Judge questions Maltese bomb link

[This is the headline over a report published on the BBC News website on this date in 2002. It reads in part:]

An appeal court judge has questioned whether the evidence presented at the Lockerbie trial was sufficient to have convicted a Libyan secret service agent.

Abdelbaset ali Mohmed al-Megrahi was appealing at a special court in the Netherlands against his conviction for mass murder.

One of the five judges hearing the case, Lord Osborne, said the bomb which brought down Pan-Am Flight 103 may not have been loaded in Malta as the trial had heard.

But Alan Turnbull QC, for the Crown, insisted that there was enough circumstantial evidence to prove the Maltese connection.

Al-Megrahi was found guilty last year of loading a suitcase bomb in Malta, which was then transferred via Frankfurt onto Pan Am Flight 103. (...)

During the appeal hearing, Al-Megrahi's defence team argued there was doubt that the bomb started its journey in Malta.

The defence suggested that it was more likely to have been loaded at Frankfurt or Heathrow.

Lord Osborne accepted there was evidence that Al-Megrahi had worked for the Libyan secret service in Malta and had bought clothes there, fragments of which were found in the Lockerbie wreckage.

But he said that despite this, it was another matter to suggest the bomb had got onto the flight in Malta.

He said: "It is quite difficult, rationally, to follow how the [trial] court took the steps it did in saying we don't know how it got on to the flight, but it must have been there."

However, Mr [Turnbull] said that documentation from Frankfurt appeared to suggest the carriage of an unaccompanied bag.

"All that is left is the reconcile two apparently contradictory portions of evidence," he said.

"This is a criminal act, not an act of negligence. Procedures exist at airports to prevent this event occurring.

"This event did occur, procedures were subverted, the only question is where those procedures were subverted."

Lord Osborne then asked if a terrorist was more likely to draw up a plan which minimised the risk of flights being delayed or the bag getting lost in the system.

"Surely if one is determined to effect a criminal purpose of this kind, one would wish to take all reasonable steps to ensure that venture succeeded?" he asked.

Mr Turnbull said: "It is in the nature of an act of terrorism that it implies the ability and desire to take risks, both of detection and of failure."

He also dismissed defence claims about Heathrow being a more likely point of infiltration as "entirely subjective comment."

[RB: Here is something that I wrote in May 2011 when Lord Osborne retired from the bench:]

The judge in question, Lord Osborne, asked many penetrating questions during the course of the appeal and had the Crown struggling to provide answers.  Regrettably, the restricted compass within which Megrahi's then legal team chose to present the appeal meant that the court could not give effect to the weighty concerns raised by Lord Osborne and his colleague Lord Kirkwood.

Legality of UN Security Council Lockerbie resolutions

[On this date in 1992 the International Progress Organisation submitted to the United Nations Security Council a memorandum signed by Professor Hans Kőchler contesting the legality of the requirement imposed on Libya by Security Council Resolution 731 (21 January 1992) to extradite the Lockerbie suspects to the United States or the United Kingdom for trial. The memorandum reads in part:]

1.     Security Council resolution 731 (1992) is not in conformity with the requirements of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes between Member States. Article 33 requires that the parties "shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement ...".

2.  The Security Council - acting under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, as required - did not pay proper attention to the specifications of Article 36, paragraph 3, according to which the Council, when making recommendations, should consider "that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice".

3.  The procedure in adopting the above-mentioned resolution was not in conformity with the stipulation of Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the Charter according to which, in decisions under Chapter VI, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. This obligation in the present dispute clearly exists for the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and France.

4.  In its letter of 18 January 1992, Libya, in regard to arbitration of the present dispute, has formally invoked article 14 of the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. The Convention establishes and controls the legal obligations of Contracting Parties, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Libya, in connection with legal proceedings related to the destruction of PanAm flight 103 and UTA flight 772. Since all the members of the Security Council are parties to the Convention, they therefore have an obligation to do nothing that would interfere with or prejudice the arbitration process. As international relations within the United Nations framework are based on the rule of law, the countries concerned should fully apply the procedures of the Montreal Convention as the chosen way for addressing this international dispute.

5.  Libya, the United Kingdom and the United States have also ratified article 14 of the Montreal Convention according to which the present dispute may be referred to the International Court of Justice by any of the parties if, within six months from the date of the request for arbitration, the parties are unable to agree on the organization of arbitration. The United States and the United Kingdom are therefore obligated to proceed in accordance with the arbitration provisions of article 14. To date they failed to do so, thereby frustrating the treaty and the method provided by international law through the Montreal Convention for addressing acts of terrorism against international civil aviation. If they reject arbitration formally or de facto in violation of the treaty, then the matter should be submitted to the International Court of Justice as the legal and specific means of determining obligations of Parties under the Convention.

6.  Libya has performed its duties under the Montreal Convention, including its obligation under article 5, Paragraph 1. Libya immediately exercised its jurisdiction over the two alleged offenders, it notified the other Parties that the suspects were in custody and that immediate steps had been taken to institute a preliminary inquiry.

7.  All Parties required were notified of the initiation of the preliminary inquiry and requested to cooperate with the Libyan judicial authorities. These authorities made the same request in official communications to the Attorney-General of the United States of America, the Foreman of the Grand Jury in the District of Columbia in the United States, and the French examining magistrate. As of this date, although obligated under the Montreal Convention, all of the requested Governments and officials have failed to respond. Until their evidence can be assessed, Libya is unable to complete the analysis that the Montreal Convention requires. Therefore, the United States and the United Kingdom are frustrating the treaty. Under the circumstances, the insistence by Security Council members on the extradition of the two suspects is in violation of article 7 of the Convention.    

8.  For the Security Council to deal with the matter to which Council resolution 731 (1992) refers is unprecedented in the United Nations history. The question of extradition in relation to tragic incidents that are several years old is essentially legal in nature. For the Council to endeavor to adjudicate such matters is beyond its power and its capacity. Such matters must be dealt with in accordance with the relevant international legal instruments that apply, and not in a highly politicized context. The Montreal Convention has for 20 years governed unlawful acts against the safety of international civil aviation. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to determine violations of the Convention. The Security Council should take no action which would interfere with legal procedures and/or which could aggravate the present dispute among Member States.

The International Progress Organization expresses the hope that the Security Council will take no action that could be seen as justifying aggressive acts by Member States in connection with the present dispute.

Having taken note of the resolutions adopted by the League of Arab States and by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, we appeal to the Security Council not to take any measure which would jeopardize an independent legal investigation of the case, and to support a policy of constructive dialogue to contain the present crisis. Only this would be in conformity with the requirements of reviving the Charter of the United Nations as an instrument to establish a new world order of democracy, peace and justice for all nations, large and small.

[RB: Those interested in the legality of the resolutions of the UN Security Council regarding Lockerbie, can find a discussion by me here.]

A very, very weak circumstantial case

[What follows is excerpted from a report published on the BBC News website on this date in 2001:]

Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi is due to reveal fresh evidence on Monday, which he says will clear the Libyan agent convicted last week of the Lockerbie bombing.

Colonel Gaddafi says the evidence will prove that Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi is innocent of the 1988 bombing in which 270 people died.

Libya's defence of Al Megrahi - a former Libyan intelligence agent who received a life sentence for the bombing of the Pan-Am aircraft over Lockerbie - received a boost after a Scottish legal expert said the verdict was obtained on "very, very weak" evidence.

A Libyan official said the opinion showed that the case was a "racist pretext" to prolong nine years of sanctions against the country.

The three Scottish judges who heard the case found Al Megrahi's alleged accomplice, Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, not guilty.

Colonel Gaddafi said last week that the judges had three options - to acquit Al Megrahi, resign or commit suicide.

Libyans flocked to public meetings on Monday in anticipation of Colonel Gaddafi's statement, leaving the country at an almost complete standstill. (...)

Correspondents say two possible scenarios are being discussed in Tripoli:

• Colonel Gaddafi could produce evidence that Washington put pressure on the Scottish judges to convict Al Megrahi
• Or he could produce evidence that another non-Libyan perpetrator carried out the bombing.

However, there is scepticism outside the country that hard evidence will emerge at this late stage.

Robert Black, the Scottish law professor who devised the format of the Netherlands-based trial, was quoted on Sunday as saying he was "absolutely astounded" that Al Megrahi had been found guilty.

Mr Black said he believed the prosecution had "a very, very weak circumstantial case" and he was reluctant to believe that Scottish judges would "convict anyone, even a Libyan" on such evidence.

The view, published in British newspapers, echoes that of some of the families of UK victims of the Lockerbie bombing, who are calling for a public inquiry to find "the truth of who was responsible and what the motive was".

Wednesday's verdict sparked angry protests in Libya on Saturday, as Washington and London demanded the Libyan Government accept responsibility for the atrocity and pay compensation to the victims' families.

The protesters condemned what they called a "CIA-dictated" verdict and demanded compensation for the victims of the 1986 US air raids on Tripoli and Benghazi.

Al Megrahi's 15-year old son, Khaled, took part in a demonstration on Saturday, holding a placard reading: "My father is innocent."

The opposing camps - Washington and London on the one hand and Libya and its supporters on the other - have become increasing polarised since the Lockerbie verdict was issued.

London and Washington are demanding that Libya accept responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and pay compensation to the families of the victims before sanctions can be lifted. (...)

A BBC correspondent in Tripoli, Frank Gardner, says Libya is on tenterhooks, waiting to learn what the new evidence Colonel Gaddafi has promised to reveal could be. [RB: As far as I am aware this fresh evidence was never produced.]

The Libya press has continued to attack last week's verdict. The Libyan daily, Al Fatah, accuses the judges of yielding to political pressure from the United States. It says the judges were stricken with political Alzheimer's Disease.

In another paper, the Green March, the editorial referred to what it called Britain's history of imperialism, aggression and human suffering. The paper accused British newspapers of carrying out an organised campaign to harm Libya. It blamed what it called disturbed writers without loyalty to Britain, who were influenced, it says, by Zionist circles.

But in a note of conciliation, the Libyan editorial added that Anglo-Libyan relations were recovering. It said it felt sincerely that the British government was keen to reinforce those relations.

Lockerbie trial “not fair ... did not meet basic requirements of due process”

[What follows is the text of a press release issued on this date in 2001:]

Lockerbie Trial - Report of International Observer

Santiago de Chile,  4 February 2001/P/HK/17034c-is

In a comprehensive report forwarded yesterday to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr Hans Koechler stated that the Lockerbie Trial concluded earlier this week at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands was not fair and did not meet basic requirements of due process.

Dr Koechler is one of five international observers appointed by the United Nations to observe the trial. In the report consisting of twenty paragraphs specifically evaluating the legal quality of the trial in regard to generally accepted legal standards, Dr Koechler reached the conclusion that the verdict of the three judges was not comprehensible in view of the conflicting evidence, the series of vague inferences and conjectures on which it is based, and because of the lack of credibility of the key witnesses presented during the trial. The apodictic verdicts of "guilty" in the case of the first accused and "not guilty" in the case of the second accused are contradictory in view of the text of the indictment and in regard to the written Opinion of the Court.

Dr Koechler explained in his report that the verdict, in his analysis, is more of a political than of a legal nature. He expressed the hope that the search for the truth will continue and a Court of Appeals will correct the inconsistencies of the verdict passed by the three Scottish judges on 31 January 2001.

The full text of the report is available on the web site of the IPO Lockerbie Observer Mission: http://i-p-o.org/lockerbie_observer_mission.htm.

[RB: The full text of Professor Köchler’s report can be read here.]

Libyan link to Lockerbie blast

[This is the headline over a report that was published in The Herald on this date in 1989. It reads in part:]

Investigators believe that employees of Libyan Arab Airways in Frankfurt planted the bomb which destroyed a PanAm Jumbo jet four days before Christmas, killing 270 people in and around Lockerbie, according to the American television network CBS News.

In a follow-up to its report on Wednesday night that the Palestinian terrorist Ahmad Jibril, sponsored by Syria and Libya, was believed to have built the bomb, CBS said this morning that the sophisticated device was in a suitcase which did not belong to any passenger aboard PanAm flight 103.

The CBS version contradicts a Radio Forth report, which said that an American agent of the Central Intelligence Agency unwittingly had the bomb in his luggage. Mr David Johnston, of Radio Forth, said last night police had given him until today to name his sources for his report which blamed a Palestinian group for the bombing.

He said he was ''completely confident'' he had been told the truth, and was prepared to face court moves if necessary. Mr Johnston said he was told by official agencies ''in Britain and elsewhere'' that the bomb was planted at Helsinki in the luggage of an American CIA agent returning from an unsuccessful attempt to release US hostages in Beirut.

Police gave him until today to approach his sources to ask if he could divulge them, he added. The officers said that if he did not want to disclose his sources to them, they would make available ''anyone in Britain, including the Prime Minister, for him to disclose them to.''

Mr Johnston said the police ''have said that if I don't tell them tomorrow where the story came from, it would be open to them to put me before a sheriff under precognition.''

CBS said that at least 100 Libyan airline employees are intelligence operatives under the command of Abdullah Senoussi, who is related to the country's leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

Senoussi reportedly has a printing plant which produces forged luggage tags, among other documents. The bomb, said by CBS to contain 20lbs of plastic explosives, was in a suitcase falsely labelled to fly to New York, via London, on flight 103. It was not searched, x-rayed, or even weighed-in at Frankfurt airport, where it was smuggled in through a ''back door,'' the TV report said, citing an American source.

CBS said the device was believed to be identical to a suitcase bomb found by West German police, in the days before the Lockerbie disaster, when they arrested 14 members of Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -- General Command. The report said the PFLP-GC wished to upset the peace initiative of the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.

Meanwhile, lawyers representing families bereaved in the Lockerbie disaster are to pursue their claims for compensation through the American courts. They will also press for a full accident inquiry to be held as soon as possible.

The first meeting of the lawyers' steering committee will be held in Glasgow today but its spokesman, solicitor Mr Michael Hughes, said last night it was virtually certain any compensation claims would be made to the American courts.

[RB: Caustic Logic has commented on this report on his blog The Lockerbie Divide. What follows is an excerpt:]

On February 3 1989, based on what someone had told them, CBS News reported that Libyans may have been behind the whole thing. The Herald (Scotland) reported on this, and I thank to JREF forum member Spitfire IX for the tip.

Libyan link to Lockerbie blast

“INVESTIGATORS believe that employees of Libyan Arab Airways in Frankfurt planted the bomb which destroyed a PanAm Jumbo jet four days before Christmas, killing 270 people in and around Lockerbie, according to the American television network CBS News.”

This is far too early for any of the bogus clues against Megrahi to have emerged. It’s also far too early to be motivated by Gulf War alliances mandating a blind eye to Syria, as some assess the motive. It doesn’t appear to be based on any evidence (see below), but it must have been based on something or it wouldn’t have been said.

“CBS said that at least 100 Libyan airline employees are intelligence operatives under the command of Abdullah Senoussi, who is related to the country's leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Senoussie reportedly has a printing plant which produces forged luggage tags, among other documents.”

That certainly would not explain accused Fhimah’s later plot to flat steal Air Malta tags for the bombing, a "clue" that wouldn’t emerge for over two years. In fact, these sounds like hollow points of speculation, maybe just a handy occasion to again draw attention to Frankfurt while floating a novel solution to the embarrassing truth. Of course, only a few people would know this soon just how embarrassing that would be.

“The bomb, said by CBS to contain 20lbs of plastic explosives, was in a suitcase falsely labelled to fly to New York, via London, on flight 103. It was not searched, x-rayed, or even weighed-in at Frankfurt airport, where it was smuggled in through a ''back door,'' the TV report said, citing an American source.

CBS said the device was believed to be identical to a suitcase bomb found by West German police, in the days before the Lockerbie disaster, when they arrested 14 members of Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command.”

There is no likeness, "identical" or otherwise, implied in the given description. Mot obviously, the ones seized were designed to blow up within 30-45 minutes or an hour (it's complicated) of leaving the ground, which has never fitted with an origin at Frankfurt or further out. Not with the blast 38 minutes after leaving London. Further, the only one of the PFLP-GC devices known of at the time contained 312 grams of Semtex-H, or well under one pound. Three found later were comparable, and the bomb used on 103 was at least that weight, and perhaps as high as 680 grams, based on the container damage. Again nowhere near this alleged 20 pound Libyan monster.

In fact, such small amounts of explosive could only work as fatally as happened on Soltice ’88 with the choicest placement within the luggage container - against the sloping outboard floor panel just two feet from the plane's skin. This is entirely possible by random baggage loading, but far less than a 50/50 shot. There’s still no guarantee, but at least a good 50/50, if the luggage is actually arranged by a terrorists who knows of the sweet spot. Someone else could then move it, or not move it. And of course that could only happen at Heathrow where the container was loaded, hundreds of miles from those dastardly Libyans at Frankfurt and their "back door" antics that still have never been elaborated.

That unspecified “American source” would have presumably been someone involved in an investigation. And we know the CIA’s probe into 103 was headed by Vincent Cannistraro, head of Agency’s counter-terrorism center. Previously, Cannistraro was one of Reagan’s make-s***-up-about-Libya men (See Maltese Double Cross – 42:40 mark). Along with Ollie North and Howard Teicher at the NSC, he used input from CIA and Deprtment of Defense to seed disinformation in the media to justify a policy of covert US harassment of Col Gaddafi up to coup plans and attempted assassination by Cruise missile, in 1986.

I’d bet money that Vincent Cannistraro was the source for this allegation. He’s friendly with the press, and always eager to tell them whatever’s convenient at the moment with some flair and no compunctions. The story had Libyan intel agents working through LAA at an airport connected to the Lockerbie bombing. The CIA at that time had Abdul Majid Giaka’s stories on file, mentioning both Megrahi and Fhimah as just such agents, but attached to LAA at Luqa airport on Malta.

Of course, no further moves were made for quite a while, as investigators spent all of 1989 and 1990 at least publicly pushing the PFLP-GC leads - and increasingly Malta leads. Even the suspicious, possibly backdated evidence pointing at Libya was dated around May ’89 and not generally understood for around a year. If this is indeed an early stirring of Vince’s Libya solution, it was too early after waking from the haze of no leads that can be pursued. Libyan guilt rather than PFLP-GC/Syria/Iran probably did look nice and comforting passing through the national news, but just six weeks after the bombing, it was clearly something to come back to after a cup of coffee and a fistful of planted clues.

Prisoner transfer and UK Government chicanery

[What follows is excerpted from a report published on the BBC News website on this date in 2008:]

Scotland's first minister has asked for assurances that the Lockerbie bomber will be excluded from any prisoner transfer deal with Libya.

Alex Salmond raised concerns that the Westminster government's position on the issue had changed.

It was reported that the UK Government drafted a transfer agreement that could cover Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi.

But UK ministers have repeated that no transfer could go ahead without the agreement of the Scottish Government.

Mr Salmond spoke out on the issue after the Financial Times reported that Libya had just ratified a £450m contract with oil giant BP, after Westminster ministers drafted a prisoner transfer agreement that it claimed could cover al-Megrahi.

However BP has stressed that the £450m exploration contract, originally signed in May 2007, was a commercial one.

Mr Salmond described the report as "a very serious allegation", but said it was up to the UK Government to explain.

He pointed out al-Megrahi's case was under appeal and that the judicial process must be allowed to take its course. (...)

Mr Salmond told BBC Scotland: "My role, the role of the government is to defend the integrity of the judicial system in Scotland and that's exactly what we intend to do."

"We've made it quite clear that, in terms of prisoner transfer agreement with Libya, we thought it would be appropriate if anyone connected with the Lockerbie atrocity was excluded specifically from any prisoner transfer agreement.

"Until very recently, that was also the position of the UK Government."

Mr Salmond went on: "Now that seems to have changed and it's up to the UK government to explain why that position has changed and why that exclusion hasn't been gained."

The UK justice department said any decision on the transfer of al-Megrahi to Libya was a matter for the Scottish legal system and stressed that no transfer could go ahead without the agreement of the Scottish Government.

A BP spokesman added: "We are a commercial company and have signed a deal that has now been ratified by the Libyan Government.

"Any matters relating to political issues should be referred to the governments concerned."

A row previously broke out between UK and Scottish ministers after former Prime Minister Tony Blair and Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi signed a memorandum of understanding on prisoner transfer.

Downing Street said at the time that the agreement did not cover Megrahi, but UK Justice Secretary Jack Straw later said the fate of the bomber was a "matter for discussion" with Holyrood ministers.

[The following day, I commented on this blog as follows:]

The truth of the matter is this. The UK Foreign Office (and officials in the office of the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair) entered into negotiations with Libya for a reciprocal prisoner transfer agreement. Both sides were perfectly well aware that the only Libyan prisoner in a British jail about whom the Libyans had the slightest concern was Megrahi. The Libyan negotiators believed, rightly believed, and were known by the UK negotiators to believe that the agreement they were drafting would cover Megrahi. The London Government did not have the courtesy to inform the Scottish Government (which is responsible for prisons and prisoners in Scotland) that these negotiations were taking place. When the Scottish Government found out about them and complained to the UK Government, the latter announced that (a) the proposed agreement was not intended to cover Megrahi and (b) even if it were, the final decision on the transfer of any Libyan prisoner in a Scottish jail would rest with the Scottish Government. The latter proposition was and is correct.The former was not: it was at best disingenuous and at worst (and probably more accurately) an outright lie.

Contemporary critique of Megrahi conviction

[On 31 January 2001, Abdelbaset Megrahi was convicted of the Lockerbie bombing. Here is something that I wrote on 1 February on the website edited by Ian Ferguson and me, TheLockerbieTrial.com:]

In paragraph 89 of the Opinion of the Court the judges say: “We are aware that in relation to certain aspects of the case there are a number of uncertainties and qualifications.  We are also aware that there is a danger that by selecting parts of the evidence which seem to fit together and ignoring parts which might not fit, it is possible to read into a mass of conflicting evidence a pattern or conclusion which is not really justified.” The danger may have been recognised.  But it has not been avoided. i.    Who was the purchaser of the clothing and when did he do it? The judges held it proved (a) that it was Megrahi who bought from Mary’s House in Malta the clothes and umbrella which were in the suitcase with the bomb and (b) that the date of purchase was 7 December 1988 (when Megrahi was on Malta) and not 23 November 1988 (when he was not). As regards (a), the most that the Maltese shopkeeper, Tony Gauci, would say (either in his evidence in court or in a series of police statements) was that Megrahi “resembled a lot” the purchaser, a phrase which he equally used with reference to Abu Talb, one of those named in the special defence of incrimination lodged on behalf of Megrahi.  Gauci had also described the purchaser to the police as being six feet tall and over 50 years of age. The evidence at the trial established (i) that Megrahi is 5 feet 8 inches tall and (ii) that in late 1988 he was 36 years of age.  On this material the judges found in fact that Megrahi was the purchaser. As regards (b), the evidence of Tony Gauci was that when the purchaser left his shop it was raining (or at least drizzling) to such an extent that his customer thought it advisable to buy an umbrella  to protect himself while he went in search of a taxi. The unchallenged meteorological evidence established that while it had rained on 23 November at the relevant time, it was unlikely that it had rained at all on 7 December, and if it had it would have been only a few drops, insufficient to wet the street.  On this material, the judges found in fact that the clothes were purchased on 7 December. ii.    Did the bomb start from Malta? The judges held it proved that there was a piece of unaccompanied baggage on Flight KM 180 from Malta to Frankfurt on 21 December 1988 which was then carried on to Heathrow.  The evidence supporting that finding was a computer printout which could be interpreted to indicate that a piece of baggage went through the particular luggage coding station at Frankfurt used for baggage from KM 180 and was routed towards the feeder flight to Heathrow, at a time consistent with its having been offloaded from KM 180. Against this, the evidence from Malta Airport was to the effect that there was no unaccompanied bag on that flight to Frankfurt.  All luggage on that flight was accounted for.  The number of bags loaded into the hold matched the number of bags checked in (and subsequently collected) by the passengers on the aircraft.  The court nevertheless held it proved that there had been a piece of unaccompanied baggage on Flight KM 180. iii.   Where did the fragment of timer come from? An important link to Libya in the evidence was a fragment of circuit board from a MST-13 timer manufactured by MeBo. Timers of this model were supplied predominantly to Libya (though a few did go elsewhere, such as to the Stasi in East Germany).  This fragment is also important since it is the only piece of evidence that indicates that the Lockerbie bomb was detonated by a stand-alone timing mechanism, as distinct from a short-term timer triggered by a barometric device, of the type displayed in the bombs and equipment found at Neuss in the Autumn Leaves operation.  The provenance of this vitally important piece of evidence was challenged by the defence, and in their written Opinion the judges accept that in a number of respects this fragment, for reasons that were never satisfactorily explained, was not dealt with by the investigators and forensic scientists in the same way as other pieces of electronic circuit board (of which there were many).  The judges say that they are satisfied that there is no sinister reason for the differential treatment. But they do not find it necessary enlighten us regarding the reasons for their satisfaction. These are some of the many factors that lead me to be astonished that the court found itself able to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of Megrahi, and which equally convince me that his conviction is unsafe and unsatisfactory.