Thursday, 27 December 2012

Debate still raging

In his review of 2012 in today’s edition of The Scotsman, Tom Peterkin, Scottish Political Editor of Scotland on Sunday and The Scotsman, says this:

“After 1,004 days of freedom, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi finally succumbed to prostate cancer in Libya. The man convicted of the mass murder of 270 people in the Lockerbie atrocity went to his grave with the debate still raging about his 
rôle in the bombing.”

14 comments:

  1. ...the debate still raging about his rôle in the bombing

    What debate would that be, then? While there may be a case for saying Megrahi was the engineer of the bombings I have never seen anyone but Richard Marquise and some character at the JREF forums even trying to defend it. Are there hordes of Zeist partisans somewhere I have not encountered?

    ReplyDelete
  2. What would the case be for Megrahi being the engineer of the bombing, then? I've never heard one.

    He appears to have had no history of violence or involvement in terrorism of any kind. There were a lot of bad people in Libya in the 1980s, still are come to that, but there was no evidence he was one of them.

    The only evidence to connect him personally to the bombing was that Toy Gauci identified him as the man who bought these infamous clothes, and that he was at Luqa airport (apparently minding his own business) at the time the bomb was supposedly placed on board KM180.

    The SCCRC exploded the Gauci identification. Not only did he bear little resemblance to Tony's original description of his customer, with Tony being bribed to change his story, the purchase took place on a day when Megrahi was nowhere near the bloody man's poxy shop.

    And we now know, for a FACT, that the bomb was snuck into the baggage container at Heathrow airport at least an hour before the feeder fight from Frankfurt landed, the feeder flight that would have carried a suitcase transferred from KM180 of there had been such a thing.

    So if you know of any other evidence indicating Megrahi "was the engineer of the bombing", I think the Dumfries and Galloway police would be delighted to hear from you, because they don't have any.

    ReplyDelete
  3. You are both right. Rolfe in pointing out that the "engineer"-role is unsustainable, bensix is asking "and if not that, what role, then?"

    As said earlier, this case is special because of the lack of _any_ debators supporting the verdict also being willing to debate the evidence.

    Needless to say, it would also not be an easy task, but still...

    ReplyDelete
  4. For some the ‘Bedford suitcase’ solves the mystery, but I don’t know why, because it relies on the far-fetched idea that there was no security at Heathrow.

    And even if we accept there was a break-in (why not use a key?), this only potentially explains how there was already luggage aboard Pan Am Flight 103, when it was loaded for its flight to America.

    But how did this luggage get on board and if ‘the Bedford case’ didn’t end up in the fatal spot, would the ‘bomb’ have been fatal?

    And all this presumes that the luggage handlers wouldn’t be curious about the unidentified luggage and seek an explanation of why it was on the plane.

    We are often told not to leave luggage unattended to avoid it being ‘blown up’. I can’t believe this wasn’t an airport security consideration at the time.

    In other words, the alleged ‘high profile revenge attack’ could have been easily foiled by luggage handlers saying, “What’s this unidentified luggage doing here then”?

    ReplyDelete
  5. Dave, I think you ought to examine the evidence around the nature of loading of PA103 and more specifically the loading of baggage container AVE4041 at Heathrow.

    This brown Samsonite seen by Bedford was loaded into container 4041 in very mysterious circumstances. A discrepancy between the accounts given by baggage loaders was also never fully resolved.

    This suitcase was observed on the floor of the left corner of 4041, where it meets the overhang section of the container. This position is within an inch or two of where the explosion took place.

    This suitcase was never moved from its position in the container and remained there throughout the loading of 103A's luggage.

    No other remnants of a brown hardshell samsonite were recovered from AVE4041 other than the primary suitcase.

    And, finally, of the luggage in 4041 which was assigned to the legitimate Heathrow interline passengers, none were assigned or in possession of a brown Samsonite hardshell suitcase.

    Therefore, in the very baggage container that housed the bomb, we have evidence of a suitcase introduced into this container in curious and disputed circumstances, is observed in almost the exact position the explosion occurred, was not repositioned at any time, and cannot be assigned to a legitimate passenger on PA103.

    So, we have a mysterious and unaccompanied suitcase already in 4041 before the Frankfurt flight arrived.

    And if that's not enough, worse still, this mysterious and unaccompanied suitcase also turns out to match the description and characteristics of the known primary suitcase in every respect.

    Consequently, 38 minutes makes perfect sense.

    We seem to have two magical brown Samsonite’s in our midst; one we have no evidence for its existence or even how it was introduced at Luqa in Malta, but are supposed to believe it did both at the hands of Megrahi.

    And a second one at Heathrow for which we have clear and incontrovertible evidence of its appearance and curious manner of ingestion into AVE4041, but which we are told was of no consequence and subsequently vanished without any trace ever found.

    ReplyDelete
  6. For some the ‘Bedford suitcase’ solves the mystery, but I don’t know why, because it relies on the far-fetched idea that there was no security at Heathrow.

    It was freely admitted at the trial that security at Heathrow was abysmal, and in particular that it was essentially non-existent in the interline shed. Everyone concerned agreed that anyone wearing plausible clothes could go where he liked and place suitcases anywhere he liked.

    And even if we accept there was a break-in (why not use a key?), this only potentially explains how there was already luggage aboard Pan Am Flight 103, when it was loaded for its flight to America.

    You can only use a key if you have a key.

    You seem to have no idea at all how Maid of the Seas operated that day. She landed at noon from a long-haul flight from San Francisco. She was definitely empty after the San Francisco luggage was unloaded. She was cleaned, refuelled, re-provisioned and generally made ready for the evening flight to New York, during the afternoon. She was under constant guard during that time.

    So really, your statement above makes no sense.

    But how did this luggage get on board and if ‘the Bedford case’ didn’t end up in the fatal spot, would the ‘bomb’ have been fatal?

    The "Bedford suitcase" was placed in the container some time between 4.15 and 4.45, by a person or persons unknown.

    I don't know what would have happened if the IED had been in the extreme inboard corner of the container, for example. I'm not sure anyone does. I think it was much less likely to have been fatal.

    And all this presumes that the luggage handlers wouldn’t be curious about the unidentified luggage and seek an explanation of why it was on the plane.

    Mmmm. They were a pretty dozy bunch.

    According to Bedford, that suitcase already had a security sticker on it. However, if he had been suspicious, or even if a terrorist wearing airline overalls had been seen coming up with the case, what would have happened? It would have been x-rayed, and nothing suspicious would have been seen because the Semtex was hidden inside a radio-cassette recorder. If it had the right tags, which I'm sure it had, it would have been loaded. The plan would still probably have worked.

    No plan in 100% foolproof. There have been many terrorist plans that have gone wrong. Sometimes they go wrong. And sometimes the terrorists get lucky, and people die. This was one of these times, it seems. And they didn't even need to get very lucky.

    You are also assuming that none of the Pan Am staff in the shed were themselves complicit. The police never investigated any of them as potential suspects. I could make a rather good case for Kamboj being complicit. Did he warn his girlfriend not to fly on 103 that night? Nobody ever followed that up.

    We are often told not to leave luggage unattended to avoid it being ‘blown up’. I can’t believe this wasn’t an airport security consideration at the time.

    That's luggage in passenger areas. The area we are talking about is airside, where no unauthorised people should be. It's a luggage transfer handling area. There were suitcases lying around there all the time. It was inevitable.

    In other words, the alleged ‘high profile revenge attack’ could have been easily foiled by luggage handlers saying, “What’s this unidentified luggage doing here then”?

    As I have explained, the possibility of one or more legitimate baggage handling or security staff being complicit in the atrocity has never been ruled out. However, even if they weren't, a properly tagged suitcase which passed the x-ray screen (as this one would have done, because Kamboj, unlike Maier at Frankfurt, had not been made aware of the "Autumn Leaves" warning) would in all probability simply been loaded anyway.

    ReplyDelete
  7. What would the case be for Megrahi being the engineer of the bombing, then? I've never heard one.

    Neither have I! The point was to say that if it exists nobody seems prepared to give it.

    ReplyDelete
  8. If the prosecution had had any further evidence connecting Megrahi to the bombing, I think it's a dead cert they'd have presented it in court. They didn't. Once Giaka was out of the way (and even his evidence was quite innocuous of itself and only became incriminating in context), all they had was the clothes purchase and Megrahi's mere presence at Luqa airport in the morning of 21st December.

    The SCCRC dealt with the clothes purchase and Sidhu's evidence deals with the route of introduction of the bomb. They've got nothing left as far as I know. I think if they had something, they would have told us about it.

    ReplyDelete
  9. Dear Rolfe, you say ‘No plan is 100% fool proof’!

    I don’t think what you describe qualifies as a plan unless you think ‘pot luck and whistle’ is a plan?

    ReplyDelete
  10. Well, it worked. Someone put a brown hardshell Samsonite suitcase containing an IED disguised as a radio-cassette recorder in the bottom front left-hand corner of baggage container AVE4041 while it was sitting in the interline shed some time between 4.15 and 4.45. Bedford, who was in charge of the container, was away having a blether, and Kamboj and Parmar the x-ray operators were either having a kip, reading the paper or in on the plot.

    The plot had a good probability of success. That baggage container routinely sat there all afternoon collecting odd piecemeal items for PA103, often not closely attended. If the terrorist had been challenged with the suitcase, or the suitcase had been queried, it would probably have been passed. The terrorist would simply have been a baggage handler from another airline helpfully bringing over a misplaced item for the Pan Am flight. The IED was well disguised and would have fooled an x-ray team who hadn't been told about the Autumn Leaves warning - which the Heathrow team had not.

    But as it happens nobody challenged the terrorist or the suitcase, though Bedford should have done. It remained where the terrorist put it, in the worst possible place for the integrity of the aircraft, and Sidhu merely loaded the Frankfurt luggage on top of it. The Khreesat device blew up 30 minutes after the interior pressure had dropped to the in-flight level.

    The amount of evidence for this is absolutely overwhelming. Please stop spamming every thread on this blog with Smith's demented lunacy.

    ReplyDelete
  11. Dear Rolfe you say, ‘the Khreesat device blew up 30 minutes after the interior pressure had dropped to the inflight level’.

    This is shameless speculation and invention based on the presumption that if a ‘bomb’ was involved, it would have to be of a certain kind to have detonated when it did and Khreesat (and no one else?) was known to have made something similar.

    And yet the only ‘bomb remains’ was a fabricated bit of circuit board?


    ReplyDelete
  12. What caused the petalled hole in the left side of the fuselage right over the position where AVE4041 was loaded? (And nowhere near any cargo door.)

    What caused the damage to the pieces of AVE4041, entirely unlike any damage noted on any other baggage container? Including sooting, pitting and other signs of intimate involvement in an explosive event.

    What blew apart two suitcases into small pieces, again unlike the damage noted on any other suitcases recovered, and including signs of intimate involvement with an explosion?

    What caused a number of pieces of clothing recovered on the ground to be singed ad burned?

    Why did the above-mentioned items, and no others from the plane, test positive for explosives residues?

    Bear in mind that this evidence was brought in, and reported in contemporaneous press articles, beginning on 24th December.

    ReplyDelete
  13. Dear Rolfe, I’m beginning to think you make it up as you go along.

    You have previously posted that you consider the fabricated fragment to be real.

    What is your view now and would the timer this fragment was from activate the AAIB IED or the Khreesat IED or both or neither?

    And was the IED mentioned in the AAIB report the same as the Khreesat IED?

    ReplyDelete