[This is the headline over an article by Lucy Adams in today's edition of The Herald. It reads in part:]
Hundreds of pages of documents that could prove the key to the Lockerbie bombing and which are expected to be released today may never see the light of day.
Contrary to public expectations following an announcement in December last year, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) will not yet be able to release its 800-page report on the case, and is unlikely to be able to disclose much information in the future.
Without the approval of all the key players in the case, including Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi, the Libyan convicted of the bombing, the Crown Office, Dumfries and Galloway Police and witnesses such as Maltese shopkeeper Toni Gauci, it is unlikely that any of the material could legally be disclosed to the public. Gauci’s evidence was central to Megrahi’s conviction.
Today, the commission will begin writing to hundreds of different parties involved, asking for their permission to disclose. But it could be months or weeks before permission is granted and many of those involved are expected to decline.
Gerard Sinclair, chief executive of the SCCRC, said: “Like any other public body dealing with personal sensitive data, the commission is subject to a number of legal constraints. We will have to comply with all the appropriate statutory obligations, including the Data Protection Act, Human Rights Act and Freedom of Information legislation.”
Legally, the commission has to respect the right to privacy under the Human Rights Act. Under the Data Protection Act 1998, it has to consider whether disclosure would constitute “a breach of confidence”, contains “personal data” or information that has been lodged in court.
The Scottish Government has made it clear that it wants to see as much information made public as possible but, even if the prosecution and key witnesses agree to disclosure, there are other documents that are never expected to be released and have not even been seen by the defence team because Westminster has blocked them with arguments about national security. (...)
Since devolution, the power [to allow the SCCRC to disclose information] has passed to Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill and on December 21 he revealed that the statutory instrument [permitting the SCCRC to disclose] would come into force on February 1.
At the time, Mr MacAskill said: “The Scottish Government has always been clear that as much information as possible in this case is published where relevant and where appropriate consents are given.
“The order laid today allows the SCCRC to disclose information it holds and it is now for them to decide what, if anything, they release.”
MISSION LOCKERBIE:
ReplyDeleteThat is the key for the Lockerbie-Affair !
Who changed the Police-Label 168 and why ?
7 Scottish Officials are still protected!
A Dishonor for the Scottish Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill!
by Edwin and Mahnaz Bollier, MEBO Ltd., Switzerland
I am sorry to post here and not in a more appropriate spot, but I find it very hard to find my way through this blog and its comments. Is there a easy way of searching it, please?
ReplyDeleteI'm really responding to Rolfe's contention that baggage containers are taken haphazardly as needed.
It's taken from an interview with Mr Terry Crabtree on 28 December 1988, which appears as part of the Zeist trial transcript.
Mr Crabtree, a baggage load supervisor, says that AVE 4041 PA was stowed in position 13R immediately inside the front cargo holdloading door on the starboard side. The marking '13R', it later transpired, had been crossed out in this statement and position '14L' subsituted. He could not explain this change beyond saying that his own hand writing was on the COOL (cargo laoding) plan document and showed the container in fact in position 14L.
There is, I suggest, nothing sinister in Mr Crabtree's error, if it was his. It might have been a mistake in the transcribing of the police statement by Mr Crabtree and it was certainly AVE4041 that was blown up and the various AAIB damage diagrams makes it clear the damaged container was loaded on the port side.
It also shows that a plan had been made for the loading of the aircraft, and presumably some time before. I don't think it is reasonable to conclude that the plan was made at the time of loading, or the location error would not have been made.
And, what would have been the point af a plan made then, and retained on the ground at Heathrow.
Probably some time before the baggage was sent out to the aircraft the COOL was made, and used to label the containers. Perhaps theer was a certain casualness that made AVE4041 be placed in 14L, though the COOL said it was to go in 13R.
But, I think Rolfe had better try to go further in explaining his baggage lading theory before commenting on how aircarft are loaded.
Charles, you are expecting forum structure when this is not a forum. You don't want to post on a forum, so there's no help for it.
ReplyDeleteIt's up to you to persuade others of the merits of your theory. Speaking for myself, I'm singularly unconvinced. To a large extent because of your refusal to get off your backside and find the information you yourself agree you need to test your theory.
Now this thread is about the lack of imminent release of the SCCRC documents. Does anyone know what sort of additional material might have been contained in these documents, or was hoped to be contained in these documents?
Dear Rolfe,
ReplyDeleteI take it you have not been able to find my reply I posted a couple of hours ago on Mr Crabtree's inforation on the POOL baggaage loading plan, which I have located (and you didn't), so there is no need for your pointless pot-calling.
I have got off my backside, and provided you with some explanation of how the baggage loading plan worked at Heathrow bin Pan Am in 1988.
You've done precisely nothing.
So you can have no views on what I've written, because you clearly haven't read it, or perhaps you can't read. Thinking seems to be beyond you.
But you pontificate!
No, I don't know what the SCCRC is going to say, but they ignored me then, and they will ignore you now. We are just mushrooms for the good reverend who runs the SCCRC to mire in muck ever so often, and shut the door on us.
You know, I don't CARE whether you ever test your own theory or not. It's no skin off my nose. I would quite like to hear the opinions of posters regarding the SCCRC documents though.
ReplyDeleteDear Charles, maybe you - in this special case - could go to the blog that Cauistic Logic set up some days ago. His blog is more of a forum that deals systematically with various aspects. And I believe he is waiting for contributions.
ReplyDeleteHere we discuss the recent news from the SCCRC.
At first sight this is ridiculous. The trial was done in public. So all implicated names and their whereabouts are well known. What details should be guarded? There are no new private informations of any kind. The only relevant new informations concern the behaviour of the Crown.
At least that is my view.
I was hoping, in part, for a fuller explanation of why the SCCRC concluded that a possible miscarriage of justice had occurred. There were some hints that they considered a purchase date of 23rd November might have been more plausible for the clothes, and that Gauci had been leaned on and/or bribed, but they didn't actually say so in so many words.
ReplyDeleteThere's also the little matter of the other two grounds for appeal they didn't even mention in the press release. Surely they could at least have given some indication of the general area these lay in?
Today the commission will begin writing to hundreds of different parties involved, asking for their permission to disclose. But it could be months or weeks before permission is granted and many of those involved are expected to decline.
ReplyDeleteFor my part, I have authorised the SCCRC to disclose all of the evidence I provided concerning the targeting of Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, in the 1988 Lockerbie disaster.
MISSION LOCKERBIE,
ReplyDeletehundreds of pages of documents that could prove the key to the Lockerbie-Affair and the large political controversy between Libya and Switzerland...
Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill es ist höchste Zeit, bitte öffnen Sie die geheim gehaltenen SCCRC Dokumente zwischen der Schweiz und Great Britain und Scotland, vom November 1988 und in der nachfolgenden Lockerbie-Affäre, damit auch die wahren Ursachen und Hintergründe des grossen politischen Streits zwischen Libyen und der Schweiz publik gemacht werden können!
"Babylon" computer translation, german/english:
Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill it is high time, for disclose the secretly documents (held back with SCCRC) between Switzerland and Great Britain and Scotland, since November 1988 and in following Lockerbie-Affair, so that he truth causes and backgrounds of the large political controversy between Libya and Switzerland become also public !
More information on our webpage: www.lockerbie.ch
by Edwin Bollier, MEBO Ltd., Switzerland
Dear Professor Black! Please do not leave us in the dark: What does the law tell us about the SCCRC´s decision?
ReplyDeleteI think their job was mainly to pursue interviews with many of the involved persons about what was presented in court (and in a few cases not presented.) So there is no secret there.
And the main purpose of those SCCRC investigations was to clear whether a second (public) appeal should be initiated. So there can be no breach of confidence.
The only document that I did not expect we could see was the notorious PII-document. This document (these documents) would even not be shown to the public in a second appeal, as we know. Everything else would be.
I understand from the SCRCC press release that a number of submissions were made concerning the alleged involvement of Khalid Jafaar. While these submissions were rejected I would be interested to know who made them.
ReplyDeletePatrick Haseldine has given permission for the SCRCC to release the evidence he submitted but I do not expect any significant new revelations.
Did Charles make a submission?
Herr Bollier?
Did Dr Swire raise the issue of the "Manley" break-in or anything else of significance?
I myself made no submission (believing this was entirely a matter for Mr Megrahi's legal representatives)but would be interested to know if the SCRCC made any comment on the issue of "Heathrow".
A reply to Rolfe:
ReplyDeleteCharles, get this. I do not CARE whether or not you choose to do the work needed to back up your own speculations. I do know that neither I nor anybody else will, or is obliged to do it for you.
== Your anger is showing and it is very discourteous to show it, bad policy to rant, and that at the moment it seems to me you are doing.
I put forward a couple more suggestions which were just as plausible as yours, on the facts available. Not because these are part of any theory of mine about what happened, but to illustrate to you the ease of armchair speculation - and at the same time the futility.
== I'm interested in suggestions (which you consider just as plausible), and I try to work out whether they work. In my last email to the blog I mentioned that according to an extract of the POOL, Pan Am's name for the LIR, a standard IATA document, the loading instruction report, whose final summary is handed to the pilot before take off, the position of AVE4041 had been moved from 13R to 14L. See Mr Crabtree's evidence. For many reasons baggage handling is a very precise science, and plans are drawn up well in advance. Loadings must be attended to. If you're carrying 10 tons of gold it doesn't go in one container, it is spread about the plane.
One critic of mine came to the conclusion that sewing machine needles were carried. They may have been. It is said to have made searching difficult. One Lockerbie researcher said that needles as heavy industrial metal would have to go by sea, and so they were actually military flechettes. When I pointed out that sewing machine needles were more valuable than personal computers (per kilogram weight), the so called investigator ceased to blog and has never been heard of since.
== The other problem is the bloke like you who says something is impossible because of a rule, or a belief in a practice or a method of working. Somebody told me that there could not be explosives on the Lockerbie plane as it was not permitted for US aircraft to carry military material on passenger flights. When I asked for the FAA regulation to that effect I got no reply.
The way to test, or refute, my suggestions, is just the same as the way you acknowledge is the test of your own - to find someone who can attest to the actual baggage handling logistics at Heathrow in 1988. As you claim it should be my obligation to test your hypothesis, then by the same token, it should be your obligation to test mine.
== But that as I repeat is you job and , if you want to be taken as a proper investigator, you will do it without rancour complaining and just be glad you're taking part in solving one of the greatest mysteries of our times. I have come up with some partial evidence of a loading plan from Mr Crabtree's evidence at Zeist and I don't know anybody else who knows what went on on the ground at Heathrow. The head of Pan Am's baggage operation at Heathrow at the time is still around, but has never replied to me. One man a marginal member of UKFF103 got in touch with me, and said that my theory was impossible, not because containers were selected on an as need basis, but because they would not have been labelled until 7:00 or 8:00 on the 21 December 1988. I took his criticism seriously, and proposed that the empty containers from the flight that would become Pan Am 103 of 20 December 1988 were simply delivered empty to the shed to await re-use on the 21st. I also proposed the existence of a load plan, and lo and behold, Mr Crabtree asserts to the existence of such a thing.
== You don't think my theory would fail on a simple matter of operational procedure do you, when I'm claiming such exotica as a second explosion (read AAIB report closely), manufacture of timer evidence (asserted to by many) and relatively well documented but unexplained meetings between senior US Government men and senior Iranians in Glyon, (de Breackeleer) do you?
(Charles: continued)
ReplyDelete==You claim to have a friend at Gatwick who knows about baggage loading. I don't, so could you ask him, please. I get very little support in researching my theories, so the more experts we get on board, the better. Eventually, canaries will begin to sing and the story will be outed.
== I thought my argument for a loading plan plausible, though you disagree with me. (Perhaps, flight crew don't have briefings before they fly then. An airline is a bureaucracy with a small number of aircraft attached.) But lining them up there in the shed made for a very organised way of doing things and would have made the preparation of the POOL simple. That is another thing I learned in my operational research career. Existing systems tend to work. When you design a waste collection round for domestic refuse, the system that is currently in use is probably nearly optimal. The bin-men have worked it out for themselves. They don't drive round picking up a bin at one end of the borough, pick up another and then go back to the first. Unfortunately the search algorithms used start with such a random pattern of waste production points (bins) and painfully work out something that is nearly optimal, though it may look entirely unlike the current pattern of operation, and so the existing roundsmen will hate to adopt it.
By finding out how these baggage containers really were assigned to flights, whether AVE4041 was really on the ground at Heathrow at midnight, and if so, would a burglar be able to identify it as the one earmarked for that flight and that position?
You show no sign of doing this. Does that mean you accept my hypothesis? It seems to me you must do that, unless you can prove me wrong.
== That is what I have theorised. I still don't know what you theory is. The last time you blogged, you said you didn't have theories, only that mine was wrong, which is of course a theory in itself, but no matter!
As I said, I don't care. It's of no interest to me how these containers were allocated, as I have no theory that depends on this.
== So what does your theory say, please Rolfe, so I really don't know. If you were Baz at this point, you'd say, read what I write, and Mr. Norrie, you can't write (citing an occasional spelling error, while incapable of using the correct spelling “its” or it's”, or as I once saw in an eccentric Australian greengrocer's “i'ts”
== When you have calmed down, and get off your high-horse of ex-cathedra pronouncements, you will no doubt come rounfd to my point of view. Meanwhile, I intend to ignore you, unless I come up with something that either supports or counters my argument.
Interesting that the question of Mr Megrahi's human rights only becomes an issue when it is a question of clearing him.
ReplyDeleteDid the CIA and the police not breach his human rights publishing virtually the whole of the prosecution case even before he was sent to Zeist.
Apparently not. What a strange world we live in!
Dear Baz,
ReplyDeleteI did make a submission to the SCCRC. They acknowledged it, but I could find no reference to what I had written in their report.
Interestingly, they took the trouble to give me a week's notice they were going to publish their less than sensational findings!
Why should they be bleieved when they have stuffed their ears with chewing gum and shoved their heads in a bucket of metaphorical horse-shit. In contrast they should all be fined for wasting public money. Malfeasance in public office comes to mind!
I recall one of the trial Judges giving an interview to The Scotsman in which he predicted the SCRCC would make some minor criticism of the Judgement but leave the fundamental findings intact.
ReplyDeleteIn fact in respect of the issue of the date of purchase of the Malta clothing and in particular the "Christmas lights" the official version of events has been fundamentally challenged.
From the evidence of the press release I thought they dealt well with the submissions concerning Khalid Jafaar. Clearly they were unimpressed with some other crackpot theories.
As the SCCRC seem to have been serious about dealing with the evidence, unlike Charles I would be interested in learning more about their conclusions.
You are joking. The SCCRC that naive bunch of bamboozled virgins! Next Baz you'll be telling us the only thing the CIA has ever done is collect domations for church fetes.
ReplyDeleteWhat's waterboarding then? Ah the collection of dues for the domestic supply of the liquid stuff.
Charles. Put up (that is, find support for your theories), or shut up.
ReplyDeleteYou've already rejected what Aku said, when he explained quite clearly that nobody could break into an airport at midnight and identify the baggage containers that would be used for a flight 18 hours later.
You've already suggested that even if my Gatwick friend says the same thing, you'll reject that on the grounds that it might have been different in 1988. (Even though your only reason for believing as you do is that you naively imagine you have theorised the perfect system from your armchair.)
Your arrogant insistence that others should do your work for you is making you a laughing stock. It's clear the SCCRC has your number.
I recall one of the trial Judges giving an interview to The Scotsman in which he predicted the SCRCC would make some minor criticism of the Judgement but leave the fundamental findings intact.
ReplyDeleteThat rather chimes with my thoughts. It seemed to me that, given the threadbare nature of the evidence, it might be most politic to overturn the conviction on what might look like a technicality, such as lack of reliablity of Gauci's identification, while at the same time asking no probing questions about timer fragments or airport break-ins.
No doubt the US relatives would be outraged, but it might have been better than opening the entire construction to scrutiny.
Insults and slander do not hurt, me Rolfe.
ReplyDeleteI have not rejected what Mr Aku said, as I found his arguments rather opaque; if he wishes to explain himself further he will. You also misrepresented him, but that's your style.
I wonder you don't conatct your Gatwick friend But then he might agree with me, and you could not face the loss of face. Conditions at Gatwick today are not those at Heathrow in 1988. Perhaps you don't keep your eyes open when you go into airports; I do, and procedures have changed a lot.
I have not "imagined a perfect system", as that at Heathrow was faulted, and anyone will confirm that, unless they are of the accident/weather/UFO school.
I put forward a way the fallible system in 1988 at Heathrow was circumvented, and you have not been able to counter it.
Why don't you go back to the dead bodies you are so expert on; you haven't even addressed my questions about Prof Basutill, but then if you did that might be professional misconduct; or take up a hobby like weightlifting of macramé, for you are not welcome amongst serious thinkers.
You know, there are times when I wish this blog supported some of the more telling smilies. Oh for the laughing dog or the headbanger when you really need them!
ReplyDeleteHie thee hence, young Rolfe.
ReplyDeleteGet thee back to the JREF website, where smilies (and a great deal more) are beckoning!
Thankfully, I don't have problems multi-tasking....
ReplyDeleteI wasn't going to coment further on the Heathrow luggage container issue, but if readers found my earllier comments "opaque", I'll try, briefly, again. 747-compatible containers are lying all over the apron. They are mostly airline-specific (i.e. owned and branded as an airline's property). Baggage handlers will use the nearest container to hand for standard (suitcase-type) luggage. In my experience, it would be impossible to identify which container would go on a particular flight (let alone in a particular position on that flight) hours before check-in.Loading for a flight would commenced a couple or three hours before scheduled departure. That is why flight numbers were marked on containers in chalk (or similar erasable marker): the loader pulls the nearest container into service when he needs it and marks it up for a prticular flight. It would also be ALMOST impossible to attach and IED to a container (as opposed to putting it inside a piece of luggage). Later in the process, containers would be assigned a position in the belly of the aircraft. The COOL/POOL documents which Charkles talks about are essentially variations of a TRIM SHEET. This is the now copmputerised system (but manual, paper-based in 1988) for ensuring that weight (including passengers) is distributed correctly around the aircraft so that there is no tendency to "roll" when the aircrat is turning in flight (unenven lateral distribution) or difficulty in getting the nose up during take-off and landing (centre of gravity too far towards the back). Sometimes, when the Trim is uneven (for example if a set of heavy flight boxes has been put into a single container), the container would be unpacked and the items redistributed, or else the container might be moved to another position within the baggage hold. Try as I might, I can see that Charles' theory holds water.
ReplyDeleteIs that last sentence right Aku?
ReplyDeleteOops, no.Sorry. It should read: Try as I might, I CAN'T see that Charles' theory holds water.
ReplyDeleteI wasn't going to comment further on the Heathrow luggage container issue, but if readers found my earlier comments "opaque", I'll try, briefly, again. 747-compatible containers are lying all over the apron.
ReplyDelete== May I thank Mr Aku for the courtesy of his extended reply. However, I fear, it has not addressed al my concerns, which see below.
== I don't think they are loaded all over the apron are they? They are assembled into a rake for a particular flight, and loaded in a baggage loading area or shed. Surely, if baggage were being loaded “all over the apron”, I as a passenger would see the coming and going of individual baggage handlers with one or two bags, and I've never noticed that. A tractor comes out to the aircraft with a line of loaded containers which are the uplifted and stowed. I think that probably the origin of the Crabtree 14L/13R error.
They are mostly airline-specific (i.e. owned and branded as an airline's property).
== Certainly the are in the case of the containers in question at Heathrow associated with PA 103 of 21 December 1988
Baggage handlers will use the nearest container to hand for standard (suitcase-type) luggage. In my experience, it would be impossible to identify which container would go on a particular flight (let alone in a particular position on that flight) hours before check-in.
== Permit me Mr Aku, but I have a certain difficulty with that statement. You say below that chalk marks are put on containers and this is presumably before loading begins. So how does the person in charge of chalking know which containers to mark. After all, he must know how many to chalk, for he cannot overfill the aircraft. Doesn't he use some sort of plan, which must also show which containers are to be unloaded mid-way? Pan Am 103 was to serve NY and Chicago?
== Then there's a second question AVE4041 PA is a bit of an odd ball container. Firstly it is for transfer baggage. Such an item might be a suitcase that landed with a passenger from the SAA overnight flight from Johannesburg, for a passenger destined for NY. The passenger takes the advantage of a stopover in London to do a bit of shopping and returns to the airport at tea time for the evening flight on Pan Am 103. Where does that suitcase that has been booked through to NY (for the passenger doesn't want the bother of bringing it into the UK, lugging it around London and taking it back to the airport) sit all day until AVE4041 PA becomes labelled. It can't be Mr Bedford's two suitcases, which Mr Kamboj denied ever existed, (and I am not sure the records of the baggage scans were ever produced in court to prove or not they existed), because they were about at around 16:00, and the SAA flight would have arrived around 07:00
Loading for a flight would commenced a couple or three hours before scheduled departure.
== So I suggest that's for passengers arriving at the airport, not transfers.
(Charles, continued)
ReplyDeleteThat is why flight numbers were marked on containers in chalk (or similar erasable marker): the loader pulls the nearest container into service when he needs it and marks it up for a particular flight. It would also be ALMOST impossible to attach and IED to a container (as opposed to putting it inside a piece of luggage).
== I fear I must doubt the word “almost”. There are very unlikely circumstances in the middle of a highly professional operation.
== I have numbers of pictures of baggage containers which show repairs. There are mostly of flat piece of metal placed on the outside of containers, which have been painted and show rivets on the repair patch.
== If we accept the Zeist evidence it seems the device was placed on the inside of AVE4041 in the portion facing backwards towards AVN7511, above the part where the bottom begins to angle in., the cutained open aprture is what the average loader (and not Lockerbie theorist) would see. It would have been very hard to see, and no rational loader seeing the patch would question for a moment that it was other than a repair. It would not be his duty, I suspect seeing an internal patch to check whether there was one on the outside. They've only got just over a hour to load the things and baggage containers have never blown up in this way. There's no warning about such an eventuality, so why expect it?
Later in the process, containers would be assigned a position in the belly of the aircraft. The COOL/POOL documents which Charles talks about are essentially variations of a TRIM SHEET. This is the now computerised system (but manual, paper-based in 1988) for ensuring that weight (including passengers) is distributed correctly around the aircraft so that there is no tendency to "roll" when the aircraft is turning in flight (uneven lateral distribution) or difficulty in getting the nose up during take-off and landing (centre of gravity too far towards the back).
== But the fact that the TRIM SHEET, presumably a Pan Am term is mostly about weight is something I have not ignored, as I mentioned the possibility of transporting gold. But you have to have had a list of containers to put bags (or gold bars into) before you can say one is overloaded.
Sometimes, when the Trim is uneven (for example if a set of heavy flight boxes has been put into a single container), the container would be unpacked and the items redistributed, or else the container might be moved to another position within the baggage hold. Try as I might, I can see that Charles' theory holds water.
= I take Mr Aku's sentence to have inadvertently have missed out “not”. But if I were Baz and Mr Aku, me I'd have had a dose of bile in my ear about not being able to think or write straight, even if the spelling were perfect.
Aku, your account is pretty much how I would have expected the system to be organised.
ReplyDeleteIn addition, as you pointed out, the containers are flimsy and open-sided. While it's probably not inconceivable that a bomb could remain attached to such a container, in a busy airport, and be unnoticed for 18 hours, I find it very improbable that a terrorist would rely on this happening. The chances of the bomb being noticed by someone during that time would surely be judged as too great.
Finally, given the flimsy nature of the luggage container, I note there is no evidence of the sort of damage to it that I would have expected if a bomb had been attached to any of its elements.
Charles: I didn't say that containers are "loaded all over the apron". I said that containers are LYING all over the apron. Containers are, of course, loaded in a specific loading area. Loading of containers does NOT noramlly start until 2-3 hours before scheduled departure time. Interline (and on-line for that matter) bags are usually just left on the ground or in a more secure lock-up, depending on how long they have to wait until loading starts properly. I think it is quite likely that the IED in a suitcase went on at Heathrow, but I can't see how it could have been attached to a container. No bile, no axe to grind.
ReplyDeleteI suppose sabotaging a container might be a plan, if the terrorist didn't much care which flight got the bomb. If the containers are specific to the 747, and you can see which belong to Pan Am, maybe you just choose one at random. Could be going anywhere, of course....
ReplyDeleteAnd then, it would have to be a barometric trigger, not a timer, and this all assumes it would even be possible to conceal an effective IED attached to the structure of a baggage container. Which I find very doubtful indeed.
I don't think this one is going to achieve lift-off, to be honest.
I suggest both the airline, the time and the flight are important.
ReplyDeleteThe exact configuration of a barometric plus a timer is assumed in my theory. Only PFLP GC didn't do it. The CIA did, or more accurately arranged for it to be done by an Iranian!