Thursday 17 September 2015

The legal warrant for the Lockerbie trial

[It was on this date in 1998 that the legal instrument that allowed the Lockerbie trial at Camp Zeist to take place was laid before the UK Parliament. What follows is excerpted from an article by me entitled The Lockerbie Disaster that was published in the Edinburgh Law Review in January 1999:]

For four years and seven months the Government of the United Kingdom (and that of the United States) consistently maintained that the "neutral venue" scheme proposed by the writer and accepted by the Libyan Government and defence lawyers in January 1994 was impossible, impracticable and inherently undesirable. For a flavour of the strength and vehemence of the Government's opposition, the interested reader is referred to "The Lockerbie Trial" 1998 SLT (News) 9 by Lord Hardie, a response by the Lord Advocate to the present writer's "The Lockerbie Proposal" 1997 SLT (News) 304.
However, on 24 August 1998 the Governments of the United Kingdom and United States announced that they had reversed their stance on the matter. In a letter of that date to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, the Acting Permanent Representatives of the UK and the USA stated:
".... in the interest of resolving this situation in a way which will allow justice to be done, our Governments are prepared, as an exceptional measure, to arrange for the two accused to be tried before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. After close consultation with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, we are pleased to confirm that the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands has agreed to facilitate arrangements for such a court. It would be a Scottish court and would follow normal Scots law and procedure in every respect except for the replacement of the jury by a panel of three Scottish High Court judges. The Scottish rules of evidence and procedure, and all the guarantees of fair trial provided by the law of Scotland, would apply."
In order to give effect to this change in policy, an Agreement was concluded on 18 September 1998 between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the United Kingdom regulating the sitting of the Scottish Court in the Netherlands; and an Order in Council (The High Court of Justiciary (Proceedings in the Netherlands) (United Nations) Order 1998, SI 1998 No 2251) was made on 16 September 1998 and laid before Parliament on 17 September, to confer the necessary legal authority for Scottish criminal proceedings against the two Libyan suspects to be conducted in the Netherlands. The scheme set out in these two documents differs from the January 1994 proposal in only two respects. First, the court is to consist of a bench of three Lords Commissioners of Justiciary (with a fourth who is to sit with the court, participate in all its deliberations, but to have no vote in any decision required to be taken unless one of the three dies or is absent for a prolonged period) as distinct from an international panel of judges chaired by a Lord Commissioner of Justiciary. Secondly, any appeal arising out of the proceedings is (where either of the accused is entitled to attend the appeal and intimates that he wishes to do so) to be heard in the Netherlands by a bench of five Lords Commissioners of Justiciary and not (as provided for in the January 1994 proposal) by three judges sitting in the Court of Criminal Appeal in Edinburgh in the usual way.

In the weeks since the announcement of the British and American change of heart there have been conflicting signals from Libyan sources regarding the acceptability or otherwise of the scheme. However, at meetings which the writer had between 20 and 22 September 1998 with Libyan government ministers (including Colonel Gaddafi) and with the new team of Libyan lawyers representing the suspects, he formed the clear impression that, provided certain clarifications of the details of the scheme were provided and reassurances as to its meaning and implications supplied, the suspects would surrender themselves for trial. But it may take some considerable time for these clarifications and reassurances to be obtained, largely because the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Netherlands refuse to negotiate or communicate directly with either the Libyan Government or the Libyan defence lawyers. They insist that all communications be channelled through the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. As far as the Libyans are concerned, however, what remain to be resolved are modalities or practicalities: the principle has been accepted, as have all but a few of the details. The odds in favour of the trial actually happening are good.

Wednesday 16 September 2015

The Greshornish House Accord

[In September 2008, the Lockerbie Justice Group convened a meeting at Greshornish House, Isle of Skye, at which the participants, Professor Hans Köchler and I, were invited to consider four questions. The resulting Greshornish House Accord, dated 16 September 2008, reads as follows:]

The questions asked were answered as follows:
QUESTION 1.  Did the Foreign and Commonwealth Office arrangements for a trial at Kamp Zeist deliver an independent and impartial tribunal?
A.1.  No.  We draw attention to five principal defects:
a)      It would have enhanced the appearance of independence and impartiality if the Judicial Bench had been composed of Judges from countries other than the United Kingdom with a Scottish Judge in the Chair. This is principally because the case involves the interests of more than one state and the appointment of all the Judges from only one of the concerned states does not meet the required standards of independence and impartiality. The Consultants present today would both have preferred a tribunal wherein a Scottish Judge chaired a panel of Judges from other countries but this was rejected by the relevant UK authorities. It should be kept in mind that there was an ongoing political dispute between the UK and Libya at this time which had led to the severing of diplomatic relations.
b)      The presence of American advisers in the well of the Court, later identified to the IPO as FBI agents, having frequent discourse and consultation with the Crown prosecution team contributed to the appearance of outside influence on the conduct of the prosecution. These persons were not identified at any point and their names did not appear on the official brochure which, amongst other things, named the prosecution and defence teams. Concerns were raised in the course of the trial that these persons appeared to be guiding witness responses by facial gestures.
c)      We are of the view that if, in an adversarial system, the defence does not properly play its antagonistic role, the interplay of forces is set off-balance. This demands both equality of arms procedurally, and a determined and dedicated wielding of these arms.  

We draw attention to the new burden placed upon all Judges under Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) to ensure that there is indeed an equality of arms in their Court.
d)      Whilst we accept that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to convict, we are not satisfied that the Court, in its written judgment, adequately explained its reasons for accepting incriminating inferences from that evidence and rejecting or dismissing evidence that supported non-incriminating inferences.
e)      We have good reason to suspect that rewards and benefits of a direct or indirect nature have been paid to prosecution witnesses.
QUESTION 2.  What should happen now?
A.2
a)  In the event that the Public Interest Immunity (PII) certificate is upheld by the Court and evidence is withheld from the Defence, we consider that this would render the conduct of a fair appeal impossible. We believe that, in actuality and in the public perception, such a denial compromises the principles of a fair hearing, which depends significantly upon equality of arms.

In this context we would like to draw attention to the position adopted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on this matter, as contained in a letter written to the IPO on 27 August 2008. It reads:
“Under the Human Rights Act 1998 the Court has a duty to act in compliance with Convention rights in terms of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, including the right to a fair trial. The UK Government has made clear its commitment to work closely with the Court to ensure that Mr Megrahi receives a fair trial and that sensitive material is handled appropriately.”
b)      In the event that the present appeal proceeds, we recommend the following:
i)       That the pending decision by the Appeal Court, regarding the scope of the appeal, be delivered with urgency. Preparation by both the appellant and the Crown is impeded whilst the precise parameters of the appeal remain unsettled. It is clearly desirable that any decision defining those parameters should give reasons for the rejection of any grounds submitted by the appellant.  
ii)      The phrase ‘the trial and any appeal’ in the Agreement between the Governments of the UK and the Netherlands concerning a Scottish Trial in the Netherlands permits the view that this further appeal should also take place in an international framework; however we consider that unlikely. We urge that the relevant Scottish andUK authorities take such steps as are necessary to secure the presence of international observers at any further appeal hearing.
c)      Irrespective of the outcome of the current appeal, there should be a re-investigation of the incident by the Scottish authorities. A further Fatal Accident Inquiry would not be inappropriate given the amount of material that has become available since the original FAI took place. When the restricted scope of an FAI is considered perhaps it would be more appropriate to have a wider-ranging public inquiry.
d)  Allegations have been made in the Press and elsewhere of incidences of tampering with evidence material to the case. The Lord Advocate should instruct that these allegations be investigated.  
QUESTION 3.  If Scotland was charged with managing such an international event in the future, what model is recommended?
A3.
a)  Although this is a hypothetical question it offers the opportunity to advise the Scottish public of developments since the Lockerbie incident. The UK is a state party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This would mean that such matters could be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
b)  Where, for whatever reason, the ICC cannot be resorted to, the possibility exists of inviting non-Scottish Judges to participate in a Scottish trial. The following are illustrative precedents for such an approach:
- The Special Court for Sierra Leone, established by agreement between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone.
- The Special Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
QUESTION 4.  What changes should be considered for the better administration of justice in Scotland?
A4.
1. Whilst Scotland retains an adversarial system as opposed to an inquisitorial system, the existence of a real equality of arms is crucial to the delivery of justice. Following the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) the responsibility for ensuring a fair trial, which includes equality of arms, lies with the Court itself. Although this judicial obligation is already enshrined in the law, it could usefully be spelled out in an amendment to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
2. It is inappropriate that the Chief Legal Adviser to the Government is also head of all criminal prosecutions. Whilst the Lord Advocate and Solicitor General continue as public prosecutors the principle of separation of powers seems compromised.  The potential for a conflict of interest always exists.  Resolution of these circumstances would entail an amendment of the provisions contained within the Scotland Act 1998.
3. The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 should be amended to oblige the Crown to disclose all prosecution witness statements. The current system, whereby the Crown’s disclosure obligation is met by simply supplying a list of possible Crown witnesses, encourages the fruitless expenditure of defence time, money and effort.
4. The absence of a particular and dedicated Criminal Appeal Court, especially when, unlike in civil matters, there is no further appeal available to a higher Court, renders the appeal system vulnerable to serious criticism.

Tuesday 15 September 2015

Key Lockerbie Witness Admits Perjury

[This is the headline over a long article by Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer that was published on the Global Research website on this date in 2007. The whole article is well worth reading. The following are excerpts from six of its fourteen sections:]

The Lockerbie Affair has taken yet another extraordinary twist. On Friday, August 31st, I received from Edwin Bollier, head of the Zurich-based MeBo AG, a copy of a German original of an Affidavit.
The document is dated July 18th 2007 and signed by Ulrich Lumpert who worked as an electronic engineer at MeBo from 1978 to 1994. I have scrutinized the document carefully and concluded that I have no reason to doubt its authenticity or the truthfulness of its content.
Lumpert was a key witness (no 550) at the Camp Zeist trial, where a three Judges panel convicted a Libyan citizen of murdering 270 persons who died in the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie.
In his testimony, Lumpert stated that: “of the 3 pieces of hand-made prototypes MST-13 Timer PC-Boards, the third MST-13 PC-Board was broken and [he] had thrown it away.”
In his affidavit, certified by [notary] Walter Wieland, Lumpert admits having committed perjury.
“I confirm today on July 18th 2007, that I stole the third hand-manufactured MST-13 Timer PC-Board consisting of 8 layers of fibre-glass from MEBO Ltd. and gave it without permission on June 22nd 1989 to a person officially investigating in the Lockerbie case,” Lumpert wrote. (The identity of the official is known.)
“It did not escape me that the MST-13 fragment shown [at the Lockerbie trial] on the police photograph No PT/35(b) came from the non-operational MST-13 prototype PC-board that I had stolen,” Lumpert added.
“I am sorry for the consequences of my silence at that time, for the innocent Libyan Mr. Abdelbaset Al Megrahi sentenced to life imprisonment, and for the country of Libya.”
In just seven paragraphs, the Lumpert affidavit elucidates the longstanding mysteries surrounding the infamous MST-13 timer, which allegedly triggered the bomb that exploded Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie on December 21st 1988.
The discovery of the MST-13 timer fragment
In the months following the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, someone discovered a piece of a grey Slalom-brand shirt in a wooded area located about 25 miles away from the town. According to a forensics expert, the cloth contained a tiny fragment – 4 mm square – of a circuit board. The testimony of three expert witnesses allowed the prosecutors to link this circuit board, described as part of the bomb trigger, to Megrahi.
There have been different accounts concerning the discovery of the timer fragment. A police source close to the investigation reported that it had been discovered by lovers. Some have said that it was picked up by a man walking his dog. Others have claimed that it was found by a policeman “combing the ground on his hands and knees.”
At the trial, the third explanation became official. “On 13 January 1989, DC Gilchrist and DC McColm were engaged together in line searches in an area near Newcastleton. A piece of charred material was found by them which was given the police number PI/995 and which subsequently became label 168.”
The alteration of the label
The officer had initially labelled the bag ‘cloth (charred)’ but had later overwritten the word ‘cloth’ with ‘debris’.
The bag contained pieces of a shirt collar and fragments of materials said to have been extracted from it, including the tiny piece of circuit board identified as coming from an MST-13 timer made by the Swiss firm MeBo.
“The original inscription on the label, which we are satisfied, was written by DC Gilchrist, was “Cloth (charred)”. The word ‘cloth’ has been overwritten by the word ‘debris’. There was no satisfactory explanation as to why this was done.”
The judges said in their judgement that Gilchrist’s evidence had been “at worst evasive and at best confusing”.
Yet the judges went on to admit the evidence. “We are, however, satisfied that this item was indeed found in the area described, and DC McColm who corroborated DC Gilchrist on the finding of the item was not cross-examined about the detail of the finding of this item.” (...)
The new page 51
According to documents obtained by Scotland on Sunday, the entry of the discovery is recorded at widely different times by UK and German investigators. Moreover, a new page 51 has been inserted in the record of evidence.
During the Lockerbie investigation, Dr Thomas Hayes and Allan Feraday were working at the DERA Forensic laboratory at Fort Halstead in Kent.
Dr Hayes was employed at the Royal Armament Research Development Establishment (RARDE). In 1995, RARDE was subsumed into the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA). In 2001, part of DERA became the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL).
Dr Hayes testified that he collected the tiny fragment of the circuit board on May 12th 1989. He testified that the fragment was green. (Keep in mind that the board stolen from Lumpert is brown.) His colleague, Allan Feraday, confirmed his story at the Zeist trial.
The record is inserted on a loose-leaf page with the five subsequent pages re-numbered by hand. Dr Hayes could not provide a reasonable explanation for this rather strange entry, and yet the Judges concluded that: “Pagination was of no materiality, because each item that was examined had the date of examination incorporated into the notes.”
The argument of the Court is illogical as the index number Dr Hayes gave to the piece is higher than some entry he made three months later.
And there is more. In September 1989, Feraday sent a Polaroid photograph of the piece and wrote in the attached memorandum that it was “the best he could do in such short time.” So, are we supposed to believe that it takes forensic experts several months to take a Polaroid picture?
Dr Hayes could not explain this. He merely suggested that the person to ask about it would be the author of the memorandum, Mr Feraday.
This however was not done. At the young age of 43, Hayes resigned just a few months after the discovery of the timer fragment.
Based on the forensic Dr Hayes had supplied, an entire family [The Maguire Seven] was sent to jail in 1976. They were acquitted in appeal in 1992. Sir John May was appointed to review Dr Hayes forensic evidence.
“The whole scientific basis on which the prosecution in [the trial of the alleged IRA Maguire Seven] was founded was in truth so vitiated that on this basis alone, the Court of Appeal should be invited to set aside the conviction,” said Sir John May.
In the Megrahi’s case, Dr Hayes did not even perform the basic test which would have established the presence of explosive residue on the sample. During the trial, he maintained that the fragment was too small while it is factually established that his laboratory has performed such test on smaller samples.
Had he performed such test, no residue would have been found. As noted by Lumpert, the fragment shown at the Zeist trial belongs to a timer that was never connected to a relay. In other words, that timer never triggered a bomb.
Allan Feraday’s reputation is hardly better. In three separated cases,where men were convicted on the basis of his forensic evidence, the initial ruling was overturned in appeal.
After one of these cases in 2005, a Lord of Justice said that Feraday should not be allowed to present himself as an expert in the field of electronics.
According to forensic scientist, Dr Michael Scott, who was interviewed in the documentary The Maltese Double Cross – Lockerbie, Feraday has no formal qualifications as a scientist.
The identification of the MeBo timer
Thomas Thurman worked for the FBI forensics laboratory in the late 80’s and most of the 90’s. Thurman has been publicly credited for identifying the fragment as part of a MST-13 timer produced by the Swiss company Mebo.
“When that identification was made, of the timer, I knew that we had it,” Thurman told ABC in 1991. “Absolute, positively euphoria. I was on cloud nine.”
Again, his record is far from pristine. The US attorney General has accused him of having altered lab reports in a way that rendered subsequent prosecutions all but impossible. He has been transferred out the FBI forensic laboratory.
“He’s very aggressive, but I think he made some mistakes that needed to be brought to the attention of FBI management,” says Frederic Whitehurst, a former FBI chemist who filed the complaints that led to the Inspector General’s report.
“We’re not necessarily going to get the truth out of what we’re doing here,” Whitehurst concluded.
The story shed some light on his formation. The report says “Williams and Thurman merit special censure for their work. It recommends that Thurman, who has a degree in political science, be reassigned outside the lab and that only scientists work in its explosives section.” (...)
The modification of the MST-13 timer fragment
Forensic analysis of the circuit board fragment allowed the investigators to identify its origin. The timer, known as MST-13, is fabricated by a Swiss Company named MeBo, which stands for Meister and Bollier.
The company has indeed sold about 20 MST-13 timers to Libyan military (machine-made 9 ply green boards), as well as a few units (hand-made 8 ply brown boards) to a Research Institute in Bernau, known to act as a front to the Stasi, the former East German secret police.
The two batches are very different but, as early as 1991, Bollier told the Scottish investigators that he could not identify the timer from a photograph alone. Yet, the Libyans were indicted in November 1991, without ever allowing Bollier to see the actual fragment, on the ground that the integrity of the evidence had to be protected.
But in 1998, Bollier obtained a copy of a blown-up photograph that Thurman had shown on ABC in 1991. Bollier could tell from certain characteristics that the fragment was part of a board of the timers made for East Germany, and definitely not one of the timers delivered by him to Libya.
In September 1999, Bollier was finally allowed to see the fragment. Unlike the one shown by Thurman on ABC, this one was machine-made, as the one sold to Libya. But, from the absence of traces of solder, it was obvious that the timer had never been used to trigger a bomb.
“As far as I’m concerned, and I told this to [Scottish Prosecutor Miriam Watson], this is a manufactured fragment,” Bollier says. “A fabricated fragment, never from a complete, functional timer.”
The next day, Bollier was shown the fragment once more. You may have already guessed that it now had the soldering traces. “It was different. I’m not crazy. It was different!” says Bollier.
Finally, at the trial, Bollier was presented a fragment of a circuit board completely burnt down. Thus, it was no longer possible to identify to which country that timer had been delivered. As he requested to explain the significance of the issue, Lord Shuterland told him that his request was denied.
How did the Judges account for all the mysterious changes in the appearance of the fragment? They simply dismissed Bollier as an unreliable witness.
“We have assessed carefully the evidence of these three witnesses about the activities of MEBO, and in particular their evidence relating to the MST-13 timers which the company made. All three, and notably Mr Bollier, were shown to be unreliable witnesses. Earlier statements which they made to the police and judicial authorities were at times in conflict with each other, and with the evidence they gave in court. On some occasions, particularly in the case of Mr Bollier, their evidence was self contradictory.” (para 45)

Monday 14 September 2015

The Arab League and Lockerbie

[What follows is the text of a Reuters news agency report published on this date in 1998:]

Arab League foreign ministers are expected to throw their diplomatic weight behind Libya this week in their first meeting since Britain and the United States agreed to hold the Lockerbie trial in a neutral country.

“The Lockerbie issue is on the front burner,” said an Arab official of the two days of talks starting on Wednesday.

“It is a priority based on the degree of attention which will be given not only in the official work of the council but on the sidelines as well.”

The Arab official said the Arab League was expected to call for clarification through UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

“The Libyans are worried Holland might be used as a conveyor belt,” he said. “There is already an environment of mistrust and the language of take-it-or-leave-it is not helpful.

“So the work of the League will focus on supporting Libya's legitimate rights to seek more clarification and guarantees. We believe this will strengthen the Libyan position,” he said.

In their last talks in March, the foreign ministers of the 22-member League renewed support for Libya's call for an end to the UN sanctions imposed on Libya after it refused to give up for trial the suspects in the bombing which killed 270 people.

But Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi apparently wants more than lip service this time.

On Sunday, the Libyan news agency said Libya had abolished its ministerial portfolio charged with promoting Arab unity and emphasised that Libya belonged to the African continent.

The last task for Libya's Unity Affairs Minister Jomaa al-Fezzani will be to attend this week's Arab League meeting. Diplomats saw the move as timed to pressure the Arab League into backing up words with deeds, as African states have done.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May called for an end to the sanctions and this month seven African leaders broke the embargo by flying into Libya without UN permission.

No Arab country has followed suit. Asked to comment, the Arab official said: “I would understand sometimes it's frustrating, but we are not competing with the OAU and Arabs cannot violate U.N. resolutions collectively. It should be decided country by country,” he said. “We have given strong collective diplomatic support to Libya.”

[And, exactly ten years later, from Wikipedia:]

On 14 September 2008, the Arab League Ministerial Council passed a resolution calling for the 'political hostage' Megrahi to be released from prison in Scotland. The resolution demanded that the Scottish government should hand to Megrahi's lawyers the documents which the SCCRC had identified, adding that Britain's refusal to do so represented a 'miscarriage of justice'. The Arab League also endorsed Libya's right to compensation for the damage done to its economy by UN sanctions which were in force from 1991 until 1999*.

Sunday 13 September 2015

Tainting evidence -- the FBI crime laboratory

[On this date in 1995 the FBI crime laboratory was the subject of a highly critical television programme broadcast on the ABC network. It followed disclosures by one of the laboratory’s scientists, Dr Frederic Whitehurst, about the methods adopted by some of his colleagues, including Tom Thurman. The scandal later became the subject of a book, Tainting Evidence, by John Kelly and Phillip Wearne. The relevance of this to the Lockerbie case is outlined in the following excerpt from Gareth Peirce’s article The Framing of al-Megrahi in the London Review of Books:]

The key features needed to prosecute al-Megrahi successfully were the scientific identification of the circuit-board fragment, which would in turn establish its origin, and the identification of the purchaser of the clothes in Malta. The timers, the indictment stated, were made by a firm in Switzerland; their circuit board matched the fragment retrieved from Lockerbie, and they sold the timers exclusively to Libya. Everything, essentially, hinged on those links.

Who found the fragment? And who understood its relevance? Thomas Hayes of the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment (RARDE) claimed the find (with his colleague Alan Feraday) and Thomas Thurman of the FBI claimed the analytical victory. All were swiftly hailed (or hailed themselves) as heroes. Thurman appeared on television on 15 November 1991, the day after indictments were issued against the two Libyans, boasting that he had identified the piece of circuit board as part of a timing device that might have been sold to Libyan Airlines staff. ‘I made the identification and I knew at that point what it meant. And because, if you will, I am an investigator as well as a forensic examiner, I knew where that would go. At that point we had no conclusive proof of the type of timing mechanism that was used in the bombing of 103. When that identification was made of the timer I knew that we had it.’ This was the claim – the hard evidence – that linked Libyans to the crime. If the claim was false the bereaved Lockerbie families have been deceived for 20 years.

On 13 September 1995 the FBI’s forensic department was the subject of a programme broadcast in the US by ABC. At its centre was a memorandum from the former head of explosive science at the FBI, Dr Frederic Whitehurst. It was a devastating indictment of a former colleague. The colleague was Thomas Thurman and the accusations related to his investigation of a terrorist attack in which a judge was killed by pipe bombs. Two years later, as a result of a review by the US inspector general, Michael Bromwich, into a large number of criminal investigations, Thomas Thurman was barred from FBI labs and from being called as an expert witness. Bromwich had discovered that he had no formal scientific qualifications and that, according to a former colleague, he had been ‘circumventing procedures and protocols, testifying to areas of expertise that he had no qualifications in . . . therefore fabricating evidence’.

Thurman had made the Libyan connection, and its plausibility relied on the accuracy of his statement that the fragment of circuit board proved that it would have been possible for the unaccompanied bag to fly from Malta without the seemingly inevitable mid-air explosion. And thus it was that a witness from Switzerland, Edwin Bollier, the manufacturer of the MEBO circuit board, was called on to provide evidence that such boards had been sold exclusively to Libya.

Saturday 12 September 2015

The disappearing police notebooks

[On this date in 1999, Scotland on Sunday broke the news that the notebooks of police officers involved in the Lockerbie investigation had been destroyed. I cannot find the original report on The Scotsman website, but news agency reports picking up the story the same day can be read here and one from BBC News the following day can be read here. A report from Sky News reads as follows:]

A claim that dozens of police notebooks relating to the Lockerbie air tragedy have been destroyed could have severe implications for a trial next year. The pads were apparently destroyed five years after the 1988 crash that took 270 lives. The Scotland on Sunday newspaper believed the loss of the notebooks could affect court proceedings scheduled to take place in Holland early next year. The newspaper said police officers would now have to give evidence years later without being able to refer back to detailed notes taken at the time.

It claimed some of the books covered the recovery of fragments of wreckage. It is not known whether police destroyed them mistakenly or whether the Crown Office, responsible for prosecutions in Scotland, did not order them to be kept. The newspaper quoted sources, said to be close to the defence, as saying: "Police officers have told us they could not give detailed statements because they did not have their notebooks.

"When we asked why, the answer was the notebooks had been taken off them and were later destroyed. In a case like this the order should have been given that they were kept. For some reason the order was either not given or was ignored. We are aware of dozens of notebooks which have been destroyed." Yet prosecution officials and police are not commenting on the revelations.

A Crown Office spokesman said: "We cannot make any comment as it would be inappropriate to comment about what may be evidential matters in the Lockerbie trial." Dumfries and Galloway police, that covers the Lockerbie area, also declined to comment. Dozens of police notebooks relating to the Lockerbie air disaster have been destroyed, it was claimed today.

The notebooks were destroyed five years after the 1988 crash which claimed 270 lives, for which two Libyans are alleged to be responsible. Prosecution officials and police declined to comment on the report in the Scotland on Sunday newspaper, which said the lack of the notebooks could have implications at the trial due to take place in The Netherlands early next year.

“Police officers will have made written statements based on their notebooks, but these probably will not be admissible,” Robert Black, professor of law at Edinburgh University and an expert on the Lockerbie case, told Scotland on Sunday. “The lack of the notebooks will be useful to the defence. I imagine police officers will have to say they do not remember exactly where they found x, y or z,” he added.