Friday 18 September 2009

Call for UN to hold inquiry into atrocity

Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the Private Eye editor Ian Hislop and former shadow Scottish secretary Sir Teddy Taylor have written to the United Nations calling for a public inquiry into the Lockerbie atrocity.

The letter to the UN General Assembly has also been signed by Jim Swire, who lost his daughter Flora on the Pan Am flight, and Professor Robert Black, one of the architects of the Scottish court that convicted Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi of the bombing.

Both Dr Swire and Prof Black believe Megrahi is innocent.

The letter, which has 19 names, sets out the areas that the investigation should cover, from the destruction of the plane to the trial at Kamp van Zeist. (...)

Today, Megrahi's defence team will release documents that would have been used in the convicted bomber's appeal, had he not abandoned it.

[The above are excerpts from a report in today's edition of The Scotsman. The full text of the letter can be read here.]

Wednesday 16 September 2009

The framing of al-Megrahi

[This is the headline over a long and detailed article -- 6500 words -- by Gareth Peirce in the current issue of the London Review of Books. It is an utterly devastating critique of the Lockerbie trial and what led up to it and flowed from it. Anyone interested in the Lockerbie affair needs to read and digest it in full. The following are extracts.] Only a simpleton could believe that Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi, convicted of responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing, was not recently returned to his home in Libya because it suited Britain. The political furore is very obviously contrived, since both the British and American governments know perfectly well how and for what reasons he came to be prosecuted. More important than the present passing storm is whether any aspect of the investigation that led to al-Megrahi’s original conviction was also about oil, or dictated by other factors that should have no place in a prosecution process. (...) [A] number of the bereaved Lockerbie families have of necessity themselves become investigators, asking probing questions for two decades without receiving answers; they have learned sufficient forensic science to make sense of what was being presented at al-Megrahi’s trial and make up their own minds whether the prosecution of two Libyans at Camp Zeist near Utrecht was in fact a three-card trick put together for political ends. Perhaps the result could have been different if there had been an entirely Scottish police investigation, with unrestricted access to all available information, without interference or manipulation from outside. Instead, from the beginning, the investigation and what were to become the most important aspects of the prosecution case against al-Megrahi were hijacked. Within hours, the countryside around Lockerbie was occupied: local people helping with the search under the supervision of Dumfries and Galloway police realised to their astonishment that the terrain was dotted with unidentified Americans not under the command of the local police. (...) Although the crime was the most hideous Scotland had ever known, the integrity of the crime scene was violated; in part because outsiders were conducting a desperate search for wreckage that it was important for them to find and spirit away. As many police investigations over the years have demonstrated, such distracting irregularities can simply be red herrings, and these intrusions may have no bearing on the question of who blew up Pan Am 103. Was it individuals? Was it a country? And if so which one? From the very beginning, in fact, it seemed that the case could and would be easily solved. Considerable (and uncomplicated) evidence immediately to hand suggested who might be responsible; it was as if giant arrows were pointing towards the solution. In the weeks before the bombing in December 1988 there had been a number of very specific warnings that a bomb would be placed on a Pan Am aircraft. Among them was a photograph of a bomb in a Toshiba cassette radio wired to a barometric timer switch; a number of such bombs had been found earlier in 1988 in the possession of members of a small group with a history of successfully carrying out bombings, primarily of American targets. One group member told police that five bombs had been made; at least one was missing at the time of the Lockerbie disaster and never recovered. The warnings were sufficiently exact that the staff of the American Embassy in Moscow, who usually travelled by Pan Am when they returned to the US for Christmas, used a different airline. Flora Swire, who was travelling to New York to spend Christmas with her boyfriend, found it surprisingly easy to buy a ticket. All the Toshiba cassette bombs that had been seized were found, when tested, to run for 30 minutes after they were set. (...) It was precisely 38 minutes after Pan Am Flight 103 took off from Heathrow on 21 December 1988 that it exploded over Lockerbie; when the remnants of the destroyed plane and its contents were put together piece by piece by the Dumfries and Galloway police, fragments of a Toshiba cassette radio were found. (...) That Iran and the PFLP-GC were responsible had fitted comfortably with UK and US foreign policy in the Middle East. Both countries had severed relations with Syria on the grounds of its persistent support for international terrorism; both had supported Iraq in the Iran/Iraq war, which ended in the summer of 1988. The obvious truth as it appeared at the time was that the Jibril group, sponsored in this instance by Iran, was a logical as well as politically acceptable fit. Then, in August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, thereby putting at risk almost 10 per cent of US oil supplies, and the stability of the Saudi and Gulf sheikhdoms on which the West depended to preserve the status quo in the region. A sudden shift of alliances was necessary: if Iraq had to be confronted, then Iran had to be treated differently and the Syrian regime needed to be brought on board. At the beginning of 1991 Syrians joined Western troops in the attack on Saddam Hussein’s invading army. The centre of the Lockerbie investigation had by this time ceased to be Scotland: the CIA was in charge. Vincent Cannistraro had made his mark under Ronald Reagan, with a clandestine programme to destabilise the Libyan regime. He boasted that he ‘developed the policy towards Libya’ which culminated in the bombing of Gaddafi’s house in Tripoli in 1986 on the basis of intercept evidence later acknowledged to be false. Now brought out of retirement, Cannistraro shifted the investigation’s approach. The suspect country was no longer Iran but Libya, and in November 1991, the UK and the US made a joint announcement that two Libyan Airlines officials, Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, had planted the bomb in Malta on behalf of Libyan intelligence. Douglas Hurd, the foreign secretary, announced to the House of Commons that Libyans alone were suspected and that other countries were not implicated. (...) The key features needed to prosecute al-Megrahi successfully were the scientific identification of the circuit-board fragment, which would in turn establish its origin, and the identification of the purchaser of the clothes in Malta. The timers, the indictment stated, were made by a firm in Switzerland; their circuit board matched the fragment retrieved from Lockerbie, and they sold the timers exclusively to Libya. Everything, essentially, hinged on those links. Who found the fragment? And who understood its relevance? Thomas Hayes of the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment (RARDE) claimed the find (with his colleague Alan Feraday) and Thomas Thurman of the FBI claimed the analytical victory. All were swiftly hailed (or hailed themselves) as heroes. Thurman appeared on television on 15 November 1991, the day after indictments were issued against the two Libyans, boasting that he had identified the piece of circuit board as part of a timing device that might have been sold to Libyan Airlines staff. ‘I made the identification and I knew at that point what it meant. And because, if you will, I am an investigator as well as a forensic examiner, I knew where that would go. At that point we had no conclusive proof of the type of timing mechanism that was used in the bombing of 103. When that identification was made of the timer I knew that we had it.’ This was the claim – the hard evidence – that linked Libyans to the crime. If the claim was false the bereaved Lockerbie families have been deceived for 20 years. On 13 September 1995 the FBI’s forensic department was the subject of a programme broadcast in the US by ABC. At its centre was a memorandum from the former head of explosive science at the FBI, Dr Frederic Whitehurst. It was a devastating indictment of a former colleague. The colleague was Thomas Thurman and the accusations related to his investigation of a terrorist attack in which a judge was killed by pipe bombs. Two years later, as a result of a review by the US inspector general, Michael Bromwich, into a large number of criminal investigations, Thomas Thurman was barred from FBI labs and from being called as an expert witness. Bromwich had discovered that he had no formal scientific qualifications and that, according to a former colleague, he had been ‘circumventing procedures and protocols, testifying to areas of expertise that he had no qualifications in . . . therefore fabricating evidence’. (...) There were throughout two aspects of the investigation over which the Scottish authorities exerted little authority: in the US, the activities of the CIA and in particular of Thomas Thurman and the forensic branch of the FBI; in England, the forensic investigations of RARDE, carried out by Hayes and Feraday. Without Hayes’s findings, the Lockerbie prosecution would have been impossible. His evidence was that on 12 May 1989 he discovered and tweezed out from a remnant of cloth an electronic fragment, part of a circuit board. The remnant of cloth, part of a shirt collar, was then traced to a Maltese shop. A number of aspects of the original circuit board find were puzzling. The remnant was originally found in January 1989 by a DC Gilchrist and a DC McColm in the outer reaches of the area over which the bomb-blast debris was spread. It was labelled ‘cloth (charred)’ by him, but then overwritten as ‘debris’ even though the fragment of circuit board had not yet been ‘found’ by Hayes. The fragment found by Hayes, and identified as a MEBO circuit board by Thurman, meant that the thesis of an Air Malta involvement could survive. (...) No forensic scientist knows when he conducts his examinations whether or when there will be a prosecution that will depend on them; this makes it all the more important that his notes are exact. Hayes confirmed that it was his practice to draw pieces of circuit board where he found them – for instance in the vicinity of blast-damaged material – but he made no such drawings of this item, nor had he given it an exhibit reference number as he had every other exhibit being designated at the time, nor did he carry out a standard test for traces of explosive. Almost a month after his inspection of the timer fragment, Hayes was identifying and drawing exhibits which were given reference numbers smaller than the number of the vital exhibit. He recorded his finding on page 51 of his notes, but the pages originally numbered 51-55 had been renumbered 52-56 at some point. Hayes stated that he had ‘no idea’ when the change in pagination was carried out. The inference put to Hayes was that the original page 51 and the following pages had been renumbered, an original page removed and space made to insert what was now page 51 of his notes. Curiously, a memorandum from Hayes’s colleague Feraday, written on 15 September 1989, to a detective inspector working on the case, referred to a fragment of green circuit board: ‘Willy, enclosed are some Polaroid photographs of the green circuit board. Sorry about the quality, it is the best I can do in such a short time.’ No one was able to explain why there should have been any shortage of time to make available in September 1989 photographs of an item that had been found on 12 May. Feraday’s note continued: ‘I feel that this fragment could be potentially most important so any light your lads or lasses can shed upon the problem of identifying it will be most welcome.’ Again no one was able to explain what light the lads and lasses could shed on something it was most curious they had not seen before now, given that Hayes had recovered it in May. Clearly it could not have been seen by the police before the cloth was passed to Hayes at RARDE and the fragment extracted by him. If Hayes had photographed the exhibit, as was his normal practice, then Feraday would not have needed to rely on Polaroids of dubious quality. The issue of his notes’ pagination was described by Hayes as ‘an unfathomable mystery’. In view of the importance of exhibit PT/35(b), how could the court have been satisfied by this evidence? (...) To discover that al-Megrahi’s conviction was in large part based on the evidence of scientists whose value as professional witnesses had been permanently and publicly demolished ten years before his trial is astounding. The discovery nearly two decades ago of a large number of wrongful convictions enabled by scientific evidence rightly led to demands that the community of forensic scientists change its ways. Similarly, a series of catastrophic misidentifications required the introduction of sound new practices for evidence based on that most fragile of human attributes, visual memory. Witnesses must not be prompted; a witness’s memory, as far as possible, must be as safely protected from contamination as a crime scene. The first description is vital. If a witness makes a positive identification of one individual, no subsequent identification of a second is permissible. Equivocation and uncertainty are not enough. Even if the science that convicted al-Megrahi had not offended against every minimum standard, then the second pillar of the prosecution case, his identification by Tony Gauci, the Maltese shopkeeper, would remain spectacular in its noncompliance with any safeguard. He described al-Megrahi as ‘6’0’’’ (he was 5’8’’), ‘50 years old’ (he was 37), and ‘hefty’; said that he ‘had been to the shop before and after’, ‘had been there only once’; that he ‘saw him in a bar months later’; that he ‘will sign statement even though I don’t speak English’; that al-Megrahi ‘was similar but not identical’, ‘perhaps like him but not fully like him’, and, fatally for any identification of al-Megrahi in the first place, that he was ‘like the man in the Sunday Times’ (in other words, like Abu Talb, whose picture Gauci had initially identified). But Gauci’s evidence was needed and, reports suggest, handsomely rewarded. He apparently now lives in Australia, supported by millions of US dollars. That a court of three experienced judges convicted on such evidence and that an appeal court upheld the conviction is profoundly shocking. Köchler, the UN observer, reported finding the guilty verdict ‘incomprehensible’ in view of the court’s admission that Gauci’s identification was ‘not absolute’. We had come to believe that such an outcome, resting on invalid identification, was no longer possible. ‘The guilty verdict’, Köchler wrote, was ‘arbitrary, even irrational’ with an ‘air of international power politics’ present ‘in the whole verdict’, which was ‘based on a series of highly problematic inferences’. He remarked on the withholding of ‘substantial information’ (‘more or less openly exercised influence on the part of actors outside the judicial framework’) and on the very visible interference with the work of the Scottish prosecutors by US lawyers present in the well of the court. But most seriously, he set out his ‘suspicion that political considerations may have been overriding a strictly judicial evaluation of the case’. All of this harks back to the bad old days when a blind eye was turned to the way convictions were obtained. Al-Megrahi’s trial constituted a unique legal construct, engineered to achieve a political rapprochement, but its content was so manipulated that in reality there was only ever an illusion of a trial. Dr Köchler recorded at its conclusion that it was ‘not fair’ and that it was not ‘conducted in an objective manner’, so that there were ‘many more questions and doubts at the end than the beginning’.

New UN General Assembly President Ali Treki

The one-year presidency of the United Nations General Assembly was assumed on Tuesday 15 September by veteran Libyan diplomat Ali Abdussalam Treki [or Treiki or Triki], a former Permanent Representative to the UN and Vice-President of the General Assembly, former ambassador to France and to the Arab League in Cairo, and a former Foreign Minister. Treki's candidacy was supported by the 53-nation African Union, which is currently chaired by Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi. Further details can be read here and here.

It is to Mr Treki that the open letter calling for the institution of a commission of inquiry into the Lockerbie disaster has been addressed.

Tuesday 15 September 2009

Why propaganda trumps truth

[This is the heading over an interesting article by Paul Craig Roberts on the VDARE website. The one paragraph that relates to Lockerbie reads as follows:]

For example, consider the case of the Lockerbie bomber. One piece of "evidence" that was used to convict Megrahi was a piece of circuit board from a device that allegedly contained the Semtex that exploded the airliner. None of the people, who have very firm beliefs in Megrahi’s and Libya’s guilt and in the offense of the Scottish authorities in releasing Megrahi on allegedly humanitarian grounds, know that circuit boards of those days have very low combustion temperatures and go up in flames easily. Semtex produces very high temperatures. There would be nothing whatsoever left of a device that contained Semtex. It is obvious to an expert that the piece of circuit board was planted after the event.

Monday 14 September 2009

Was the 'Lockerbie bomber' framed?

[This is the heading over a long and detailed article on the consortiumnews website by Morgan Strong, a former professor of Middle Eastern History at the State University of New York and advisor on the Middle East for CBS News “60 Minutes.” The following are excerpts.]

President Barack Obama has said Scottish Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill was wrong to order the compassionate release of Ali al-Megrahi, a former Libyan Intelligence agent who was the only man convicted of the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, an appalling act of terrorism that killed all 259 passengers aboard and 11 more on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland.

“We have been in contact with the Scottish government, indicating that we objected to this, and we thought it was a mistake," Obama declared.

The President, however, did not appear to be fully informed about the Megrahi case, perhaps understandable given the one-sided coverage that it has received in the U.S. news media. Left out of much of that coverage was the fact that in 2007, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission agreed to reconsider Megrahi’s conviction in 2001 out of a strong concern that it had been a miscarriage of justice. (...)

The [judges'] principal stated reason for finding Megrahi guilty – while exonerating [Fhimah] – was the testimony of Toni Gauci, the owner of a clothing store, Mary’s House, in Malta. Gauci allegedly sold a shirt to Megrahi, the remnants of which were found with the shards of the suitcase that contained the bomb. The shirt was traced to Gauci’s shop.

The remainder of the case rested on a theory that Megrahi could have put the luggage on a flight from Malta to Frankfurt, where it was transferred to a connecting flight to London, where it was transferred onto Pan Am 103 bound for New York, a decidedly idiosyncratic way to undertake an act of terrorism given the random variables involved.

It would be a brilliant example of evil genius – or a case of bewildering stupidity – to assume that at a time of heightened scrutiny about possible airline terrorism that an unaccompanied bag would be mindlessly transferred from plane to plane to plane.

For the prosecution’s theory to be correct, one would have to assume that three separate airport security systems – at Malta, Frankfort and London – failed to give any serious scrutiny to an unaccompanied suitcase or to detect the bomb despite security officials being on the lookout for just such a threat. (...)

The case for the suitcase's hypothetical travels must also deal with the fact that, according to Air Malta, all the documented luggage on KM180 was collected by passengers in Frankfurt and did not continue in transit to London, and that two Pan Am on-duty officials in Frankfurt testified that no unaccompanied luggage was introduced onto Pan Am 103A, the feeder flight to London.

Plus, there was the problem with Gauci’s belated identification of Megrahi as the shirt-buyer 10 years after the fact (and only after Gauci had made contradictory IDs and given a physical description that didn’t match Megrahi). (...)

To get the costly sanctions lifted, Libya was required to accept "responsibility" for the Pan Am 103 bombing and pay about $1.8 billion in compensation to the victims’ families. Libya, however, never admitted that it actually had carried out the bombing and Megrahi continued to protest his innocence.

After Megrahi’s release last month as a humanitarian gesture because he is suffering from terminal prostate cancer, the U.S. news media, American politicians and some victims’ family members went into overdrive with their condemnations of what they called Megrahi’s “hero’s welcome” back to Libya.

The outrage in the United States might have been more measured if the U.S. press corps had reprised the fragility of the case against Megrahi, but his conviction was treated nearly universally as a closed case. (...)

There have been examples of the U.S. news media making brief references to Megrahi’s continued claims of innocence but the evidence of his innocence has been played down or ignored.

For instance, you have to read to the end of a recent New York Times article, which puzzles over why Qaddafi had “overreached” in welcoming Megrahi home, to spot this stunning revelation by Dirk Vandewalle, associate professor of government at Dartmouth.

“I remember talking to one of the judges from the panel that convicted him,” Vandewalle recalled. “He said there was enormous pressure put on the court to get a conviction.”

This comment from one of the Scottish judges – indicating that Megrahi was railroaded – was extraordinary, and it might have gone a long way to explain why the Libyans hailed Megrahi as a hero: because they consider him an innocent man wrongly imprisoned in large part because he was a Libyan. But the judge's admission was ignored by most of the U.S. news media.

Instead, the U.S. press corps joined the outrage over Megrahi’s release and published, without skepticism, a harsh attack from FBI Director Robert Mueller, who had been a U.S. prosecutor involved in the Pan Am 103 investigation. (...)

However, the intensity of Mueller’s protest may have been meant more to obscure the weakness of the case against Megrahi and to further discourage the U.S. press corps from reexamining the evidence, including the possibility that other terrorist elements in the Middle East may have been responsible -- and that the FBI had bungled the whole affair.

Despite the fact that warnings of a possible terrorist attack on Pan Am 103 were circulating in 1988, the FBI and CIA failed to take effective action, especially regarding the chief suspect, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, or the PFLP-GC headed by Ahmed Jabril.

At the time, there was strong evidence that Iran was desperate to get revenge for the destruction of Iran Air Flight 655 on July 3, 1988, by a missile fired from the American destroyer, the U.S.S. Vincennes. Though excused by U.S. officials as an unfortunate mistake, the missile killed 290 people aboard, including 66 children.

The PFLP-GC allegedly received several million dollars from Iranians to get revenge. The evidence of this Iranian/PFLP-GC collaboration included interviews with PFLP-GC intelligence officer, Major M. Tunayb [RB: probably means Major Khalil Tunayb] who identified one of the group’s members as the person who planted the bomb in a suitcase that was carried onto Pan Am 103.

Knowledge of this complicated history among Europeans is one of the reasons that there has been a more subdued reaction to the Megrahi release in Europe than in the United States, where the fury has bordered on hysteria. (...)

As for the U.S. news media, it clearly finds selling outrage and pain a lot easier than confronting the difficult issues raised by the Megrahi case. Some journalists also might cringe at the possibility of being labeled “Libyan apologists” or “conspiracy theorists” if they challenge the official story.

An open letter to the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations

“Justice must prevail beyond all other considerations. Beyond politics, convictions, religion, even compassion (and certainly expedience), regardless of one's sympathies, JUSTICE must be the banner that unites us. This is more than pity for a dying man, this is a demand for justice.” (Danton de Vouvray)

In light of the abandonment of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi’s second appeal against conviction for the bombing of Pan American flight 103 over Lockerbie with the loss of 270 people, both passengers and citizens of Lockerbie, on the twenty-first of December nineteen eighty-eight, we, the undersigned, hereby formally submit that the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation institute a full public inquiry, under the provisions of Article 22 of its Charter, into:

• the investigation of the destruction of the aircraft,
• the Fatal Accident Inquiry into the event conducted in 1991,
• the subsequent trial of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi and Lamin Khalifa at Camp van Zeist
• both of Mr al-Megrahi’s appeals and the circumstances surrounding the dropping of his second appeal.

We believe that a United Nations public inquiry into the above should call witnesses who have been both directly and indirectly involved to give testimony and account for their actions, decisions and opinions relating to these events. Amongst others, such an inquiry ought ideally to draw on individuals from:

• Dumfries and Galloway Police and other UK police forces involved in the investigation,
• the security services and other governmental agencies of nations involved either at first hand or tangentially in the investigation,
• members of the legislatures of nations involved either at first hand or tangentially in the investigation,
• the Scottish Judiciary,
• the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission,
• legal counsel involved in the Zeist trial and subsequent appeals, to the extent permitted by legal professional privilege,
• witnesses from the original Zeist trial list, both those who testified and those who were on the list but not called to testify,
• forensic scientists involved in the investigation (particularly from the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment, UK),
• and informed experts whose independent research has led them to develop alternative theories concerning the destruction of the aircraft.

Whilst we are aware that, under the terms of Article 22 of the Charter, a United Nations General Assembly inquiry does not possess within its gift the power to subpoena witnesses to testify, we nevertheless feel that such an initiative could make a valuable and highly significant contribution towards removing many of the deep misgivings which persist in lingering over this tragedy.

Now that Mr al-Megrahi has dropped his second appeal and been repatriated to Libya to spend what time is left to him with his family, one of the last best hopes that existed to establish the facts of this disputed and sorry event once and for all has evaporated. Whether or not he is guilty, the alleged abuse of Maltese sovereignty by foreign investigators employing illegal wire-taps, the question mark over the reputation of Luqa airport, the break-in to Heathrow airside shortly prior to Pan Am 103’s fateful departure, in addition to allegations of:

• tampering with material evidence,
• financial and other inducements in order to secure desired testimony,
• harassment of potential witnesses to dissuade them from coming forward at the Zeist trial,
• the with-holding of evidence from the defence counsel at Zeist,
• political obfuscation and serious economies with the truth

have dogged this affair from the very outset and cast considerable doubt over the safety of the Zeist verdict. We now appeal to the General Assembly of the United Nations, which we consider to be an eminently suitable platform under the circumstances given the international nature of events, to take the appropriate steps to set the record straight.

Although we are also fully cognisant that further investigation of this tragic occurrence over twenty years ago will yet again bring pain to the victims’ families and friends, we are confident that they too will wish to see matters concluded beyond reasonable doubt. We do this in the hope of restoring the stature of justice following what has been described as being: ‘a spectacular miscarriage of justice’ (Professor Hans Köchler, International Observer appointed by the United Nations for the trail at Camp van Zeist). Our faith in justice ultimately prevailing now lies in the hands of the United Nations.

Signed:

Mr John Ashton
(Co-author of Cover-up of Convenience: The Hidden Scandal of Lockerbie).

Mrs Jean Berkley
(Co-ordinator UK Families Flight 103 and mother of Alistair Berkley: PA103 victim).

Professor Robert Black QC
(Commonly referred to as the Architect of the Camp van Zeist Trial).

Professor Noam Chomsky
(Professor Emeritus of Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

Mr Tam Dalyell
(Member of Parliament: 1962 – 2005, Father of the House: 2001 – 2005).

Mr Ian Ferguson
(Co-author of Cover-up of Convenience: The Hidden Scandal of Lockerbie).

Mr Robert Forrester
(Justice for Megrahi Campaign committee member).

Mr Ian Hislop
(Editor of Private Eye: one of the UK’s most highly regarded journals of political comment).

Father Pat Keegans
(Lockerbie Parish Priest at the time of the bombing of Pan Am 103).

Mr Iain McKie
(Retired Police Superintendent and justice campaigner).

Heather Mills
(Reporter for Private Eye specialising in matters relating to Pan Am flight 103).

Denis Phipps
(Aviation security expert).

Mr Steven Raeburn
(Editor of The Firm, one of Scotland’s foremost legal journals).

Doctor Jim Swire
(Justice campaigner. Dr Swire’s daughter, Flora, was killed in the Pan Am 103 incident).

Mr Abdullah Swissy
(Former President of the Libyan Students’ Union in Scotland and Libyan Student Affairs of the Libyan Students’ Union, UK Branch).

Sir Teddy Taylor
(Former Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland and Member of Parliament from 1964 to 2005).

Mr Bob Watts
(Businessman and Justice for Megrahi committee member).

The release of Megrahi

[The current issue of The Journal (a 32-page, tabloid format newspaper published on a fortnightly basis and distributed to all five of Edinburgh's higher education institutions, reaching a total readership of approximately 60,000 students) carries an article by me on three of the issues that have arisen in the context of the release of Abdelbaset Megrahi. It reads as follows:]

Government undertakings and understandings

1. There can be absolutely no doubt that an undertaking was given by the UK government that anyone convicted in the Lockerbie case would serve his sentence in Britain. In paragraph 4 of their joint letter of 24 August 1998 to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Acting Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States said: "If found guilty, the two accused will serve their sentence in the United Kingdom." This letter is referred to in, and formed the basis of, UN Security Council Resolution 1192 (1998)which provided the international warrant for the Lockerbie trial at Camp Zeist.

It is disingenuous in the extreme for Jack Straw to claim that the debate over a deal between the UK and Libyan Governments over Abdelbaset Megrahi is absurd because he was in fact repatriated, not under the prisoner transfer agreement, but through compassionate release.

In the words of the Daily Telegraph's Scottish Editor Alan Cochrane: "If there are questions to be answered about why the British government thinks that terrorist bombers are fit subjects to be included in trade deals and their release bartered away for commercial ends, then that's for them to explain. It is no business of the Nats in Edinburgh, which to be fair to them is what they've been saying to London for nigh on two years.”

2. The memorandum of understanding regarding prisoner transfer that Tony Blair entered into in the course of the "deal in the desert" in May 2007, and which paved the way for the formal prisoner transfer agreement, was intended by both sides to lead to the rapid return of Mr Megrahi to his homeland. This was the clear understanding of Libyan officials involved in the negotiations and to whom I have spoken.

It was only after the memorandum of understanding was concluded that [it belatedly sunk in] that the decision on repatriation of this particular prisoner was a matter not for Westminster and Whitehall but for the devolved Scottish Government in Edinburgh, and that government had just come into the hands of the Scottish National Party and so could no longer be expected supinely to follow the UK Labour Government's wishes. That was when the understanding between the UK Government and the Libyan Government started to unravel, to the considerable annoyance and distress of the Libyans, who had been led to believe that repatriation under the PTA was only months away.

Justice Secretary's visit to Megrahi

The visit by the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Justice to Abdelbaset Megrahi became inevitable as soon as Mr MacAskill decided, presumably after taking advice from his officials, to take representations in person (and not just in writing) from interested persons, such as relatives of those killed on Pan Am 103. He could not, while complying with the requirement of procedural fairness incumbent upon him, offer the opportunity to make representations in person to categories of interested persons while denying that opportunity to the prisoner himself.

Are the politicians who have rushed to criticise Kenny MacAskill for meeting Abdelbaset Megrahi prepared to criticise him for meeting - in person in some cases, by video link in others - Lockerbie relatives? If not, their criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the legal position and reflects on them, not on Mr MacAskill.

The medical evidence

We should be careful not to give credit to those who argue that there are shortcomings in the medical advice which led to Mr Megrahi's release based on his imminent death because it came not from a cancer specialist but from a General Practitioner, for there is a straightforward answer. Specialist oncologists simply are not prepared to tell a patient, or anyone else who may want to know, how long that person has to live. They regard their function as being to provide, or advise on, the best care and treatment for the patient for however long or short a period he may have left. This means that if a patient, or anyone else with a need to know, insists on being provided with a time scale, this must be provided, not by the cancer specialists, but by the ordinary general practitioner attending the patient who must do his best, with his overall knowledge of the patient and the progress of the disease, to translate the specialists’ views into weeks or months.

That is precisely what has happened in Abdelbaset Megrahi’s case. The newspapers and politicians who have sought to read something sinister and underhand into the medical aspects of Kenny MacAskill’s decision should be thoroughly ashamed of themselves.

Sunday 13 September 2009

Archbishop Tutu backs Megrahi release

Archbishop Desmond Tutu, one of the world’s most respected churchmen, has thrown his weight behind Scottish Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill’s decision to release Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi.

Archbishop Tutu’s backing comes hard on the heels of similar support from fellow South African Nelson Mandela, as revealed in The Sunday Post two weeks ago.

In a message sent to the Scottish Government Archbishop Tutu also claimed much of the outcry about the release had been caused by the welcome received by al-Megrahi in Libya.

He said this issue should be kept separate from the decision to release him.

He also called on families and friends of those who died at Lockerbie to show compassion to al-Megrahi, who has been diagnosed with terminal prostate cancer.

“I believe the Scottish Justice Secretary’s decision to release Mr al-Megrahi on compassionate grounds is to be commended,” Archbishop Tutu said in his message.

“One understands the anguish of family members and friends of the victims but they honour their memory more by being compassionate than retributive,” he added.

“The outcry has been caused not so much by the release as by the welcome he got in Libya. These two issues should be separated.”

A spokesman for First Minister Alex Salmond said Archbishop Tutu’s remarks were welcome and added, “More and more people in Scotland support the decision.

“Approval has moved forward to 45 per cent, as opposition has declined to the same level, and there is substantial international opinion in favour.

“In rejecting the Prisoner Transfer Application, and granting compassionate release to al-Megrahi to be sent back to Libya to die, the Justice Secretary took the right decision for the right reasons.”

Archbishop Tutu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984 for his work against apartheid in South Africa.

In 1996, he was appointed by President Nelson Mandela to chair the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established to investigate human rights violations during apartheid.

[The above is an excerpt from a report in today's edition of The Sunday Post, Scotland's largest-circulation Sunday newspaper.

Many other newspapers have now picked up The Sunday Post's exclusive, including The Herald, whose report can be read here.]

Megrahi's lawyers to reveal 'evidence of innocence'

[This is the headline over a report in today's edition of The Independent on Sunday. The following are extracts.]

Lawyers for the Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi are to release within days vital evidence they claim will clear him of involvement in the atrocity.

The development came as Megrahi's brother and doctors revealed the Libyan's health had worsened, leaving him unable to speak from his hospital bed in Tripoli. (...)

Megrahi's Glasgow-based lawyer, Tony Kelly, who was in Tripoli last week, is to publish a detailed account of what had been planned to be used as part of the Libyan's appeal. The appeal was abandoned days before his release from a Scottish jail on compassionate grounds last month.

It is believed there is no single document which would provide an alibi for Megrahi, but a mass of evidence that supports his case. Megrahi has insisted that he can prove he is innocent of the Pan Am bombing, and wants the evidence to be published. The Libyan government is also pressing for the documents to be made public.

Megrahi ‘health worsens’ as bid made to release Lockerbie files

[This is the headline over an article in today's edition of The Sunday Herald. It reads in part:]

The health of convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi has worsened, his brother says. Megrahi is now said to be unable to talk, due to a sudden deterioriation in his health.

"He is at a special ward at Tripoli Medical Centre. His condition has deteriorated rapidly since yesterday," Abdenasser Megrahi said.

Megrahi, jailed for the 1988 attack which claimed 270 lives, was freed on compassionate grounds from Greenock Prison in August.

Meanwhile, Kenny MacAskill is to seek cross-party support to release secret documents casting doubt on Megrahi’s conviction.

The justice secretary is to ask MSPs to approve a statutory instrument which would let him disclose documents currently held by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC).

In 2007, the SCCRC produced an 800-page report on Megrahi’s case, concluding there were six grounds for believing the 57-year-old Libyan may have suffered a miscarriage of justice. It has never been made public. (...)

But even with parliament’s approval, he may run into legal obstacles over some of the documents.

The UK government blocked the release of SCCRC material to Megrahi’s defence team on security grounds.

Christine Grahame, the SNP MSP who visited Megrahi in jail, said publication of the SCCRC report will help demonstrate Megrahi’s innocence, adding: "I hope that very soon Mr Megrahi himself will publish additional material that has since come to light since the SCCRC report was completed which further undermines the Crown case."

A spokeswoman for MacAskill said if parliament agreed the order, "all other legitimate obstacles and legal obligations in respect of disclosure would then need to be fully investigated and resolved before any decision could be taken on what, if any of this information, could be made public by the commission."

Saturday 12 September 2009

Lockerbie questions remain

[This is the heading over a letter from Jean and Barrie Berkley in the current issue of The Economist.]

Our son was killed in the Lockerbie disaster. He was on his way to spend Christmas with us in New York, where we were living at that time. We read your article following up the decision to release Abdelbaset al-Megrahi (“Nowhere to hide”, September 5th). UK Families Flight 103 is a group of relatives and friends of most of the British victims of the Lockerbie bombing. When the group was founded in 1989, it adopted the maxim “The Truth Must Be Known”. After more than 20 years we are still asking for answers to many more crucial matters concerning the disaster.

Members of the group have varying views about the guilt or innocence of Mr Megrahi, which colour their reaction to his release on compassionate grounds. Some think that he is innocent. Others, including ourselves, believe that we are not in a position to know whether he was involved in some way or not, since much of the evidence at the trial was circumstantial and unconvincing to many, including an official UN observer and a prominent academic who is an authority on Scottish law. It is also a fact that in 2007 the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, after considering the matter for more than three years, concluded that there were six grounds for an appeal against the verdict in Mr Megrahi’s trial.

It is deeply disappointing that the appeal has now been—unnecessarily, in the case of compassionate release—abandoned. We were expecting to learn something new from the evidence we understood would have been presented. We still hope that some way will be found to release the evidence and our members are united in continuing to demand a full independent inquiry into the whole Lockerbie story. We have asked for such an inquiry many times in meetings with past and present senior government ministers, including Tony Blair. We were appalled that the ratification of the prisoner-transfer agreement, which stipulates that there must be no ongoing criminal proceedings if a prisoner is to be released, took place just as the first part of Mr Megrahi’s appeal was about to begin.

We are now hearing much talk of realpolitik, but we believe this has been the case right from the night of the crash. Why else would there be such difficulty in establishing answers to questions about, for example, the motive for the bombing of a Pan Am flight? The American attack on Tripoli in 1986 was said by Margaret Thatcher to have resulted in a marked decline in terrorist activity from Libya. Retaliation from Iran for shooting down one of its passenger jets by the Americans in July 1988 remains a distinctly plausible motive. We are told no evidence could be found to involve Iran, but we wonder how much effort went into finding evidence at a time when it would have been highly inconvenient to accuse that country or Syria.

Another unanswered question is about who else was involved. No one believes that Mr Megrahi could have operated alone and he was charged with “acting in concert with others”. Somehow, it has not been possible to establish who these others were. Surely, this is a major failure of the criminal investigation team? There were also numerous recorded warnings, some very explicit, and a prediction from the International Civil Aviation Organisation that retaliation from Iran was likely. We would like to know why the intelligence and security services failed to stop what was described at the Fatal Accident Inquiry as “a preventable disaster”.

It cannot be useful in preventing further terrorist attacks for Lockerbie to remain “a mystery”, as it was called recently by a well-informed academic. And the victims’ families surely have the right to know the full truth about the tragedy in which their loved ones died.

Campaigners push for UN inquiry into Lockerbie

Campaigners are pushing for the General Assembly of the United Nations to hold an international inquiry into the Lockerbie bombing.

Professor Robert Black, one of the original architects of the trial at Camp Zeist, and Hans Koechler, the UN observer at the original trial, are [amongst those] putting together a list of signatories to persuade the General Assembly to establish a commission to investigate.

Dr Jim Swire, whose daughter Flora died in the tragedy, and Father Patrick Keegans, the priest in Lockerbie at the time of the bombing, have already backed the move.

Only one country would be required to endorse such a commission and, unlike in the case of the Security Council, there is no right to veto such a project. The hope is to get an inquiry established once Libya takes over presidency of the General Assembly later next week.

Such a commission could not compel other countries to co- operate but could publicly name and shame them. (...)

Professor Hans Koechler, Professor of the University of Innsbruck, said the General Assembly had set up such a commission in 1968 to look at Gaza.

He said: “As the General Assembly is a deliberative body it has only moral authority and no coercive powers. It could however raise international awareness of the different issues involved and name and shame certain countries enough to ensure they do something about it. It could pressure Britain into holding an inquiry.”

While Kenny MacAskill, the Justice Secretary who made the decision to free Megrahi last month, has said he would support a UK inquiry into the Lockerbie bombing, Westminster has consistently refused.

The Scottish Parliament’s Justice Committee is investigating the circumstances surrounding the decision to free Megrahi but many of the relatives and those involved strongly believe the whole case – from beginning to end – needs to be scrutinised.

Dr Swire, said: “We are preparing something to send to the UN General Assembly and looking to get people to sign up to it.”

A petition is also being prepared to persuade the Prime Minister to back an inquiry in Westminster.

Other relatives of the victims have suggested there could also potentially be an application to, and another reference from, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) to refer the case back for a third appeal.

Professor Black, who is supporting the application to the UN, said: “Theoretically, there could also be another application to the SCCRC – particularly as the commission has already said this may have been a miscarriage of justice on six separate grounds.”

[Libya] takes over the rotating presidency of the UN General Assembly later this month.

[The above are excerpts from an article by Lucy Adams in today's edition of The Herald.

This story has now been picked up by many other news outlets. The BBC News report can be read here.]

Gareth Peirce calls for independent inquiry into Lockerbie bombing

[This is the headline over a report in today's edition of The Times. It reads in part:]

An independent inquiry into the Lockerbie bombing was called for last night by a leading human rights lawyer.

Gareth Peirce, who has represented a string of high-profile victims of miscarriage of justice, said that the forensic evidence on which the Lockerbie bomber, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, was convicted was flawed.

The finding itself was “very, very worrying” and based the same kind of discredited forensic science that was at the heart of several notable miscarriages of justice in the '70s and '80s, she said.

“The [Lockerbie] case was founded on twin pillars: one, that al-Megrahi was linked to a charred fragment of a bomb timer; and second, his identification was ‘claimed’ by a man who could not be sure of his evidence.

“Has everyone forgotten the lessions learned of lawed scientified evidence and identification?

“The point being made by the families over 20 years is that they want to know the cause of the Lockerbie diaster. And at every turn, limitations have been put on their ability to discover it.” (...)

She said that there had been a Fatal Accidents Inquiry in 1999, which was limited to the immediate cause of the explosion so as not to prejudice future prosecutions, she said.

Some 15 years later there was the prosecution in the Hague of two Libyans, where the family could only be prsent and observe. But there had never been a “proper explanation of what they want to hear.”

But a UN assessor appointed to the trial had been scathing of the judges’ verdict, she adde, and of the “atmosphere of political interference that permeated the trial”.

It was now down to ministers to set up an independent inquiry, whether Scottish or UK ministers, she said.

“I completely endorse what the families say, that this country, Britain, bears the responsibility for there being an adequate investigation into what actually occured.”

She added that the fact that the case was referred back to the Court of Appeal by the Scottish Criminal Cases Appeal Commission showed the huge obstacles that al-Megrahi had surmounted.

“It is very difficult to get a case referred back. “He then had a choice of abandoning it and going home to die, or staying a fighting it,” she added.

But it was crucial that the evidence assembled came out. “The families had believed that after 20 years there was about to be a proper investigation. But their wishes have been frustrated.”

Friday 11 September 2009

Why Libya welcomed Megrahi

[This is the headline over an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal by Ali Aujali, Libyan ambassador to the United States. It dates from 2 September, but has only just come to my attention. The following are excerpts.]

When Abdel Baset al-Megrahi landed in Tripoli following his release from Scotland last week, the world saw a single event in two very different ways. Through the prism of the Western media, Americans saw a terrorist being given a hero's welcome by a country eager to celebrate mass murder. Libyans saw a dying man—believed to be innocent by his countrymen and many others world-wide—being embraced by his family.

The misperception of both the circumstances that led to Mr. Megrahi's release and the reception he received upon his arrival in Libya has reopened painful wounds for the families of those lost in the Lockerbie tragedy. It's also threatened to derail years of progress and newly restored relations between Libya and the West.

While many take Mr. Megrahi's guilt for granted, there is a large and growing body of evidence that casts serious doubt on his conviction and suggests that an innocent man may have been languishing in prison. This is a view shared by many observers—not only in Tripoli, but in Edinburgh, London, New York, Washington and even among many families of the victims of that terrible act. This perspective has been absent from much of the reporting that has surrounded Mr. Megrahi's return.

Hans Koechler, a U.N.-appointed observer at Mr. Megrahi's trial in 2001, called the conviction a "spectacular miscarriage of justice." In 2007, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission formally concluded after three years of painstaking inquiry that the conviction of Mr. Megrahi may have been a "miscarriage of justice" in that it rested on evidence that had been discredited. Mr. Megrahi has been pursuing an appeal in order to clear his name. But when he learned of his terminal illness, he gave up this appeal in order to spend his remaining days with his family.

When Mr. Megrahi landed in Tripoli, the reception he was given was not a "hero's welcome for a terrorist," as some have characterized it. Libyans would not regard any man who they believed to have taken 270 innocent lives as a hero. Just the opposite: We would find such a monster to be abhorrent.

Most of those on the tarmac were members of Mr. Megrahi's extended family and tribe who have followed his plight and know he has very little time to live. The Scottish flags they flew alongside Libyan flags were not an endorsement of the terrible deeds of which he was accused. They were a powerful sign of solidarity between two very different nations that nonetheless share the value of compassion.

There were no parades for Mr. Megrahi, and the streets were quiet the next day in observance of Ramadan. It is worth repeating that the happiness on the faces of his family and his countrymen would be expressed by any people welcoming home a loved one whom they believe was wrongly imprisoned in a foreign land.

It is important to reiterate that the Libyan people stand firmly and unequivocally alongside America and the West in the fight against terrorism. As anyone who has spent time with Libyans can attest, we are a compassionate people, and we feel deep sympathy for those who lost loved ones in the Lockerbie bombing, just as we do for the victims of any terrorist attack. We are confident that, when presented with the facts, the American people and the international community will not misconstrue our warm welcome for Mr. Megrahi as indicative of support for terrorism.

[An op-ed along similar lines by Saif-al-Islam Gaddafi appeared in The New York Times on 30 August 2009.]

Thursday 10 September 2009

Petition to set up public inquiry into Lockerbie

An online petition to the UK Prime Minister has been instituted. It reads: We the undersigned petition the Prime Minister to launch a public inquiry to investigate the Lockerbie bombing.

I would have preferred the petition simply to refer to the "Lockerbie disaster" since there are those, such as John Parkes and Robbie the Pict, who contend, on grounds which are not fanciful, that the destruction of Pan Am 103 was caused, not by a bomb but by the explosion of munitions being carried as cargo. This explanation, as well as the various IED explanations, deserves to be explored. I would also have preferred the petition to refer to an "independent inquiry" since the demand that the inquiry be "public" makes it easier for the UK Government to resist on the ground that certain pertinent evidence is so sensitive that its public disclosure is not in the national interest: witness the assertions of public interest immunity advanced by the Foreign Secretary in Abdelbaset Megrahi's now-abandoned appeal.

However, notwithstanding these reservations, I shall be supporting the petition. British citizens or residents who wish to sign it can do so here.