[What follow are excerpts from an article in today's edition of The Christian Science Monitor.]
But to Richard Marquise, the lead FBI investigator into the bombing, the public doubts expressed about Megrahi, who was convicted by a tribunal of three Scottish judges in 2001, are puzzling and frustrating. In his 31 years at the FBI, Mr. Marquise said he's rarely seen a "stronger circumstantial case" than the one against Megrahi, who was also caught repeatedly lying to investigators and reporters. "There's nobody else that I'm aware of anywhere in the world that has such evidence pointing to their guilt," he says. (...)
Marquise says that "there were other people that we strongly believed were involved in terms of the planning process and ordering process.... Megrahi was the guy who was assigned to get it done. We think at least six were probably involved if you only had to make an intelligence case, but in terms of making a criminal case, we didn't have strong enough evidence." (...)
But many remain unconvinced -- though, as Marquise and others point out, there's no evidence to support any of a myriad of alternative theories about his guilt. One popular alternative theory, advanced most recently by The Herald newspaper of Scotland on Friday, is that Mohammed Abu Talb, an Egyptian convicted of carrying out other attacks in Europe in the early 1980s on behalf of a Palestinian group, carried out the bombing.
The Herald writes that the "Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) is understood to have uncovered new evidence that strengthens the case against Talb" without actually explaining how this is "understood" or what additional evidence, if any, exists to tie him to the murders. The article also asserts that Mr. Talb was "arrested in connection with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103" in 1989.
Marquise says that last assertion is false and that Talb's arrest in 1989 dealt with a different terrorism case. While Megrahi was proven to have traveled to Malta on a false passport (which he had originally lied about), and to [have] been there on the date that the explosive was placed on the plane, Talb was in Sweden at the time.
The key piece of evidence against Megrahi was a fragment of the timer used for the bomb at Lockerbie, which was of an unusual design. "There were maybe as many as 25 of these timers ever made -- 20 really with a couple of circuit boards left over," says Marquise. "All 20 were hand-delivered to Libyan intelligence."
Another theory floating about is that the British government squashed possibly exculpatory evidence about Megrahi at the time of his trial and has been hiding it ever since. The Guardian newspaper quoted a Scottish human rights lawyer last week as saying that there is a "secret intelligence report" that "is believed to cast serious doubts on prosecution claims that Megrahi used a specific Swiss timer for the bomb."
Again, it isn't clear who believes this or how they could possibly know such the contents of a "secret" document.
"I don’t know if some of these people are reading too many of these spy novels or what," says William Chornyak, another former FBI investigator. "But a lot of the people making these suppositions simply weren't there. It's easy to say, 'I'm going to assume there's some secret document' ... that proves Megrahi is innocent. But where is the document?"
Mr. Chonyak says he's "absolutely" convinced that Megrahi's conviction was accurate. "The evidence is pretty specific, the guy even admitted using a phony passport, and he was caught lying. If a guy is going to lie in one instance, and you have the documentation that proves he lied, he’s going to continue to lie."
"I feel bad for the families," says Marquise. "They got partial justice."
[Readers are invited to compare the above with Lockerbie: A satisfactory process but a flawed result and The SCCRC decision.
Caustic Logic's commentary on The Christian Science Monitor article can be read here on The Lockerbie Divide blog.]
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Richard Marquise. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Richard Marquise. Sort by date Show all posts
Wednesday 25 August 2010
Friday 24 April 2009
The Dutch TV documentary and reactions
[The Herald's report on the film shown last night in the Scottish Parliament can be read here. A letter from Dr Jim Swire in the same newspaper can be read here. The following are two accounts of the film from persons who attended the showing, and to whom I am extremely grateful.]
1. From Dr Swire
I saw the film last night in the Scottish Parliament. Lord Fraser, Stuart Henderson, Richard Marquise, Fred Whitehurst, Tom Thurman, Prof Hans Koechler and Robert Baer all made contributions in it.
The subject was the famous 'timer circuit board fragment', called PT35B in the court records.
There was evidence of widespread confusion over what was supposed to have been the way in which PT35B was handled, some claimed it had been to the USA others that it had not. The impression was that at least some of these were trying to contribute to a story the truth of which they did not want us to know.
Their stories could not all be true, for they differ widely.
'Oh what a complex web we weave when first we practice to deceive'
For me Robert Baer of the CIA was the most significant. His view was basically that of course it was a Iranian/Syrian job, but that even the USA (and therefore the UK) could not confront Iran militarily over it. That would, without question, have been to strangle the straits of Hormuz and therefore US oil supplies for a start. That sounds common sense to me.
The interviewer of these men was Gideon Levy himself [the film-maker], who showed great skill in extracting a maximum of information from them.
There was one criticism and that was that the film did show the famous picture of a tiny piece of circuit board on someone's finger tip. This is a picture of a shattered piece from a domestic cct board such as a tape recorder. It carried the codes of the former components printed in white on the fragment which appeared to have been of 'Paxolin' (mid brown) and bore no resemblance to a piece of fibre-glass board.
Use of this image will cause some confusion and allow the critics to get their knives in.
Otherwise it gave excellent support to the idea that the PT35B fragment has a very suspicious history, lacking the confirmed freedom from interference required of any significant item of 'evidence' for use in a murder trial.
I was able to point out at the end that PT35B also appeared to be something that could hardly have survived such close proximity to the Semtex charge, and that at least two independent explosives firms have confirmed this. Also that its police evidence bag had had its label interfered with, while its entry into the UK forensic report appeared to have been a hasty afterthought, requiring renumbering of the subsequent pages.
There is also said to be evidence that PT35B was never tested prior to the trial, for explosives residues, but that this has now been done and shown no trace of such residues.
Incredibly one contributor to the film claimed that the failure to do this was ' for reasons of economy'. Can you believe it? PT35B was only the most important forensic item in the entire 'evidence' armoury.
2. From an interested observer
Although the film obviously had the approval of all (or most?) of those present, my own feeling is that it required the audience to already know something – of course it did the usual intro.
Around 18:05, Christine Grahame (MSP) introduced one or two of the better known names. Then hands over to Gideon Levy who introduces his film – played, I think, from his laptop to a beamer (not the BMW variety). His preamble is simply to say we will see conflicting statement between CIA and Scottish authorities.
*Film starts
*Initially just various quotes for effect, giving cause to doubt the verdict. And then showing that he has been to a ceremony for the 20th anniversary at Arlington.
*In charge of the investigation were Marquise (FBI) and Stewart Henderson, Scottish Police.
*Interview with Hans Köchler and a review of his opinion; why one guilty verdict and one not guilty? Initial indictment based on conspiracy, so how could it change?
*Interview with Ian Ferguson [co-author of Cover-Up of Convenience: The Hidden Scandal of Lockerbie] (who turns up at other times in film).
*Chopping of interviews with Bob Baer (ex CIA), Fred Whitehurst (FBI), and Marquise and Lord Fraser; he (Levy) required of all his interviewees a handshake on their saying that they’d tell him the truth. They all agreed (although one of them – possibly Marquise, can’t remember – did reserve the right not to answer a question).
*Fraser says his successors (4 or 5 of different parties) could have stopped the proceeding
*Marquise shown Bob Baer saying he had been a bomb maker for the CIA. He (BB) found it very unlikely that anyone would have a bomb transferred from Malta to Frankfurt to Heathrow and onwards.
*BB mentions PFLP-GC (on behalf of Iran) being responsible after the USS Vincennes/Iran Air
*Why was the agent Khreesat released back to Jordan by the German BKA; Fraser said K was double agent of PFLP and CIA; Marquise suggested double agent of PFLP and Jordan spying agency.
*Ferguson (on film) now says there was a change of focus in the investigation because the U.S. was somehow involved.
*A video is shown of Gaddafi (we have to rely on subtitles naturally) saying U.S. companies have had to pay to get back in to Libya – the same amount as Libya has paid out to relatives of victims.
*Marquise says no money paid to witnesses prior to the trial; does not answer regarding after the trial.
*Fraser says he gave instructions, there should be no money to be paid to witnesses; admits he was conscious of the effects if discovered afterwards.
*Tom Thurman explains his analysis of the circuit chip which he found – it is pointed out by Gideon Levy that T.T’s degree is in political science.
*Whitehurst says that Thurman altered his (W.’s) reports. W. also asks why the chip was given to the FBI when the Brits should have experts to look at it. (Fraser denies knowing chip was ever in USA). W. claims it is Thurman’s finger behind the chip fragment in the photo ‘going the rounds’ – later in film, TT seems to agree, or at least lets the comment of Levy go without any complaint. Marquise says it was brought to the U.S. – Fraser is seen raising his eyebrows!
*Ferguson asks why fragment not tested for explosive residue – talk of cost, but various people waffle (sorry can’t really explain what was going on here, except that people could not really believe cost was a factor).
*Fraser states that he was never satisfied with the investigation that went into the PFLP-GC – should have been pushed further to show that they were not involved.
*Thurman denies that he was thrown out of his job, he retired voluntarily; his opinion regarding the fragment was verified in England.
*Marquise acknowledges “People don’t trust government”
*Then Marquise at Arlington (in company of Henderson) says the fragment was never in the U.S., but the circuit board was in the U.S. (yes, I am confused – perhaps he was talking of an example of such a circuit board). Henderson confirms fragment never left the U.K. Henderson says loudly in walking away ‘culprit is in custody’.
*Film ends, but Levy now adds that he received a letter from Marquise after the shooting while the film was being completed to say that (effectively) to clarify the interview he had given, he agrees that the fragment did come to Washington but under the control of Faraday of the U.K.
After the film, the two MSPs Christine Grahame and Margo MacDonald lead the ‘discussion’ – not much is actually discussed – mostly just points people want to draw attention to. Dr Swire speaks first on the film, and then to the question of the break-in at Heathrow the night before the crash. Asks why there were no restrictions on flights because of that breach of security. Also wanted to know why details of the break-in only became public knowledge (or at least available to defence) very late. Prof John Grant gives his opinion and is asked a couple of legal questions by one of the MSPs. Swire also asks Grant about the break-in and whether it can still be used in argument. Grant wants to know why Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission have not published their reasons – says they do publish a couple of wishy-washy (my words) paragraphs, but no detail.
1. From Dr Swire
I saw the film last night in the Scottish Parliament. Lord Fraser, Stuart Henderson, Richard Marquise, Fred Whitehurst, Tom Thurman, Prof Hans Koechler and Robert Baer all made contributions in it.
The subject was the famous 'timer circuit board fragment', called PT35B in the court records.
There was evidence of widespread confusion over what was supposed to have been the way in which PT35B was handled, some claimed it had been to the USA others that it had not. The impression was that at least some of these were trying to contribute to a story the truth of which they did not want us to know.
Their stories could not all be true, for they differ widely.
'Oh what a complex web we weave when first we practice to deceive'
For me Robert Baer of the CIA was the most significant. His view was basically that of course it was a Iranian/Syrian job, but that even the USA (and therefore the UK) could not confront Iran militarily over it. That would, without question, have been to strangle the straits of Hormuz and therefore US oil supplies for a start. That sounds common sense to me.
The interviewer of these men was Gideon Levy himself [the film-maker], who showed great skill in extracting a maximum of information from them.
There was one criticism and that was that the film did show the famous picture of a tiny piece of circuit board on someone's finger tip. This is a picture of a shattered piece from a domestic cct board such as a tape recorder. It carried the codes of the former components printed in white on the fragment which appeared to have been of 'Paxolin' (mid brown) and bore no resemblance to a piece of fibre-glass board.
Use of this image will cause some confusion and allow the critics to get their knives in.
Otherwise it gave excellent support to the idea that the PT35B fragment has a very suspicious history, lacking the confirmed freedom from interference required of any significant item of 'evidence' for use in a murder trial.
I was able to point out at the end that PT35B also appeared to be something that could hardly have survived such close proximity to the Semtex charge, and that at least two independent explosives firms have confirmed this. Also that its police evidence bag had had its label interfered with, while its entry into the UK forensic report appeared to have been a hasty afterthought, requiring renumbering of the subsequent pages.
There is also said to be evidence that PT35B was never tested prior to the trial, for explosives residues, but that this has now been done and shown no trace of such residues.
Incredibly one contributor to the film claimed that the failure to do this was ' for reasons of economy'. Can you believe it? PT35B was only the most important forensic item in the entire 'evidence' armoury.
2. From an interested observer
Although the film obviously had the approval of all (or most?) of those present, my own feeling is that it required the audience to already know something – of course it did the usual intro.
Around 18:05, Christine Grahame (MSP) introduced one or two of the better known names. Then hands over to Gideon Levy who introduces his film – played, I think, from his laptop to a beamer (not the BMW variety). His preamble is simply to say we will see conflicting statement between CIA and Scottish authorities.
*Film starts
*Initially just various quotes for effect, giving cause to doubt the verdict. And then showing that he has been to a ceremony for the 20th anniversary at Arlington.
*In charge of the investigation were Marquise (FBI) and Stewart Henderson, Scottish Police.
*Interview with Hans Köchler and a review of his opinion; why one guilty verdict and one not guilty? Initial indictment based on conspiracy, so how could it change?
*Interview with Ian Ferguson [co-author of Cover-Up of Convenience: The Hidden Scandal of Lockerbie] (who turns up at other times in film).
*Chopping of interviews with Bob Baer (ex CIA), Fred Whitehurst (FBI), and Marquise and Lord Fraser; he (Levy) required of all his interviewees a handshake on their saying that they’d tell him the truth. They all agreed (although one of them – possibly Marquise, can’t remember – did reserve the right not to answer a question).
*Fraser says his successors (4 or 5 of different parties) could have stopped the proceeding
*Marquise shown Bob Baer saying he had been a bomb maker for the CIA. He (BB) found it very unlikely that anyone would have a bomb transferred from Malta to Frankfurt to Heathrow and onwards.
*BB mentions PFLP-GC (on behalf of Iran) being responsible after the USS Vincennes/Iran Air
*Why was the agent Khreesat released back to Jordan by the German BKA; Fraser said K was double agent of PFLP and CIA; Marquise suggested double agent of PFLP and Jordan spying agency.
*Ferguson (on film) now says there was a change of focus in the investigation because the U.S. was somehow involved.
*A video is shown of Gaddafi (we have to rely on subtitles naturally) saying U.S. companies have had to pay to get back in to Libya – the same amount as Libya has paid out to relatives of victims.
*Marquise says no money paid to witnesses prior to the trial; does not answer regarding after the trial.
*Fraser says he gave instructions, there should be no money to be paid to witnesses; admits he was conscious of the effects if discovered afterwards.
*Tom Thurman explains his analysis of the circuit chip which he found – it is pointed out by Gideon Levy that T.T’s degree is in political science.
*Whitehurst says that Thurman altered his (W.’s) reports. W. also asks why the chip was given to the FBI when the Brits should have experts to look at it. (Fraser denies knowing chip was ever in USA). W. claims it is Thurman’s finger behind the chip fragment in the photo ‘going the rounds’ – later in film, TT seems to agree, or at least lets the comment of Levy go without any complaint. Marquise says it was brought to the U.S. – Fraser is seen raising his eyebrows!
*Ferguson asks why fragment not tested for explosive residue – talk of cost, but various people waffle (sorry can’t really explain what was going on here, except that people could not really believe cost was a factor).
*Fraser states that he was never satisfied with the investigation that went into the PFLP-GC – should have been pushed further to show that they were not involved.
*Thurman denies that he was thrown out of his job, he retired voluntarily; his opinion regarding the fragment was verified in England.
*Marquise acknowledges “People don’t trust government”
*Then Marquise at Arlington (in company of Henderson) says the fragment was never in the U.S., but the circuit board was in the U.S. (yes, I am confused – perhaps he was talking of an example of such a circuit board). Henderson confirms fragment never left the U.K. Henderson says loudly in walking away ‘culprit is in custody’.
*Film ends, but Levy now adds that he received a letter from Marquise after the shooting while the film was being completed to say that (effectively) to clarify the interview he had given, he agrees that the fragment did come to Washington but under the control of Faraday of the U.K.
After the film, the two MSPs Christine Grahame and Margo MacDonald lead the ‘discussion’ – not much is actually discussed – mostly just points people want to draw attention to. Dr Swire speaks first on the film, and then to the question of the break-in at Heathrow the night before the crash. Asks why there were no restrictions on flights because of that breach of security. Also wanted to know why details of the break-in only became public knowledge (or at least available to defence) very late. Prof John Grant gives his opinion and is asked a couple of legal questions by one of the MSPs. Swire also asks Grant about the break-in and whether it can still be used in argument. Grant wants to know why Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission have not published their reasons – says they do publish a couple of wishy-washy (my words) paragraphs, but no detail.
Monday 5 April 2010
Surely Mr Marquise should know the answer?
[What follows is a response by Dr Jim Swire to a comment by Richard Marquise on the article "Taking Another Look at the Destruction of Pan Am 103" that recently appeared in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. The article, and Mr Marquise's comment, can be read here.]
How remarkable that a man of your stature, Mr Marquise, should publish a comment which starts by claiming that those who wrote this article and those who do not believe that the Megrahi verdict was correct 'Have no knowledge other than what they have read in blogs on the internet offering an "opinion" of the evidence at Lockerbie....'
I sat, Mr Marquise, in the court at Zeist throughout the main trial and the first appeal: were you there? Frequently I still refer to the full set of transcripts to try to ensure that I make as few mistakes as possible. But I would add that it is what is not there that is often so interesting.
I presume you know, sir, that the trial judges were forced to report that it was 'a difficulty for the prosecution case that no evidence was led as to how Megrahi breached security in Malta'. Perhaps with your resources Mr Marquise, you can tell me, why was it that the break-in the night before Lockerbie at Heathrow airport was concealed from the main trial? It only emerged after 12 years: too late for the trial court to use.
Why was that? If you were indeed in charge of the case, presumably you know the answer. The Crown Office tell me they didn't know about it during that time either, what do you think? Did you know about it yourself? You were in charge you say of the investigation. If you knew, why didn't you tell, if you didn't know then it can't have been a very careful investigation can it? One or the other must be true. Did you know or not?
You must know by now that the break-in gave an unknown intruder access to Heathrow airside close to where the PanAm baggage container (later shown in court evidence to have contained the IED) had stood unguarded the following evening. Where the man loading that container gave evidence at Zeist that he had seen an unauthorised bag which he failed to remove, and that he'd seen it before the Frankfurt feeder flight (PA103A) had even landed at Heathrow.
What verdict do you think their Lordships at the main trial would have reached had they been required to compare the evidence from Luqa airport with the break-in evidence at Heathrow? Would they really then have been able to surmount the hurdle of 'reasonable doubt'? Their Lordships in the trial knew from the evidence led that terrorists had access to IEDs stable at ground level for days or even weeks, but designed always to explode around 40 minutes after take off, courtesy of their air pressure sensitive switches. No human intervention required in airside, except to get one into the target airplane. What if the Heathrow intruder brought one of those in with him? What if he left it with a message in the IranAir facility nearby?
So many queries because there was no scrap of evidence that the break-in was responsibly investigated at the time, that was not your fault, sir, because proper investigation, to be effective, would have had to start before the disaster had occurred, would it not?
Yes, I know that President Bush was trying back-channel negotiations with the Iranians in those days, despite the embarrassing shoot-down of an Iranian airbus by the US Cruiser Vincennes six months before, for which Iran had sworn revenge. That attempted negotiation wouldn't be a legitimate reason for interfering with a criminal trial would it? Not unless one was working in intelligence on one's country's behalf rather than as a criminal investigator.
Might not that break-in be the reason why my daughter's life was snuffed out in an explosion over Lockerbie 38 minutes after take-off from Heathrow with its now proven failed security perimeter?
Before you say 'Ah, but despite the Heathrow evidence, the first appeal failed' let me point out that Megrahi's defence had decided they would not challenge the 'sufficiency of evidence' led in the main trial. That extraordinary decision meant that their Lorships of appeal had no obligation to sift through that main trial evidence. That in turn meant that their belief that the 16 hours between the break-in and the take-off meant that it might be too long for it to be relevant may have been reached without the detailed knowledge of the nature of the available IEDs of which the main trial knew so much.
Did you know about the Heathrow break-in while the trial was in progress Mr Marquise, or did you not?
Do not fear, we are only after the truth, and I don't blog on the internet either. The fact that other well informed people do, makes it very difficult to conceal things for ever these days, doesn't it?
How remarkable that a man of your stature, Mr Marquise, should publish a comment which starts by claiming that those who wrote this article and those who do not believe that the Megrahi verdict was correct 'Have no knowledge other than what they have read in blogs on the internet offering an "opinion" of the evidence at Lockerbie....'
I sat, Mr Marquise, in the court at Zeist throughout the main trial and the first appeal: were you there? Frequently I still refer to the full set of transcripts to try to ensure that I make as few mistakes as possible. But I would add that it is what is not there that is often so interesting.
I presume you know, sir, that the trial judges were forced to report that it was 'a difficulty for the prosecution case that no evidence was led as to how Megrahi breached security in Malta'. Perhaps with your resources Mr Marquise, you can tell me, why was it that the break-in the night before Lockerbie at Heathrow airport was concealed from the main trial? It only emerged after 12 years: too late for the trial court to use.
Why was that? If you were indeed in charge of the case, presumably you know the answer. The Crown Office tell me they didn't know about it during that time either, what do you think? Did you know about it yourself? You were in charge you say of the investigation. If you knew, why didn't you tell, if you didn't know then it can't have been a very careful investigation can it? One or the other must be true. Did you know or not?
You must know by now that the break-in gave an unknown intruder access to Heathrow airside close to where the PanAm baggage container (later shown in court evidence to have contained the IED) had stood unguarded the following evening. Where the man loading that container gave evidence at Zeist that he had seen an unauthorised bag which he failed to remove, and that he'd seen it before the Frankfurt feeder flight (PA103A) had even landed at Heathrow.
What verdict do you think their Lordships at the main trial would have reached had they been required to compare the evidence from Luqa airport with the break-in evidence at Heathrow? Would they really then have been able to surmount the hurdle of 'reasonable doubt'? Their Lordships in the trial knew from the evidence led that terrorists had access to IEDs stable at ground level for days or even weeks, but designed always to explode around 40 minutes after take off, courtesy of their air pressure sensitive switches. No human intervention required in airside, except to get one into the target airplane. What if the Heathrow intruder brought one of those in with him? What if he left it with a message in the IranAir facility nearby?
So many queries because there was no scrap of evidence that the break-in was responsibly investigated at the time, that was not your fault, sir, because proper investigation, to be effective, would have had to start before the disaster had occurred, would it not?
Yes, I know that President Bush was trying back-channel negotiations with the Iranians in those days, despite the embarrassing shoot-down of an Iranian airbus by the US Cruiser Vincennes six months before, for which Iran had sworn revenge. That attempted negotiation wouldn't be a legitimate reason for interfering with a criminal trial would it? Not unless one was working in intelligence on one's country's behalf rather than as a criminal investigator.
Might not that break-in be the reason why my daughter's life was snuffed out in an explosion over Lockerbie 38 minutes after take-off from Heathrow with its now proven failed security perimeter?
Before you say 'Ah, but despite the Heathrow evidence, the first appeal failed' let me point out that Megrahi's defence had decided they would not challenge the 'sufficiency of evidence' led in the main trial. That extraordinary decision meant that their Lorships of appeal had no obligation to sift through that main trial evidence. That in turn meant that their belief that the 16 hours between the break-in and the take-off meant that it might be too long for it to be relevant may have been reached without the detailed knowledge of the nature of the available IEDs of which the main trial knew so much.
Did you know about the Heathrow break-in while the trial was in progress Mr Marquise, or did you not?
Do not fear, we are only after the truth, and I don't blog on the internet either. The fact that other well informed people do, makes it very difficult to conceal things for ever these days, doesn't it?
Saturday 19 July 2008
"One of the most dangerous men in the world"
The reference is to Monzer al-Kassar, who was extradited in June to the United States to stand trial for having supplied weapons to the FARC guerilla movement in Colombia. The German Kurtz Report features an article about him headlined (in translation) "Arms dealer or hostage saviour?" His alleged connection to Lockerbie is outlined in the following two paragraphs:
'Wenn Al Kassar, auch bekannt unter den Namen Abu Munawar und Al Taous, vor dem Bundesgericht erscheinen wird, kommen vielleicht noch andere Verbrechen zur Sprache. Richard Marquise, der frühere FBI-Beamte, der die Lockerbie-Ermittlungen leitete, empfahl dem Justizministerium, Kassar auch nach Lockerbie zu befragen. In seinem Schreiben bezog er sich auf die Behauptung des früheren israelischen Agenten Juval Aviv, Al Kassar habe als Mittler zwischen Iran und der amerikanischen Regierung im sogenannten “October Surprise Project” gehandelt, bei dem Waffen für den Iran gegen die Freilassung der amerikanischen Geiseln. Als Belohnung habe er Heroin aus dem Bekaa-Tal auf Flügen der amerikanischen Fluglinie Pan Am über Frankfurt in die USA liefern dürfen. Dabei sei die Drogenlieferung durch die Bombe ausgetauscht worden, die über Lockerbie explodierte.
'Der mögliche Lieferant des Zünders, Edwin Bollier, sollte im Rahmen des Todesermittlungsverfahrens Dr. Uwe Barschel vernommen werden. In den Akten der Lübecker Staatsanwaltschaft zum Fall Barschel findet sich auch eine sogenannte “Sonderakte Al Kassar”. Einen Monat vor der Verhaftung Al Kassars erschien das Buch “Deckname Dali” des ehemaligen Agenten des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (BND) Wilhelm Dietl. Darin beschreibt er, wie er auf Al Kassar angesetzt war, wie er wie in James Bond-Filmen dessen Akte auswendig gelernt habe, ihn mit Hilfe eines Observationsfotos des Bundeskriminalamts (BKA) auf einem Empfang der Österreichischen Botschaft in Damaskus identifizierte und ihn dann in Wien und Madrid traf.'
[I am grateful to a reader, who wishes to remain anonymous, for the following translation:
'When Al Kassar, also known under the names Abu Munawar and Al Taous, appears before the US Federal Court, other crimes may also come up. The former FBI agent, Richard Marquise, who led the Lockerbie investigation, has recommended to the Justice Department that Kassar should also be interrogated in connection with Lockerbie. In his writing, Marquise referred to the claim of the former Israel agent Juval Aviv, that Al Kassar functioned as an intermediary between Iran and the American government in the so-called “October Surprise Project”, whereby weapons were delivered to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages. By way of reward, he was supposedly allowed to fly heroin into the States from the Bekaa valley on Pan Am flights out of Frankfurt. In the course of this, the drug delivery was replaced by the bomb which exploded over Lockerbie.
‘It is claimed that the possible supplier of the fuse*, Edwin Bollier, was questioned in the context of the investigation into the death of Dr Uwe Barschel**. In the files of the Lübeck Public Prosecutor’s Office concerning the Barschel case, there is a so-called “Special File Al Kassar”. The book “Deckname Dali”, by former German secret service employee Wilhelm Dietl was published (in German) one month before the arrest of Al Kassar. In this book, he describes how he was instructed to track Al Kassar; how he, in the manner of James Bond, learned Al Kassar’s files by heart; how he identified Al Kassar at a reception held by the Austrian Embassy in Damascus, with the help of photos supplied by the German Federal Criminal Police Office; and how he met him in Vienna and Madrid.'
*Although it is the timer that Edwin Bollier’s company is alleged to have supplied, the German word “Zünder” means “fuse” or “detonator”.
**For information on the fascinating story of Dr Barschel, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uwe_Barschel and (in German, but much more detailed) http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uwe_Barschel]
Also relevant is this post dating from 5 December 2007.
'Wenn Al Kassar, auch bekannt unter den Namen Abu Munawar und Al Taous, vor dem Bundesgericht erscheinen wird, kommen vielleicht noch andere Verbrechen zur Sprache. Richard Marquise, der frühere FBI-Beamte, der die Lockerbie-Ermittlungen leitete, empfahl dem Justizministerium, Kassar auch nach Lockerbie zu befragen. In seinem Schreiben bezog er sich auf die Behauptung des früheren israelischen Agenten Juval Aviv, Al Kassar habe als Mittler zwischen Iran und der amerikanischen Regierung im sogenannten “October Surprise Project” gehandelt, bei dem Waffen für den Iran gegen die Freilassung der amerikanischen Geiseln. Als Belohnung habe er Heroin aus dem Bekaa-Tal auf Flügen der amerikanischen Fluglinie Pan Am über Frankfurt in die USA liefern dürfen. Dabei sei die Drogenlieferung durch die Bombe ausgetauscht worden, die über Lockerbie explodierte.
'Der mögliche Lieferant des Zünders, Edwin Bollier, sollte im Rahmen des Todesermittlungsverfahrens Dr. Uwe Barschel vernommen werden. In den Akten der Lübecker Staatsanwaltschaft zum Fall Barschel findet sich auch eine sogenannte “Sonderakte Al Kassar”. Einen Monat vor der Verhaftung Al Kassars erschien das Buch “Deckname Dali” des ehemaligen Agenten des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (BND) Wilhelm Dietl. Darin beschreibt er, wie er auf Al Kassar angesetzt war, wie er wie in James Bond-Filmen dessen Akte auswendig gelernt habe, ihn mit Hilfe eines Observationsfotos des Bundeskriminalamts (BKA) auf einem Empfang der Österreichischen Botschaft in Damaskus identifizierte und ihn dann in Wien und Madrid traf.'
[I am grateful to a reader, who wishes to remain anonymous, for the following translation:
'When Al Kassar, also known under the names Abu Munawar and Al Taous, appears before the US Federal Court, other crimes may also come up. The former FBI agent, Richard Marquise, who led the Lockerbie investigation, has recommended to the Justice Department that Kassar should also be interrogated in connection with Lockerbie. In his writing, Marquise referred to the claim of the former Israel agent Juval Aviv, that Al Kassar functioned as an intermediary between Iran and the American government in the so-called “October Surprise Project”, whereby weapons were delivered to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages. By way of reward, he was supposedly allowed to fly heroin into the States from the Bekaa valley on Pan Am flights out of Frankfurt. In the course of this, the drug delivery was replaced by the bomb which exploded over Lockerbie.
‘It is claimed that the possible supplier of the fuse*, Edwin Bollier, was questioned in the context of the investigation into the death of Dr Uwe Barschel**. In the files of the Lübeck Public Prosecutor’s Office concerning the Barschel case, there is a so-called “Special File Al Kassar”. The book “Deckname Dali”, by former German secret service employee Wilhelm Dietl was published (in German) one month before the arrest of Al Kassar. In this book, he describes how he was instructed to track Al Kassar; how he, in the manner of James Bond, learned Al Kassar’s files by heart; how he identified Al Kassar at a reception held by the Austrian Embassy in Damascus, with the help of photos supplied by the German Federal Criminal Police Office; and how he met him in Vienna and Madrid.'
*Although it is the timer that Edwin Bollier’s company is alleged to have supplied, the German word “Zünder” means “fuse” or “detonator”.
**For information on the fascinating story of Dr Barschel, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uwe_Barschel and (in German, but much more detailed) http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uwe_Barschel]
Also relevant is this post dating from 5 December 2007.
Tuesday 13 April 2010
FBI agent dismisses CIA spy’s claim of Iran ties to Pan Am 103 bomb
[This is the heading over a post on Jeff Stein's Spy Talk blog hosted by The Washington Post. It reads in part:]
Retired Special Agent Richard Marquise, who headed the FBI’s investigation into the Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, says there is no credible evidence for former Iranian double agent Reza Kahlili’s claim that Iran downed the plane.
Moreover, Kahlili's claim that his CIA handlers weren’t interested in hearing what he knew about it is ridiculous, Marquise said in an interview.
Kahlili (the name is a pseudonym) makes the claims in a memoir, "A Time to Betray: The Astonishing Double Life of a CIA Agent Inside the Revolutionary Guards of Iran," which has generated a lot of attention since it was published April 6. Its general theme is that Washington has underestimated the Iranian threat.
“I have read the parts about Lockerbie and did not see anything which was more than pure speculation on his part,” says Marquise, who headed the FBI task force on the bombing and later wrote a book about the probe.
”He said his info came from some guy he met in London after the attack. He never mentions anything about having knowledge of the attack before, and no information that would substantiate how it could have happened.“
Kahlili’s allegations aren’t nearly as specific in his book as they are in his interviews promoting it.
One news report summarizes Kahlili saying the CIA “didn’t seem interested in [his] information, which included details on the type of radio transmitter used in the bomb and other details not publicly known.”
But in the book, Khalili makes no claim of knowing technical details about the bomb, much less that the CIA wasn’t interested in what he knew.
In interviews, however, he has expanded on the theme.
“Shortly after the Pan Am incident I was in Europe on a mission and I had met with Iranian agents somewhere in Europe …” he told Roger L. Simon, the Hollywood writer and head of the Pajamas Media web site.
“We talked about the incident, they verified that Rafsanjani had ordered the Pan Am bombing and the retaliation for the Iranian airliner incident and they talked about a Palestinian suspect and the transistor — that the bomb was in the transistor radio. … In my conversation with them I was convinced that this was an Iranian act. It was delivered, as promised, through their proxies.”
Kahlili continues: “I reported my findings to the CIA, gave the names of the agents. They were traced — their travels were traced; where they were before, what countries they had visited. I told them of their connection to the Iranian hierarchy and so that’s where we left it off.”
Kahlili said he “expected a follow-up,” but “nothing happened.”
“The new US administration, President Bush Senior, made an assessment that Hashimi Rafsanjani, the new president, is ready for a change in diplomatic relations…,” he writes. George H.W. Bush wanted to move on
Twenty years later, U.S. intelligence is still covering up the Iranian role in the Pan Am bombing, Kahlili hints darkly.
“In August 2009,” he writes in his book, “Scottish authorities freed Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, the Libyan convicted for downing the plane, just when his legal team was ready to present US Defense Intelligence Agency documents implicating Iran.”
It's true that DIA sources did report, soon after the plane went down, that Iran orchestrated the bombing through Syria and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, or PFLP.
And the FBI’s Marquise, now retired, does acknowledge that Iran was first suspected of carrying out the bombing, because U.S. fighters had mistakenly downed an Iranian Airbus over the Persian Gulf five months before.
But investigators eventually discounted the reports for lack of evidence, he said.
Amid the debris, Marquise recounted, an investigator found the main piece of evidence that eventually led to Libya’s authorship of the crime: a piece of the circuit board that set off the bomb.
The FBI traced it to the head of a Swiss firm, who told them he had made only “20 or 21” of the type, “all of which were delivered to Libyan officials,” Marquise said.
All the physical evidence pointed to Libya.
“Nothing ties Iran to the evidence,” he declared. “There is no evidence, nothing that could be used in court, that ties Iran to those timers.”
Asked for comment, Kahlili repeated the main points in his book and said, "I think the lack of investigation of Iran's involvement into Pan Am bombing and behind the scene negotiations between Rafsanjani and President Bush were related."
Retired Special Agent Richard Marquise, who headed the FBI’s investigation into the Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, says there is no credible evidence for former Iranian double agent Reza Kahlili’s claim that Iran downed the plane.
Moreover, Kahlili's claim that his CIA handlers weren’t interested in hearing what he knew about it is ridiculous, Marquise said in an interview.
Kahlili (the name is a pseudonym) makes the claims in a memoir, "A Time to Betray: The Astonishing Double Life of a CIA Agent Inside the Revolutionary Guards of Iran," which has generated a lot of attention since it was published April 6. Its general theme is that Washington has underestimated the Iranian threat.
“I have read the parts about Lockerbie and did not see anything which was more than pure speculation on his part,” says Marquise, who headed the FBI task force on the bombing and later wrote a book about the probe.
”He said his info came from some guy he met in London after the attack. He never mentions anything about having knowledge of the attack before, and no information that would substantiate how it could have happened.“
Kahlili’s allegations aren’t nearly as specific in his book as they are in his interviews promoting it.
One news report summarizes Kahlili saying the CIA “didn’t seem interested in [his] information, which included details on the type of radio transmitter used in the bomb and other details not publicly known.”
But in the book, Khalili makes no claim of knowing technical details about the bomb, much less that the CIA wasn’t interested in what he knew.
In interviews, however, he has expanded on the theme.
“Shortly after the Pan Am incident I was in Europe on a mission and I had met with Iranian agents somewhere in Europe …” he told Roger L. Simon, the Hollywood writer and head of the Pajamas Media web site.
“We talked about the incident, they verified that Rafsanjani had ordered the Pan Am bombing and the retaliation for the Iranian airliner incident and they talked about a Palestinian suspect and the transistor — that the bomb was in the transistor radio. … In my conversation with them I was convinced that this was an Iranian act. It was delivered, as promised, through their proxies.”
Kahlili continues: “I reported my findings to the CIA, gave the names of the agents. They were traced — their travels were traced; where they were before, what countries they had visited. I told them of their connection to the Iranian hierarchy and so that’s where we left it off.”
Kahlili said he “expected a follow-up,” but “nothing happened.”
“The new US administration, President Bush Senior, made an assessment that Hashimi Rafsanjani, the new president, is ready for a change in diplomatic relations…,” he writes. George H.W. Bush wanted to move on
Twenty years later, U.S. intelligence is still covering up the Iranian role in the Pan Am bombing, Kahlili hints darkly.
“In August 2009,” he writes in his book, “Scottish authorities freed Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, the Libyan convicted for downing the plane, just when his legal team was ready to present US Defense Intelligence Agency documents implicating Iran.”
It's true that DIA sources did report, soon after the plane went down, that Iran orchestrated the bombing through Syria and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, or PFLP.
And the FBI’s Marquise, now retired, does acknowledge that Iran was first suspected of carrying out the bombing, because U.S. fighters had mistakenly downed an Iranian Airbus over the Persian Gulf five months before.
But investigators eventually discounted the reports for lack of evidence, he said.
Amid the debris, Marquise recounted, an investigator found the main piece of evidence that eventually led to Libya’s authorship of the crime: a piece of the circuit board that set off the bomb.
The FBI traced it to the head of a Swiss firm, who told them he had made only “20 or 21” of the type, “all of which were delivered to Libyan officials,” Marquise said.
All the physical evidence pointed to Libya.
“Nothing ties Iran to the evidence,” he declared. “There is no evidence, nothing that could be used in court, that ties Iran to those timers.”
Asked for comment, Kahlili repeated the main points in his book and said, "I think the lack of investigation of Iran's involvement into Pan Am bombing and behind the scene negotiations between Rafsanjani and President Bush were related."
Friday 18 December 2020
“Is this an American attempt to influence the judges?"
[What follows is excerpted from an article by Tom Peterkin in today's edition of The Press and Journal:]
The FBI agent who led the original Lockerbie investigation has revealed the atrocity’s latest suspect was on his “radar” 30 years ago but there was a struggle to prove the case against him.
Richard Marquise said it was strongly suspected Abu Agila Mohammad Masud was the “technician” responsible for the bomb that killed 270 people in the worst terrorist outrage committed on UK territory.
Mr Marquise was reacting to reports suggesting that US prosecutors will seek the extradition of Mr Masud and he will be charged in a matter of days, to stand trial in America.
As the man who led the US side of the inquiry into the bombing, Mr Marquise welcomed reports that Mr Masud could face justice, claiming any progress would be appreciated by the families who lost loved ones on Pan Am Flight 103.
“If there is going to be another trial, I’m sure the families will be… I’m not going to use the word thrilled…. because it doesn’t bring a loved one back. But I am sure they will be grateful,” Mr Marquise said. (...)
“He’s been on my radar for around 30 years,” Mr Marquise said. “He was someone we were very interested in, but we never quite found out who he was. The Libyans disavowed any knowledge of him. We knew he existed but he was never really identified.
“Back in 1991, we knew his name. We knew what he looked like and we knew what he allegedly was responsible for. He was the technician.”
The retired FBI agent added: “In my mind I always felt he was connected to it somehow But we didn’t have the clues to prove it.”
Kenny MacAskill, the former Justice Secretary who controversially released Megrahi on compassionate grounds, agreed.
“He was the one with the skills. He was on the original indictment, I’m led to believe. So he was always a wanted man,” Mr MacAskill said. “The idea that Megrahi did this on his own was absurd.”
Reports from the other side of the Atlantic suggest Mr Masud had been in custody in Libya on unrelated charges but his current whereabouts are unknown.
Since Mr Marquise’s official involvement in the investigation, there have been some developments. At the forefront of these have been the work of Ken Dornstein, a journalist whose brother David was on the London to New York flight.
In 2015 Mr Dornstein produced a investigative documentary, Lockerbie: My Brother’s Bomber, which linked Mr Masud to the bombing of Berlin’s La Belle nightclub in 1986.
Mr Dornstein interviewed a Libyan intelligence officer who said Mr Masud was involved in the bombing before the unification of Germany, which killed two US servicemen.
The same source alleged Mr Masud, by then in jail in Tripoli, was involved in the Lockerbie bombing and said he was still alive.
Mr Dornstein also claimed Mr Masud met Megrahi after the latter was freed from a Scottish jail in 2009 and given a hero’s welcome when he landed back in Libya. (...)
Mr MacAskill has already made it plain that he believes that people other than Megrahi should be held to account for the bombing.
“Question arise as to why, if they are going for Masud, aren’t they going for Senussi?” asked the former Justice Secretary.
Mr MacAskill was referring to Abdullah Al Senussi, the late Libyan dictator Colonel Gaddafi’s brother-in-law and former spy chief who has long been associated with the crime. (...)
“I heard over recent years the view of the Libyans was they don’t like Senussi and they don’t like Masud, but giving them up to the Americans is a step too far,” Mr MacAskill said.
“I think this is probably the juncture for Britain and America to be a bit more open in information they do have and produce it, as opposed to hiding it.”
What can be read into the timing of Masud’s extradition?
That is an interesting question, according to Professor Robert Black, an the Edinburgh University legal academic who has been a keen student of the Lockerbie case.
Professor Black is regarded as the architect of the Scottish court that was set up in Camp Zeist, Netherlands, to try Megrahi and his co-accused, Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, who was found not guilty.
“I wonder…. why now?” asked Professor Black. “Masud’s name has featured in the Lockerbie case since the very beginning, when charges were brought against Megrahi and Fhimah in 1991.”
“I think the answer to that is William Barr, the US Attorney General, is wanting to go out with a bang.”
This week it was announced that Mr Barr, who has been one of Donald Trump’s staunchest allies, is to step down as head of the US’s Justice Department.
Professor Black pointed out that Mr Barr was actually acting Attorney General way back in 1991 and was the one to announce that Megrahi and Fhimah were being charged.
“Now that he’s about to leave the scene, I think he wants to go out and his name to be remembered: Lockerbie at the beginning and Lockerbie at the end,” Professor Black said. (...)
Professor Black, who has long argued that Megrahi should not have been convicted on the evidence brought before Camp Zeist, suggested cynics might view attempts to extradite Musad as an attempt to make an impact on the appeal process.
“The other possibility is that it is a blatant attempt to influence the Scottish judges because they have got the latest Megrahi appeal before them and we await their judgement,” Professor Black said.
The argument would be that the existence of another high-profile Libyan suspect, alongside Megrahi, would back up the case for Libyan involvement in the crime.
“Is this an American attempt to influence the judges to uphold the Megrahi conviction? That’s a very, very cynical view.”
But cynicism was how the development was greeted by Megrahi family’s lawyer, Aamer Anwar.
“It’s difficult not to be cynical about the motivation of the Americans, that on the eve of the anniversary of the Lockerbie bombing as well as the appeal decision, the US now wish to indict an individual, 32 years after the bombing, what exactly have they been doing up until now?” said Mr Anwar
“Why would the Attorney General William Barr wait until just as he is about to step down from the Justice Department, considering that he was involved with this case since 1991.”
Tuesday 23 June 2009
The Truth, Trust, Inconsistencies and Contradictions of Lockerbie
[This is the heading over a lengthy and important recent post on the Ed's Blog City weblog. Reproduced below is the bulk of the text of the post.]
Since the release of the Dutch TV documentary, "Lockerbie:Revisted", a number of curious unexplained inconsistencies in the accounts given by many of those who led the investigation have remained unchallenged. Officially anyway. The documentary maker Gideon Levy asked a number of important questions, crucial to the investigation and pivotal to the whole case, which were quite clearly not satisfactorily answered. Even more astounding, given the position and power of those in the investigation, some of the answers given by those entrusted to find those guilty of the bombing in 1988 directly conflicted with one another.
Mr Levy's first unexplained question relates to the PFLP-GC cell which was exposed by the German BKA and who's members were arrested in Neuss, Germany in October 1988, two months before the Pan Am bombing. They had been discovered with an array of weapons including a radio cassette manipulated into a bomb designed specifically for targeting aircraft. The key member of this group Marwan Khreesat, seemingly known to be the bomb maker, and part of a group planning on attacking American targets, was inexplicably released without charge and was thought to have left Germany for Jordan. After the bombing over Lockerbie, and it was determined that the bomb had been concealed in a radio cassette player, naturally suspicion focussed on the cell that had been exposed in Germany.
Lord Fraser, the former Lord Advocate entrusted in leading the investigation into the bombing, claims that the Scottish authorities were never given the opportunity to question Khreesat at any point with regard to any connection or knowledge about the Lockerbie bombing. Mr Khresat's involvement with the PFLP group and yet subsequent release can only be explained by deducing he was involved with very powerful individuals with the capability of securing such a release, and we can only conclude that the chance to question him was denied due to Khreesat's complex and unclear association with various intelligence and government agencies.
Richard Marquise, head of the FBI investigative team, states that he does not know why Khreesat was released by the Germans, and it is a matter Mr Levy should take up with the German government to clarify. Mr Marquise considers an explanation may be that Khreesat was working for the Palestinian group, as a bomb maker targeting US trains, bases and aircraft, but was also involved with the Jordanian intelligence services who enabled his release from Germany. Lord Fraser however, suggests that the only plausible explanation was that Khreesat was working for the Palestinian group while also involved with US intelligence therefore facilitating his release from Germany and proving someone who the Scottish authorities could not gain access to interview.
This in itself seems a disturbing chain of events and assumptions by those investigating the bombing of 103, and even more inexplicable to those who expect honest endeavour when seeking truth and justice from the investigators, especially given the nature of Khreesat's activities in Germany and his apparent history of expertise in bomb making. This cynicism is merely strengthened when Mr Fraser had stated unequivocally that neither he nor the Scottish prosecutors had ever gained access, despite repeated attempts, "they (the PFLP-GC cell) had simply disappeared", to interview Khreesat, while Mr Marquise seems quite indifferent to the fact that the German authorities had simply released a man of extremely dubious background clearly engaged in activities to cause serious harm to American citizens and institutions.
Mr Marquise does however state that to his knowledge Scottish prosecutors did in fact interview Khreesat, as did the FBI in 1989, clearly contradicting Lord Fraser's position, and that Scottish investigators were happy to accept Khreesat's word during an interview that he knew nothing of the Lockerbie bombing. That a key figure such as Khreesat, the man that according to Mr Marquise was "building the bombs", with the motive, method and capability of attacking US targets, and whether investigators had interviewed him or not, is not conclusively known to either of the two people leading the investigation, is simply incomprehensible.
Mr Levy then enquires about the possibilty of financial payments made to witnesses before, during or subsequent to the trial at Zeist in Holland where Al-Megrahi was found guilty. Inducement had been made to the public by the US authorities to "Give up these terrorists, and we'll give you upto $4 million" by the way of posters with photographs of the two Libyans, and presumably, naturally, by those investigating while interviewing suspects or witnesses. Even if not explicitly offered to those potential witnesses by investigators, the witnesses would be well aware of the financial reward that was available for the successful conviction of the two Libyan's.
Both Lord Fraser and Mr Marquise deny any financial reward, as promised in the posters and adverts issued, was made before or during the trial. However, while Lord Fraser is unaware of any payment subsequent to the trial, Mr Marquise will not comment. The only implication that can be made from this is that the reward offered before the trial and during the investigation was indeed paid to some witnesses after the trial. Any financial reward or inducement to those providing statements would surely render any testimony or information as lacking credibility and does not enhance the supposed search for 'truth' when life changing amounts of money are used as enticement.
So concerned with the implication of rewards to witnesses that Lord Fraser is reluctant to even comment on the suggestion that money was paid to witnesses after the trial without his knowledge.
The focus of the documentary then turns to the most pivotal and crucial piece of evidence found during the investigation and presented at the trial in Zeist. The fragment of microchip discovered 6 months (although the exact period has been disputed) after the disaster, and determined to be the most significant piece of evidence linking the bomb to a Swiss timer manufacturer who had links to Megrahi and Libya.
This particular piece of evidence, the microchip fragment, already somewhat controversial given the unexplained altering of the labels on evidence bags containing the 'charred' fragments, was examined and concluded had originated with the Swiss company called 'Mebo'. They had supplied these timers, it was claimed, to Libya, and Megrahi with his connections and dealings with Mebo, had used this timer in constructing the bomb which he then placed on a flight in Malta, later finding it's way onto the Pan Am flight from Heathrow.
Now it seems, neither Lord Fraser or Mr Marquise can conclusively explain who exactly made this identification of the timer fragment, and where this identification was made. In the UK or in Washington? By Mr Thurman or Mr Feraday? The fragment itself, or as part of the larger circuit board from where the fragment came? By photograph or the actual fragment?
Mr Marquise is certain that this evidence was transported from the UK to the US, and taken to the FBI labs in Washington, by a member of RARDE, thought to be Alan Feraday were the identification was made. The photograph of the tiny piece of fragment of the microchip (evidence PT35b) on a persons finger is claimed to be that of Thomas Thurman of the FBI, who was also the scientist who uncovered the microchips origin and connection to the circuit board made by Mebo. He claims in Mr Levy's film that the microchip was "brought over by UK authorities" to the United States were identification was made, and was conclusively re-identified in the UK by RARDE (Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment).
However, once again there are contradictions in the accounts given. Lord Fraser is adamant that no evidence recovered from the Pan Am debris has ever left his authority or the UK mainland. This would have compromised the whole investigation and could have resulted in accusations of manipulation and, or, contamination of any evidence purity. Detective Chief Supt Mr Stuart Henderson, head of the UK police investigation, also states that the evidence relating to Pan Am 103, any evidence, but specifically the fragment of microchip, never left the UK mainland, but in actual fact the US investigators and the FBI had travelled to the UK to identify the fragment at RARDE with Mr Feraday.
When the public are asked to trust the integrity of those we commend with providing the truth and justice our democratic society demands, expectations can be, on occasion, somewhat unrealistic. Especially when dealing with highly complex issues of international politics, international crimes of nation states and multi-national business corporations. The public however, do expect a genuine and honest search for these truths, and those we charge with this responsibility to fulfil those simplest and most honourable tasks to have carried out their duty, with conscience and integrity.
Those who died over Lockerbie, and the families of the victims deserve at least this. With the pain of a lost loved one however, the relatives of those who died have also had to endure the persistent inaccuracies, the constant contradictions, and the inexplicable decisions taken with respect to those who carried out the atrocity and how their government failed in their loved ones protection. Not by those who wish to seek conspiracies were there are none, and not by those who have ulterior motives for continuing to ask questions. But by the very investigators, police, professionals, experts, lawyers and those in power entrusted with upholding their faith in human kind and seeking justice in the supposed democratic nation we live in today. For those fundamental expectations and hopes are diminished with every conflicting statement, every unexplained area of the investigation, and every inscrutable and unaccountable decision taken by those with power in relation to finding the true perpetrators who organised and carried out the crime over Lockerbie in 1988.
Since the release of the Dutch TV documentary, "Lockerbie:Revisted", a number of curious unexplained inconsistencies in the accounts given by many of those who led the investigation have remained unchallenged. Officially anyway. The documentary maker Gideon Levy asked a number of important questions, crucial to the investigation and pivotal to the whole case, which were quite clearly not satisfactorily answered. Even more astounding, given the position and power of those in the investigation, some of the answers given by those entrusted to find those guilty of the bombing in 1988 directly conflicted with one another.
Mr Levy's first unexplained question relates to the PFLP-GC cell which was exposed by the German BKA and who's members were arrested in Neuss, Germany in October 1988, two months before the Pan Am bombing. They had been discovered with an array of weapons including a radio cassette manipulated into a bomb designed specifically for targeting aircraft. The key member of this group Marwan Khreesat, seemingly known to be the bomb maker, and part of a group planning on attacking American targets, was inexplicably released without charge and was thought to have left Germany for Jordan. After the bombing over Lockerbie, and it was determined that the bomb had been concealed in a radio cassette player, naturally suspicion focussed on the cell that had been exposed in Germany.
Lord Fraser, the former Lord Advocate entrusted in leading the investigation into the bombing, claims that the Scottish authorities were never given the opportunity to question Khreesat at any point with regard to any connection or knowledge about the Lockerbie bombing. Mr Khresat's involvement with the PFLP group and yet subsequent release can only be explained by deducing he was involved with very powerful individuals with the capability of securing such a release, and we can only conclude that the chance to question him was denied due to Khreesat's complex and unclear association with various intelligence and government agencies.
Richard Marquise, head of the FBI investigative team, states that he does not know why Khreesat was released by the Germans, and it is a matter Mr Levy should take up with the German government to clarify. Mr Marquise considers an explanation may be that Khreesat was working for the Palestinian group, as a bomb maker targeting US trains, bases and aircraft, but was also involved with the Jordanian intelligence services who enabled his release from Germany. Lord Fraser however, suggests that the only plausible explanation was that Khreesat was working for the Palestinian group while also involved with US intelligence therefore facilitating his release from Germany and proving someone who the Scottish authorities could not gain access to interview.
This in itself seems a disturbing chain of events and assumptions by those investigating the bombing of 103, and even more inexplicable to those who expect honest endeavour when seeking truth and justice from the investigators, especially given the nature of Khreesat's activities in Germany and his apparent history of expertise in bomb making. This cynicism is merely strengthened when Mr Fraser had stated unequivocally that neither he nor the Scottish prosecutors had ever gained access, despite repeated attempts, "they (the PFLP-GC cell) had simply disappeared", to interview Khreesat, while Mr Marquise seems quite indifferent to the fact that the German authorities had simply released a man of extremely dubious background clearly engaged in activities to cause serious harm to American citizens and institutions.
Mr Marquise does however state that to his knowledge Scottish prosecutors did in fact interview Khreesat, as did the FBI in 1989, clearly contradicting Lord Fraser's position, and that Scottish investigators were happy to accept Khreesat's word during an interview that he knew nothing of the Lockerbie bombing. That a key figure such as Khreesat, the man that according to Mr Marquise was "building the bombs", with the motive, method and capability of attacking US targets, and whether investigators had interviewed him or not, is not conclusively known to either of the two people leading the investigation, is simply incomprehensible.
Mr Levy then enquires about the possibilty of financial payments made to witnesses before, during or subsequent to the trial at Zeist in Holland where Al-Megrahi was found guilty. Inducement had been made to the public by the US authorities to "Give up these terrorists, and we'll give you upto $4 million" by the way of posters with photographs of the two Libyans, and presumably, naturally, by those investigating while interviewing suspects or witnesses. Even if not explicitly offered to those potential witnesses by investigators, the witnesses would be well aware of the financial reward that was available for the successful conviction of the two Libyan's.
Both Lord Fraser and Mr Marquise deny any financial reward, as promised in the posters and adverts issued, was made before or during the trial. However, while Lord Fraser is unaware of any payment subsequent to the trial, Mr Marquise will not comment. The only implication that can be made from this is that the reward offered before the trial and during the investigation was indeed paid to some witnesses after the trial. Any financial reward or inducement to those providing statements would surely render any testimony or information as lacking credibility and does not enhance the supposed search for 'truth' when life changing amounts of money are used as enticement.
So concerned with the implication of rewards to witnesses that Lord Fraser is reluctant to even comment on the suggestion that money was paid to witnesses after the trial without his knowledge.
The focus of the documentary then turns to the most pivotal and crucial piece of evidence found during the investigation and presented at the trial in Zeist. The fragment of microchip discovered 6 months (although the exact period has been disputed) after the disaster, and determined to be the most significant piece of evidence linking the bomb to a Swiss timer manufacturer who had links to Megrahi and Libya.
This particular piece of evidence, the microchip fragment, already somewhat controversial given the unexplained altering of the labels on evidence bags containing the 'charred' fragments, was examined and concluded had originated with the Swiss company called 'Mebo'. They had supplied these timers, it was claimed, to Libya, and Megrahi with his connections and dealings with Mebo, had used this timer in constructing the bomb which he then placed on a flight in Malta, later finding it's way onto the Pan Am flight from Heathrow.
Now it seems, neither Lord Fraser or Mr Marquise can conclusively explain who exactly made this identification of the timer fragment, and where this identification was made. In the UK or in Washington? By Mr Thurman or Mr Feraday? The fragment itself, or as part of the larger circuit board from where the fragment came? By photograph or the actual fragment?
Mr Marquise is certain that this evidence was transported from the UK to the US, and taken to the FBI labs in Washington, by a member of RARDE, thought to be Alan Feraday were the identification was made. The photograph of the tiny piece of fragment of the microchip (evidence PT35b) on a persons finger is claimed to be that of Thomas Thurman of the FBI, who was also the scientist who uncovered the microchips origin and connection to the circuit board made by Mebo. He claims in Mr Levy's film that the microchip was "brought over by UK authorities" to the United States were identification was made, and was conclusively re-identified in the UK by RARDE (Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment).
However, once again there are contradictions in the accounts given. Lord Fraser is adamant that no evidence recovered from the Pan Am debris has ever left his authority or the UK mainland. This would have compromised the whole investigation and could have resulted in accusations of manipulation and, or, contamination of any evidence purity. Detective Chief Supt Mr Stuart Henderson, head of the UK police investigation, also states that the evidence relating to Pan Am 103, any evidence, but specifically the fragment of microchip, never left the UK mainland, but in actual fact the US investigators and the FBI had travelled to the UK to identify the fragment at RARDE with Mr Feraday.
When the public are asked to trust the integrity of those we commend with providing the truth and justice our democratic society demands, expectations can be, on occasion, somewhat unrealistic. Especially when dealing with highly complex issues of international politics, international crimes of nation states and multi-national business corporations. The public however, do expect a genuine and honest search for these truths, and those we charge with this responsibility to fulfil those simplest and most honourable tasks to have carried out their duty, with conscience and integrity.
Those who died over Lockerbie, and the families of the victims deserve at least this. With the pain of a lost loved one however, the relatives of those who died have also had to endure the persistent inaccuracies, the constant contradictions, and the inexplicable decisions taken with respect to those who carried out the atrocity and how their government failed in their loved ones protection. Not by those who wish to seek conspiracies were there are none, and not by those who have ulterior motives for continuing to ask questions. But by the very investigators, police, professionals, experts, lawyers and those in power entrusted with upholding their faith in human kind and seeking justice in the supposed democratic nation we live in today. For those fundamental expectations and hopes are diminished with every conflicting statement, every unexplained area of the investigation, and every inscrutable and unaccountable decision taken by those with power in relation to finding the true perpetrators who organised and carried out the crime over Lockerbie in 1988.
Thursday 22 June 2017
Inconsistencies and contradictions of Lockerbie
[This is part of the heading over a lengthy item posted on this date in 2009 on the Ed's Blog City website. Reproduced below is the bulk of the text of the post.]
Since the release of the Dutch TV documentary, Lockerbie: Revisted, a number of curious unexplained inconsistencies in the accounts given by many of those who led the investigation have remained unchallenged. Officially anyway. The documentary maker Gideon Levy asked a number of important questions, crucial to the investigation and pivotal to the whole case, which were quite clearly not satisfactorily answered. Even more astounding, given the position and power of those in the investigation, some of the answers given by those entrusted to find those guilty of the bombing in 1988 directly conflicted with one another.
Mr Levy's first unexplained question relates to the PFLP-GC cell which was exposed by the German BKA and who's members were arrested in Neuss, Germany in October 1988, two months before the Pan Am bombing. They had been discovered with an array of weapons including a radio cassette manipulated into a bomb designed specifically for targeting aircraft. The key member of this group Marwan Khreesat, seemingly known to be the bomb maker, and part of a group planning on attacking American targets, was inexplicably released without charge and was thought to have left Germany for Jordan. After the bombing over Lockerbie, and it was determined that the bomb had been concealed in a radio cassette player, naturally suspicion focussed on the cell that had been exposed in Germany.
Lord Fraser, the former Lord Advocate entrusted in leading the investigation into the bombing, claims that the Scottish authorities were never given the opportunity to question Khreesat at any point with regard to any connection or knowledge about the Lockerbie bombing. Mr Khresat's involvement with the PFLP group and yet subsequent release can only be explained by deducing he was involved with very powerful individuals with the capability of securing such a release, and we can only conclude that the chance to question him was denied due to Khreesat's complex and unclear association with various intelligence and government agencies.
Richard Marquise, head of the FBI investigative team, states that he does not know why Khreesat was released by the Germans, and it is a matter Mr Levy should take up with the German government to clarify. Mr Marquise considers an explanation may be that Khreesat was working for the Palestinian group, as a bomb maker targeting US trains, bases and aircraft, but was also involved with the Jordanian intelligence services who enabled his release from Germany. Lord Fraser however, suggests that the only plausible explanation was that Khreesat was working for the Palestinian group while also involved with US intelligence therefore facilitating his release from Germany and proving someone who the Scottish authorities could not gain access to interview.
This in itself seems a disturbing chain of events and assumptions by those investigating the bombing of 103, and even more inexplicable to those who expect honest endeavour when seeking truth and justice from the investigators, especially given the nature of Khreesat's activities in Germany and his apparent history of expertise in bomb making. This cynicism is merely strengthened when Mr Fraser had stated unequivocally that neither he nor the Scottish prosecutors had ever gained access, despite repeated attempts, "they (the PFLP-GC cell) had simply disappeared", to interview Khreesat, while Mr Marquise seems quite indifferent to the fact that the German authorities had simply released a man of extremely dubious background clearly engaged in activities to cause serious harm to American citizens and institutions.
Mr Marquise does however state that to his knowledge Scottish prosecutors did in fact interview Khreesat, as did the FBI in 1989, clearly contradicting Lord Fraser's position, and that Scottish investigators were happy to accept Khreesat's word during an interview that he knew nothing of the Lockerbie bombing. That a key figure such as Khreesat, the man that according to Mr Marquise was "building the bombs", with the motive, method and capability of attacking US targets, and whether investigators had interviewed him or not, is not conclusively known to either of the two people leading the investigation, is simply incomprehensible.
Mr Levy then enquires about the possibilty of financial payments made to witnesses before, during or subsequent to the trial at Zeist in Holland where Al-Megrahi was found guilty. Inducement had been made to the public by the US authorities to "Give up these terrorists, and we'll give you upto $4 million" by the way of posters with photographs of the two Libyans, and presumably, naturally, by those investigating while interviewing suspects or witnesses. Even if not explicitly offered to those potential witnesses by investigators, the witnesses would be well aware of the financial reward that was available for the successful conviction of the two Libyan's.
Both Lord Fraser and Mr Marquise deny any financial reward, as promised in the posters and adverts issued, was made before or during the trial. However, while Lord Fraser is unaware of any payment subsequent to the trial, Mr Marquise will not comment. The only implication that can be made from this is that the reward offered before the trial and during the investigation was indeed paid to some witnesses after the trial. Any financial reward or inducement to those providing statements would surely render any testimony or information as lacking credibility and does not enhance the supposed search for 'truth' when life changing amounts of money are used as enticement.
So concerned with the implication of rewards to witnesses that Lord Fraser is reluctant to even comment on the suggestion that money was paid to witnesses after the trial without his knowledge.
The focus of the documentary then turns to the most pivotal and crucial piece of evidence found during the investigation and presented at the trial in Zeist. The fragment of microchip discovered 6 months (although the exact period has been disputed) after the disaster, and determined to be the most significant piece of evidence linking the bomb to a Swiss timer manufacturer who had links to Megrahi and Libya.
This particular piece of evidence, the microchip fragment, already somewhat controversial given the unexplained altering of the labels on evidence bags containing the 'charred' fragments, was examined and concluded had originated with the Swiss company called 'Mebo'. They had supplied these timers, it was claimed, to Libya, and Megrahi with his connections and dealings with Mebo, had used this timer in constructing the bomb which he then placed on a flight in Malta, later finding it's way onto the Pan Am flight from Heathrow.
Now it seems, neither Lord Fraser or Mr Marquise can conclusively explain who exactly made this identification of the timer fragment, and where this identification was made. In the UK or in Washington? By Mr Thurman or Mr Feraday? The fragment itself, or as part of the larger circuit board from where the fragment came? By photograph or the actual fragment?
Mr Marquise is certain that this evidence was transported from the UK to the US, and taken to the FBI labs in Washington, by a member of RARDE, thought to be Alan Feraday were the identification was made. The photograph of the tiny piece of fragment of the microchip (evidence PT35b) on a persons finger is claimed to be that of Thomas Thurman of the FBI, who was also the scientist who uncovered the microchips origin and connection to the circuit board made by Mebo. He claims in Mr Levy's film that the microchip was "brought over by UK authorities" to the United States were identification was made, and was conclusively re-identified in the UK by RARDE (Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment).
However, once again there are contradictions in the accounts given. Lord Fraser is adamant that no evidence recovered from the Pan Am debris has ever left his authority or the UK mainland. This would have compromised the whole investigation and could have resulted in accusations of manipulation and, or, contamination of any evidence purity. Detective Chief Supt Mr Stuart Henderson, head of the UK police investigation, also states that the evidence relating to Pan Am 103, any evidence, but specifically the fragment of microchip, never left the UK mainland, but in actual fact the US investigators and the FBI had travelled to the UK to identify the fragment at RARDE with Mr Feraday.
When the public are asked to trust the integrity of those we commend with providing the truth and justice our democratic society demands, expectations can be, on occasion, somewhat unrealistic. Especially when dealing with highly complex issues of international politics, international crimes of nation states and multi-national business corporations. The public however, do expect a genuine and honest search for these truths, and those we charge with this responsibility to fulfil those simplest and most honourable tasks to have carried out their duty, with conscience and integrity.
Those who died over Lockerbie, and the families of the victims deserve at least this. With the pain of a lost loved one however, the relatives of those who died have also had to endure the persistent inaccuracies, the constant contradictions, and the inexplicable decisions taken with respect to those who carried out the atrocity and how their government failed in their loved ones protection. Not by those who wish to seek conspiracies were there are none, and not by those who have ulterior motives for continuing to ask questions. But by the very investigators, police, professionals, experts, lawyers and those in power entrusted with upholding their faith in human kind and seeking justice in the supposed democratic nation we live in today. For those fundamental expectations and hopes are diminished with every conflicting statement, every unexplained area of the investigation, and every inscrutable and unaccountable decision taken by those with power in relation to finding the true perpetrators who organised and carried out the crime over Lockerbie in 1988.
Tuesday 21 March 2017
Lockerbie questions for the FBI
What the SCCRC should have asked the FBI
[This is the heading over an item posted today by John Ashton on his Megrahi: You are my Jury website. It reads as follows:]
On 18 March Scotland on Sunday ran an article headlined Megrahi probe ‘failed to speak to FBI agents’, which reported criticisms of the SCCRC by FBI officers Oliver ‘Buck’ Revell and Richard Marquise. [RB: See here and here.]
It states: Oliver “Buck” Revell, the former associate deputy director of investigations for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, has reacted angrily to the examination into the case by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC). In an e-mail seen by Scotland on Sunday, Revell expressed frustration that no-one from the FBI was consulted by the SCCRC when it compiled its report into the safety of Megrahi’s conviction … In his e-mail to government and legal officials in Scotland and the US, Revell complained that the SCCRC failed to interview members of the FBI for its Statement of Reasons. The e-mail pointed out that the original Lockerbie investigation was carried out by Scottish police, Scotland Yard, the German BKA and the FBI. Revell added: “I don’t know what the SCCRC expects to determine when it is not even interviewing the actual investigators involved in solving this terrible crime.”
Marquise said: “I don’t know if you can say you have done a comprehensive report unless you speak to key people. To me it is an incomplete report whatever they are going to publish. They never did speak to the people who might be able to shed some light on whatever it is that they were looking to find out. If you are going to say you have done a complete investigation, you should talk to everybody who was key, and I like to think people in the FBI were key. I like to think some people in the CIA were key and they could and should have been interviewed.”
While neither man shed any light on what the FBI investigators could have told the commission, we might infer from their comments that the Bureau held further evidence of Abdelbaset’s guilt. Of course, it almost certainly didn’t, because any such evidence would have been handed to the Crown.
That said, I share Revell’s and Marquise’s disappointment that the SCCRC failed to interview anyone from the FBI, as many important questions remain unanswered. For example:
1. What did FBI agent John Hosinski discuss with Tony Gauci when he met him alone on 2 October 1989?
2. What did Senegalese official Jean Collin reveal when interviewed in the US in December 1990?
3. Was the content of Collin’s interview revealed to the Scottish police? And, if not, why not?
4. Why did the FBI’s Tom Thurman ‘front’ for the CIA in relation to the identification of the timer fragment?
5. According to FBI agent Hal Hendershot, Thurman had a laboratory in Lockerbie within days of the bombing. What forensic work did he undertake and was that work shared with the Scottish investigators?
6.When, in June 1990, Thurman demonstrated to the Scottish police that PT/35b matched the control sample MST-13 timer, why did he not reveal that he was already aware that the timers were made by Mebo?
7. Why was Hendershot aware of the contents of the Toshiba manual fragment PK/689 before it was examined for the Scottish police at RARDE?
8. Why was the FBI able to investigate debris item PI/1389 (a blue T-shirt, which, according to the FBI’s Bonn legal attache David Keyes, showed blast damage and the imprint of the grills of two radio speakers) before RARDE?
9. What information did Hendershot, Thurman and Bob Howen uncover in relation to the crystals used in the MST-13 timers? In particular, were they able to establish the date of manufacture of the crystal used in the control sample timer K-1, which was recovered from Togo and which Thurman used for comparative purposes with the fragment PT/35b?
10. Regarding the episode at Frankfurt airport, witnessed by FBI agent Lawrence Whittaker and DI Watson McAteer, in which a baggage handler apparently entered a bag into the automated transit system without recording the transaction, why was Whittaker’s trial testimony at odds with McAteer’s statement S3743A?
11. How many FBI FD302 reports by Lockerbie field agents were handed to the Crown? (Only a handful were provided to the defence.)
12. The US Department of Justice has stated that only three reports were produced in relation to the FBI’s inquiries in Malta. Given the centrality of Malta to the case, why were there so few?
Perhaps Mr Revell and Mr Marquise can answer these questions.
The article is also notable for the following quote by Marquise: “On the issue of witnesses being paid, no witness [was paid] to my knowledge. What some police officer or FBI agent might have told somebody in the corner in a dark room in the middle night that I don’t know about, I can’t vouch for that. But everybody that worked for me were under orders that they were not allowed to tell people that they could get money for this case. So, as far as I know, nobody was promised or paid money to testify.”
The SCCRC report states, at paragraph 23.19: Enquiries with D&G [Dumfries and Galloway Police] have established that, some time after the conclusion of the applicant’s appeal against conviction, Anthony and Paul Gauci were each paid sums of money under the “Rewards for Justice” programme administered by the US Department of State. Under that programme the US Secretary of State was initially authorised to offer rewards of up to $5m for information leading to the arrest or conviction of persons involved in acts of terrorism against US persons or property worldwide. The upper limit on such payments was increased by legislation passed in the US in 2001.
According to DCI Harry Bell’s diary, on 28 September 1989, FBI agent Chris Murray told Bell that he (Murray): ‘had the authority to arrange unlimited money for Tony Gauci and relocation is available. Murray states that he could arrange $10,000 immediately.’ Murray would not have said these things unless he believed that the offer might have been put to Gauci, yet, according to Marquise, “everybody that worked for me were under orders that they were not allowed to tell people that they could get money for this case.” So, was Murray acting against Marquise’s orders? And, if so will he be held to account? Again, maybe Marquise and Revell can enlighten us.
Wednesday 21 March 2012
What the SCCRC should have asked the FBI
[This is the
heading over an item posted today by John Ashton on his Megrahi: You are my Jury website.
It reads as follows:]
On 18
March Scotland on Sunday ran an article headlined Megrahi probe ‘failed to speak
to FBI agents’, which reported criticisms of the SCCRC by FBI
officers Oliver ‘Buck’ Revell and Richard Marquise. [RB: See here and here.]
It
states: Oliver “Buck” Revell, the former associate deputy director of
investigations for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, has reacted angrily to
the examination into the case by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission
(SCCRC). In an e-mail seen by Scotland on Sunday, Revell expressed
frustration that no-one from the FBI was consulted by the SCCRC when it
compiled its report into the safety of Megrahi’s conviction … In his e-mail to government
and legal officials in Scotland and the US, Revell complained that the SCCRC
failed to interview members of the FBI for its Statement of Reasons. The e-mail
pointed out that the original Lockerbie investigation was carried out by
Scottish police, Scotland Yard, the German BKA and the FBI. Revell added: “I
don’t know what the SCCRC expects to determine when it is not even interviewing
the actual investigators involved in solving this terrible crime.”
Marquise said: “I don’t know if you can say
you have done a comprehensive report unless you speak to key people. To me it
is an incomplete report whatever they are going to publish. They never did
speak to the people who might be able to shed some light on whatever it is that
they were looking to find out. If you are going to say you have done a complete
investigation, you should talk to everybody who was key, and I like to think
people in the FBI were key. I like to think some people in the CIA were key and
they could and should have been interviewed.”
While neither man shed any light on what the FBI investigators
could have told the commission, we might infer from their comments that the
Bureau held further evidence of Abdelbaset’s guilt. Of course, it almost
certainly didn’t, because any such evidence would have been handed to the
Crown.
That
said, I share Revell’s and Marquise’s disappointment that the SCCRC failed to
interview anyone from the FBI, as many important questions remain unanswered.
For example:
1.
What did FBI agent John Hosinski discuss with Tony Gauci when he met him alone
on 2 October 1989?
2.
What did Senegalese official Jean Collin reveal when interviewed in the US in
December 1990?
3.
Was the content of Collin’s interview revealed to the Scottish police? And, if
not, why not?
4.
Why did the FBI’s Tom Thurman ‘front’ for the CIA in relation to the
identification of the timer fragment?
5.
According to FBI agent Hal Hendershott, Thurman had a laboratory in Lockerbie
within days of the bombing. What forensic work did he undertake and was that
work shared with the Scottish investigators?
6.When,
in June 1990, Thurman demonstrated to the Scottish police that PT/35b matched
the control sample MST-13 timer, why did he not reveal that he was already
aware that the timers were made by Mebo?
7.
Why was Hendershot aware of the contents of the Toshiba manual fragment PK/689
before it was examined for the Scottish police at RARDE?
8.
Why was the FBI able to investigate debris item PI/1389 (a blue T-shirt, which,
according to the FBI’s Bonn legal attache David Keyes, showed blast damage and
the imprint of the grills of two radio speakers) before RARDE?
9.
What information did Hendershot, Thurman and Bob Howen uncover in relation to
the crystals used in the MST-13 timers? In particular, were they able to
establish the date of manufacture of the crystal used in the control sample
timer K-1, which was recovered from Togo and which Thurman used for comparative
purposes with the fragment PT/35b?
10.
Regarding the episode at Frankfurt airport, witnessed by FBI agent Lawrence
Whittaker and DI Watson McAteer, in which a baggage handler apparently entered
a bag into the automated transit system without recording the transaction, why
was Whittaker’s trial testimony at odds with McAteer’s statement S3743A?
11.
How many FBI FD302 reports by Lockerbie field agents were handed to the Crown?
(Only a handful were provided to the defence.)
12.
The US Department of Justice has stated that only three reports were produced
in relation to the FBI’s inquiries in Malta. Given the centrality of Malta to
the case, why were there so few?
Perhaps
Mr Revell and Mr Marquise can answer these questions.
The article is also notable for the following quote by Marquise: “On
the issue of witnesses being paid, no witness [was paid] to my knowledge. What
some police officer or FBI agent might have told somebody in the corner in a
dark room in the middle night that I don’t know about, I can’t vouch for that.
But everybody that worked for me were under orders that they were not allowed
to tell people that they could get money for this case. So, as far as I know,
nobody was promised or paid money to testify.”
The SCCRC report states, at paragraph 23.19: Enquiries
with D&G [Dumfries and Galloway Police] have established that, some
time after the conclusion of the applicant’s appeal against conviction, Anthony
and Paul Gauci were each paid sums of money under the “Rewards for Justice”
programme administered by the US Department of State. Under that programme the
US Secretary of State was initially authorised to offer rewards of up to $5m
for information leading to the arrest or conviction of persons involved in acts
of terrorism against US persons or property worldwide. The upper limit on such
payments was increased by legislation passed in the US in 2001.
According
to DCI Harry Bell’s diary, on 28 September 1989, FBI agent Chris Murray told
Bell that he (Murray): ‘had the authority to arrange unlimited
money for Tony Gauci and relocation is available. Murray states that he could
arrange $10,000 immediately.’ Murray would not have said these
things unless he believed that the offer might have been put to Gauci, yet,
according to Marquise, “everybody that worked for me
were under orders that they were not allowed to tell people that they could get
money for this case.” So, was Murray acting against Marquise’s orders?
And, if so will he be held to account? Again, maybe Marquise and Revell can
enlighten us.
[The commentary on this issue in Scottish lawyers' magazine The Firm can be read here.]
[The commentary on this issue in Scottish lawyers' magazine The Firm can be read here.]
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