"The destruction of Flight 103 may well have been preventable"

[On this date in 1990, the Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (PCAST) presented its report to President George H W Bush. The full report can be read here. A report in The Washington Post the following day reads in part:]

A presidential commission yesterday placed much of the blame for the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on a "seriously flawed" aviation security system, beginning with inept and confused Pan Am security at Frankfurt and London and compounded by the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to enforce its rules.

"The destruction of Flight 103 may well have been preventable," the commission said. (...)

The commission found fault throughout the government, from the FAA to the State Department, which it blamed for failing to adequately aid and inform the families of the victims. Only the US intelligence system, including the CIA, did its job adequately, the commission said. (...)

The commission said that for many months before and after the crash, Pan Am failed to follow written federal security guidelines, employed poorly trained security personnel and generally ran a lax security apparatus in Frankfurt and London. It said that despite $630,000 in fines, problems were not cleared up until 10 months after the crash when [Federal Aviation Authority administrator James B] Busey had a face-to-face meeting with Pan Am's new chief executive officer.

"It is astonishing . . . that Pan Am permitted those problems and others to continue at that level month upon month after the disaster," the report said.

The report said the commission could not determine exactly how the bomb got onto the plane, although it said there is ample evidence that an "extra" unaccompanied bag was placed on the plane at Frankfurt. A container of luggage was also left unguarded on the tarmac at Heathrow Airport in London for about 30 minutes.

The commission called the extra unaccompanied bag "the 13th bag," because an X-ray operator's list of parcels delivered from other airlines totaled 13, while other records could trace only 12 of them to passengers.

The report also did not identify any individual or country responsible for the bomb, apparently Semtex explosive hidden in a small Toshiba radio. A criminal investigation continues, and no charges have been filed.

However, [Commission chair, former Secretary of Labor Ann] McLaughlin indicated the commission may know more than it is making public. She said the panel delivered a private letter to President Bush yesterday morning with his copy of the report. She said the letter contained more specifics about dealing with terrorism but refused to elaborate.

[RB: The current president of US relatives’ organisation Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 Inc, Frank Duggan, was on the staff of the Commission, in charge of family liaison.]

"We should be investigating whether crucial information was withheld"

[Three years ago today, the leader of the Liberal Democrats in Scotland called for an investigation into the withholding from the Lockerbie trial court by the Crown of information relevant to Abdelbaset Megrahi’s defence. An article in Scottish lawyers’ magazine The Firm reads in part:]

The Liberal Democrat leader at the Scottish Parliament, Willie Rennie, has today called for an investigation into claims crucial information was withheld from the criminal trial of Abdelbaset Al Megrahi.

His statement came in response to remarks from UK Prime Minister David Cameron, Labour justice spokesman Lewis Macdonald and Scottish Conservative chief whip John Lamont who expressed negative views that Mr Megrahi had not yet deceased.

“However evil Megrahi is, however badly the SNP handled his release and however long he has survived, rather than obsessing about whether a dying man is dead yet we should be investigating whether crucial information was withheld from the trial,” Rennie said.

A petition is currently live before the Parliament’s petitions committee calling for an inquiry into the debacle. [RB: The petition remains live in the Scottish Parliament.]

Jim Swire to speak at Major Incidents Conference

[What follows is an excerpt from an item posted today on Lockerbietruth.com, the website of Dr Jim Swire and Peter Biddulph:]

Jim Swire is to speak at a national conference Major Incidents and Beyond at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham on Wednesday 20th May. He will open his address with a short extract from our book Lockerbie. This is the basis of a feature film directed by six-time Oscar nominated director Jim Sheridan.

The event will address topics surrounding acute trust involvement during a major incident such as recovery-phase post incident, personal accounts and psychological effects following an incident, security arrangements, and first-hand accounts of inquests and public inquiries.

This is a full day event for all those involved in emergency planning, working in emergency departments and those with a particular interest in major incidents.

The dodgy timer fragment sees the light of day

It was (apparently) on this date in 1989 that Dr Thomas Hayes of the Royal Armaments Research and Development Establishment (RARDE) discovered amongst Lockerbie debris a fragment of circuit board embedded in a shirt collar. This became PT35(b) -- the notorious dodgy timer fragment. The story of the discovery and how it was recorded is narrated an article headed Page 51 and its Environs on Caustic Logic’s blog The Lockerbie Divide. The dialogue between Caustic Logic and Rolfe in the comments following the blogpost is also a mine of information.

Mrs Horton's mysterious manual

[What follows is an excerpt from a report on proceedings at the Lockerbie trial published on this date in 2000 on the BBC News website:]

Gwendoline Horton, a witness, described how she helped gather debris in the fields near her home in Northumberland.

Among her finds was what looked to be "a document relating to a radio cassette player", she told the court.

Ex-police constable Brian Walton, to whom Ms Horton handed in the item, identified it as "pieces of an instruction handbook".

Asked what had struck him about the object, Mr Walton said: "It had tiny bits of singe on some of the edges of the pieces."

[RB: Mrs Horton’s find was both significant and mysterious. Read all about it on Caustic Logic’s blog The Lockerbie Divide here and here.]

Francovich film shown on UK TV 20 years ago

[On this date twenty years ago a version of Allan Francovich’s The Maltese Double-Cross was broadcast on television in the United Kingdom. What follows is an excerpt from the relevant entry in Wikipedia:]

The UK's Channel 4 had planned to broadcast the film as early as 1994 but apparently backtracked when several American relatives of PA 103 victims wrote a letter to a newspaper alleging that the film was partially funded by Libya and used a number of "confidence tricksters" as sources. After the Special Broadcasting Service of Australia agreed to screen the film in its entirety, Channel 4 re-entered negotiations with Francovich and reached a compromise to broadcast a slimmed down, 92-minute version of the film which cut material that could have caused legal problems. The shortened version of the film was ultimately shown on Channel 4 on 11 May 1995, but some American relatives of the victims again criticised the decision and accused Channel 4 of giving air-time to "Libyan propaganda." A Channel 4 spokeswoman said the decision to broadcast the film was based on the view that it needed to be shown to a wider public.

The film has never been shown on television or in cinemas in the United States.

[The full version, not the Channel 4 abridgement, can be viewed here.]

"The Lockerbie judges got it wrong, they simply got it wrong"

[The following are excerpts from two articles published in the Maltese newspaper The Sunday Times on this date in 2009:]

The judges got it wrong

A German expert has raised fresh controversy on a crucial piece of evidence in the conviction of Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi as the Lockerbie bomber.

The verdict relied heavily on the judges' acceptance of a brief computer printout of the baggage movements at Frankfurt airport. The prosecution had argued it proved an unaccompanied bag containing the bomb was transferred from Air Malta flight KM180 to the Pan Am flight 103 to London on December 21, 1988.

The expert who helped design the baggage system in place at Frankfurt airport in 1988 and familiar with the operating software has now said: "The Lockerbie judges got it wrong, they simply got it wrong."

In the original trial, the Crown could offer no evidence of how the bag got aboard the Air Malta flight in the first place. Malta had presented records showing that no unaccompanied baggage was on the Air Malta flight in question.

The baggage reconciliation system at Malta's airport did not only rely on computer lists. Personnel also counted all pieces of baggage, manually checking them off against passenger records. Maltese baggage loaders had been prepared to testify, yet they were never called as witnesses.

In spite of a lack of evidence that the baggage containing the bomb actually left Malta, the judges concluded that it must have been the case, based on an interpretation of the computer print out from Frankfurt.

The hotly disputed computer printout was saved by Bogomira Erac, a technician at Frankfurt airport. She testified at the original trial under the pseudonym Madame X. One of the reasons this computer printout was so controversial was that although Ms Erac thought it important to save, she then tossed it in her locker and went on holiday.

Only on her return did she hand it to her supervisor who gave it to the Bundeskiminalmt (BKA), the German Federal Police. The BKA did not disclose this printout to Scottish and American investigators for several months.

The German expert has now examined all of the evidence that related to the Frankfurt baggage system placed before the court in the original trial. The expert, who agreed to review this evidence on condition of anonymity, spent six months examining the data.

Although he demanded anonymity, he agreed that if a formal approach was made by Mr Al-Megrahi's lawyers or the Scottish Criminal Cases review commission, he would meet them.

He was puzzled when he saw how short the printout out was and explained that there was no need to print a very small extract from the baggage system traffic, as a full back-up tape was made. This would have shown all the baggage movements at Frankfurt airport that day.

When it was explained that the court heard that the system was purged every few days and that no back-up tape existed, he said: "This is not true."

"Of course it is possible no back-up tape was made for that particular day but that day would have been the first and only day in the history of Frankfurt Airport when not one piece of baggage or cargo was lost, rerouted or misplaced," he added.

He went on to say that FAG, the company that operated Frankfurt Airport, needed these tapes to defend against insurance claims for lost or damaged cargo.

The expert maintains that even with his expert knowledge of the system he could not draw the conclusion reached by the Lockerbie trial judges in 2001.

"They would have needed much more information of the baggage movements, not this very narrow time frame," he said.

Questions are now raised about why Mr Al-Megrahi's legal team at the trial in the Netherlands decided to accept and rely upon a report on the baggage system compiled by a BKA officer and not find an expert on the system. The Scottish police also did not seek to interview those people who designed and installed the system.

Jim Swire, whose daughter lost her life in the bombing and who has been campaigning relentlessly for the truth to emerge, explained there was a break-in at Heathrow airport, early on December 21, 1988, in the relevant area of Terminal 3. This was followed by the sighting (before the flight from Frankfurt had even landed) of an unauthorised bag within the very container where the explosion later occurred.

"What we need now is an equally clear explanation as to why the information about the Heathrow break-in was concealed for 13 years," he said.

Dr Swire added: "At last, the time has come to turn away from Malta and Frankfurt and look a lot closer to home at Heathrow airport for the truth, for that is what we still seek.

Scottish legal expert says Lockerbie verdict was flawed

The trial held in the Netherlands under Scottish law led to the conviction in 2001 of Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi as the bomber who placed the explosive on Air Malta flight KM180 on December 21, 1988. It was said that the suitcase containing the bomb was transferred in Frankfurt to Pan Am flight 103A which then headed for London before continuing to the US.

"There is no acceptable evidence that the bomb left Malta. There never was. There was never an explanation given by the judges to contradict the clear evidence from Malta," Prof Robert Black said.

Malta presented records at the original trial showing there had been no unaccompanied bags on the flight.

Prof Black echoed comments made last week by a representative of the families of the British victims, Jim Swire, who lost his 24-year-old daughter Flora when Pan Am Flight 103 from London Heathrow to New York's JFK airport exploded over Lockerbie in Scotland an hour into the journey on December 21, 1988. All 259 people on board died as well as 11 locals on the ground.

The legal team representing Mr Al-Megrahi, who is eight years into a 27-year sentence for his part in the bombing, began appeal proceedings in Edinburgh on April 28. They are arguing that the evidence against him in the original trial was "wholly circumstantial". (...)

The Maltese government yesterday told The Sunday Times it was monitoring the situation, while Air Malta said it had no comment to make.

The ongoing appeal was ordered by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission in 2007, after a four-year investigation that concluded Mr Al-Megrahi may have suffered a "miscarriage of justice".

According to Prof Black the appeal took so long to reach the court because the prosecutors and the British Foreign Office used delaying tactics.

"They refused the defence access to documents they were entitled to see and that were an important part of the conclusions reached."

Documentation sought by the defence team includes a fax they say questions the original testimony of key Maltese witness Tony Gauci, who said he sold clothes to Mr Al-Megrahi from his shop in Sliema. It was said the suitcase containing the bomb on the Pan Am flight included those clothes.

The evidence the defence team is seeking relates to contact between police and other investigators with another potential Maltese witness, David Wright. They believe Mr Wright may have material evidence that calls into question Mr Gauci's statement.

At the start of the appeal, the judges ordered prosecutors to hand over 45 key pieces of evidence to the defence in what was described by British newspaper The Herald as "an embarrassing setback for the Crown Office".

Prof Black was not surprised: "The truth would be extremely embarrassing from the point of view of saving what is left of the reputation of the Scottish criminal justice system. Also, the truth would not place Britain's reputation in a very good light."

He insisted that it was in the interest of the British government that this appeal would "quietly go away".

"The easiest way for that to happen is for Mr Al-Megrahi to abandon his appeal and be transferred back to Libya."

Libyan authorities recently applied for Mr Al-Megrahi's transfer to Libya. It came after a prisoner transfer agreement was ratified by the UK and Libyan governments two weeks ago.

A few weeks earlier, the Westminster Joint Select Committee on Human Rights had called for the ratification of the agreement to be delayed, pending investigation into concerns over the content of the treaty. But Jack Straw, the UK Secretary of State for Justice, insisted the treaty must go ahead.

This prompted the campaign group UK Families Flight 103 to issue a statement accusing Mr Straw of hypocrisy, saying the agreement cleared the way for the man convicted of the bombing to return home before the truth emerged.

Another claim of Iranian responsibility for Lockerbie

[What follows is excerpted from an article by Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer published on this date in 2008 in OhmyNews International:]

On May 7, Britain's Court of Appeal ruled that the Government had been wrong to include an Iranian opposition group on its list of terrorist organizations.

In a 22-page document, the Court of Appeal ruled there were "no valid grounds" to contend that a British panel made legal errors when it ordered the removal of the People's Mujahedeen Organization of Iran (PMOI) from a list of more than 20 proscribed terrorist organizations under Britain's Terrorism Act. (...)

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, or Mujahedeen-e-Khalq [MEK], is a member of the National Council of Resistance of Iran [NCRI].  (...)

The PMOI was also listed as a terrorist organization by the United States in 1997 and the European Union in 2002 on the basis of the 2001 British finding against the PMOI. The PMOI believes that all Member States of the European Union will follow the UK ruling and remove the organization from their terrorist organizations list. 

The group is most famous for having revealed in 2002 the existence of a secret nuclear program in Iran, which was eventually confirmed by the IAEA inspectors. 

The NCRI unambiguously blames Tehran for the bombing of Pan Am 103 over the town of Lockerbie. On their official web site one can read the following.

"The policy of kowtowing to the Iranians goes back a long way. It started in the late 1980s when Sir Geoffrey Howe, the then foreign secretary, attempted to establish a constructive dialogue with the mullahs in what proved a futile attempt to persuade Teheran to free British hostages in Lebanon. 

"As part of this policy, the British government took the shameful decision to drop its claim that the Iranians had masterminded the Lockerbie bombing that killed 270 people in December 1988, even though British intelligence uncovered significant evidence of Iranian involvement."

Dodgy circuit board fragment makes first appearance at trial

[What follows is excerpted from a report published in The Pan Am 103 Crash Website on the proceedings of this date in 2000 at the trial at Camp Zeist:]

The Lockerbie trial heard references Monday to a circuit board, part of a suitcase and charred clothing found among debris after a bomb destroyed Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland in December 1988. A spokesman for the prosecution declined to say if the items were the same pieces of key evidence expected to be introduced later as alleged remnants of the timer, case and clothes used to pack and detonate a bomb.

A Scottish police officer testifying in the trial of two Libyans said today that he raised concerns about the possibility of missing evidence early on in the bombing investigation of Pan Am Flight 103. Douglas Roxburgh testified about evidence-tracking procedures during the fourth day of the proceedings against alleged Libyan intelligence agents Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah.

Roxburgh, 63, was the acting deputy chief ... of a police unit that catalogued debris brought in from around Lockerbie and identified pieces that might be of interest to investigators. He told prosecutor Alan Turnbull that “tens of thousands” of items were brought to a collection point near Lockerbie, where they were catalogued and stored.

Mr Roxburgh said he set up the storage centre at Dexstar. It was guarded 24 hours a day and split into sectors which corresponded to the sectors of Lockerbie and the surrounding areas being searched by teams of officers. Any suitcases brought in would be examined by sniffer dogs for explosives as police feared there could be secondary devices.  He told the court: “It would be put through an x-ray machine like at an airport for the detection of explosives. It would then be booked in and given priority examination in case it was going to be required for further forensic examination.”

If there were any explosive marks, for example, the item would be logged and taken to a special area where AAIB staff or explosive experts could examine it, he said. Mr Roxburgh said: “We started off by ensuring that items were not required in the legal process and we started releasing stuff back to the relatives sometimes via consulates but it was mainly personal possessions like rings, jewellery and wallets.” He told how a laundry was set up at Dexstar to clean clothing before it was returned to the victims' families. (...)

Under cross-examination, Fhimah lawyer Richard Keen talked about worries that agencies other than police were dealing with items and that some property was removed by those agencies.

Roxburgh admitted he raised such concerns at a meeting with superiors in the days following the tragedy after “someone had taken off property where there had been traces of explosion.”  But he later said he had ascertained that the “someone” had been from a legitimate investigating authority in Britain, suggesting it did not constitute a security breach. He also refused to answer Keen's question about whether British and foreign intelligence agencies were involved in the collection of evidence.

Taylor also questioned the identity of one American, who was said to wear hearing aids in both ears and told police at the scene he was an explosives expert working for the Pan Am airline. (...)

Two police officers were asked to describe the discovery of a piece of charred circuit board and a mangled remnant of an aluminum baggage container. The special attention given these two pieces of evidence suggested they would figure as significant items later in the trial, when prosecutors seek to link the two suspects to the bombing.

The prosecution also introduced as evidence part of a brown suitcase and referred to pieces of charred clothing, but again did not specify whether these were the Samsonsite case and tweed jacket allegedly used by the accused to pack the bomb. The evidence was wrapped in plastic and not clearly visible to reporters watching the proceedings on closed-circuit television. Some items were referred to only by coded numbers or the labels police gave them at the time. (...)

Alexander Arnott, 57, a former detective constable, said he had been part of a team given a remit to check metal debris for signs of damage by an explosion. He had been assisted by an American, Walter Cosguard, an expert in explosive substances. “He said he was from Pan Am’s investigation branch and had been involved with explosives all his life, so much so he had to wear two hearing aids because he was almost deaf,” said Mr Arnott.

The expert had indicated that a piece of container frame found in the countryside around Lockerbie appeared to have been marked and pitted by an explosion.

Dr David Fieldhouse and Lockerbie

[This is the headline over an article by Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer published on this date in 2008 on the OhmyNews website. It reads in part:]

Back in 1988, Dr David Fieldhouse was a police surgeon from Bradford, Yorkshire. On Dec 21, Fieldhouse heard about the crash of Pan Am 103 on News at Ten. He immediately phoned the Lockerbie police station to volunteer his help and experience, which the Lockerbie Police eagerly accepted.

Minutes later, Fieldhouse was driving on the highway to Scotland and arrived to Lockerbie shortly before midnight. There, he reported to the police station. After having received his instructions, he was sent out with a police officer to find bodies and certify them dead.

"My work began after briefings and involved several square miles of the crash scene over a period of about 16 hours -- ending, as I recall, at about 1600 hours on 22nd December 1988.

"During those hours of the search for and confirmation of death in the case of many bodies, I was accompanied by one or more police officers at all times. We occasionally met others both during the night and the ensuing day," Fieldhouse told me.

Fieldhouse was working to the east and southeast of Lockerbie between Middlebie and Tundergarth, which happens to be the earliest place where the bodies fell from the plane.

When he reported to the police station that evening, he had certified 58 bodies dead and labeled them accordingly from DCF 1 to DCF 58.

"I saw 58 bodies during that period of the search. Fifty-five of them were to the Northwest of a road that runs from Middlebie to Bankshill and only three were to the Southeast of that road.

"I confirmed death in the case of many bodies including one that I afterwards learned was that of McKee [an American intelligence operative returning from Lebanon]. At the time I saw the bodies I made brief notes which included, in some cases, a note of any clothing remaining on them and in every case, the sex and any major injuries visible, such as decapitation or loss of a limb," he said.

For several weeks after the explosion, Fieldhouse traveled on one day per week to Lockerbie to work on the computers installed at the temporary headquarters of the team at the Academy, a school in Lockerbie, in order to help the police identify the bodies and where they had been found. On each of those occasions, Fieldhouse was officially signed, or logged, in on arrival and logged out on departure.

"I always had a police officer, not always the same one, to assist me in the work. The aim was to work out the identities of the bodies I had certified as dead at the scene of the crash during the night of 21st and the daylight hours of 22nd December 1988 by looking through all the information available at the time such as statements, post mortem notes, other reports," Fieldhouse explained to me.

Fieldhouse was told that information was made available on a "need to know" basis only. It is thus likely that so some was probably withheld from him. He was told that the computers were linked to Washington.

"My identification was limited to correlating the bodies I had certified as being dead with those logged by the police. My sole aim in doing so was to enable me to write an accurate report of which persons I had pronounced deceased and at roughly what times I had done so," he said.

Nearly two years later, during the Fatal Accident Inquiry (FAI) into the Lockerbie disaster, Fieldhouse was unjustifiably tarnished by a police officer in official sworn evidence.

Led by Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, the Scottish Lord Advocate, Sgt David Johnston of the Strathclyde police started his evidence about Fieldhouse as follows.

"On the evening of the disaster, and in the early hours of the following day, Fieldhouse went out and examined a number of victims on his own, pronouncing life extinct, and attached on them his own form of identification. This was not known to us until some considerable time later," Johnston said.

The Lord Advocate continued with a series of similar questions that were all intended to destroy the credibility of Fieldhouse. After asking about the discovery of the body of American businessman Tom Ammerman, Fraser went as far as suggesting that Fieldhouse was not a medical doctor.

"Would this be another example of or Mr Fieldhouse carrying out a search on his own?" the Lord Advocate asked.

"It would, my Lord," Johnston said.

"And marking the body of a person who is dead without notifying the police?"

"That is correct."

In fact, Fieldhouse was accompanied throughout by police officers, three of whom he has named. Ammerman's body had been found by Fieldhouse and an accompanying police officer. Both men agreed on the report.

On Jan 22, 1991, Fieldhouse appeared at the inquiry. He had no difficulty to swiftly dispose of all the false allegations that had been tossed against him.

"I would record my thanks to Fieldhouse and my apologies for the undeserved criticism of his activities," concluded Sheriff Mowat, who was in charge of the inquiry.

"I was accompanied by three Police Officers at about 1500 hours GMT on 22nd December 1988," stated Fieldhouse. "One of them made notes for me as I dictated what I wished to be recorded. There were several bodies in a few fields near a monument south of Tundergarth church, near to Lockerbie town.

"I labeled one body DCF 49 and recorded: Heavy adult male, multi-colored T-shirt, blue jeans, field going northwest from monument.

"I knew that the identification of McKee was absolutely correct because of the clothing which correlated closely with the other reports and statements, and the computers that were linked up to Washington," he concluded.

In a letter to me, former FBI agent R Marquise, who led the Lockerbie investigation, wrote: "I would like to know about the statement attributed to Fieldhouse where he spoke of the clothing worn by McKee based on reports and statements and the computers that were linked up to Washington. Please we are talking about FBI computers I assume and we did not have any then. Before we ever had any infrastructure in place, I would imagine that McKee was identified."

Fieldhouse explained: "The quote is very slightly incorrect and should have read: … reports and statements on the computers that were linked to Washington. I noted this at the time of reading the FAI report, but did not make any comment as I did not think that it was relevant, though the sense is slightly altered by the correct version of what (I think) I said."

In the early weeks of 1989, Fieldhouse studied the records held on the computers in the Academy (Investigation Headquarters) at Lockerbie.

He noted that none of the codes (DCF 1 to 58) he had given to bodies was recorded on the computers. He was amazed that all except two of his labels had all been thrown away and replaced with others. "This was astounding to me," Fieldhouse said.

Fieldhouse claims that the computer record, which seemed to match his notes relating to DCF 49, gave the mortuary body number as 225 and although he did not recall and did not note the description of the clothing on the computer file, it would certainly have correlated with his findings sufficiently for him to be confident that he had correctly "married them up."

Fieldhouse told me a very disturbing story. He is adamant that nobody on the computer files matched the location of the one that he recorded as "DCF 12." He is almost certain of this because the body was found at a very particular location. DCF 12 was one of the three bodies southeast of the road that runs from Middlebie to Bankshill.

"I saw 58 bodies during that period of the search," Fieldhouse told me. "Fifty-five of them were to the north of a road and only three were to the south of that road. DCF 12 was one of the three bodies south of the road. I was as confident as I could have been that I had not made any errors, but I do accept it is possible that I misunderstood the location of the body when trying to pinpoint its position on a map and trying to provide a map reference number.

"However, if the police had recorded my codes (DCF 1 to DCF 58) on the computer records which they were compiling, there would have been no difficulty in marrying up the bodies which I had seen and the ones which they had recovered.

"When the bodies were being examined by the pathologist, all notable characteristics such as sex, fractures, clothing were noted, but apparently not my labels. It seems inconceivable that 58 consecutive numbered codes on 58 bodies could be disregarded. Clearly it would have been obvious to the most ignorant observer that they served a purpose and that, in any event, it would have been better to record the details in case they had a usefulness not then apparent to the person recording the details in the mortuary.

"You could not, for example get any results for a 'search and find' instruction given to the computer for 'DCF 12,' whereas it was easy enough to get results in the search for a 'black … face … ewe.' It does make one wonder why they ignored, for official purposes at least, all my reference codes and labels and this gives rise to suspicions that there was an ulterior motive on their part."

Nearly two years later, in December 1993, Fieldhouse gave an interview for a film about Lockerbie, The Maltese Double Cross, in which he narrates some of the events discussed in this article.

A few days after the interview, Fieldhouse was summoned to a meeting with two senior West Yorkshire police officers at Wakefield. Without explanation, he was sacked as police surgeon with a three-month notice.

"In my wildest dreams, I did not realize that I was to set a ball rolling which resulted in the ensuing lies by the police to the Fatal Accident Inquiry about what I had done or about the apparent missing body -- DCF 12," Fieldhouse wrote to me.

The day before the Lockerbie bombing McKee called his mother. "Meet me at the Pittsburgh airport tomorrow night," McKee told his mother.

"This was the first time Chuck ever telephoned me from Beirut," McKee's mother said. "I was flabbergasted. It's a surprise. Always before he would wait until he was back in Virginia to call and say he was coming home."

McKee's mother says she is sure her son's sudden decision to fly home was not known to his superiors in Virginia.

If indeed McKee was returning unannounced, one is left wondering how the computers in Washington had information concerning the clothes he was wearing on Dec 21.