The Heathrow baggage-handling evidence

[What follows is excerpted from the report of proceedings at the Lockerbie trial on 25 August 2000 published by the University of Glasgow’s Lockerbie Trial Briefing Unit:]

Mr [Sulkash] Kamboj, a security agent with Alert Management in 1988, based at Terminal 3 in Heathrow, gave evidence. In December 1988 he worked in the interline shed and was responsible for scanning the baggage from connecting flights other than Pan Am flights. In the interline shed was situated a scanning machine. After baggage had passed through the scanning machine a security tag was placed on the bag. The scanning machine was an x-ray which was black and white. Both airline and security workers were in the interline shed. The airline staff gave the baggage to the security staff for scanning. If the suitcase was destined for a Pan Am flight sometimes either Alert Security or Pan Am staff would take the bag off the belt. Following scanning the airline worker would put the bag into a container. There would normally be 2 staff members from Alert in the interline shed. 1 worker would watch the screen and the other placed a sticker on the bag. The witness said that Alert staff would sometimes place bags into containers if it was a quiet time or the airline worker was in the rest room or away, but this was not the normal routine. Mr Palmer was working in the interline shed with Mr Kamboj that day.

The witness did not remember Mr Bedford working in the interline shed that day. He remembered that a Pan Am flight was due to leave for New York that afternoon.  By late afternoon it was quiet in the interline shed. Mr Palmer and the witness finished at the same time. The witness was asked to accept that Mr Bedford was working that day and he then confirmed that it was Mr Bedford's job to load the Pan Am luggage that afternoon. The witness said it was possible that he had helped Mr Bedford by loading 2 bags but that he didn't remember. He accepted that if Mr Bedford said this he would accept it, but that the bags would have gone through the appropriate security procedures. Mr Kamboj confirmed that the luggage in the interline shed was from different airlines which were connecting to various flights.

The Advocate Depute [Alan Turnbull QC] asked if the scanning machine allowed the witness to see electrical items e.g., tape recorders or radios. The witness said it was hard to distinguish radios and tape recorders but that you could tell that there was an electrical item. It was not easy to identify a suspicious item using the machine. If an item looked normal no action would be taken. If abnormal it would be sent to the gate to be investigated. He also said it would be normal to see an electrical item every day.

In cross-examination Mr [Jack] Davidson [QC, for Fhimah] asked the witness if he recalled having a break that afternoon and on his return to the shed Mr Palmer left for the day. He said he did not. He confirmed it would be usual for a container to be loaded in the interline shed with bags bound for New York and then that container would meet the Frankfurt flight. Mr Davidson then asked if it was normal for the container to be taken first to baggage build up for some time before going to meet the Frankfurt flight. Mr Kamboj said he was not sure. He confirmed that the interline area was open and was not sure if it was locked at night. He could not recall if he was the last person to leave the interline shed that night. He confirmed that the bags reached the machine on a belt which started outside the shed and that he had not seen security there. He denied that he had been aware of the 'Toshiba Warning' before December 1988 or that he had been asked to look out for a fake Toshiba radio. He was asked again whether he ever loaded luggage onto a container. He said he remembered being interviewed by the police but did not recall what he said. A police interview on 6 January 1989 was referred to wherein the witness said that Mr Bedford had brought a metal tin into the interline shed to transport luggage for flight PA 103. He told the Police that he did not place any luggage in that tin. In a statement made to Police on 28 December 1988 the witness did not refer to putting any bag in the container on 21 December 1988 and stated that this would not be done as it was not part of his job. The Fatal Accident Inquiry transcript revealed that when giving evidence at that time, the witness said he would not have put bags into the tin container. Mr Davidson referred to the statement by the witness during the examination in chief by the Advocate Depute where he indicated that if Mr Bedford's account of 21 December included that he, Mr Kamboj placed 2 bags into container 4041 that he would accept this. This clearly contradicts statements given around the time of the disaster to the Police and the court at the Fatal Accident Inquiry.

Mr Kamboj did not recall what shift Mr Bedford worked that day or seeing the container leaving the shed. He did not recall being asked by Police officers how many bags came through Interline that day or how many were in Mr Bedford's container that day. Previous statements were referred to where the witness said he thought that there were 5 cases in Mr Bedford's container when he drove it away but that this was just a guess.

Mr Bill Taylor [QC, for Megrahi] , [in] cross-examination, referred to the lack of security at the interline shed which would have allowed anyone to drop a bag onto the belt which carried luggage into the shed to be x rayed. The witness accepted that this was the case. The witness stated that the information he gave to the police and the Fatal Accident Inquiry was truthful and accurate.

The judges asked Mr Kamboj if only Pan Am bags would come into the interline shed. The witness said that bags for all airlines would be carried on the same conveyor belt. Pan Am flights are identified by the Pan Am tag and these are picked off by the airline employees and sometimes security employees when they are beside the x-ray machine. Mr Kamboj said he did not remember seeing Mr Bedford leaving the shed with the container.

Mr [John] Bedford then gave evidence that bags were loaded by a company White onto the conveyor belt that carried them into the shed. A Pan Am employee would then take those bags bound for a Pan Am flight and give them to Alert Security staff to be x rayed. Some of the other airlines did x ray but this was not done by the Alert workers. The shed was reasonably quiet in the afternoon. The people who worked for Alert sometimes helped to identify which bags were bound for a Pan Am flight. Once x rayed the bags were put into containers and occasionally Alert staff helped to do this.  Flight 103 was the last Pan Am flight to be dealt with that day. By 2pm he was the only Pan Am employee in the shed. Messrs Kamboch and Palmer, Alert employees, were also there. The baggage for flight 103 was put into container 4041 but the witness cannot remember how many bags were put into the container and said it was a few rather than many. He told the court he loaded these bags into the back of the container, spine down with handle up.

After putting bags into the container that afternoon the witness said he went to Mr Walker's office, his supervisor who gave evidence yesterday, and had a cup of tea.  He left the container in the interline area for approximately half an hour while he was away. When he returned to the interline area the container had 2 more bags at the front of the container laying down. Mr Kamboj said that he had put these 2 bags in the container. The container was taken from the interline shed to the build up area to his supervisor Mr Walker. The witness said he expected that the container would be taken to the 103 inbound flight from Frankfurt, loaded up and then to the 103 outbound flight to New York. He said that on container AVE 4041 he filled out a record sheet on the side of the container with the flight number, the container number and the type of bags. The witness could not recall what he had entered for the type of bags. He said that the container was not full when it left the interline shed and he estimated there were 8 or 10 bags. He told the court that he had not placed any bags on top of the two bags at the front.

The judges asked Mr Bedford if a photograph, which is a production, showed his usual method of loading a container. He said that it did and from his recollection this is how the container was loaded on 21 December 1988. This photograph was taken on 9 January 1989 and shows Mr Bedford beside a container similar to 4041 containing luggage stacked the way he described 4041 having been stacked.

Mr Davidson referred to this photograph in his cross-examination of Mr Bedford. He put to the witness that the method of loading would vary and that the witness has no recollection of the precise number of bags put into container 4041. The witness accepted this and that no record of this was kept by either himself or the interline shed and recollection of such details would be difficult. Mr Davidson referred to 2 bags in the photograph being in the 'angle' area of the container (where it is believed the case containing the bomb was located). Mr Davidson asked how the witness could be so sure that he did not put any bags on top those at the front of the container. Mr Bedford said when he returned from tea with Mr Walker he took the container to baggage build up. Mr Bedford was unable to explain why Mr Kamboj had denied putting the cases into the container to Police Officers and the Fatal Accident Inquiry.

Mr Davidson referred to a police statement given on 9 January 1989 where Mr Bedford said that the bags at the front of the container were 2 Samsonite type suitcases one of which was brown and the other was of a similar colour.  Mr Bedford said he did not recall saying it but accepted that he did.

UK and US cave in over neutral venue Lockerbie trial

On this date in 1998 the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, succumbing to international pressure, announced that they had reversed their stance on the matter of a "neutral venue" trial, such as I had proposed (and the Libyan Government, and the Libyan lawyer for Megrahi and Fhimah, had accepted) in January 1994.  In a letter of 24 August 1998 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, the British and American Acting Permanent Representatives to the United Nations stated:

"....  in the interest of resolving this situation in a way which will allow justice to be done, our Governments are prepared, as an exceptional measure, to arrange for the two accused to be tried before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands.  After close consultation with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, we are pleased to confirm that the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands has agreed to facilitate arrangements for such a court.  It would be a Scottish court and would follow normal Scots law and procedure in every respect except for the replacement of the jury by a panel of three Scottish High Court judges.  The Scottish rules of evidence and procedure, and all the guarantees of fair trial provided by the law Scotland, would apply."

The full text of the letter can be read here. A statement by the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, can be read here; and one by the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, can be read here.

Abu Nidal 'behind Lockerbie bombing'

[This is the headline over a report published on this date in 2002 on the BBC News website. It reads in part:]

A former aide of Abu Nidal says the militant Palestinian leader, who was found dead in Iraq this week, was behind the 1988 bombing of a passenger plane over the Scottish town of Lockerbie.

In an interview, Atef Abu Bakr says Abu Nidal told a meeting of his Fatah-Revolutionary Council that he had organised the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which killed 270 people.

He told London-based Arabic daily al-Hayat that Abu Nidal had threatened to kill anyone who revealed his responsibility for the attack.

A special Scottish court in the Netherlands convicted a former Libyan government agent, Abdelbaset ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, of the Lockerbie bombing and sentenced him to life in prison.

Mr Abu Bakr, a former spokesman for the group, split with Abu Nidal in 1989, a year after the bombing.

"Abu Nidal said during an inner-circle meeting of the leadership of the Revolutionary Council, 'I will tell you something very important and serious, the reports which link the Lockerbie act to others are false reports. We are behind what happened'," Mr Abu Bakr is quoted by the newspaper as saying.

Abu Nidal told the meeting that if anyone leaked what he had said, "I will kill him even if he is in the arms of his wife".

Al-Hayat did not make clear when or where the meeting took place, or who attended apart from Abu Nidal.

A senior British parliamentarian has urged the Foreign Office to investigate the claims "as a matter of the utmost urgency".

Tam Dalyell, a left-wing Labour MP, has long argued that the Libyans were not responsible for the attack and that it was carried out by Abu Nidal.

"If these allegations are true they blow everything relating to Lockerbie out of the water, including the trial in Holland," he said.

The group led by Abu Nidal, one of the world's most wanted men before Iraqi authorities announced that he had killed himself in his Baghdad apartment, has been blamed for attacks in which hundreds were killed or wounded in the 1970s and 1980s.

Abu Nidal set up his headquarters in the Libyan capital Tripoli in 1987. He was put under house arrest when Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi came under pressure to crack down on militants after the Lockerbie bombing.

Mr Abu Bakr has given a series of exclusive interviews to the Saudi-owned, London-based al-Hayat since the first accounts of Abu Nidal's death emerged.

The Crown and the CIA

[This is the title of an article that I wrote for The Lockerbie Trial website in August 2000. It reads as follows:]

When the trial resumed on Tuesday 22 August, the defence teams complained to the Court that they had just learned the previous day that certain CIA cables relating to the Libyan defector Abdul Majid Giaka, which they had thought had been made available to both the prosecution and the defence only in a censored or redacted form, had in fact been seen by members of the prosecution team on 1 June 2000 in uncensored or unredacted form.  The defence contended that the principle of equality of arms enshrined in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights required that the defence should have similar access to this material.  The Crown opposed the defence's application.  They conceded that it is the duty of a Scottish prosecutor to supply to the defence any material available to the prosecution which advances the defence case or is relevant to a defence attack on the credibility of a prosecution witness. However, in the course of the Crown's lengthy submissions, it was stated by the Lord Advocate, Colin Boyd QC, that the deletions from the versions of the cables supplied to the defence related only to matters which were (a) irrelevant both to the facts in issue in the Lockerbie trial and to the credibility of the witness Majid Giaka or (b) related to sensitive matters of United States national security.  Indeed, it was for the purpose of ensuring that the Crown were in a position to fulfil their disclosure obligations that members of the Crown team inspected the unredacted cables on 1 June.  To quote the Lord Advocate:

"First of all, they considered whether or not there was any information behind the redactions which would undermine the Crown case in any way.  Secondly, they considered whether there was anything which would appear to reflect on the credibility of Mr Majid.  They also considered whether was anything which might bear upon the special defences which had been lodged and intimated in this case.

"On all of these matters, the learned at Advocate Depute reached the conclusion that there was nothing within the cables which bore on the Defence case, either by undermining the Crown case or by advancing a positive case which was being made or may be made, having regard to the special defence... 

"There is nothing within these documents which relate to Lockerbie or the bombing of Pan Am 103 which could in any way impinge on the credibility of Mr Majid on these matters."

The Court was unimpressed by the arguments of the Lord Advocate and instructed him to use his best endeavours to secure the release by the CIA to the defence of the unredacted or uncensored cables.

These cables were in due course made available to the defence, and on Tuesday 29 August various excerpts from them were read out in open court by defence counsel in an attempt to convince the judges that further CIA cables relating to Giaka should be made available to the defence, if necessary by means of a request by the Scottish Court at Camp Zeist to the appropriate Federal Court in the United States of America for an order compelling the CIA to disgorge the relevant material.  The Court, wishing to avoid the delays which would necessarily be caused by any recourse to the American courts, has instructed the Lord Advocate again to use his best endeavours to secure the release by the CIA of these additional cables.  Only if he is unsuccessful will the Scottish Court reluctantly consider the option of a formal request through the American courts. 

The previously blacked-out passages read out to the Court from the cables now in the hands of the defence indicated that, as at 1 September 1989 (more than eight months after the destruction of Pan Am 103), Giaka's CIA handlers were highly critical of him and of the lack of important information supplied by him.  He is described in the now-revealed portions of the cables as a man in the business of selling information for his own benefit; as someone who will never have the penetration of Libyan intelligence services that had been anticipated; as someone who had never been a true member of Libyan intelligence; and as someone whose CIA salary of $1000 per month should be cut off if he supplied no significant information.  It seems to be the natural inference from this that, by 1 September 1989, Giaka had still not informed his CIA masters that his Libyan colleagues in Malta had been responsible for the Lockerbie bombing: if he had done so, it is difficult to see how these criticisms of his value and of the worth of the information supplied by him could conceivably been made. 

But apart altogether from that, if the excerpts read out in court on Tuesday 29 August and summarised in the preceding paragraph accurately reflect passages from the cables which had been blacked out from the versions originally supplied to the defence, it is somewhat difficult to appreciate how it could possibly have been accurate or justifiable for the Crown to state to the Court on Tuesday 22 August that the redacted or censored portions within the documents contained nothing "which could in any way impinge on the credibility of Mr Majid."

CIA Giaka cables surface at Lockerbie trial

[What follows is the text of the report for 22 August 2000 from the University of Glasgow’s Lockerbie Trial Briefing Unit:]

The Lockerbie trial started again this morning following summer recess. Proceedings began with Bill Taylor, defending the first accused making a submission to the court. He said that cable communications  which had been made available to both the Crown and the defence initially had sections which had been blanked out. It has come to light that the Crown had recently obtained further copies of these documents which showed the full text. His submission was that the full documents should now also be made available to the defence.

These documents are significant as they allegedly communicated information provided by Giaka via another CIA agent to the USA prior to the Lockerbie disaster. Giaka, who is expected to give evidence this week is currently on a witness protection programme in the USA and is alleged to be a former Libyan agent who worked under cover as an Libyan Arab Airline employee in Malta from 1986. In August 1988 the Crown allege that he contacted US representatives in Malta and operated for a period as a double agent in Malta. The defence wish sight of the full text of these cable communications in preparation of their cross examination of this witness. Under the European Convention on Human Rights the principle of equality of arms may persuade the judges that the defence claim for this information is well founded. The question remains, however, whether the Court can grant access to unedited versions of such sensitive information when it does not belong to them. The Lord Advocate has stated that he does not have copies of the unedited documents nor does he have the authority to compel the US authorities to hand them over.

The Lord Advocate addressed the court after a lengthy adjournment. He stated that there was nothing in the cable documents that would either assist or hinder the defence case and also in the interests of US security the documents should not be handed over. He claimed that the deleted sections of the cables related to sensitive intelligence information and operations not related to Lockerbie. All of the judges asked the Lord Advocate questions. It was highlighted that the accused, if given sight of the information which relates to other operations, may doubt its accuracy and this in turn would raise questions of the credibility and reliability of information provided by Giaka.

The court adjourned for lunch without the matter being resolved.

The court heard further submissions from the Lord Advocate this afternoon relating to the Defence submission raised this morning regarding access to unedited copies of cables sent by a CIA agent in Malta to Headquarters in Washington. These cables allegedly contain information supplied by Giaka (also referred to as Mr Majid).

Lord Sutherland indicated that while he accepted that certain names and operations required to be protected and not disclosed in these cables that his concerns rested with the submission of the Crown that the redactions included irrelevant information. Lord Sutherland appeared unconvinced that the Crown were necessarily in a position to determine that this information was indeed irrelevant to the credibility of the evidence of Giaka and the defence case.

It was disclosed that the unedited cable documents were made available to the Crown on 1 June 2000 but the defence only became aware of this fact yesterday. It also appears that the documents were consulted in The Netherlands and possibly at Camp Zeist by Mr Turnbull QC, Advocate Depute and Mr McFadyen, the Procurator Fiscal. Lord Sutherland stated that as the court were discussing a document that the Crown had lodged as a production, he was concerned that information contained within the document was now viewed as being irrelevant.

Bill Taylor, QC, addressed the court again. He said that the consultation by the Crown of the cables in June resulted in their positions, which were previously on the same footing in relation to the cables, now being inequitable. If there were security considerations regarding the content of the cable he asked what assurances were sought by the USA and given by the Crown. He further asked why the information could be given to one side and not the other and referred to the concession by the Lord Advocate that information disclosed to the Crown may assist in the establishment of the credibility of the witness.

He referred to problems encountered when precognosing witnesses related to the cables. This was done in the presence of US Department of Justice Attorneys instructed by the CIA. He said the precognition process was characterised by long silences, by "take 5" (to allow consultation with attorneys) answers of "not relevant", refusing to answer and "I've seen the unredacted cables and had no part in the redaction process". He commented that it was of no assistance to the important precognition process when witnesses are instructed by foreign governments not to answer questions. He admitted that he did not know the exact content of the information edited out in the cables but did view it as material in his cross-examination of Giaka.

He requested that the Judges make no orders but invite the Crown to use best endeavours to ensure that the defence receive copies of the cables with no deletions or editing. He said that having read the document he did not agree with the Lord Advocate's suggestion that the blanked out sections were of no relevance. He further noted that US security may already have been breached by the Crown having access to these documents.

Richard Keen, QC, wished to enquire if the Lord Advocate had checked that the defence would also be able to consult the unedited Cables. He said the US Government had upset the balance of fairness in the trial by their actions. He viewed the Lord Advocate's suggestion that the defence were conducting a fishing exercise as unfounded and stated that during precognition CIA agents had referred to offers and counter offers for information being made to Giaka.  Further, the unedited cables may disclose that some defence witnesses are in fact Libyan intelligence agents and if this was only known by the Crown it would prejudice the defence.

The Lord Advocate submitted that all payments which have been made to Giaka were listed in a production. Lord Sutherland said that the issue was not merely how much had been paid but also the negotiations and the witness’s motivation in giving the CIA this information. These issues are relevant to the witness’s credibility.

The judges retired to consider the submission and when they returned one hour later invited the Lord Advocate to use his best endeavours to ensure that the information on the unedited cables was disclosed to the defence. It is now unclear when Giaka will give evidence as the dispute over the cables will require to be resolved first.

I saw the trial – and the verdict made no sense

[This is the headline over an article by Professor Hans Köchler that was published in The Independent on this date in 2009. It reads as follows:]

I am always surprised when people refer to Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi as the Lockerbie bomber. Even if he is guilty – something which, personally, I do not believe – he would only be a Lockerbie bomber, just one of many people who carried out a crime which would have taken a large network of people and lots of money to carry out. It amazes me that the British and American governments act as if the investigation into the bombing is somehow complete.

But I welcome the release of Megrahi, because I firmly believe that he is innocent of the charges made against him. Believe me, if I thought he was guilty I would not be pleased to see him released from jail.

His decision to drop his appeal, however, is deeply suspicious – I believe Megrahi made that decision under duress. Under Scottish law he did not need to abandon his appeal in order to be released on compassionate grounds. So why did he do it? It makes no sense that he would suddenly let it go.

In my time as the UN's observer at Megrahi's trial, I watched a case unfold that was based on circumstantial evidence. The indictment against him and al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah went to great lengths to explain how they supposedly planted a bomb on Flight 103, and yet Fhimah was acquitted of all the charges against him. It made no sense that Megrahi was guilty when Fhimah was acquitted.

The prosecution produced key witnesses that lacked credibility or had incentives to bear false witness against Megrahi. Tony Gauci, the Maltese shopkeeper who supposedly sold him the clothes that went around the bomb, had been fêted by the Scottish police who took him fishing. The Americans paid him cash following his testimony. The weakness of that testimony would have been a key component of Megrahi's appeal.

We will probably never really know who caused the Lockerbie bombing. So much key information was withheld from the trial. A luggage storage room used by Pan Am at Heathrow was broken into on the night of the bombing, and yet this information was withheld. The British have yet satisfactorily to explain why.

I want to know when the bomb was placed on the plane and by whom. We have to look more closely into the "London theory" – that the bomb was placed on the plane at Heathrow and not in Malta.

It would be childish to be satisfied with the conviction of just one person for a crime that clearly involved a large number of people. I find it very difficult to understand why there seems to be so little pressure from the British and American public on their governments to investigate the bombing properly.

The UK regularly talks of the need to pursue all terrorist atrocities. Yet how can the Government assure the public they really believe that, when they have virtually abandoned their investigation into the worst terrorist attack in the country's history?

We have to know what happened and the only way is a full public inquiry, either mandated by the House of Commons or by an investigative commission voted for by the UN's General Assembly. Time is of the essence. This crime is already 21 years old. To find out the truth we must act now.

A selection of the Crown's misdeeds

[On this date in 2009 Abdelbaset Megrahi was released from HMP Greenock and flew back to Libya. The report on the BBC News website can be read here.

Two years later, on 20 August 2011, an article by Marcello Mega appeared in the Scottish edition of The Sun. It reads in part:]

The Scottish Sun today lifts the lid on a top-secret dossier that accuses Scots cops and prosecutors of suppressing seven key areas of evidence that cast doubt on the Lockerbie bomber's conviction. (...)

Seven key flaws

Denied fair trial

The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission says Megrahi WAS denied a fair trial in their damning report.

They said the Crown suppressed from Megrahi's defence team statements showing how much key witness Tony Gauci changed his mind about crucial details over the years.

Maltese shopkeeper Gauci's evidence fingered Megrahi as the man who bought clothes in his shop on the Mediterranean isle that were linked to the suitcase carrying the bomb that blew up Pan Am flight 103.

The SCCRC report says Gauci was an "unreliable" witness but this was not shown to be the case in court.

They said: "The effect of all of these inconsistencies is powerful. The court was left with a distorted and different impression of the witness. In this way Megrahi was denied a fair trial."

Cop lies

The SCCRC found that police said in evidence they first showed Gauci photos of Megrahi on September 14, 1989 - when he had in fact also been shown them on September 8.

The report said: "This was not disclosed to the defence. There is no statement from Gauci produced, no police witness statements produced."

The SCCRC said if Gauci had been shown Megrahi's pic six days before he picked him out as resembling the buyer at his shop, then that ID was totally undermined.

Diary dispute

In its report, the SCCRC challenges the integrity of evidence given by retired Strathclyde DCI Harry Bell, who had a close bond with Gauci.

The commission found that events recorded in Bell's diaries didn't always match what he said in evidence.

The commission noted that Bell claimed the Megrahi photo shown to Gauci on September 14, 1989, was the first one. This was not true.

It also reveals Bell, DC John Crawford, a retired Lothian and Borders cop, and an FBI agent all made statements claiming that Gauci had talked of a "striking similarity" between Megrahi and the buyer.

But Maltese officers revealed Gauci was unsure, was coached and told to age the photos by ten to 15 years.

The report says: "This is different to DCI Bell's evidence at trial. It also implies the witness is unclear."

Cash for answers

The commission obtained evidence from police memos that Gauci was made aware from his first contact with investigators that his testimony could be worth MILLIONS.

This contradicted evidence given by Scots and US investigators at Megrahi's trial.

One undisclosed memo reveals the FBI discussed with Scots cops an offer of unlimited cash to Gauci - with "$10,000 available immediately".

If a judge was made aware of this in another case, they'd tell a jury to discount the evidence.

Xmas lights lies

In court Gauci was vague about the exact date on which the clothes were bought.

The date was narrowed to either November 23, 1988, when Megrahi was not on Malta, or December 7, 1988, when he was.

Gauci said Christmas lights were NOT on yet in his hometown Sliema when the suspect visited his shop.

Cops said they could not find out when the lights were switched on.

But the SCCRC easily established it was December 6 - a day too early for Megrahi to have been the buyer.

The commission's report says: "It is clear that the police were in no doubt that Gauci was clear in his recollection." It adds "no reasonable court" could have concluded Megrahi bought the clothes from Gauci's shop.

Defence in the dark

It appears efforts were made to cover up key evidence that would have been useful for Megrahi's defence team.

The commission noted that early uncertainty on the part of Gauci was never passed over to the defence, nor was the fact that Scots detectives feared he was trying too hard to please them.

The fact a senior Maltese detective also considered Gauci to be an unreliable witness was never disclosed to lawyers representing Megrahi.

Evidence supressed

The SCCRC claims Colin Boyd QC, who was Lord Advocate at the time of Megrahi's trial and conviction in 2001, suppressed key evidence.

The trial judges maintained Gauci was "entirely reliable" on the list of clothing he claimed the buyer suspect purchased.

Yet a statement he made in 1999, and discovered by the SCCRC, saw him produce "a wholly different list of items and prices". This, along with many other files that could damage the Crown case, was suppressed. The report says Mr Boyd failed in his duty of disclosure to the defence.

Forensics and Feraday

[This is the headline over a report published on the BBC News website on this date in 2005. It reads in part:]

Fresh doubts have emerged over the conviction of the Lockerbie bomber, BBC Scotland has learned.

The evidence of a major prosecution witness who testified during the trial of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi has been called into question.

Three men who forensic scientist Allen Feraday gave evidence against have since had their convictions quashed.

BBC Scotland understands papers on one case have gone to the commission reviewing Megrahi's conviction.

Mr Feraday is now retired after 42 years' experience in explosives.

He told the Lockerbie trial he was in no doubt that a circuit board fragment found after the disaster was part of the detonator.

The trial judges accepted his conclusion.

However, in three separate cases men against whom Mr Feraday gave evidence have now had their convictions overturned.

After the first case, which took place seven years before the Lockerbie trial, the Lord Chief Justice said Mr Feraday should not be allowed to present himself as an expert in the field of electronics.

The latest case to be quashed happened just last month.

Papers relating to the most recent case have now been sent to the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, which is looking at the Lockerbie bomber's conviction.

The commission will consider whether the Lockerbie trial judges should have given so much weight to Mr Feraday's evidence.

Gerry Brown, of the Law Society of Scotland, said expert witnesses were "essential" in cases like the Lockerbie trial.

"It is like a string of beads," he told BBC Radio Scotland.

"You have to have the beads held together by string, and if the string is weak at one point the beads fall to the ground.

"That is possibly the situation here, and that is probably what is being investigated now by the commission."

Solicitor Eddie McKechnie, who represents Megrahi, said the information raised "serious issues" about the conviction.

"It is a factor that I take very seriously into account on behalf of Mr Megrahi," he said.

"One would have thought that when a professional and a government forensic expert is impugned in a number of cases... then serious issues arise."

Dr Jim Swire, whose daughter Flora died in the bombing, said: "I'm personally not satisfied of Mr Megrahi's guilt.

"I emerged (from the trial) riddled with doubts. This will of course augment them.

"If one finds that three cases have been overturned, it rather undermines one's confidence."

However, American lawyer Jody Flowers - who represents one woman whose husband died in the bombing - said she thought the latest claims were "much ado about nothing".

"I don't think it has much impact at all. I think it is a bit of a belated and half-hearted attempt," she said.

"Any serious challenge to Mr Feraday's credibility or the specifics of his testimony would have been raised at the trial or the appeal, and they were not.

"The court accepted his testimony as reliable."

Six years ago today Megrahi abandoned his appeal

[What follows is excerpted from a report published on the BBC News website on this date in 2009:]

Judges have accepted an application by the Lockerbie bomber to drop his second appeal against conviction.

The permission of the High Court in Edinburgh was required before the proceedings by Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi could be formally abandoned.

It comes as the Scottish Government considers his requests for either release or transfer to a Libyan jail. (...)

The Libyan's legal team outlined his current state of health to the appeal hearing.

QC Margaret Scott said: "The court is aware of Mr Megrahi's medical condition in that he has progressive prostate cancer.

"This has now reached the terminal stage and my client's condition has recently worsened very considerably.

"Up-to-date medical reports from three eminent experts also concurred in the view that he has a very aggressive cancer, that his condition is grave and that the prognosis is extremely limited."

By dropping his appeal, Megrahi has removed one potential obstacle to his transfer to a jail in his homeland.

However, a Crown appeal against the length of his sentence is still ongoing.

Scotland's senior law officer, Lord Advocate Elish Angiolini QC, will now have to consider whether that should also be dropped.

A Crown Office statement said its appeal was "entirely separate" from Megrahi's appeal.

It said the lord advocate had not received any request to indicate whether the appeal would continue.

"The lord advocate has always been prepared to give any request her full and prompt consideration," it stressed.

It added that no information had been received about Megrahi's current medical situation which might need to be taken into account in handling the appeal.

Scotland's senior judge, the Lord Justice General, Lord Hamilton, said it was important the Crown appeal issue was resolved quickly.

"It appears to the court to be of the utmost importance that an early decision be made by the lord advocate as to whether she is to insist or not to insist on that appeal," he said.

He added: "The court urges her to reach a decision on that matter without undue delay."

Some relatives of the victims said the dropping of the appeal meant that many questions would now go unanswered.

The Reverend John Mosey, who lost his daughter in the bombing, described it as a "very sad day for Scottish justice".

"My feeling is that I would be happier if he was going home after the hearing of his appeal, either as an innocent man or as a guilty man," he said.

"Either way, my personal feeling is 85% that he is an innocent man - of this crime anyway - having sat through the whole of the trial in Holland."

It emerged last week that the Libyan had applied to withdraw his second appeal against conviction.

It prompted claims he had been put under pressure to make the move - a suggestion the Scottish Government has strenuously denied.

The Justice Secretary is currently considering whether or not to release Megrahi on compassionate grounds or to allow his transfer to a prison in Libya.

He is expected to announce his decision within the next two weeks.