawyers were due to claim that Gauci was paid over $2 million by US investigators for his evidence, which followed more than 20 police interviews, and that many of the often wildly conflicting statements taken on each occasion were withheld from the defence

But his police statements are inconsistent, and prosecutors failed to tell the defence that shortly before he attended an identity parade, Mr Gauci had seen a magazine article with a picture of al-Megrahi, and speculated that he might have been involved. The BBC programme has discovered that the Scottish police knew Mr Gauci had looked at al-Megrahi’s photograph just days before the line-up.

But, contrary to police rules of disclosure designed to ensure a fair trial, this crucial information was not passed on to the defence.

Besides that, if it were proven that he was rewarded, his testimony would cast doubt on its value.

The SCCRC has thoroughly checked out the claims and found he received “a phenomenal sum of money” from the US. It was reported that Gauci is understood to be planning to use his newfound wealth to fund a move to Australia with his brother, Paul, who was also on the witness list but was not called to give evidence.

Professor Emeritus Robert Black of Scots Law at the University of Edinburgh, “architect” of the Scottish court on Dutch soil (and himself from Lockerbie) said of the original conviction: “I thought this was a very, very weak circumstantial case. I am absolutely astounded, astonished. I was extremely reluctant to believe that any Scottish judge would convict anyone, even a Libyan, on the basis of such evidence.”

He said in 2005 that al-Megrahi’s conviction was “the most disgraceful miscarriage of justice in Scotland for 100 years.” “Every lawyer who has ... read the judgment says ‘this is nonsense’. It is nonsense. It really distresses me; I won’t let it go.”

It is no wonder that some people were hoping that al-Megrahi would die before certain witnesses were called. The release on compassionate grounds is a blessing for them, as much as it was for him.

The key lesson is that the human rights of all parties need to be at the centre of the legal process and decision making if the public interest is to be served, and if justice is to be done and seen to be done.

The dead cannot cry out for justice; it is a duty of the living to do so for them.

Megrahi to Senussi: I am an innocent man

[What follows is a paragraph from the Wikipedia article Abdelbaset al-Megrahi:]

On 29 August 2011, a letter written by Megrahi was discovered by The Wall Street Journal at intelligence headquarters in Tripoli, Libya. In what was a private letter to Libya's intelligence chief not previously available to the public, Megrahi wrote "I am an innocent man," a letter apparently composed while he was serving a life sentence in Scotland, and written in blue ink on ordinary paper. The letter was found in a steel four-drawer filing cabinet that had been forced open by rebels who entered the office of intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi.

[The relevant article in The Wall Street Journal contains the following:]

Convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdel Baset al-Megrahi maintained his innocence in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 throughout his trial and appeals—and did so in a private letter to Libya's intelligence chief, discovered on Monday in intelligence headquarters in Tripoli.

"I am an innocent man," Mr Megrahi wrote to Abdullah al-Senussi, a powerful official who was regarded as one of Col Moammar Gadhafi's closest aides, in a letter found by The Wall Street Journal. The letter, in blue ink on a piece of ordinary binder paper, was apparently written while Mr Megrahi was serving a life sentence in the UK. (...)

The letter to Mr Senussi was found in a steel, four-drawer filing cabinet in the intelligence chief's office in Tripoli. The cabinet had been forced open, apparently by rebels who shot holes in the lock. The office lay in shambles, but many of Mr Senussi's personal papers appeared untouched. There was no way to immediately confirm the authenticity of the letter. (...)

Mr Megrahi was sentenced by a Scottish court to life imprisonment in 2001. In the letter to Mr Senussi, Mr Megrahi mentions that he had been jailed for seven years, suggesting it was written sometime in early 2008 or late 2007, in the run up to the second appeal of his conviction.

It is unclear why he would have had reason to profess his innocence to Mr Senussi, who was in a position to already know details about the bombing. (...)

Mr Megrahi insisted he was innocent throughout his original trial and subsequent appeals. Even after his conviction, mystery and unanswered questions about who else may have been involved have surrounded the case.

In the letter, addressed to "My dear brother Abdullah," Mr Megrahi blamed his conviction on "fraudulent information that was relayed to investigators by Libyan collaborators."

He blamed "the immoral British and American investigators" who he writes "knew there was foul play and irregularities in the investigation of the 1980s."

He described in detail his latest legal maneuvering, focusing on the testimony by a Maltese clothes merchant that was critical to his conviction. The Maltese clothes merchant in question testified that Mr Megrahi had purchased clothes from him that were later found in the suitcase that contained the bomb that brought down Flight 103.

"You my brother know very well that they were making false claims against me and that I didn't buy any clothes at all from any store owner in Malta," Mr Megrahi wrote to Mr Senussi.

Mr Megrahi also had a message for "our big brother," a likely reference to Col Gadhafi, "that our legal affairs are excellent and we now stand on very solid ground."

"Send my regards to our big brother and his family and by the will of God we will meet soon and we will be victorious," he wrote. "I only hope that the financial support will continue in the coming period," he added.

Mr Megrahi eventually dropped his appeal as a condition of his application for extradition to Libya.

MacAskill ignores Megrahi evidence

[This is the headline over a letter from John Ashton that appears in today’s Scottish edition of The Sunday Times (but not, as far as I can see, on the newspaper’s website). It reads as follows:]

The first serialised extract of Kenny MacAskill’s book, The Lockerbie Bombing: The Search for Justice, contained factual errors (“Who was really behind the Lockerbie bombing”, News Review, May 15). I shall confine myself to two.

First, MacAskill claims Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi was “unable to give any explanation” for his presence in Malta -- where the Lockerbie bomb supposedly began its journey -- on the night before and morning of the bombing. He adds: “Even in his own biography professing his innocence he simply says he can’t recall why he went.” In fact, in his biography, which I wrote, Megrahi gave a clear explanation of the visit. Second, MacAskill states crown witness Edwin Bollier claimed to have seen Megrahi at explosive tests conducted in Libya two years before Lockerbie. In fact, Bollier made no such claim, either in his numerous police interviews or in his trial testimony.

MacAskill insists Megrahi was guilty of the bombing, yet ignores the substantial body of evidence that suggests not only that the prosecution case was deeply flawed, but also that Megrahi was not involved.

[John Ashton has this afternoon provided on his Megrahi: You are my Jury website an account of his protracted dealings with The Sunday Times that eventually led to the publication today of the above letter. What follows is the gist:]

The Scottish Sunday Times has today published a letter by me about some of the significant errors in its serialised extract of Kenny MacAskill’s book The Lockerbie Bombing: The Search for Justice published on 15 May. This comes after a three-month wrangle, which began on 17 May when I wrote to the paper asking that they correct the errors (my email can be read here). It took almost two months for the paper to respond. The letter, which was from from the paper’s legal department, contained annotations by Mr MacAskill of my complaint and a flat refusal to print corrections (the letter can be read here).

I wrote back on 3 August pointing out errors in Mr MacAskill’s annotations and again asking that the paper publish corrections of the significant errors in line with section 1 of the IPSO editors’ code of practice (the letter can be read here). The paper again refused to print corrections, but offered to publish a letter from me. After some negotiation, it today published the following letter under the headline MacAskill ignores Megrahi evidence: [RB: see above].

You can read a more detailed critique of the book extract here.

‘Lockerbie is history. Now it's time to talk business’

[This is part of the headline over a report published in The Herald on this date in 2009. It reads as follows:]

Speaking exclusively to The Herald at his home near Tripoli, Saif al Islam al Gaddafi disclosed the original prisoner transfer deal with the UK government was directly linked to talks on trade and oil.

However, he denied this had anything to do with the eventual release of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and said the mercy shown by the Scottish Government had transformed the traditional Arabic view of Britain as “crusaders” against Islam.

Mr al Gaddafi praised Kenny MacAskill, the Scottish Justice Secretary, who last week freed Megrahi on compassionate grounds, as “a great man”, and said his decision had opened the way for future business.

In his first full interview since the international storm surrounding the release, Mr al Gaddafi apologised for any perception that the Libyan government had not done its best to contain the jubilant scenes that accompanied Megrahi’s arrival in Libya, but said they could have been far more extensive and were emphatically not a “hero’s welcome”.

He also revealed that Megrahi, who was convicted of the murder of 270 people in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, will not be taking part in the 40th anniversary celebrations of Colonel Gaddafi coming to power next week.

In what he said was his most important message, Mr al Gaddafi said: “Lockerbie is history. The next step is fruitful and productive business with Edinburgh and London. Libya is a promising, rich market and so let’s talk about the future. There is no reason for people to be angry. Why be so angry? This is an innocent man who is dying.”

His remarks are likely to increase the pressure on Gordon Brown to explain both the UK Government’s role in the negotiations and his personal views on Megrahi’s release.

Mr al Gaddafi said that the infamous “deal in the desert”, which saw an agreement signed between Tony Blair and Libya allowing prisoner transfers, specifically targeted Megrahi -- although his name was never mentioned.

He said: “For the last seven to eight years we have been trying very hard to transfer Mr Megrahi to Libya to serve his sentence here, and we have tried many times in the past to sign the PTA (prisoner transfer agreement) without mentioning Mr Megrahi, but it was obvious we were targeting Mr Megrahi and the PTA was on the table all the time.

“It was part of the bargaining deal with the UK. When [Tony] Blair came here we signed the agreement. It is not a secret. But I want to be very clear to your readers that we didn’t mention Mr Megrahi. People should not get angry because we were talking about commerce or oil. We signed an oil deal at the same time. The commerce and politics and deals were all with the PTA.”

Mr al Gaddafi, who is convinced of Megrahi’s innocence, has led the negotiations for the Libyan Government with the UK and Scotland and was waiting to greet Megrahi on the Afriqiyah Airbus at Glasgow airport that flew him home.

On the flight to Tripoli, Mr al Gaddafi spoke briefly on camera and was later criticised for suggesting that, in all commercial contracts for oil and gas with the UK, Megrahi’s transfer was on the “negotiating table”. However, Mr al Gaddafi told The Herald there had been no quid pro quo and that his comments had been misunderstood partly because people do not understand the difference between the PTA and compassionate release.

“This [the PTA] was one animal and the other was the compassionate release,” he said. “They are two completely different animals. The Scottish authorities rejected the PTA. It did not work at all, therefore it was meaningless. He was released for completely different reasons.”

Ultimately, however, he said the work to secure prisoner transfer of Megrahi failed as it was rejected by Mr MacAskill. Instead, the minister chose to release Megrahi from Greenock prison early on compassionate grounds because he is terminally ill and medical reports suggested he had less than three months to live.

Megrahi, 57, was serving a 27-year sentence at HMP Greenock for the bombing of Pan Am 103 in December 1988. He has consistently pleaded his innocence and his second appeal began in April, but his diagnosis with terminal prostate cancer meant he was unlikely to live to see its conclusion.

Mr al Gaddafi said: “It was a shock and surprise for Libyan society that he was freed on compassionate grounds and it showed the Libyans that the British and Scottish are civilised people because the perception here is that they are crusaders and they hate us and Islam and hate Arabs and they are not tolerant at all of us. But this act has touched the minds of many people and shown that they are merciful and more civilised than people had thought.

“That is why, for the first time in our history, that Libyan citizens have been out in the streets waving a different flag -- the Scottish flag. This is a unique event for us. This act changed the minds of many people.”

Mr Brown this week spoke of his “revulsion” at what the media described as a “hero’s welcome” when Megrahi was met by his family and hundreds of Libyans waving flags, including Saltires.

Local news reports said there were thousands of people present but Mr al Gaddafi said the Libyans had not organised an official welcome party for Megrahi and that there were only a couple of hundred of his friends and family. He also expressed regret at the response from the US and UK to Megrahi’s release and how he was met when he arrived in Tripoli.

Mr al Gaddafi said: “There was no official celebration, no guards of honour, no fireworks and no parade. We could have arranged a much better reception.

“The US knew a long time ago that Mr Megrahi would probably be released and asked us to keep the reception low-key. For the last three or four weeks it has become obvious that he might have been released, so it was not a complete surprise for them.

“Most of the families of the victims in Scotland have written to us to say they are pro the decision and more than 20% of the American families say they have no objection. Even some of the families are in favour but different parties -- politicians -- may be trying to use it to their own advantage.”