The British, American and Scottish governments appear shifty

[What follows is the text of an article by Lesley Riddoch published in The Scotsman on this date in 2009:]

Kenny MacAskill is now facing an almost impossible situation over the man convicted in 2001 of the Lockerbie bombing.

Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi wants early release from his 27-year minimum sentence on compassionate grounds – he's expected to die within three months of prostate cancer. Such compassion has recently been shown to Ronnie Biggs and in Scotland, of the 30 such requests made since 2000, only seven have been denied. Even though there's every prospect he will arrive in Libya like a returning hero, that must have nothing to do with the medical and legal decision here.

But Megrahi's surprise decision to end his appeal has queered the pitch, raising suspicions that a prison transfer has been agreed instead to temper American anger that a convicted mass killer should be shown any compassion at all. The fate of Megrahi is emotive and urgent, but it is not actually the most important issue at stake.

Trust in government and faith in the law also hang in the balance, partly because faith in Scotland's ability to do big things well is easily dented – and Megrahi's conviction by Scottish judges under Scottish law at Camp Zeist was perhaps the biggest ever moment for our distinctive legal system – but mostly because the official explanation for the Lockerbie bombing is at least as unconvincing as the most compellingly argued rivals.

Conspiracy theories abounded in 1994 when the London Film Festival dropped its planned screening of The Maltese Double Cross – a documentary blaming Iran not Libya – and this newspaper took the decision to screen it.

As assistant editor, I sat with a reporter for a full week, checking claims made by American film-maker Allan Francovich.

Scotsman lawyers needed sight of relevant documents and sworn affidavits from interviewees – including one from a witness living in hiding in Sweden. After three small edits, the film was "legalled" and ready, but our booked venue in Edinburgh suddenly discovered a double-booking. The Glasgow Film Theatre (GFT) stepped in – though it received phone calls threatening legal action from men purporting to be lawyers for one of the American Drug Enforcement Agency officials named in the film.

Cuts were still being made in London the night before the GFT screening – so Lockerbie relative Dr Jim Swire was asked to bring the final version north with him the following morning. Jim had attended the first private screening of the film by Tam Dalyell in the House of Commons – protected from possible libel claims by parliamentary privilege – and apparently sat with a blanket at the open front door all night to make sure he didn't miss the dispatch rider who arrived at 3am with the completed film.

That morning, we got news that the only other copy of the film, held by a human rights group in Birmingham, had been destroyed in a mysterious overnight fire. I travelled with the large Beta cassettes of the film in a rucksack, reckoning that a casual appearance was the safest strategy.

The audience settled, the film was shown, there was a question-and-answer session with Jim Swire, and we held our collective breath. Would The Scotsman, as one prominent journalist had warned, find itself frozen out of Crown Office briefings for a decade? Would we be sued, contradicted, even disappeared?

In fact, next to nothing happened. The Edinburgh Film Festival awarded Best Documentary prize to the Double Cross and, bizarrely, Francovich died of a heart attack three years later at the relatively young age of 56. The "unsayable" had been said: that Palestinians, backed by Iran, may have been responsible for Lockerbie. Like all well-formed conspiracy theories, it shook faith in the conventional explanation but didn't offer a foolproof alternative. And, despite the emergence of key bits of information since then, there still is none.

There doesn't have to be. Our legal system works on the basis of reasonable doubt, and even if judges in Camp Zeist had none, key politicians, relatives and lawyers still do. And that matters, especially now.

The public was sold a pup on the existence of WMD in Iraq, and another on the 45-minute warning. We were sold a pup on the health of our banks and an almighty pup on the promise that bankers' bonuses would never reach those judgment- distorting, greedy, heady heights ever again. Governments lie. Bankers lie. And people lie – even under oath.

The stitch-up exists, but the cock-up is infinitely more common. Conspiracies appeal to the anti-authoritarian streak in the Scottish psyche. Yet most are compelling nonsense. So what is the public to believe?

Scottish philosopher David Hume suggested a miracle occurs when believing witnesses are lying is more incredible than believing their claims. That observation describes perfectly the flawed business of human judgment. In the absence of all the facts, the public doesn't suspend judgment; it bases opinion on the demeanour of the parties involved.

The American relatives are still angry and punitive. The British, American and now Scottish governments appear shifty. Jim Swire alone has demonstrated dignity and tenacity, and he wants a public inquiry: even though no public inquiry – from Holyrood to Cullen, from Butler to Bloody Sunday – has ever completely answered the big questions.

And he's right. A public inquiry, or a de facto inquiry based on a court case triggered by human rights legislation, must now take place, and for one simple reason – the same reason that prompted The Scotsman to show The Maltese Double Cross film 15 years ago – 270 people were murdered on Scottish soil. Reasonable doubt about the full circumstances of their murder remains. So we must hear it.

Never mind what Hillary Clinton thinks, and never mind what ultimately happens to Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi.

US spies blamed Iran for Lockerbie bomb

[This is the headline over a report published in The Sunday Times on this date in 2009. It reads as follows:]

American intelligence documents blaming Iran for the Lockerbie bombing would have been produced in court if the Libyan convicted of Britain's worst terrorist attack had not dropped his appeal.

Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, a former Libyan intelligence officer expected to be freed this week, had instructed his lawyers to produce internal US intelligence communications unavailable to his defence team at his trial in 2000.

The cables, from the American Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), suggest that Iran was behind the attack on Pan Am flight 103, which killed 270 people in 1988, in response to the shooting down of an Iranian commercial airliner by the USS Vincennes, an American warship, five months earlier.

One document that the defence team had planned to produce was a memo from the DIA dated September 24, 1989. It states: "The bombing of the Pan Am flight was conceived, authorised and financed by Ali-Akbar (Mohtashemi-Pur), the former Iranian minister of interior.

"The execution of the operation was contracted to Ahmad (Jabril), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC) leader, for a sum of 1,000,000 US dollars.

"One hundred thousand dollars of this money was given to Jabril up front in Damascus by the Iranian ambassador to Sy [ie Syria], Muhammad Hussan (Akhari) for initial expenses. The remainder of the money was to be paid after successful completion of the mission."

The document is included in an unpublished report by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, a public body that considers miscarriage of justice claims and which had cast doubt in 2007 on the safety of Megrahi's conviction.

The report also cites a DIA briefing in December 1989 entitled Pan Am 103, Deadly Co-operation, which named Iran as the probable state sponsor of the bombing.

Robert Baer, a retired senior CIA agent who claims that Iran was behind the attack, has alleged that the Americans were wary of pursuing the country in case it disrupted oil supplies and damaged the economy.

And so it begins...

"I will never apologize for the United States — I don't care what the facts are... I'm not an apologize-for-America kind of guy." - Vice-President George H W Bush on the presidential campaign trail, quoted in Newsweek on 15 August 1988, six weeks after the USS Vincennes had shot down Iran Air flight 655 in the Persian Gulf killing all 290 on board.

Moves towards normalization of relations between Libya and UK, US

In a letter dated 15 August 2003 addressed to the President of the UN Security Council, Libya’s ambassador to the United Nations wrote:

Libya as a sovereign State:

• Has facilitated the bringing to justice of the two suspects charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103 and accepts responsibility for the actions of its officials.

• Has cooperated with the Scottish investigating authorities before and during the trial and pledges to cooperate in good faith with any further requests for information in connection with the Pan Am 103 investigation. Such cooperation would be extended in good faith through the usual channels.

• Has arranged for the payment of appropriate compensation. To that end, a special fund has been established and instructions have already been issued to transmit the necessary sums to an agreed escrow account within a matter of days.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which during the last two decades has, on numerous occasions, condemned all acts of terrorism in its correspondence to the General Assembly and to the Security Council, reaffirms its commitment to that policy.

On the same date, Voice of America broadcast a news item of which the following is a transcript:

INTRO: Senior Bush administration officials say there will be no early end to US economic sanctions against Libya even though the Muammar Gadhafi government will shortly fulfill terms for the permanent lifting of U-N sanctions stemming from the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. The families of the 270 victims of the 1988 airliner attack were briefed on the status of the case Friday in Washington. V-O-A's David Gollust reports from the State Department.

TEXT: Secretary of State Colin Powell joined in the briefing for the families on fast-moving developments in the Pan Am 103 case that are likely to lead to a Security Council vote ending UN sanctions next week.

The UN sanctions were suspended in 1999 after Libya turned over two of its intelligence agents who were charged in the attack, one of whom was later convicted by a special court in the Netherlands and sentenced to life in prison.

Libya is now fulfilling terms for the permanent lifting of the sanctions, including acceptance of responsibility for the attack, a renunciation of terrorism, and creation of a two-point-seven billion dollar fund for the compensation of the victims families.

The Security Council vote, expected by mid-week, would trigger payment to the families of the first four million of what could eventually be ten million dollars in Libyan compensation for each person killed.

However, family spokesman Dan Cohen, whose 20-year-old college student daughter was killed in the terror attack, told reporters here after the briefing that the money will not bring closure for the still-grieving families:

“I hope you will not in reporting this say money, money, money. It's not money, money, money. Everyone of us, everyone of us, would have foregone every cent of that in a heartbeat, if this had never happened. And it's unfortunate the way the world is structured that this is one of the only ways that these terrible crimes are dealt with.”

Under terms of the deal worked out between the Libyan government and lawyers for the families, the remaining six million dollars for each victim would not be paid unless bilateral US sanctions against Libya are also lifted and that country is removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Mr Cohen said he personally opposed the lifting of the US sanctions, which among other things bar American investment in Libya's oil industry, as long as Mr Gadhafi remains the head of what he termed a "criminal" regime.

However the chairman of the families' organization, Glenn Johnson, who also lost a daughter in the bombing, took a less severe view, saying the Bush administration should examine each sanction on a case-by-case basis:

“At this point, providing the UN sanctions are lifted, our government should take a look at each and every US sanction that's involved, and see if the (Libyan) government's met it. If the Libyan government has completed it, we would like to see them lifted. If they have not, as a group, we feel they should not be lifted.”

A senior administration official who briefed reporters said Libya has made "significant progress" in getting out of the terrorism business since the mid-1990s.

However he said it "does not deserve a clean bill of health" and that the United States continues to have serious concerns about Libya's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, its poor human rights record, and meddling in the affairs of other countries, especially African states including Chad, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone and Liberia.

The official said the United States might abstain in the UN sanctions vote to underline its ongoing concerns.

He also said the Bush administration has strongly urged France not to veto the lifting of sanctions, which it has threatened to do in an effort to force Libya to increase compensation for victims of a French UTA jetliner downed over Niger in 1989.

The verdict cannot possibly stand as a representation of historical fact

[The item that follows has been contributed by Dr Kevin Bannon:]

It appears that the vast majority of parliamentarians, jurists, academics and news editors in the UK - and their US equivalents - have very little idea of the extent of the affront to justice in the conviction of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi for the Lockerbie bombing, in which 270 people died on 21 December 1988. 

Just to recount the basics, the crime-scene was the largest in law enforcement history and police investigations took about three years. By international arrangement, Al-Megrahi’s special trial under Scottish jurisdiction and his appeal were held at Kamp Zeist, Holland in 2000-2001. He served 10 years until his release because of his terminal cancer and following his agreement to drop his planned second appeal. Al-Megrahi died in May 2012.

Here is a summary of matters largely omitted from the general narrative about the Lockerbie atrocity:

Investigation and Evidence

The most important item of hard evidence in the investigation was a centimetre square fragment of circuit-board, found, remarkably, within a debris field of hundreds of square miles. Just as fortunately, this was matched by its appearance to a commercially marketed circuit board from a timing device supplied to Libya. Despite that the fragment remains the only part of the explosive device found, no test for explosives residues was carried out on it – which one investigator described as “inconceivable” and “irrational”. In fact neither were such tests carried out on the fragments of the radio/cassette player housing the bomb, or the pieces of suitcase which had contained it – a series of evasions simply too outrageous to describe as an oversight. 

Despite a supposedly meticulous investigation, both the date of the fragment’s discovery and the identity of its discoverer remain contradictory and matters of dispute. Most suspiciously of all, the police evidence label pertaining to this item had been manifestly falsified, crucially altering its apparent provenance. 

It was never discovered how a bomb was introduced at Malta’s Luqa airport, nor how it transited unaccompanied through Frankfurt and Heathrow - supposedly impossible under security protocols. Instead of solving such outstanding issues, the largest criminal investigation in history has left us with only uncertainties and discrepancies.

A day or two after the Lockerbie bombing, a relatively intact suitcase was removed from the debris field by US officials and taken by helicopter to an unknown destination where its contents were ‘handled’. The suitcase had belonged to a US intelligence official on the passenger list. Four days after the bombing, two Americans believed to be from the CIA, returned the suitcase to the exact position from where it had been removed – a manoeuvre not logged in police records. 

In September 1989 a Maltese shopkeeper, Tony Gauci, described to police the visit of a Libyan to his shop in late November 1988 to purchase several clothing items which matched pieces later found near Lockerbie; these items had apparently been adjacent to the bomb in ‘the primary suitcase’ aboard PA 103. Gauci appeared to have a magnificent memory, and in his first police interviews – nine months after the purchase – he recalled most of the items bought by the customer, the total bill and the weather at the time. Unfortunately, he described in detail someone entirely unlike al-Megrahi both facially and in stature. In any event, al-Megrahi was not in Malta in late November 1988. However, Gauci changed all of his initial evidence in subsequent interviews – changes which were more consistently harmonious with police suspicions and later with the Crown prosecution case. The purchaser’s visit was now revised to December 7 – the only day in the timeframe consistent with al-Megrahi’s movements.

In a ‘photo-session’ al-Megrahi’s picture had been shown to Gauci amongst 11 other photographs of individuals, some of which had been blatantly ‘doctored’ - supposedly to make them more similar to the suspect; even under these circumstances a senior investigating detective gave a plainly illegitimate prompt to Gauci who then chose al-Megrahi’s picture – already known as the ‘correct’ choice to police officers observing the procedure in the same room. This became the clinching identification of al-Megrahi and the basis of his eventual indictment. An identification line-up observed by Gauci was held only years later after al-Megrahi’s picture had been widely publicised, but in any event, the procedure was again improperly set-up in the Crown’s favour. 

Two months before the Lockerbie bombing, an apparent Frankfurt-based plot to bomb an airliner had been uncovered by German police. Marwan Khreesat (possibly an alias) arrested as the supposed mastermind, was a Jordanian (i.e. pro-western) intelligence agent and was allowed to return home, despite being caught red-handed making bombs. One of these later exploded killing a German police investigator, but no reports of an investigation or a prosecution transpired; Khreesat has not been seen or heard in public since. 

Just two weeks before the PA 103 attack, a telephone warning was received in Helsinki about a plan to bomb a Pan Am transatlantic flight from Frankfurt. Despite this being recognised as entirely spurious by investigators, US and airline security officials took it seriously. The caller’s identity remains oddly obscure to this day and he was not prosecuted for his ‘hoax’.

Both the German and UK investigators concluded that neither the Frankfurt set-up nor the Helsinki hoax had any link to the Lockerbie bombing but the obvious artificiality and official suppression of facts surrounding these incidents remains profoundly suspicious. 

The Trial

The Helsinki and Frankfurt incidents were referred to frequently in cross-examinations at Kamp Zeist, helping create a backdrop concerning Middle Eastern bomb threats in Europe, and reminding the court that such terrorists were devious and repeatedly escaped justice. Additional to this undercurrent were a cohort of invisible Crown witnesses: three CIA agents and three more from the former East German STASI - gave evidence concealed behind screens, under pseudonyms and with their voices disguised – all for unexplained reasons. Three more CIA agents, similarly pseudo-named, did not attend court but supplied written statements. Several other Crown witnesses were so vaguely identified in court as to remain obscure. 

Four Crown witnesses were described as liars in open court without objection – because it was transparently obvious. A director of the company which supplied the Lockerbie bomb timer had been shown to have conspired to falsely implicate Libya in the Lockerbie bombing during the investigation. In another incident the same witness claimed to have contacted the CIA with another false story implicating Gaddafi and his security chief Abdullah Senoussi in the Lockerbie attack. These clumsy acts of espionage were justly treated as laughable by the Defence. For all practical purposes, witnesses at Kamp Zeist were free from risk of perjury charges which would normally be applicable in Criminal trials in Scotland. 

One major Crown witness, Abu Talb, was serving a life sentence for a terrorist murder and two more (a Mr. ‘Wenzel’ and one Mansour El Saber) had each been party to preparing explosive devices for terrorist purposes – so it was claimed.  Her Majesty’s prosecutors had never before been propped-up by such a motley collection of crooks and spooks.

The bomb’s introduction at Malta’s international airport was never established but the judges, like the police before them, decided that this is what must have happened because of al-Megrahi’s ‘identification’ by Tony Gauci. This highly improbable arrangement diverted the investigation away from straightforward, circumstantial evidence that the bomb was introduced at Heathrow – the most logical scenario, but of course entailing an entirely different conspiracy.

Despite facing 227 Crown witnesses, al-Megrahi, mild-mannered and of previous good character, was advised to say nothing in his defence – a suicidal defence strategy designed for jury trials of gangsters or otherwise ‘open and shut’ cases. Of only three witnesses who testified on behalf of the Defence, two were FBI men, whose organisation was backing the prosecution. 

The trial and appeal, among the most extensive in the UK’s legal history, were made considerably more lengthy and costly by the attendance of irrelevant Crown witnesses and vast tracts of waffle on points of law and case citations emanating from al-Megrahi’s advocate, without any perceptible contribution to al-Megrahi’s defence. Stupendous weaknesses in the Crown case went unchallenged, in particular Gauci’s contradictory police statements, details of which were almost entirely evaded in cross-examination.

Al-Megrahi’s appeal was prepared in such a way that it was doomed to fail – as even the judges themselves emphasised in their verdict.

After the trial and appeal, Gauci was paid ‘in excess of $2 million’ by the US department of Justice for helping the investigation - his brother received $1 million despite not appearing in court - such payments are not legitimate under Scottish law and if a witness has been promised, or has formed expectations about receiving such payment it should be disclosed to the defence, having significant relevance to the witness’s credibility. Other witnesses received substantial benefits for their information or testimony, whether in the form of money from the US or fishing trips and fancy hotel stays in Scotland, laid on by the police. 

The CIA’s witness

Crown witness Majid Giaka worked for the JSO (the Libyan external security organisation) and was on secondment with Libyan Arab Airlines in Malta around the time of the bombing. He was also a CIA mole and as a former colleague of the accused he was regarded as a principal Crown witness at trial. Giaka’s evidence included his sight of a box of TNT in the office drawer of the second accused; the Libyan Consul in Malta seen handling the same explosives; Libyan senior security officials speaking of surreptitiously placing a bag on an ‘English’ aircraft, and the two accused couriering a Samsonite suitcase – the same as the suspect suitcase - into Malta’s Luca airport from Libya. This might have been damning evidence were it to have been credible.

In preparing their case, the Defence, acquired copies of 25 redacted CIA reports or ‘cables’ understanding that these represented all relevant material on Giaka, and believing that the redactions were mere security formalities. However, Defence advocates accidentally got wind of the fact that the Crown had been shown greatly extended versions of the CIA cables at a ‘secret’ meeting at the US embassy. This was against the rule of ‘equality of arms’ - fundamental to the principles of fairness in an adversarial trial. The failure to notify the defence and arrange for the exposed cables to be shared was a duplicitous and illegitimate act in any event. The chief prosecutor Lord Advocate Colin Boyd was then obliged to make a statement admitting his responsibility for the issue but he belittled the significance of the redactions – telling the court that “While they may have been of significance to the Central Intelligence Agency, they had no significance whatsoever to the case”. 

This statement from the chief prosecutor, Scotland’s Lord Advocate, proved to be an outstanding misrepresentation. The court was left in the humiliating position of having to petition the CIA to reveal the redactions for the benefit of the Defence. After only a brief scan of the exposed passages Richard Keen QC for the second accused, was scathing about what had become ‘abundantly clear’:

‘…what is now disclosed is, in many instances, highly relevant to the Defence, and I frankly find it inconceivable that it could have been thought otherwise…Some of the material, which is now disclosed, goes to the very heart of material aspects of this case, not just to issues of credibility and reliability but beyond...’ 

The revelations showed that the CIA themselves had considerable doubts about Majid Giaka, believing he was a smuggler, was milking them for thousands of dollars and supplying little useful information, but plenty which was implausible. It was revealed that a further 11 cables featuring Giaka’s behaviour had been withheld from the Defence. The judge’s conclusions describe the man who had been posited as second principal Crown witness in the trial of the century. Majid Giaka attempted to give a ‘false impression of his importance within the JSO’. He had told the CIA that he had been in the JSO ‘secret files section’ when in fact he was in ‘vehicle maintenance’. He falsely claimed to be on familiar terms with senior JSO officials – and to be related to Libya’s former King Idris – which he was not. Giaka’s claims were ‘at best grossly exaggerated, at worst simply untrue’ the judges noted, and he was ‘largely motivated by financial considerations’. 

Inviting the CIA to assist with the Lockerbie investigation was an extraordinary error of judgement by the Scottish authorities. If the Kamp Zeist bench imagined the CIA to be a bona fide intelligence agency gathering information about security threats, they were mistaken. The US defence department has considerably greater, genuine intelligence resources to inform its defence department and government of such threats. The CIA is in fact a civilian institution, specialising in clandestine operations serving the interests, including the political interests, of the White House. The CIA’s ambit includes disinformation and propaganda and it has been infamous for manipulating events solely in the interests of the USA. Its methods have involved bribery, intimidation and murder and various other criminal means. Historically the CIA has assisted in the overthrow of benign governments – even those of democratic states and NATO members – and to have helped replace them with ruthless military juntas or corrupt and murderous oligarchs. 

The CIA’s contribution to the indictment of al-Megrahi was quite remarkable: the CIA came up with the commercial timing device brand which was matched to the circuit board fragment found near Lockerbie. The CIA also unearthed the photograph of al-Megrahi which led to his identification by the eyewitness. The CIA would also have supplied the court with the Crown’s principal witness but were exposed withholding the fact that Giaka was a liar. 

The CIA, whose personnel had tampered with the crime scene itself, have no place whatsoever in either assisting police investigations or in the gathering of information for use as evidence in criminal trials, most especially those in foreign jurisdictions, and with political implications. 

Expert views

Most citizens understand that a criminal trial is supposed to include a transparent examination and exposition of facts. Whence a conviction is reached, there should not be lingering doubts about the verdict. Every jurist, lawyer, academic investigator or researcher who has examined or analysed al-Megrahi’s conviction has reasoned that it represent an outstandingly blatant and audacious miscarriage of justice. These include:

• Robert Black QC, Professor Emeritus of Scottish Law at Edinburgh University, former General Editor of The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia and frequently referred to as ‘the architect of the Lockerbie trial’ - has described its verdict as ‘a disgrace and an outrage’.
• Britain’s most celebrated defence lawyer Gareth Peirce, whose advocacy led to the overturn some of Britain’s most infamous miscarriages of justice, called the Lockerbie trial outcome ‘the death of justice’. As well as describing certain aspects of the forensic investigations as ‘disgraceful’ she refers to political interference, believing that al-Megrahi was returned to his home in Libya because it suited Britain: She wrote: ‘The political furore has been very obviously contrived, since both the British and American governments know perfectly well the history of how and for what reasons he came to be prosecuted’
• American media analyst and economist, Emeritus Prof. Edward S. Herman addressed the CIA’s attempt to withhold from the court, evidence about Giaka’s character: ‘Only under considerable court pressure did they produce a limited number of documents which showed Giaka to have been an incorrigible liar and the CIA, The United States and prosecuting attorneys, to be dishonest’.
• Former US international lawyer and jurist Professor Michael P. Scharf, who had worked with the State Department on preparations for the indictment of the Lockerbie suspects, later formed the opinion that these were not based so much on evidence ‘...but rather on representations from the CIA and FBI and the Department of Justice about what the case would prove, and did prove.’ About Majid Giaka he declared: “It wasn’t until the trial that I learned this guy was a nut-job and that the CIA had absolutely no confidence in him and that they knew he was a liar.”
• Dr. Hans Köchler is one of Europe’s most eminent authorities on international law, in which he has made major contributions to the development of legal infrastructure. Reporting on his observations of the entire Camp Zeist proceedings on behalf of the UN, he wrote: ‘…foreign governments or (secret) governmental agencies may have been allowed, albeit indirectly, to determine, to a considerable extent, which evidence was made available to the Court.’ Dr Köchler described the verdict as ‘totally incomprehensible…a spectacular case of a miscarriage of justice.’
• Len Murray, now retired as one of Scotland’s most distinguished and experienced lawyers, found it inexplicable that the Court could ‘have drawn so many adverse inferences against the accused when there were other explanations that were just as likely...’. Mr. Murray believed that the court’s finding of the crucial date - on which the eyewitness controversially identified al-Megrahi - was established by a means which ‘bordered on the perverse’.
• Eddie MacKechnie, solicitor to al-Megrahi’s acquitted co-accused said: ‘This case was intelligence driven and the conduct of the CIA and other clandestine bodies had a very significant impact…the supposed evidence….was wholly inadequate and contrived’.
• Ian Hamilton QC. Former rector of Aberdeen University wrote: ‘‘I don’t think there’s a lawyer in Scotland who now believes that Mr. Megrahi was justly convicted’.

These eminent people are experts in their fields and mostly involved either directly with the Lockerbie case itself or with special knowledge of Scottish law, international law or terrorist trials. 

Undeniably, other jurists, terrorism experts or commentators have made public statements in support of al-Megrahi’s conviction, but these have avoided factual analyses, offering instead their confidence in due process of law:

• Anthony Aust was legal adviser to the UK’s UN Mission and later to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office department. Writing in a law journal he applauded the ‘ingenious use of international law’ in bringing the accused to justice - in fact the Kamp Zeist court was specifically an application of Scotland’s municipal law to an international case. Mr. Aust describes the trial as ‘This example of what can be achieved in the cause of justice...’
• Lord Advocate Colin Boyd QC, Scotland’s chief prosecutor in the Lockerbie trial, took a very similar view: “…these proceedings have demonstrated what the judicial process can achieve when the international community acts together…I hope that this can be the enduring legacy of the Lockerbie trial. It is one that cannot and must not be forgotten”.
• Stephen Emerson, a former staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and author is Director of the Investigative Project on Terrorism which focuses on ‘Islamic and Middle Eastern terrorist groups’. While describing the Lockerbie forensic investigation as ‘meticulous’ Emerson frankly outlined his analytical priorities: ‘Rather than detail the actual components of the investigation, it is helpful to step back and consider the Pan Am 103 investigation and trial from a cost-benefit analysis perspective to determine whether U.S. interests were ultimately served’.

More recently Prime Minister David Cameron referred to Stephen Emerson as ‘a complete idiot’ for describing Birmingham, UK as “...totally Muslim where non-Muslims just don’t go in” on a US News broadcast.

Those who knew al-Megrahi personally have testified as to his good character. Investigative journalist John Ashton researched for a TV documentary about the Lockerbie bombing in the 90s and co-authored two seminal books about the affair and did research for Al-Megrahi’s legal team in preparation for his second appeal. He attested to the decency and integrity of al-Megrahi in August 2011:

‘I am as certain as I can be that al-Megrahi is innocent. His good manners and cooperative behavior won him respect from prison officers and inmates alike and he strongly desires to clear his name.’

Former Scottish Police Detective George Thomson researched for and interviewed contributors to the Al Jazzera film documentary Lockerbie: Case closed, including al-Megrahi himself. Thompson’s emotional, affectionate portrayal of al-Megrahi in the opening and closing minutes of the film fully substantiates the magnanimous, forgiving statements of al-Megrahi himself from his deathbed. I strongly recommend anyone to see Lockerbie Case closed and judge for themselves the sincerity of al-Megrahi’s comments.

See: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/2012/02/20122286572242641.html

Al-Megrahi’s conviction was not merely based on weak circumstantial evidence but on a collection of stark falsehoods and transparent absurdities. Once the imaginary ‘identification’ evidence against al-Megrahi had been authorised, the remaining case was constructed around it - in particular the evidence pertaining to the fragment of the bomb itself, which is contradictory in every aspect of its appearance throughout the investigation.

In the context of the conspicuous improprieties in both investigation and trial - the falsification of evidence and documents, the gaps in the forensic evidence, the contradictory testimony, the unknown witnesses, and the extent of circumstantial and hearsay evidence - the verdict cannot possibly stand as a representation of historical fact. 

Unlike most criminal trials, the outcome of the Lockerbie trial has had profound connotations for the development of foreign and security policies of the UK and the USA. It has strongly influenced popular and governmental attitudes to Middle Eastern terrorism, Islam, and the Arabic-speaking peoples in general. Based on the obvious discrepancies pervading the Lockerbie case, then even history itself appears to have been bent and continues on a perilously misguided course. 

I invite any jurist or expert to be the first to defend the conviction of al-Megrahi on a factual, analytical basis. I also invite members of the SCCRC or the Scottish Judiciary to respond informally or otherwise, to matters raised here, which are based entirely on either reputable, published sources or from notes made from the Kamp Zeist trial transcript or extracts from it. 

Hopefully, in the name of justice and humanity - and common sense - the Scottish or UK authorities will soon make a courageous decision leading to a root-and-branch review of this case. Taking no action is the most perilous option.

A furious reaction from the usual suspects

[What follows is the text of an article by Alex Massie published on this date in 2009 in the Coffee House section of The Spectator website:]

Back when I worked at Scotland on Sunday I was never the Lockerbie Guy. Nor was I even the Lockerbie Guy’s Assistant. For years every paper needed a Lockerbie specialist, not least because having one ensured that the rest of us didn’t have to follow the tortuously complicated story any more closely than the readers. Which is to say, I don’t know the extent of Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi’s involvement, though clearly even if he was involved he wasn’t the fellow who ordered or thought of the mission.

Still, the speculation that he might be released on compassionate grounds – he has been diagnosed with incurable prostate cancer – has provoked a furious reaction from some of the usual suspects. Con Coughlin, for instance, considers his potential release a "humiliating episode" and wonders if Megrahi, far from dying, might "suddenly make a miraculous recovery the moment he sets foot back in Libya". Does Con really think Megrahi has faked his own cancer? Perhaps!

Still, Coughlin is more restrained than Nile Gardiner who writes:

It would send completely the wrong signal to terrorists across the world that the West doesn’t even have the stomach to keep them in jail for more than a few years. Such a move will only encourage future terrorist attacks, and embolden our enemies.

It also defies belief that the United States government (most of the victims were American) would agree to such a deal being struck, though it could well be part of the Obama administration’s broader strategy of engagement with dictatorial regimes, including Libya. Barack Obama recently shook hands with Gadaffi at the G8 summit in Italy.

It is important in the coming days that US Senators and Congressmen, as well as British MPs, speak out against any release for Megrahi, and demand that he serve the rest of his days behind bars on British soil. David Cameron should also make his voice heard on the issue and call for a full explanation from the Brown government.

The families of those who were viciously murdered over Lockerbie deserve to be given a huge say over the fate of Megrahi – there appears to be little indication they have been fully consulted on the matter. The release of such a brutal terrorist, with the blood of hundreds of innocents on his hands, would be an affront to civilized values and a dangerous gesture of surrender to terrorism.

Frankly, it is hard to see how any decision made by Kenny MacAskill (the Scottish Justice Secretary) is going to have much impact upon international terrorism. For good or for ill. Perhaps we should keep Megrahi in jail even after he has died? That would show the terrorists that we’re serious!

I also find it curious that Gardiner seems to think that the American administration should have the power to decide what is, despite the international elements to the case, a decision for the Scottish legal and political systems. I dare say the Americans have been consulted, but unlike Gardiner, I don’t think that means giving them the power of veto. (It’s also worth remembering that it was the Bush administration that began the rapprochement with Libya, not Obama.)

Nor for that matter is there much point calling for a "full explanation from the Brown government" since, as Gardiner must know, it’s not a matter for Jack Straw to decide either. Equally, if permitting a man with terminal cancer the luxury of dying at home constitutes a "dangerous gesture of surrender to terrorism" then, really, we’re losing our minds. By this standard, letting Megrahi appeal his conviction must also be considered a dangerously naive, soft-on-terrorism decision. 

One final point: it’s interesting to ask who leaked this? Was it MacAskill wanting to "soften up" public opinion in advance of letting Megrahi go home, or was it a senior civil servant (or someone else) hoping to provoke a backlash against the idea and keep Megrahi in Scotland until he dies?