Moves towards normalization of relations between Libya and UK, US

In a letter dated 15 August 2003 addressed to the President of the UN Security Council, Libya’s ambassador to the United Nations wrote:

Libya as a sovereign State:

• Has facilitated the bringing to justice of the two suspects charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103 and accepts responsibility for the actions of its officials.

• Has cooperated with the Scottish investigating authorities before and during the trial and pledges to cooperate in good faith with any further requests for information in connection with the Pan Am 103 investigation. Such cooperation would be extended in good faith through the usual channels.

• Has arranged for the payment of appropriate compensation. To that end, a special fund has been established and instructions have already been issued to transmit the necessary sums to an agreed escrow account within a matter of days.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which during the last two decades has, on numerous occasions, condemned all acts of terrorism in its correspondence to the General Assembly and to the Security Council, reaffirms its commitment to that policy.

On the same date, Voice of America broadcast a news item of which the following is a transcript:

INTRO: Senior Bush administration officials say there will be no early end to US economic sanctions against Libya even though the Muammar Gadhafi government will shortly fulfill terms for the permanent lifting of U-N sanctions stemming from the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. The families of the 270 victims of the 1988 airliner attack were briefed on the status of the case Friday in Washington. V-O-A's David Gollust reports from the State Department.

TEXT: Secretary of State Colin Powell joined in the briefing for the families on fast-moving developments in the Pan Am 103 case that are likely to lead to a Security Council vote ending UN sanctions next week.

The UN sanctions were suspended in 1999 after Libya turned over two of its intelligence agents who were charged in the attack, one of whom was later convicted by a special court in the Netherlands and sentenced to life in prison.

Libya is now fulfilling terms for the permanent lifting of the sanctions, including acceptance of responsibility for the attack, a renunciation of terrorism, and creation of a two-point-seven billion dollar fund for the compensation of the victims families.

The Security Council vote, expected by mid-week, would trigger payment to the families of the first four million of what could eventually be ten million dollars in Libyan compensation for each person killed.

However, family spokesman Dan Cohen, whose 20-year-old college student daughter was killed in the terror attack, told reporters here after the briefing that the money will not bring closure for the still-grieving families:

“I hope you will not in reporting this say money, money, money. It's not money, money, money. Everyone of us, everyone of us, would have foregone every cent of that in a heartbeat, if this had never happened. And it's unfortunate the way the world is structured that this is one of the only ways that these terrible crimes are dealt with.”

Under terms of the deal worked out between the Libyan government and lawyers for the families, the remaining six million dollars for each victim would not be paid unless bilateral US sanctions against Libya are also lifted and that country is removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Mr Cohen said he personally opposed the lifting of the US sanctions, which among other things bar American investment in Libya's oil industry, as long as Mr Gadhafi remains the head of what he termed a "criminal" regime.

However the chairman of the families' organization, Glenn Johnson, who also lost a daughter in the bombing, took a less severe view, saying the Bush administration should examine each sanction on a case-by-case basis:

“At this point, providing the UN sanctions are lifted, our government should take a look at each and every US sanction that's involved, and see if the (Libyan) government's met it. If the Libyan government has completed it, we would like to see them lifted. If they have not, as a group, we feel they should not be lifted.”

A senior administration official who briefed reporters said Libya has made "significant progress" in getting out of the terrorism business since the mid-1990s.

However he said it "does not deserve a clean bill of health" and that the United States continues to have serious concerns about Libya's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, its poor human rights record, and meddling in the affairs of other countries, especially African states including Chad, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone and Liberia.

The official said the United States might abstain in the UN sanctions vote to underline its ongoing concerns.

He also said the Bush administration has strongly urged France not to veto the lifting of sanctions, which it has threatened to do in an effort to force Libya to increase compensation for victims of a French UTA jetliner downed over Niger in 1989.

Nelson Mandela confirms surrender of Lockerbie suspects imminent

[The following items are from this date in 1999:]

1. The following statement was issued today by the spokesman for Secretary-General Kofi Annan:

This afternoon, the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Ambassador Abuzed Omar Dorda, hand delivered to the Secretary-General a letter from Omar Mustafa Muntasser, Secretary of the General People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

As already announced by President Nelson Mandela in Tripoli this morning, the letter confirms the readiness of Libya to proceed with the transfer of the two accused to the Netherlands. The Secretary-General is greatly encouraged by this development and the necessary arrangements will now be initiated by the Secretariat.

The Secretary-General has shared the letter with the Security Council.

The Secretary-General would like to record his warm appreciation of the efforts made by President Mandela, as well as Crown Prince Abdullah and others in order to bring this matter to a satisfactory conclusion, in cooperation with the authorities of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

2. Following is the text of remarks made today to the press by the President of the Security Council, Qin Huasun (China), following Council consultations:

Security Council members welcomed the letter from the Foreign Minister of Libya to the Secretary-General of 19 March 1999, indicating that the two suspects would be available for the Secretary-General to take custody of them on or before 6 April;

Security Council members reaffirmed existing Security Council resolutions as the basis to bring about a full and final resolution of the situation;

Security Council members looked forward to the implementation of that handover in accordance with the agreed arrangements and, taking into account also the information provided by the French authorities regarding UTA 772, to the immediate suspension of sanctions with a view to lifting them as soon as circumstances permit, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions;

Security Council members thanked the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts in reaching an understanding with Libya on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1192 (1998), and expressed appreciation also for the positive actions taken by the Governments of South Africa, Saudi Arabia and other countries in support of these efforts.

3. Lockerbie trial: new developments

On 19 March 1999 President Nelson Mandela of South Africa announced in Tripoli that Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi, the leader of Libya, had written to Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, agreeing to surrender to him for trial the two Libyans (Abdel Baset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah) accused of bombing the Pan-Am jet over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988. The handover is to occur on or before 6 April 1999. UN sanctions against Libya in respect of the country’s failure to hand over the suspects will be lifted within 90 days of compliance. The trial will take place in the Netherlands under Scots criminal law and before a panel of three Scottish judges from the High Court of Justiciary.

Libya, UTA 772 and Pan Am 103

[On this date in 1999 a French court convicted in absentia six Libyans, including Abdullah al-Senussi, for the bombing of UTA flight 772 over Niger and the murder of the 170 passengers and crew. A BBC News report contains the following:]

Colonel Gaddafi's brother-in-law and five other Libyans have been found guilty of bombing a French airliner.

They were sentenced to life in prison by a special court in Paris. However, they were tried in absentia and will be allowed another hearing if they are ever taken into French custody.

The aircraft, a DC-10 operated by the French airline UTA, crashed in Niger in September 1989, killing all 170 people on board. Debris was scattered over hundreds of kilometres in the Sahara desert.

Libya helped France during part of the investigation but did not offer full co-operation and refused to hand over the suspects. (...)

Prosecutors said a package containing a bomb had been planted on a young Congolese with links to Libyan agents in the Congolese capital Brazzaville, from where the UTA flight to Paris had set off.

The prosecution said the six had been working for the Libyan secret service, which is also accused of bombing Pan Am flight 103 over the Scottish town of Lockerbie in 1988. (...)

Correspondents have highlighted differences between France's handling of the case and the way the UK and US Governments have sought the extradition of those accused of the Lockerbie bombing.

Evidence against the UTA suspects is said to be much stronger than that against the two Lockerbie suspects.

Libya has been under UN sanctions since 1992 in connection with the UTA and Pan Am bombs.

[RB: As with Pan Am 103, Libya eventually paid compensation to the families of those who died on UTA 772. The most detailed account of the UTA 772 bombing and its relationship to Lockerbie is to be found here on The Masonic Verses website.]

Eleven years since removal of UN sanctions against Libya

[Today marks the eleventh anniversary of the removal by the United Nations Security Council of the sanctions against Libya imposed in the wake of Lockerbie. Here are some extracts from the report published at the time by the United Nations News Centre:]

After several delays in recent weeks, the United Nations Security Council today finally lifted decade-old sanctions imposed against Libya over the deadly bombing in 1988 of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, after Tripoli agreed to pay up to $10 million each to the families of the 270 victims.

The vote on the resolution, adopted by 13 in favour with two abstentions – France and the United States – had been postponed repeatedly while Paris negotiated with Libya to improve a settlement of $34 million it had already reached over the similar bombing of a French UTA plane over Niger in 1989, which killed 170 people.

Welcoming the vote, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in a statement he hoped this "important step, along with the settlement arrangements agreed following many years of intensive negotiations, will help bring some comfort to the families of the victims of the tragic events" over Scotland and Niger "as the international community strives to bring this tragic chapter to a close."

The sanctions, which included a ban on military sales, air communications and certain oil equipment, had already been suspended by the Council in 1999 after Libya agreed to hand over two nationals for trial before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands in connection with the bombing. One of them, Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi, was convicted and jailed for his role.

The United Kingdom and Bulgaria cosponsored the resolution after Libya told the Council in August of its readiness to cooperate in the international fight against terrorism and compensate the families of those killed at Lockerbie, as demanded by Council resolutions 748 of 1992 and 883 of 1993.

Earlier this week, UK Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry, who is Council President for the month of September, said Libya’s current compliance with the terms of the earlier resolutions could allow it to move back into the international community.

[A flavour of the current situation in Libya, eleven years after the removal of sanctions and approaching three years after the death of Muammar Gaddafi, can be gleaned here and here and here.]

Pan Am 103 and UTA 772

Today being Bastille Day, I felicitate this blog’s followers in France (the tenth largest source of its traffic). 

On this day it seems appropriate to provide a reminder of what may be regarded as the principal link between France and the Lockerbie disaster.  This is the destruction of UTA flight 772 over Niger on 19 September 1989 resulting in the deaths of all 170 passengers and crew on board the DC-10 aircraft. References to this tragedy on this blog can be accessed here.

Lockerbie, and the mangled logic of Magnus Linklater

[This is the headline over an article by John Ashton in today’s edition of the Scottish Review.  It reads as follows:]

Earlier this month, together with other supporters of the 'Lockerbie bomber', Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, I found myself accused in the Scottish Review of being an obsessive conspiracy theorist, impervious to fact or reason. The article's author, The Times' columnist Magnus Linklater, believes that, far from being a stain on Scottish justice, Mr Megrahi's case 'triumphantly vindicates' it.

He argues that we prefer innuendo, myth, and half-truths to straight evidence and independent judgement, yet he displays exactly that preference. For good measure, he misrepresents his opponents, mangles logic and contradicts himself.

He ascribes to us two related conspiracy theories: firstly that the bombing was commissioned by Iran and carried out by the Syrian-based anti-PLO, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command; and, secondly, that there was a grand conspiracy to shift blame to Megrahi and Libya, to which the police, the Crown Office, witnesses, judges, senior politicians and the intelligence services were all willing parties.

A word about that term 'conspiracy theory'. It's a cheap and nasty little put-down that herds honest truth-seekers into the same pen as the Elvis-was-abducted-by-aliens crowd, while relieving the user of the obligation to properly address the facts.

If the Iran/PFLP-GC scenario is a conspiracy theory, then so too is what the Crown posited at Megrahi's trial. That theory went as follows. On 21 December 1988 he placed a suitcase on board Air Malta flight KM180 from Malta to Frankfurt. It contained a bomb concealed within a Toshiba BomBeat radio-cassette player and was labelled for New York on PA103. From Frankfurt it was transferred to a Heathrow then loaded onto PA103.

The suitcase was packed with clothes that Megrahi had bought in Malta on 7 December, from a shopkeeper called Tony Gauci. He took the case to Malta on 20 December and the following morning flew home on a flight whose check-in time overlapped with KM180's. Before leaving, he managed to place the suitcase on KM180 with the help of his former LAA colleague Lamin Fhimah, with whom he stood trial.

The two men fronted companies for the Libyan intelligence service, the JSO. One of them, ABH, co-owned by Megrahi, shared Zurich offices with electronics company Mebo, which, three years before Lockerbie, had supplied 20 unique electronic timers to Libya, one of which was used in the bomb.

As conspiracy theories go, it was pretty lousy. Mr Linklater acknowledges that the case was entirely circumstantial. What he ignores is that, towards the end of the trial, the Crown amended the indictment, quietly dropping many of the conspiracy claims, a tacit admission that much of its theory was unsupported.

What of the evidence? Mr Linklater's summary thoroughly exaggerates its strength: 'It placed al-Megrahi in Malta on the relevant date, travelling in the company of another intelligence operative, holding a false passport, and identified as the purchaser of clothing, later found in the case which held the explosives. Forensic evidence, in the form of a fragment of timer used to detonate the bomb, had been supplied to the Libyans by its Swiss manufacturer. Subsequent evidence also turned up some $1.8 million in al-Megrahi's personal bank account, calling into question the Libyan government's description of him as a low-ranking airline worker'.

To summarise more accurately: the evidence suggested that Megrahi was not in Malta on the clothes purchase date; there is no evidence that his travel companion was an intelligence operative and the evidence suggests that he only worked for the service in 1986 (the claim that he was a senior intelligence agent was made by discredited Libyan CIA informant Magid Giaka, who also alleged that Colonel Gaddafi was a freemason); he kept the false passport and handed it over at trial – hardly the actions of a terrorist; forensic evidence proves that the timer fragment was not from one of the 20 Libyan timers; Megrahi never described himself as a low-ranking airline worker, rather he admitted that he used his connections to senior Libyan officials to make a nice living importing goods through ABH; had he testified at trial, the court would have been shown bank and company records that support his claim that all the bank transactions were legitimate. (...)

Many aspects of the Crown's theory were incredible. For example, Megrahi chose to buy clothes in a small shop and did so in a random manner, which seemed designed to bring attention to himself. Rather than compartmentalising the operation, as any sensible terrorist would, he returned to the island a fortnight later to plant the bomb. Furthermore, he chose to launch it on a three-stage journey from Malta's Luqa airport, where Mr Fhimah was well known, and which had unusually strict baggage procedures.

Libya's supposed motive was revenge for the US air raids of 1986. This element of the theory was contradicted by none other than Margaret Thatcher, who wrote in her autobiography that the 'Libyan counter attack did not and could not take place…There was a marked decline in Libyan-sponsored terrorism in succeeding years'.

Since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, no evidence has emerged publicly to suggest that Libya was involved in the bombing – this despite the fact that the opposition leader Mustafa Abdel Jalil claimed to have proof of Gaddafi's involvement. (When pressed on the claim by the BBC, the best he could offer was that the government had paid for Megrahi's legal case.) Inconveniently for the Crown, some senior anti-Gaddafi figures have challenged claims of Libyan involvement.

In defending the official narrative, Mr Linklater offers the following king-sized non-sequitur: 'Even the Libyan government appears to accept that the origins of the plot lie in their country – it has appointed prosecutors to liaise with Scottish investigators in their search for further proof'. The appointment of prosecutors does not connote an acceptance of Libyan involvement.

Mr Linklater points out that my books barely touch upon another alleged case of Libyan aviation terrorism, the bombing of UTA flight 772 in 1989. The reason is simple: I am not an expert on it and am therefore happy to accept that Libya might have been to blame. (French journalist Pierre Péan, who is an expert, has, I am told, destroyed the official case.) The UTA bombers' use of a Samsonite suitcase and a timer, according to Mr Linklater, makes the attack 'strikingly similar' to Lockerbie, yet the Sikhs who blew up Air India flight 182 in 1985 also used a Samsonite case and a timer.

A more startling parallel, in my view, is the fact that the forensic cases both rested on tiny fragments of the alleged timers recovered from a vast crash site, which were analysed by the same discredited FBI expert, and traced to a shady European supplier. And, as with Lockerbie, the prosecution rested upon the erratic testimony of a single witness.

What, then, of the Iran/PFLP-GC conspiracy theory? Mr Linklater ascribes it to Megrahi's supporters, yet the Justice for Megrahi campaign, to which most of the supporters are signatories, is deliberately neutral on the matter. For reasons I am about to explain, however, as I cautioned in my book Megrahi: You are my Jury, the case against these alternative suspects may turn out to be as flawed as the one against Megrahi – a statement that undermines Mr Linklater's characterisation of me as wholly wedded to this counter theory.

Iran had a powerful motive: revenge for the US Navy's shoot-down of Iran Air flight 655, which killed 290 six months before Lockerbie. Declassified US intelligence documents state as fact that Iran hired the PFLP-GC. Another, written months after the investigation had switched to Libya, stated that Iran's interior minister had paid the bombers $10 million. In October 1988 a PFLP-GC cell in West Germany was caught by the police planning an attack on western airlines. Its bomb-maker, Marwan Khreesat, confessed that he had made five barometrically triggered bombs, two of which he had concealed within a mono Toshiba BomBeat radio cassette players. The Lockerbie Toshiba BomBeat was stereo.

According to Khreesat, a senior group member and airline security expert known as Abu Elias evaded arrest. Less than three weeks before the bombing, without naming the PFLP-GC, a US State Department security bulletin warned of an imminent attack by anti-PLO Palestinian terrorists based in Europe. It added: '[Targets] specified are Pan Am airlines and US mil[itary] bases'.

Apologists for the official line have claimed that the intelligence documents merely recycled old and unreliable intelligence, yet a deep-cover CIA asset called Richard Fuisz was told by numerous high ranking Syrian officials as late as 1995 (four years after the two Libyans were indicted) that the PFLP-GC's leader, Ahmed Jibril, was taking credit for the bombing. These sources, said Fuisz in a 2001 court hearing, the scope of which was severely limited by the CIA, interacted with Jibril on a constant basis.

Mr Linklater wrote in an email to me: 'I am amazed that you should be touting shadowy CIA agents like Fuisz…whose evidence would never stand up in court'. He stopped short of calling Fuisz a liar, because there is nothing to suggest that he is, but the pejorative verb and adjective carried the innuendo that neither of us were to be trusted. How does Mr Linklater know that Fuisz's evidence would not stand up? If the CIA had loosened its leash on Fuisz, he could have named names, and provide leads and evidence that would have been accepted in court.

On to that second conspiracy theory. According to Mr Linklater's Times column of 13 August 2012, we allege a huge plot to shift the blame from Iran and the PFLP-GC to Libya, which involved: 'the planting or suppression of forensic evidence, the control of witnesses by intelligence services, the approval of senior politicians, the complicity of police officers, a prosecution team prepared to bend every rule to secure a conviction, and a set of senior Scottish judges willing to go along with that'.

The last sentence is key. It suggests that we claim that everyone from the police to the judges plotted with government and intelligence services to protect the likely bombers and convict those whom they knew to be innocent. The trouble is neither I, nor the great majority of Megrahi's supporters, have ever made such a claim.

To be clear, I believe that two different things happened: firstly, the US government ensured that blame was from Iran and the PFLP-GC to Libya; secondly, the Scottish criminal justice system screwed up massively. The first I consider likely, but unproven, the second I consider a cert. Both are based upon a rational evaluation of the available facts. I do not believe that the second occurred because the Americans told the Scots to exonerate the real culprits and frame innocents, indeed I find such suggestions fanciful.

In an email to me, Mr Linklater wrote: 'I've been in the [journalism] business for more than 40 years, and have learned over that time a simple principle of reporting: that good investigation requires sound proof'. Yet he has failed to produce any evidence that the majority of Megrahi's supporters have posited a grand conspiracy. The Justice for Megrahi campaign committee has formally alleged that some of the failures might have involved criminal conduct by certain Crown servants. They do not, however, claim that it happened at the behest of governments and intelligence services.

The US government was motivated to exonerate Iran, I believe, because the Iranians knew where the Iran-Contra skeletons lay and also held sway over the US hostages held in Lebanon – whose safe return was an obsession of the Reagan-Bush White House. Another obsession was Libya. As Watergate journalist Bob Woodward revealed, CIA director William Casey launched one of the biggest covert programmes in the agency's history, with the clear aim of toppling Gaddafi. Disinformation – that is, lying and fakery – was at its core.

The Lockerbie investigation was supposedly driven by old-fashioned detective work, but, as we have learned over the years, behind the scenes the CIA played a key role. We now know that the timer fragment was not from one of the 20 timers to Libya. Is it really far-fetched to suggest that the CIA planted it in order to conclusively link Libya to the bombing?

I have done many months of my own old-fashioned detective work among the hundreds of people who searched the crash site. They witnessed American officials in Lockerbie within two hours of the crash, CIA agents searching the site without police supervision, and substantial drug and cash finds – all things that have been officially denied. There may well be innocent explanations for these events, in which case the authorities should reveal them. And, instead of writing me off as a conspiracy theorist, perhaps Mr Linklater should do some door knocking of his own.

The core of his argument is that we have dismissed hard evidence in favour of speculation, yet our chief concern is not the suspicion that blame was shifted. Rather, it is that the evidence that convicted Megrahi was anything but hard, and that the hard evidence that should have acquitted him was withheld.

Our case is built on facts, not speculation – these facts in particular:

1. The trial court judgement, delivered by three of Scotland's most senior judges, was deemed unreasonable by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, indeed the commission came as close as it legally could to saying that the guilty verdict itself was unreasonable.

2. The SCCRC discovered that the Crown had withheld numerous items of evidence that, in its view, would have been important to Megrahi's defence. No fewer than four of the SCCRC's six appeal referral grounds concerned such undisclosed evidence.

3. During the trial, two senior prosecutors viewed the previously redacted extracts of CIA cables concerning the key Crown witness and CIA informant Magid Giaka. They reported back to their boss, the Lord Advocate Colin Boyd QC, that there was nothing within them that might assist the defence, and he relayed the assurance to the court. However, when that material was later disclosed to the defence, it was found to contain numerous damaging details, including the fact that his CIA handlers had grown so dissatisfied with him that they had been on the verge of sacking him. The revelations prompted Fhimah's leading counsel, Richard Keen QC, to comment that he found it 'inconceivable' that the Crown could have considered the material had no bearing on the case. The SCCRC noted that Mr Boyd's assurance to the court was 'difficult to understand'. (...)

4. The Crown Office allowed the police to obtain a $2m reward for the most important prosecution witness, Tony Gauci, despite the payment of such rewards being against its own rules (a subject on which I have also written for the Scottish Review). The Crown withheld the results of forensic tests, which had been supervised by the chief prosecution forensic scientist, that directly contradicted his crucial assertion that the timer fragment was 'similar in all respects' to the boards used in the timers supplied to Libya.

5. Despite being under a legal obligation to investigate all leads, not only those that point to Libya, the police and Crown Office have failed to interview witnesses who can attest to the fact that the fragment could not have originated from the Libyan timers.

6. When, in 2012, the committee of Justice for Megrahi submitted a summary of their allegations of criminal misconduct in confidence to the justice secretary, Kenny MacAskill, and invited him to appoint an independent investigator to consider them, MacAskill instead passed them to the Crown Office and told them to take the allegations to the police, even though Crown Office officials and police officers were named in the allegations. Despite having seen neither the detailed allegations, nor the supporting evidence, the Crown Office immediately declared publicly that they were 'without exception, defamatory and entirely unfounded' and that the committee had been 'deliberately misleading', i.e. were liars.

These are all facts, not opinions or theories. Mr Linklater fails to acknowledge most of them and the rest he brushes over lightly. I believe that they add up to the greatest scandal in Scotland's post-devolution era. The Crown Office's response to the Justice for Megrahi committee's allegations is especially disturbing. The allegations remain unproven and their subjects are entitled to the presumption of innocence, but they were made in good faith by people of intelligence and integrity, among them a former police superintendent, the former parish priest of Lockerbie and the father of one of the Lockerbie victims. However, the Crown Office's petulant and partisan response excluded from the outset any prospect of prosecutions.

Rather than engaging with the SCCRC report's awkward contents, Mr Linklater has used it to mow down his straw men of conspiracy nuts. In a Times article he claimed that the report 'triumphantly vindicates' the justice system. This is like suggesting that the emergency services who save lives at a train crash are a triumphant vindication of rail safety.

He asserts that the SCCRC disposes of most of our 'cherished theories' in particular claims that evidence had been manipulated by the police. These allegations emanated not from Megrahi's supporters, but from a former police officer known as the Golfer. I have also been critical of the Golfer. Strange, then, that Mr Linklater should have inferred that I cherish the Golfer's claims.

He accuses us of rejecting parts of the report that don't suit us, when we in fact accept most of them. But if, as we believe, the report is a curate's egg, are we not entitled to say so? Parts of it are demonstrably poor; for example, the commission conducted a lengthy review of the evidence concerning the timer fragment, yet failed to uncover the crucially important fact – based upon the evidence of Crown witnesses – that it could not have originated from one of the Libyan timers. Its investigation of events at the crash site was very limited and it failed to interview any of the civilian and military witnesses who attest to the events and finds that I have described above.

It is not only Mr Linklater's conspiracy theorists who don't accept all the SCCRC's findings: neither did the lawyers who led Megrahi's second appeal (which, sadly, he felt compelled to abandon in order to secure compassionate release). They also contended that there were serious failings in the conduct of his defence and that the defence team was mistaken in not leading certain evidence in relation to, inter alia, the PFLP-GC, Heathrow airport and Tony Gauci.

I am not a lawyer and therefore make no judgement on the defence team, who have vigorously contested these claims. But to imply, as Mr Linklater does, that it is a matter of uncontested fact that they properly evaluated all the evidence is simply misleading.

Mr Linklater is apparently oblivious to the contradictions in his own arguments, with occasionally hilarious consequences. For example, having dismissed my summary of the police investigation as 'little more than a caricature', he delivers this cartoon-like portrait of his antagonists: 'Once seized with the virus of suspicion, nothing in the way of fact or reason will deter those who are determined to prove their case'.

He berates me for using the phrase 'we may never know', declaring that he has always distrusted it as 'it is a means of dropping a hint without ever revealing whether there is any truth in it'. How marvellous that he later writes: 'The SCCRC raised questions about the identification, which, it determined, were grounds for appeal. Whether that would have overturned the verdict we may never know'.

The hint dropped by this particular 'we may never' is that the verdict would have stood. To drive home the point he claims that Megrahi might have been convicted, even if he had not been correctly identified as the clothes purchaser. If he has properly read the court's judgement, he should know that the 'identification' – not an identification at all, of course – was central to the conviction. But maybe he hasn't properly read it, because, as he acknowledges, he is not a Lockerbie specialist. This is especially apparent in his account of the Heathrow evidence, which has come under fresh scrutiny thanks to the publication of the book Adequately Explained by Stupidity? by another of his targets, Dr Morag Kerr.

Mr Linklater's Times article of 21 December highlighted an assertion by Mr Megrahi's trial counsel, Bill Taylor QC, that the Heathrow evidence was 'tested to destruction'. An unnamed member of the defence team added the suggestion that the bomber had bought clothes in Malta then planted the bomb at Heathrow: 'just doesn’t stack up'. Again, this was odd, because during his final submissions to the court Mr Taylor argued, quite rightly, that Maltese clothing did not prove the bomb's origin. Clothes bought weeks earlier had plenty of time to leave the island prior to the bombing.

Mr Linklater says that the implication that the bomber bought clothes in Malta and planted the bomb at Heathrow 'requires a heavy suspension of disbelief'. The idea that the same person bought the clothes and planted the bomb is, I agree, far fetched (although this is what the Crown posited at trial), but is not the suggestion that the bombers used the clothes to lay a false trail to Malta. As Mr Taylor asked during his final submissions: 'If the clothes buyer had intended to place the bomb bag on to a plane at Luqa, having regard to the high level of risk of detection, wouldn't one have expected him to remove the clothing labels?'.

Mr Linklater claims that the SCCRC found the evidence of a Heathrow bomb 'so thin' that it did not bother to examine it. What the SCCRC actually said was that it did not examine the Heathrow evidence because it received no submissions on the matter, and because it received substantial attention at trial. The evidence we found when preparing Megrahi's second appeal was, in the view of senior counsel, significant and should have been before the trial court. It is clear, both from Dr Kerr's analysis and the second appeal team's, that the trial court was not given a clear view of the Heathrow evidence. (I wrote more about this in an open letter to Mr Linklater, to which he has so far failed to respond.)

Mr Linklater's biggest howler is his assertion that Dr Kerr and I claim that the bombing was linked to a break-in that occurred at Heathrow 15 hours earlier. We do no such thing, indeed we both accept that the break-in may well be wholly irrelevant. Mr Linklater points out, as I have previously, that the matter was considered and rejected at Mr Megrahi's first appeal, but this does not excuse the Crown's failure to disclose it.

For all that he insults me as an irrational conspiracy theorist, we should be grateful to Mr Linklater for his contributions. The Megrahi case deserves public debate and, until he emerged as the voice of the 'it-couldn't-happen-here' tendency, that debate was very one-sided. When boiled down, his defence of the conviction is that the Crown case 'has been tested and re-tested under the strict conditions imposed by a court of law', whereas the counter evidence has not. Yet he knows that court scrutiny is no guarantee of a conviction's safety.

The most notorious miscarriage of justice cases, like the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four, were only resolved when the courts accepted the evidence and arguments of the victims' supporters. Which begs a big question: when those convictions still stood, but their weakness were widely known, would Mr Linklater have defended them with the equivalent vigour? As he might say, we may never know.

John Ashton is a writer, researcher and TV producer. He has studied the Lockerbie case for 18 years and from 2006 to 2009 was a researcher with Megrahi's legal team. His book 'Megrahi: You Are My Jury', is published by Birlinn  

[An expanded version of this article can be found on Mr Ashton's Megrahi: You are my Jury website.]

Gaddafi's spy chief may hold key to Lockerbie

[This is the headline over a report in today’s edition of The Sunday Herald.  It reads in part:]

'I do not say that he is not guilty, I just say that he should have a fair trial," said Anoud Senussi in an interview with The Sunday Herald about her father, Abdullah Senussi, Colonel Gaddafi's former intelligence chief and the alleged mastermind behind the 1988 Lockerbie bombing.

At the former Libyan leader's side until the final months of the 2011 civil war, Abdullah fled with his family to Mauritania. According to Anoud, her father was betrayed by the Mauritanian president, who lured him to an airport meeting. "He was taken on to a plane and a man, the new Libyan minister of finance, was sitting there with $200 million in a bag. As soon as my father was on board, the minister handed over the bag. It was a business deal."

Held in Libya, Senussi faces charges over the 1996 massacre of more than 1000 inmates and for war crimes allegedly committed during the civil war. The International Criminal Court has issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of crimes against humanity. Senussi's lawyers in London are seeking his transfer to the jurisdiction of the ICC, but their initial application, since appealed, was refused. (...)

As Libya's spy chief, Senussi is thought by many to have played a key role in the Lockerbie bombing. But while he was convicted in absentia by a French court for his role in the 1989 bombing of a UTA airliner, he has not been charged in connection with Lockerbie. Instead, in 2001, Scottish judges sitting in Holland sentenced Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, a Libyan spy, to life in prison in Scotland. Questions have been raised about the safety of the conviction, and whether he was handed over in part to divert attention from the true perpetrators.

On learning that Senussi had been flown to Libya, Scottish police hurried to Tripoli. It is not clear whether they interrogated him about Lockerbie but, in a statement to The Sunday Herald, Police Scotland did not rule out having spoken to him, and confirmed they had been to Libya in connection with Lockerbie. With Senussi held incommunicado, his London lawyers could not confirm whether Scottish police had questioned him.

According to Anoud, legal proceedings against her father are being influenced to prevent him reaching a public court, given what he must know as a former spy chief. "America, Britain, France - ask them why they do not let my father come to the ICC. They do not want him to speak." Without access to legal counsel, facing closed court in Libya and on a charge punishable by death, there is every chance Senussi will never be questioned in public about the Lockerbie bombing.

"There is no justice in Libya," said Anoud. "They will kill him in Libya. In the ICC, there is justice."

[First it was Moussa Koussa who was supposedly holding the key to Lockerbie. Now it’s Abdullah Senussi. I’d have thought that by now there was enough evidence in the public domain for even the dimmest journalist or police officer to realise that the key to Lockerbie most probably does not lie in Libya.]

Tenth anniversary of removal of UN Libya sanctions

[Today is the tenth anniversary of the removal by the United Nations Security Council of the sanctions against Libya imposed in the wake of Lockerbie. Here are some extracts from the report published at the time by the United Nations News Centre:]

After several delays in recent weeks, the United Nations Security Council today finally lifted decade-old sanctions imposed against Libya over the deadly bombing in 1988 of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, after Tripoli agreed to pay up to $10 million each to the families of the 270 victims.

The vote on the resolution, adopted by 13 in favour with two abstentions – France and the United States – had been postponed repeatedly while Paris negotiated with Libya to improve a settlement of $34 million it had already reached over the similar bombing of a French UTA plane over Niger in 1989, which killed 170 people.

Welcoming the vote, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in a statement he hoped this "important step, along with the settlement arrangements agreed following many years of intensive negotiations, will help bring some comfort to the families of the victims of the tragic events" over Scotland and Niger "as the international community strives to bring this tragic chapter to a close."

The sanctions, which included a ban on military sales, air communications and certain oil equipment, had already been suspended by the Council in 1999 after Libya agreed to hand over two nationals for trial before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands in connection with the bombing. One of them, Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi, was convicted and jailed for his role.

The United Kingdom and Bulgaria cosponsored the resolution after Libya told the Council in August of its readiness to cooperate in the international fight against terrorism and compensate the families of those killed at Lockerbie, as demanded by Council resolutions 748 of 1992 and 883 of 1993.

Earlier this week, UK Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry, who is Council President for the month of September, said Libya’s current compliance with the terms of the earlier resolutions could allow it to move back into the international community.

[A flavour of the current situation in Libya, ten years after the removal of sanctions and approaching two years after the death of Muammar Gaddafi, can be gleaned here and here and here.]