Lockerbie questions for the FBI

What follows is an article originally posted on this blog on this date in 2012.

What the SCCRC should have asked the FBI

[This is the heading over an item posted today by John Ashton on his Megrahi: You are my Jury website.  It reads as follows:]

On 18 March Scotland on Sunday ran an article headlined Megrahi probe ‘failed to speak to FBI agents’, which reported criticisms of the SCCRC by FBI officers Oliver ‘Buck’ Revell and Richard Marquise. [RB: See here and here.]

It states:  Oliver “Buck” Revell, the former associate deputy director of investigations for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, has reacted angrily to the examination into the case by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC). In an e-mail seen by Scotland on Sunday, Revell expressed frustration that no-one from the FBI was consulted by the SCCRC when it compiled its report into the safety of Megrahi’s conviction … In his e-mail to government and legal officials in Scotland and the US, Revell complained that the SCCRC failed to interview members of the FBI for its Statement of Reasons. The e-mail pointed out that the original Lockerbie investigation was carried out by Scottish police, Scotland Yard, the German BKA and the FBI. Revell added: “I don’t know what the SCCRC expects to determine when it is not even interviewing the actual investigators involved in solving this terrible crime.”

Marquise said:  “I don’t know if you can say you have done a comprehensive report unless you speak to key people. To me it is an incomplete report whatever they are going to publish. They never did speak to the people who might be able to shed some light on whatever it is that they were looking to find out. If you are going to say you have done a complete investigation, you should talk to everybody who was key, and I like to think people in the FBI were key. I like to think some people in the CIA were key and they could and should have been interviewed.”

While neither man shed any light on what the FBI investigators could have told the commission, we might infer from their comments that the Bureau held further evidence of Abdelbaset’s guilt. Of course, it almost certainly didn’t, because any such evidence would have been handed to the Crown.

That said, I share Revell’s and Marquise’s disappointment that the SCCRC failed to interview anyone from the FBI, as many important questions remain unanswered. For example:

1. What did FBI agent John Hosinski discuss with Tony Gauci when he met him alone on 2 October 1989?

2. What did Senegalese official Jean Collin reveal when interviewed in the US in December 1990?

3. Was the content of Collin’s interview revealed to the Scottish police? And, if not, why not?

4. Why did the FBI’s Tom Thurman ‘front’ for the CIA in relation to the identification of the timer fragment?

5. According to FBI agent Hal Hendershot, Thurman had a laboratory in Lockerbie within days of the bombing. What forensic work did he undertake and was that work shared with the Scottish investigators?

6.When, in June 1990, Thurman demonstrated to the Scottish police that PT/35b matched the control sample MST-13 timer, why did he not reveal that he was already aware that the timers were made by Mebo?

7. Why was Hendershot aware of the contents of the Toshiba manual fragment PK/689 before it was examined for the Scottish police at RARDE?

8. Why was the FBI able to investigate debris item PI/1389 (a blue T-shirt, which, according to the FBI’s Bonn legal attache David Keyes, showed blast damage and the imprint of the grills of two radio speakers) before RARDE?

9. What information did Hendershot, Thurman and Bob Howen uncover in relation to the crystals used in the MST-13 timers? In particular, were they able to establish the date of manufacture of the crystal used in the control sample timer K-1, which was recovered from Togo and which Thurman used for comparative purposes with the fragment PT/35b?

10. Regarding the episode at Frankfurt airport, witnessed by FBI agent Lawrence Whittaker and DI Watson McAteer, in which a baggage handler apparently entered a bag into the automated transit system without recording the transaction, why was Whittaker’s trial testimony at odds with McAteer’s statement S3743A?

11. How many FBI FD302 reports by Lockerbie field agents were handed to the Crown? (Only a handful were provided to the defence.)

12. The US Department of Justice has stated that only three reports were produced in relation to the FBI’s inquiries in Malta. Given the centrality of Malta to the case, why were there so few?

Perhaps Mr Revell and Mr Marquise can answer these questions.

The article is also notable for the following quote by Marquise:  “On the issue of witnesses being paid, no witness [was paid] to my knowledge. What some police officer or FBI agent might have told somebody in the corner in a dark room in the middle night that I don’t know about, I can’t vouch for that. But everybody that worked for me were under orders that they were not allowed to tell people that they could get money for this case. So, as far as I know, nobody was promised or paid money to testify.”

The SCCRC report states, at paragraph 23.19:  Enquiries with D&G [Dumfries and Galloway Police] have established that, some time after the conclusion of the applicant’s appeal against conviction, Anthony and Paul Gauci were each paid sums of money under the “Rewards for Justice” programme administered by the US Department of State. Under that programme the US Secretary of State was initially authorised to offer rewards of up to $5m for information leading to the arrest or conviction of persons involved in acts of terrorism against US persons or property worldwide. The upper limit on such payments was increased by legislation passed in the US in 2001.

According to DCI Harry Bell’s diary, on 28 September 1989, FBI agent Chris Murray told Bell that he (Murray): ‘had the authority to arrange unlimited money for Tony Gauci and relocation is available. Murray states that he could arrange $10,000 immediately.’  Murray would not have said these things unless he believed that the offer might have been put to Gauci, yet, according to Marquise, “everybody that worked for me were under orders that they were not allowed to tell people that they could get money for this case.” So, was Murray acting against Marquise’s orders? And, if so will he be held to account? Again, maybe Marquise and Revell can enlighten us.

What the SCCRC should have asked the FBI

[This is the heading over an item posted today by John Ashton on his Megrahi: You are my Jury website.  It reads as follows:]

On 18 March Scotland on Sunday ran an article headlined Megrahi probe ‘failed to speak to FBI agents’, which reported criticisms of the SCCRC by FBI officers Oliver ‘Buck’ Revell and Richard Marquise. [RB: See here and here.]

It states:  Oliver “Buck” Revell, the former associate deputy director of investigations for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, has reacted angrily to the examination into the case by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC). In an e-mail seen by Scotland on Sunday, Revell expressed frustration that no-one from the FBI was consulted by the SCCRC when it compiled its report into the safety of Megrahi’s conviction … In his e-mail to government and legal officials in Scotland and the US, Revell complained that the SCCRC failed to interview members of the FBI for its Statement of Reasons. The e-mail pointed out that the original Lockerbie investigation was carried out by Scottish police, Scotland Yard, the German BKA and the FBI. Revell added: “I don’t know what the SCCRC expects to determine when it is not even interviewing the actual investigators involved in solving this terrible crime.”

Marquise said:  “I don’t know if you can say you have done a comprehensive report unless you speak to key people. To me it is an incomplete report whatever they are going to publish. They never did speak to the people who might be able to shed some light on whatever it is that they were looking to find out. If you are going to say you have done a complete investigation, you should talk to everybody who was key, and I like to think people in the FBI were key. I like to think some people in the CIA were key and they could and should have been interviewed.”

While neither man shed any light on what the FBI investigators could have told the commission, we might infer from their comments that the Bureau held further evidence of Abdelbaset’s guilt. Of course, it almost certainly didn’t, because any such evidence would have been handed to the Crown.

That said, I share Revell’s and Marquise’s disappointment that the SCCRC failed to interview anyone from the FBI, as many important questions remain unanswered. For example:

1. What did FBI agent John Hosinski discuss with Tony Gauci when he met him alone on 2 October 1989?

2. What did Senegalese official Jean Collin reveal when interviewed in the US in December 1990?

3. Was the content of Collin’s interview revealed to the Scottish police? And, if not, why not?

4. Why did the FBI’s Tom Thurman ‘front’ for the CIA in relation to the identification of the timer fragment?

5. According to FBI agent Hal Hendershott, Thurman had a laboratory in Lockerbie within days of the bombing. What forensic work did he undertake and was that work shared with the Scottish investigators?

6.When, in June 1990, Thurman demonstrated to the Scottish police that PT/35b matched the control sample MST-13 timer, why did he not reveal that he was already aware that the timers were made by Mebo?

7. Why was Hendershot aware of the contents of the Toshiba manual fragment PK/689 before it was examined for the Scottish police at RARDE?

8. Why was the FBI able to investigate debris item PI/1389 (a blue T-shirt, which, according to the FBI’s Bonn legal attache David Keyes, showed blast damage and the imprint of the grills of two radio speakers) before RARDE?

9. What information did Hendershot, Thurman and Bob Howen uncover in relation to the crystals used in the MST-13 timers? In particular, were they able to establish the date of manufacture of the crystal used in the control sample timer K-1, which was recovered from Togo and which Thurman used for comparative purposes with the fragment PT/35b?

10. Regarding the episode at Frankfurt airport, witnessed by FBI agent Lawrence Whittaker and DI Watson McAteer, in which a baggage handler apparently entered a bag into the automated transit system without recording the transaction, why was Whittaker’s trial testimony at odds with McAteer’s statement S3743A?

11. How many FBI FD302 reports by Lockerbie field agents were handed to the Crown? (Only a handful were provided to the defence.)

12. The US Department of Justice has stated that only three reports were produced in relation to the FBI’s inquiries in Malta. Given the centrality of Malta to the case, why were there so few?

Perhaps Mr Revell and Mr Marquise can answer these questions.

The article is also notable for the following quote by Marquise:  “On the issue of witnesses being paid, no witness [was paid] to my knowledge. What some police officer or FBI agent might have told somebody in the corner in a dark room in the middle night that I don’t know about, I can’t vouch for that. But everybody that worked for me were under orders that they were not allowed to tell people that they could get money for this case. So, as far as I know, nobody was promised or paid money to testify.”

The SCCRC report states, at paragraph 23.19:  Enquiries with D&G [Dumfries and Galloway Police] have established that, some time after the conclusion of the applicant’s appeal against conviction, Anthony and Paul Gauci were each paid sums of money under the “Rewards for Justice” programme administered by the US Department of State. Under that programme the US Secretary of State was initially authorised to offer rewards of up to $5m for information leading to the arrest or conviction of persons involved in acts of terrorism against US persons or property worldwide. The upper limit on such payments was increased by legislation passed in the US in 2001.

According to DCI Harry Bell’s diary, on 28 September 1989, FBI agent Chris Murray told Bell that he (Murray): ‘had the authority to arrange unlimited money for Tony Gauci and relocation is available. Murray states that he could arrange $10,000 immediately.’  Murray would not have said these things unless he believed that the offer might have been put to Gauci, yet, according to Marquise, “everybody that worked for me were under orders that they were not allowed to tell people that they could get money for this case.” So, was Murray acting against Marquise’s orders? And, if so will he be held to account? Again, maybe Marquise and Revell can enlighten us.


[The commentary on this issue in Scottish lawyers' magazine The Firm can be read here.]

See them squirming!

[Today's edition of Scotland on Sunday contains a report headlined Megrahi probe 'failed to speak to FBI agents'. It reads in part:]

The former FBI officer who oversaw the Lockerbie investigation has criticised the Scottish legal body that cast doubt on the conviction of Libyan Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi.

Oliver “Buck” Revell, the former associate deputy director of investigations for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, has reacted angrily to the examination into the case by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC).

In an e-mail seen by Scotland on Sunday, Revell expressed frustration that no-one from the FBI was consulted by the SCCRC when it compiled its report into the safety of Megrahi’s conviction.

The controversy surrounding the Lockerbie trial re-ignited following the publication of John Ashton’s book Megrahi: You Are My Jury, in which the convicted bomber – now back in Libya after being released on compassionate grounds as he is suffering from terminal cancer – proclaims his innocence.

The furore increased when extracts of the SCCRC’s report were leaked last week.

Excerpts from the confidential SCCRC Statement of Reasons document, which gave Megrahi, 59, grounds for appeal, identified six different areas that could have constituted a miscarriage of justice.

Publicity surrounding the document has angered investigators who headed up the US arm of the inquiry into the killing of 270 people when Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie in December 1988.

In his e-mail to government and legal officials in Scotland and the US, Revell complained that the SCCRC failed to interview members of the FBI for its Statement of Reasons. The e-mail pointed out that the original Lockerbie investigation was carried out by Scottish police, Scotland Yard, the German BKA and the FBI.

Revell added: “I don’t know what the SCCRC expects to determine when it is not even interviewing the actual investigators involved in solving this terrible crime.”

The SCCRC document is said to have concentrated on Tony Gauci, the Maltese shopkeeper who testified that Megrahi bought clothes from his shop which were later found in the suitcase carrying the bomb.

The SCCRC also focused on “undisclosed evidence”, including a police statement that showed Gauci had been handed a magazine with a photograph of Megrahi weeks before he singled him out in an identity parade.

Also identified by the SCCRC was undisclosed evidence about Gauci’s interest in rewards. The SCCRC discovered three police documents that indicated that, before first picking out Megrahi from a photo line-up in 1991, Gauci was aware a substantial reward was on offer from the US government.

Ashton’s book claimed that a Scottish policeman’s diary entry recorded an FBI agent saying that he had the authority to arrange “unlimited money” for Gauci. The Commission was unable to establish whether the FBI had actually made an offer.

One of Revell’s senior colleagues Richard Marquise, the FBI agent, who led the Lockerbie investigation on the ground, said that as far as he was aware no money had changed hands.

Speaking to Scotland on Sunday, Marquise said: “On the issue of witnesses being paid, no witness [was paid] to my knowledge. What some police officer or FBI agent might have told somebody in the corner in a dark room in the middle night that I don’t know about, I can’t vouch for that. But everybody that worked for me were under orders that they were not allowed to tell people that they could get money for this case. So, as far as I know, nobody was promised or paid money to testify.” [RB: Wow! Contrast with this and this (at pages 148 to 170).]

Revell’s disappointment at the FBI’s lack of involvement was shared by Marquise.

He said: “I don’t know if you can say you have done a comprehensive report unless you speak to key people.

“To me it is an incomplete report whatever they are going to publish.

“They never did speak to the people who might be able to shed some light on whatever it is that they were looking to find out.

“If you are going to say you have done a complete investigation, you should talk to everybody who was key, and I like to think people in the FBI were key. I like to think some people in the CIA were key and they could and should have been interviewed.”

[An editorial in today's edition of the Sunday Herald reads as follows:]

The arrest yesterday of Libya's former spy chief Abdullah al-Senussi could at last shed some much-needed light on the Lockerbie atrocity. [RB: The paper's news report can be read here.]

If anyone knows the details of Libya's involvement – or non-involvement – in that terrible mass murder, it is Senussi.

As our sister paper The Herald made clear in reports last week, there remain serious doubts over the guilty verdict delivered on Abdelbaset Mohmed Ali al-Megrahi.

The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission has suggested that, among other flaws in the court case, evidence important to the defence was kept from Megrahi's lawyers.

There are doubts too over the circumstances surrounding Megrahi's eventual release on compassionate grounds to allow him to return home ''to die''.

We have heard suspicions that Westminster politicians were acting behind the scenes to encourage the release. And there has been a strenuously denied claim that Holyrood Justice secretary Kenny MacAskill had suggested Megrahi's chances of release would be greatly boosted if he were to drop his appeal.

It is unfortunate, to say the least, that the appeal was dropped. The best place to test Megrahi's conviction would have been in court. For reasons that remain unclear, the appeal looks unlikely to be revived.

The vacuum around the case has acted as a breeding ground for countless conspiracy theories.

If Senussi holds the key to unlocking some of the Lockerbie mysteries, we need to discover what he knows.

Lockerbie bombing: Witnesses evade police in Libya

[This is the headline over a report in today’s edition of Scotland on Sunday. It reads in part:]

The new investigation into the Lockerbie bombing appears to be stalling after Scottish police officers failed to gain access to key suspects in Libya, Scotland on Sunday can reveal.

A team from the Crown Office and the former Dumfries and Galloway force was despatched to the north African country in February following an International Letter of Request (ILOR) sent by Lord Advocate Frank Mulholland to Libyan judicial authorities.

The team – accompanied by FBI officers – are trying to establish whether a new case can be brought against Libyans suspected of being involved in the plot that brought down a US airliner over southern Scotland in 1988, killing 270 people.

According to the Crown Office documents released under FOI legislation, the ILOR “seeks information in relation to the ongoing investigation of others involved in the plot”. But they go on to disclose: “There was no access to any individuals of interest during this visit.”

Instead, the team met officials and ministers in tightly-controlled secure buildings in Tripoli, fuelling suspicion that the new Libyan government does not want investigations to proceed.

Former Libyan intelligence officer Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi – who died in Libya from cancer last year three years after being released from prison in Scotland – is the only person ever convicted of the atrocity but the Crown Office believes he did not act alone and the attack on Pan Am flight 103 was “an act of state sponsored terrorism”.

They have previously sought information on his co-accused, Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, who was acquitted at the trial of the two men at Camp Zeist in Holland in 2001.

But the FOI response indicates they are more interested in “others,” although the Crown Office will not comment publicly on their identity. They are believed to include Abdullah Senussi, the former Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi’s brother-in-law, head of the intelligence services, and Megrahi’s immediate boss.

Other potential suspects include Saeed Rashid, who, an FBI report previously claimed, “managed a sustained Libyan effort to conduct terrorist attacks against US interests since the early-1980s”, and Izz Aldin Hinshiri, who was suspected of buying the trigger device for the Lockerbie bomb.John Ashton, author of Megrahi: You are my Jury, and former FBI agent Richard Marquise have both said investigations should also target Gadaffi’s former intelligence chief, Moussa Koussa, who fled the country during the Libyan revolution.

Former FBI assistant director Buck Revell, who oversaw that agency’s Lockerbie investigation until 1991, believes the Libyan authorities are trying to protect members of the former regime, and urged sanctions as a way of extracting the truth. “I think it was rather naive of us to think they would be given access,” he told Scotland on Sunday.

“I don’t fault them for trying, but there was nothing to indicate they were going to get to speak to the people they wanted to.

“It was a long shot worth taking, given the magnitude of the tragedy, but people there are still protecting elements of the previous government. They don’t believe it is in their best interests to come clean.”

He urged western governments to take a harder line. Libya already faces sanctions over arms deals and military activities, but Revell urged broader economic restrictions.

“We should hold out support and co-operation until they give us support and cooperation,” he said. (...) [RB: Earlier posts on this blog featuring Buck Revell can be accessed here.]

The former chief constable of the Dumfries and Galloway force, Patrick Shearer, is due to meet the Justice for Megrahi Campaign, which believes Megrahi was innocent, this week to discuss their concerns over the investigation.

The Crown Office says the new investigation is still “live” but a spokesman for Police Scotland confirmed that “in an ideal world” the team would have liked to speak to “individuals of interest”.

Prime Minister David Cameron announced the team’s visit would take place when he was in Tripoli earlier this year. However, Hameda al-Magery, the new Libyan government’s deputy justice minister, was reported as saying: “Britain and America are asking us to reopen this file. But this is something of the past. We want to move forward to build a new future, and not to look back at Gaddafi’s black history. This case was closed and both UK and US governments agreed to this. They had their compensation.”

Gaddafi paid victims’ families more than $2 billion 10 years ago, although his regime insisted it was a political move and continued to deny being behind the bombing.

[As I have said before, if the "new investigation" limits itself to seeking evidence of Libyan responsibility for Lockerbie, it is likely to prove futile. Closed minds are the last thing that a true and meaningful investigation requires.]

Missing witnesses

[On this date in 2000 the Lockerbie trial was adjourned for two weeks. This adjournment had proved necessary largely because of difficulties encountered by the Crown in inducing witnesses (particularly from Malta) to attend at Camp Zeist to give evidence.  During the break in court proceedings I wrote a number of articles for The Lockerbie Trial website, curated by Ian Ferguson and me. Here are two of them:]

THE MISSING WITNESSES

When the trial resumes at Camp Zeist on Tuesday 11 July 2000, it will be the thirty-first day of evidence.  Many witnesses have been called into the box to testify, a substantial number of them regarding matters not disputed by the defence and in respect of which it might have been thought that agreement could have been reached between prosecution and defence to obviate the necessity of their attendance.  But if some of the witnesses have seemed to the outside observer to be superfluous, it is equally the case that persons whose presence as witnesses might have been expected, have been conspicuous by their absence.

Prominent amongst these is John Orr who, as a Detective Chief Superintendent and Joint Head of Strathclyde CID and latterly as Deputy Chief Constable of Dumfries and Galloway, headed the Scottish police investigation into the Lockerbie disaster.  In a normal Scottish murder trial the officer in charge of the police investigation team is usually one of the earliest witnesses to be summoned to give evidence.  The absence of Mr Orr, who is now Chief Constable of Strathclyde, from the ranks of police witnesses at the proceedings at Zeist has caused a number of raised eyebrows. 

Other absentees are Oliver "Buck" Revell and Vincent Cannistraro.

Revell was the chief FBI agent assigned to the Lockerbie investigation.  In The Oklahoma City Bombing and the Politics of Terror by David Hoffman (1998, Feral House, Venice CA) he is described as Associate Deputy Director of the FBI and as the FBI counter-terrorism chief.  His son had been booked as a passenger on Pan Am 103, but switched to another flight some time before the plane departed. Cannistraro was the chief CIA operative assigned to the Lockerbie investigation.  In Libya: The Struggle For Survival by Geoff Simons (2nd edition, 1996, Macmillan, London) he is described as "the head of the CIA's counter-terrorism centre who led the American investigation into the bombing" and in The Oklahoma City Bombing he is described as a "CIA intelligence advisor to the National Security Council."  Both of these men are now retired, and in the years since November 1991 when the two Libyans were first accused of the atrocity, have been far from reticent in making known their views on the subject of Lockerbie in the media.  It is a pity that the Crown has not seen fit to call upon them to share with the Court, from the witness box, their very great knowledge of the Lockerbie affair.

Members of the defence team asked Mr Cannistraro to meet them for the purpose of precognition (the Scottish equivalent of taking a pre-trial deposition), but he refused to do so. 

In Scotland, there is a legal duty upon citizens to make themselves available for precognition by both the prosecution and the defence.  As one of Scotland's most distinguished criminal judges, Lord Justice Clerk MacDonald, said: "I consider it to be the duty of every true citizen to give such information to the Crown as he may be asked to give in reference to the case in which he is to be called; and also that every witness who is to be called for the Crown should give similar information to the prisoner's legal advisers, if he is called upon and asked what he is going to say....  I have been asked to express my view, and it is that every good citizen should give his aid, either to the Crown or to the defence, in every case where the interests of the public in the punishment of crime, or the interests of a prisoner charged with crime, call for ascertainment of facts."

But none of this seems to cut any ice with Mr Cannistraro.

UNWILLING WITNESSES

Courts of law in general have powers of compulsion only in respect of persons who are physically present within their territorial jurisdiction.  Amongst other things, this means that only such persons can be compelled to attend and give evidence before them.  This limitation on its coercive powers is not something which is unique to the Scottish Court sitting at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands or to Scottish courts in general.  It would have applied equally if the Lockerbie trial had been held in a court in, for example, the United States of America.

A number of Maltese witnesses, mainly persons employed or formerly employed at Luqa Airport, have refused to attend to give evidence at Camp Zeist, and because of this the prosecution have been compelled to seek (and have been granted) yet another adjournment to enable them to secure the attendance of other witnesses.

The refusal of the Maltese witnesses to attend does not mean that their evidence is necessarily lost to the Court.  It is open to the Scottish Court by Letter of Request to seek the assistance of the appropriate Maltese judicial authorities in obtaining, if necessary compulsorily, the testimony of the witnesses in question.  This might involve either the witnesses giving evidence from Malta by means of a live television link to the courtroom at Zeist or the witnesses being examined before a magistrate or judge sitting in Malta and a transcript of their evidence then being supplied to the Scottish Court.  These procedures are competent in a Scottish criminal court by virtue of the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, section 3, and the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, sections 272 and 273.

As a last resort, the Crown, if able to satisfy the Court that it was not reasonably practicable to secure the attendance of the witnesses at the trial or to obtain their evidence in any of the ways mentioned above, and notwithstanding the general prohibition on the use of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings, would be able to use as evidence any statement made by the witnesses in question, e.g. to police or other investigators, in the course of the Lockerbie investigation.  This is provided for under section 259 of the 1995 Act.  It does, of course, affect the weight likely to be accorded to the evidence that it is not given by the witness personally in court and is not subject to cross-examination.

If the Crown are having difficulty in securing witnesses to appear before the Court, and their need to request an adjournment when these Maltese witnesses (whose reluctance to attend has been known for months) balked at appearing seems to suggest that they are, perhaps they should reconsider their apparent decision not to call Chief Constable John Orr, Oliver "Buck" Revell and Vincent Cannistraro.

Just a suggestion.

Jim Swire responds to Frank Duggan's falsehood and fable accusation

[What follows is Dr Jim Swire’s response to Frank Duggan’s assertion that UK relatives are lying and promoting a fable when they refer to a member of  the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism saying: "Your government and mine know exactly what happened but they're never going to tell."]

I do not usually reply to statements in the media from Mr Frank Duggan, however he has recently very publicly accused me of lying, concerning an event which happened in the United States embassy, where Mr Duggan was present, acting as relatives' liaison officer over the Lockerbie case, I believe.

I was also present.

Mr Duggan now claims that an alleged remark to one of the British relatives was not made.

It is hard to understand how he would know that because the remark was made 'off the record', confidentially in an aside to the father of another British victim.

I know and trust that victim's father.

The remark made to him was "Your government and ours know exactly what happened but they're never going to tell.”

That is not the kind of remark which any bereaved parent is ever likely to forget, but Mr Duggan could not have overheard it; perhaps he also does not understand its implications for a bereaved family.

Perhaps whatever Mr Duggan does not hear does not happen?

[RB: Jim Swire here wrote a sentence about PCAST which I have omitted because it referred to the wrong PCAST. Dr Swire has now circulated a correction. In an email to me he says: 'In demonstration of the fallibility of my memory I must also point out that Google led me to the wrong use of PCAST.' I may add that I should be happy if my own memory were only as fallible as Dr Swire's.]

I do however owe Mr Duggan and others an apology: the meeting in the US embassy in London apparently took place in February 1990 not in 1989 as I had thoughtlessly previously claimed. Forgive the weakness of an old man's memory for dates, Mr Duggan, but these days there is always Google.

Those who wish to view Mr Duggan in action may like to dig out of the net the Channel Four showing of a film about Lockerbie called The Maltese Double-Cross, which was followed by a live on air discussion where again I was present, as was Mr Duggan and where I had to ask a Mr Buck Revell of the FBI (appearing by satellite) why his son had canceled his flight on Pan Am 103 instead of getting murdered like my daughter. Mr Revell is, I understand, no longer in the FBI. If I recall correctly he told us that his son had received an unexpected change of leave dates from the army. His son was not claimed to be a member of the staff at the US Embassy in Moscow, where warnings about a terrorist threat specific to Pan Am had been posted on a staff notice board well before the tragedy. [RB: I cannot find this particular discussion online. But another instructive media performance by Frank Duggan can be viewed here.]

We have always been mystified as to why the Pan Am 103 plane was 'only' 2/3 full just before Christmas.

I won't ascribe a date to that discussion group, in case my memory might again prove defective.

There was also a British near equivalent to this amazing revelation from PCAST. In her autobiographical book published in 1993 - two years after the two Libyans had been indicted over involvement in the Lockerbie disaster. Lady Thatcher wrote, speaking of the attack by the USAF on Tripoli in 1986, itself an alleged reprisal for a terrorist bombing of a German disco:

“It turned out to be a more decisive blow against Libyan sponsored terrorism than I could ever have imagined....the much vaunted Libyan counter attack did not and could not take place. Gaddafi had not been destroyed but he had been humbled.” (The Downing Street Years, pp 448-9)

I fear, Mr Duggan, we shall continue to seek the truth and since we are European citizens we have an inalienable right to that truth under the provisions of the ECHR. Please Google that.

Father of Lockerbie victim supports coronavirus memorial cairn campaign

[What follows is excerpted from an article published in today's edition of The Herald:]

As the father of Lockerbie victim Flora Swire, he sadly knows only to well how important having a place to mourn a loved one can be.

Dr Jim Swire and his wife Jane lost their daughter on the night flight Pan Am 103 was blown out of the sky over the small Dumfriesshire town.

And a memorial was later created in Dryfesdale Cemetery following the tragic events of December 21, 1988 which saw 259 passengers and cabin crew lost their lives and 11 people from the town also died.

When he read of our plans, Dr Swire contacted The Herald to offer his backing to our campaign to create a memorial cairn with the name of every Scot who has died from coronavirus. (...)

Dr Swire said: “Many a time, on our way north to Skye my wife Jane and I have visited Dryfesdale cemetery and seen again the name of our dear daughter Flora on the Pan Am 103 memorial there.

“I would like to thank all those involved in the maintenance of that memorial and for the sympathetic and caring response we have always found in the town whenever anniversaries and other occasions have reminded us all of that awful night in December 1988.

“I cannot speak for others but I would personally warmly support the creation of a memorial cairn for the relatives of the virus victims in Scotland now.” (...)

The Swires' holiday home in Skye is somewhere they still like to travel to, outwith current restrictions, and is a place where Flora visited as a child. (...)

Flora was born on December 22, 1964, near their Gloucestershire family home. She was named after her paternal ancestor Flora MacDonald, who famously helped Bonnie Prince Charlie escape from Skye following the battle of Culloden.

She was training to be a neurosurgeon when she met young American doctor Hart Lidov. She began commuting regularly across the Atlantic to see him and, just before Christmas, decided on a whim to fly to New York so they could spend the holiday together. [RB: The CIA's Oliver "Buck" Revell sued Dr Lidov over an article that he wrote about the Lockerbie case. Revell lost.]

As her sister Cathy dropped her at the airport, she was on top of the world, having just won a place to complete her training at Cambridge, her father's old university.

But just 38 minutes after her plane took off, a suitcase exploded in the hold. All on board died. Now her ashes are buried in the pretty churchyard of the ruined St John's Chapel in Caroy.

When the news first broke on television, the Swires tried to quell rising panic with a conviction that it couldn't be her plane - the timing didn't match the details she had given. But as they realised it had been delayed, the terrible truth hit.

Earlier this year the family of Libyan Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, the only person to be convicted and jailed for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, were told they can launch a posthumous appeal against his conviction, by Scotland's criminal appeals body has ruled.

The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) has referred his case to the High Court, after ruling a miscarriage of justice may have occurred in the conviction.

The ruling paves the way for a posthumous appeal and is something which Dr Swire supported. Dr Swire has long believed that Megrahi was wrongfully convicted of the bombing and that Libya was not behind the plot.

The court ruled the review of Megrahi’s conviction met two statutory tests for referral – it may have been a miscarriage of justice and it is in the interests of justice to refer it back to the court.

Former Libyan intelligence officer Megrahi was the only person convicted of the bombing, having been found guilty in 2001 of mass murder and jailed for life with a minimum term of 27 years.

Megrahi died aged 60 in 2012, still protesting his innocence.