Statement from Lord Trefgarne and Professor Black

In 1993 Lord Trefgarne approached Professor Black (having been given his name by the then Dean of the Faculty of Advocates) for advice in determining whether there was any legal mechanism whereby the impasse could be resolved that had resulted from the UN Security Council’s demand that the two Libyan suspects be handed over for trial in Scotland or the United States and Libya’s refusal to do so on the grounds that Libyan law did not permit the extradition of its nationals for trial overseas. Over the course of the next six years, Lord Trefgarne and Professor Black worked strenuously to secure acceptance of the neutral venue scheme that Professor Black formulated in early 1994. No payment was sought or received for these endeavours. It was only after Abdelbaset al-Megrahi’s conviction at Zeist in January 2001 and Professor Black had publicly expressed the strong view that that conviction was legally unwarranted [RB: eg on the BBC HARDtalk programme the week the verdict was returned; and in an article in the May 2001 issue of the Edinburgh Law Review] that an agreement was entered into with his lawyer, Dr Ibrahim Legwell, that Lord Trefgarne and Professor Black should receive payment for future political and legal advice on avenues of appeal.

In the event the only sum actually paid barely covered expenses. Lord Trefgarne and Professor Black again emphasise that this was an entirely proper arrangement reflecting the circumstances of the time.

Lord Trefgarne did declare this matter in the House of Lords Register in accordance with the rules then in force.

[This statement is issued in the light of forthcoming publication of a letter sent in 2007 by Lord Trefgarne to Saif al-Islam Gaddafi seeking his assistance in securing the payments envisaged in the agreement with Dr Legwell. No such payments were made (apart from a sum which barely covered the expenses which had been incurred by Lord Trefgarne in funding various trips to Libya for consultations).

The story features (behind the paywall) in the 11 September edition of The Sunday Times.  A news agency report from The Press Association can be read here.  A report published on 13 September on the website of The Times (behind the paywall) contains the following:]

The peer admitted today that he had registered his work on behalf of the bombers in just 2003 and 2004 in the Lords’ register of interests despite acting as an advisor for al-Megrahi’s legal team until 2007. 

In a personal statement to the house he will say: “I accept that although the business to which the letter refers was correctly entered in your Lord’s records in 2003 it was removed in 2005, which was clearly premature. I also accept that the use of Lord’s writing paper was inappropriate.”

The letter to Saif, which was discovered by The Sunday Times, referred to “fees owed over a considerable number of years prior to September 2001”. 

The fees were owed by Ibrahim Legwell, a Tripoli-based lawyer who represents al-Megrahi, the only person to be convicted for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing which killed 270 people. (...)

In a statement after the discovery of the letter Lord Trefgarne and Professor Black said that no payment had been sought for advice prior to al-Megrahi’s conviction in January 2001. (...)

He told The Times the money he actually received in relation to the al-Megrahi case, which was paid unexpectedly directly into his bank account, “barely covered expenses” and that his letter to Mr al-Islam produced no results. (...)

He said he had been “confused” in his letter to Mr al-Islam in seeking money for work carried out prior to 2001.

An' then the world came tae oor doorstep

[What follows is taken from an item published on this blog on this date in 2008:]

An' then the world came tae oor doorstep: Lockerbie Lives and Stories

by Jill S Haldane, with a foreword by Robert Black.

Product Description

The Lockerbie Stories tell of the absolute incomprehension of something as alien as hunks of aeroplane and associated detritus falling through the roof of the home from aerospace above, penetrating the security of the family and exposing the self to chaos and despair, inverting life's experience from relatively familiar to discrete. The grief and trauma that followed, dealing with veil of death and destruction as victims and their belongings rained on homes, gardens and streets, together with the shock and upset involved in evacuation from your home and disruption of your routine. The frustrating inability to communicate with family and friends out with the community; the violation of all pre-conceived representations of Christmas and the descending swarm of strangers. To see your wee space on the planet, on the screen and beamed to innumerable other homes across the world. The silence then the noise: the sound of people and busyness was deafening to the quietude of the town and the echo reverberated for a few years. This is not a comparative study of how the Lockerbie bombing compares to any other disaster, natural or premeditated. By nature, disasters are variously horrific for the people directly and indirectly involved.

The book consists of accounts by Lockerbie indwellers of their experiences on 21 December 1988 and the years that followed.

Product Details

Paperback: 332 pages

Publisher: The Grimsay Press (December 19, 2008)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 1845300637

ISBN-13: 978-1845300630

List price: £16.95/US$32.50

[RB: My foreword reads as follows:]

The only previous book of which I am aware which is devoted to recording something of the social life of the town of Lockerbie is Lockerbie: A narrative of village life in bygone days (Lockerbie: Herald Press, 1937) by Thomas Henderson, Solicitor, of the law firm Henderson & Mackay (which exists to this day). The author’s intention was to record with historical accuracy (albeit in a loose, fictionalised narrative form) what was known about life in the town at the time of the Napoleonic wars, while there were still people around who had heard first-hand accounts from parents and others who were alive at the time. My copy contains a clipping of a lengthy and laudatory review (probably from the local newspaper, The Annandale Herald) by the then minister of Dryfesdale Parish Kirk, Rev John Charlton Steen MA (who, incidentally, some ten years later, baptised me).

At least part of Jill Haldane’s aim in the present book is not entirely dissimilar: to record accounts by inhabitants of Lockerbie of the recent event with which the name of the town has become indissolubly linked and to reflect on how that seminal event may have changed, for good or ill, the life of the town and its indwellers.

Here, in brief, is my, and my family’s, story.

In 1988, both of my parents were still alive and living in the town’s Hillview Street. I was due to join them there on 23 December to spend Christmas and the New Year.

The first news of the Lockerbie disaster came to me through BBC radio. I was at my home in Edinburgh preparing my evening meal with, as usual, my wireless tuned to Radio Four. The first reports were, inevitably, sketchy and, I remember, suggested that Langholm too had been affected. But as soon as it was indicated that a plane had crashed on the town, my immediate thought was that it must have been one of the RAF jets that used the locality for low-flying exercises, to the great concern of the local inhabitants who often predicted that there would one day be a tragedy.

I immediately tried to telephone my mother, but all the lines were down and I could not get through. Shortly after 8pm a university colleague phoned me. Her first words were: “Bob, are you sitting down?” When I said that I wasn’t, she said “I think you should.” She then said that television programmes had been interrupted to announce that a plane had crashed on Lockerbie. Knowing that I did not have a television set (and twenty years later I still don’t) she assumed that I would not have received the news.

As the gravity of the incident became clearer, so my concern for the safety of my mother and father increased. However, at around 8.15, I received a phone call from my niece, at that time a nurse in a hospital in Glasgow. It transpired that she had actually been on the phone to my mother when the plane came down and, because the line was not cut until a few minutes thereafter, was able to confirm that her grandmother and grandfather had not been killed or injured. At the actual moment of impact, my father had been outside the house, posting a letter in the pillar box just across the road. He rushed to the alleyway between the houses and sheltered there while small items of debris rained down on the street.

When I drove in to Lockerbie on 23rd December, I was asked by the police what my business there was and, having convinced them that it was legitimate, was instructed to take a circuitous route to Hillview Street because the direct route was closed. That route would have led through Park Place which, of course, was one of the locations (other than Sherwood Crescent) most affected by debris from the plane.

Hillview Street itself had not been damaged. But a short distance away, just beyond Lambhill Terrace, the local golf course was one of the main sites from which bodies were recovered. Indeed, the main immediate impact that the disaster had on my family’s daily life was that it prevented my father from taking his daily walks over the golf course with his elderly next-door neighbour’s equally elderly dog.

The most obvious signs to me over the next few days that all was not normal were: the presence of multitudes of strangers in the town; the prevalence of baseball caps (not at that time a common item of headgear in Scotland) among the (presumably American) incomers; and the constant noise of helicopters.

My parents – typically, I think – did not then, or in the years that followed, talk a great deal about the event. Nor did their friends and neighbours. These were not people who wore their emotions on their sleeves. Scorn and distaste were, of course, expressed for the disaster groupies who felt compelled to visit the principal sites of destruction and gawk. But apart from that, reticence was the keynote of local reaction. And while there may well have been some citizens of the town who made use of the counselling services provided, on the whole the denizens of Lockerbie did not provide fertile ground for trauma counsellors.

My personal involvement in the aftermath of the destruction of Pan Am 103 began in early 1993. I was approached by representatives of a group of British businessmen whose desire to participate in major engineering works in Libya was being impeded by the UN sanctions that had been imposed on Libya in attempt to compel the surrender for trial in Scotland or the United States of America of their two accused citizens. They asked if I would be prepared to provide (on an unpaid basis) independent advice to the government of Libya on matters of Scottish criminal law, procedure and evidence with a view (it was hoped) to persuading them that their citizens would obtain a fair trial if they were to surrender themselves to the Scottish authorities. This I agreed to do, and submitted material setting out the essentials of Scottish solemn criminal procedure and the various protections embodied in it for accused persons.

In the light of this material, it was indicated to me that the Libyan government was satisfied regarding the fairness of a criminal trial in Scotland but that since Libyan law prevented the extradition of nationals for trial overseas, the ultimate decision on surrender for trial would have to be one taken voluntarily by the accused persons themselves, in consultation with their independent legal advisers. For this purpose a meeting was convened in Tripoli in October 1993 of the international team of lawyers which had already been appointed to represent the accused. This team consisted of lawyers from Scotland, England, Malta, Switzerland and the United States and was chaired by the principal Libyan lawyer for the accused, Dr Ibrahim Legwell. The Libyan government asked me to be present in Tripoli while the team was meeting so that the government itself would have access to independent Scottish legal advice should the need arise. However, the Libyan government expectation was clearly that the outcome of the meeting of the defence team would be a decision by the two accused voluntarily to agree to stand trial in Scotland.

I am able personally to testify to how much of a surprise and embarrassment it was to the Libyan government when the outcome of the meeting of the defence team was an announcement that the accused were not prepared to surrender themselves for trial in Scotland. In the course of a private meeting that I had a day later with Dr Legwell, he explained to me that the primary reason for the unwillingness of the accused to stand trial in Scotland was their belief that, because of unprecedented pre-trial publicity over the years, a Scottish jury could not possibly bring to their consideration of the evidence in this case the degree of impartiality and open-mindedness that accused persons are entitled to expect and that a fair trial demands. A secondary consideration was the issue of the physical security of the accused if the trial were to be held in Scotland. Not that it was being contended that ravening mobs of enraged Scottish citizens would storm Barlinnie prison, seize the accused and string them up from the nearest lamp posts. Rather, the fear was that they might be snatched by special forces of the United States, removed to America and put on trial there (or, like Lee Harvey Oswald, suffer an unfortunate accident before being put on trial).

The Libyan government attitude remained, as it always had been, that they had no constitutional authority to hand their citizens over to the Scottish authorities for trial. The question of voluntary surrender for trial was one for the accused and their legal advisers, and while the Libyan government would place no obstacles in the path of, and indeed would welcome, such a course of action, there was nothing that it could lawfully do to achieve it.

Having mulled over the concerns expressed to me by Dr Legwell in October 1993, I returned to Tripoli and on 10 January 1994 presented a letter to him suggesting a means of resolving the impasse created by the insistence of the governments of the United Kingdom and United States that the accused be surrendered for trial in Scotland or America and the adamant refusal of the accused to submit themselves for trial by jury in either of these countries. This was a detailed proposal, but in essence its principal elements were: that a trial be held outside Scotland, ideally in the Netherlands, in which the governing law and procedure would be that followed in Scottish criminal trials on indictment but with this major alteration, namely that the jury of 15 persons which is a feature of that procedure be replaced by a panel of judges who would have the responsibility of deciding not only questions of law but also the ultimate question of whether the guilt of the accused had been established on the evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

In a letter to me dated 12 January 1994, Dr Legwell stated that he had consulted his clients, that this scheme was wholly acceptable to them and that if it were implemented by the government of the United Kingdom the suspects would voluntarily surrender themselves for trial before a tribunal so constituted. By a letter of the same date the Deputy Foreign Minister of Libya stated that his government approved of the proposal and would place no obstacles in the path of its two citizens should they elect to submit to trial under this scheme.

On my return to the United Kingdom I submitted the relevant documents to the Foreign Office in London and the Crown Office (the headquarters of the Scottish prosecution service) in Edinburgh. Their immediate response was that this scheme was impossible, impracticable and inherently undesirable, with the clear implication that I had taken leave of what few senses nature had endowed me with. That remained the attitude of successive Lord Advocates and Foreign Secretaries for four years and seven months. During this period the British government's stance remained consistent: United Nations Security Council Resolutions placed upon the government of Libya a binding international legal obligation to hand over the accused for trial to the UK or the US authorities. Nothing else would do. If Libyan law did not currently permit the extradition of its own nationals to stand trial overseas, then Libya should simply alter its law (and, if necessary, its Constitution) to enable it to fulfil its international duty.

However, from about late July 1998, following interventions supporting my “neutral venue” scheme from, amongst others, President Nelson Mandela, there began to be leaks from UK government sources to the effect that a policy change over Lockerbie was imminent; and on 24 August 1998 the governments of the United Kingdom and United States announced that they had reversed their stance on the matter of a "neutral venue" trial.

Although many within the governments of Britain and the United States and within the media were sceptical, the suspects did eventually, on 5 April 1999, surrender themselves for trial before the Scottish court at Camp Zeist. That trial, after lengthy delays necessitated by the defence's need for adequate time to prepare, started on 3 May 2000 and a verdict of guilty was returned against one of the accused, and of not guilty against the other, on 31 January 2001.

I feel a measure of pride in the part that I, a Lockerbie boy born and bred, played in resolving an international impasse and in bringing the trial about. I have reason to suspect, however, that the United Kingdom government feels no sense of gratitude towards me. And I feel no pride whatsoever in the outcome of the proceedings. The conviction of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi on the evidence led at the trial constitutes, in my view, a flagrant miscarriage of justice, and one that I hope to live to see rectified as a result of the reference of the case back for a further appeal by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission in June 2007.

Many in Lockerbie hoped, I think, that the twentieth anniversary of the tragedy would signal an end to the town’s exposure to the eyes of the world. Regrettably, because of the Crown’s delaying tactics, it looks as if the new appeal will not be concluded before 21 December 2008. But the town’s wish will surely be fulfilled before the twenty-first anniversary and Lockerbie will be permitted to sink back into decent obscurity. But future generations will be grateful that, before that happened, Jill Haldane had the vision and the persistence to find a way of ensuring that the voices of the people of Lockerbie were heard and preserved.

Megrahi should never have been convicted in the first place

[What follows is excerpted from a report published in The Scotsman on this date in 2002:]

Megrahi’s appeal is being financed and co-ordinated by a consortium of Libyan lawyers headed by Tripoli-based academic Dr Ibrahim Legwell. [RB: Dr Legwell was a practising lawyer in Tripoli. His academic appointments were honorary.]

In a bid to bolster the appeal case, the Libyan lawyers raised funds to recruit the services of some of the world’s leading legal minds and PR men.

The appeal is to be heard by Scotland’s highest-ranking judge, Lord Cullen, the Lord Justice-General, sitting with Lords Kirkwood, Osborne, Macfadyen and Nimmo Smith.

Professor Robert Black, QC, of Edinburgh University, who helped to pave the way for the Lockerbie trial to be held in a neutral country, believes that Megrahi should win his appeal.

He added: "I did not believe either of the accused should have been convicted, and it is pretty plain my view is that the appeal should succeed, simply because Megrahi should never have been convicted in the first place on the evidence that was led.

"I believe that conclusions drawn by the court, that Megrahi bought clothing on Malta on a day when he was known to be on the island, went against the weight of the evidence.

"These conclusions were absolutely vital to his conviction. But it is very difficult for five judges to turn round and say, ‘Our three very senior colleagues at the trial got it wrong and they were not entitled to convict.’ I’m not oozing confidence that my view will turn out to be correct."

Megrahi's 2001 appeal

[What follows is the text of a report published in The Scotsman on this date in 2001:]

Tne appeal of convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi has been plagued by bitter in-fighting because members of his defence team have not been paid for their services.

The Scotsman has learned that Megrahi’s Libyan backers owe tens of thousands of pounds to the lawyers and spin doctors hired to bolster his case. Two members of the defence team have already resigned from the organising committee and one has even served a writ on Megrahi’s UK representative, claiming £30,000 in unpaid fees.

Megrahi was found guilty a year ago of mass murder for bombing New York-bound Pan Am flight 103 out of the sky in December 1988, killing all 259 passengers and crew and 11 people in Lockerbie.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a recommendation that he serve at least 20 years.

His co-accused, Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah, was cleared. Megrahi’s appeal is due to start on Wednesday [23 January 2001].

Professor Alan Dershowitz, a leading American civil rights lawyer and one of the main legal brains behind the appeal, has admitted technical specialists and lawyers gathering vital evidence for the case have yet to be paid by the Libyans.

He said: "I’ve been a consultant to the law firm and (I know) some people have not been paid. Some of the experts have not been paid as well. Some of the people that have been retained to do some of the scientific research on the case have not been paid."

Professor Dershowitz’s comments came after David Wynn Morgan and Patrick Robertson, the London-based PR experts brought in to publicise the appeal, resigned from their posts over financial disputes.

Mr Robertson has served a writ on Stephen Mitchell, the representative for Needleman Treon, Megrahi’s London-based solicitors, for almost £30,000.

Last night, Mr Robertson, who has represented former Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet, confirmed he had served a writ on Mr Mitchell. He said: "I was forced to resign from the committee because I was not paid the agreed sum in my contract to assist the team. I was brought in to inform the media on the case, set up a website on the appeal and organise a seminar for the committee and I had agreed a sum to carry out these functions.

"Unfortunately I have been forced to issue a writ to retrieve the money owed to me, that is now public knowledge and it is a position I would rather not be in."

It has also emerged that Mr Wynn Morgan resigned from the appeal committee by sending an e-mail to his colleagues, stating he was no longer in a position to carry out his duties. The disagreement is said to have come to a head after a five-figure cheque paid to Mr Wynn Morgan’s PR firm was allegedly stopped by representatives acting for the Libyans. A source close to Mr Wynn Morgan said: "David did resign from the appeal committee and it is fair to suggest there was a financial disagreement but we are in a tricky position at the moment.

"All we can say is this ‘disagreement’ has since been resolved and we hope to contribute more to the team in the future, but it was the basis for our withdrawal from the appeal team."

An appeal team insider suggested the timing for the dispute could not be worse and the growing financial cloud hanging over the committee could undermine the Libyan’s case.

He said: "There is a growing unease in the team and many of the lawyers and specialists who have contributed to the appeal feel they have been used by the Libyans."

Megrahi’s appeal is being financed and co-ordinated by a consortium of Libyan lawyers headed by Tripoli-based academic Dr Ibrahim Legwell. [RB: Dr Legwell was not an academic (save for an honorary professorship) but a practising lawyer.]

In a bid to bolster the appeal case, the Libyan lawyers raised funds to recruit the services of some of the world’s leading legal minds and PR men.

The appeal is to be heard by Scotland’s highest-ranking judge, Lord Cullen, the Lord Justice-General, sitting with Lords Kirkwood, Osborne, Macfadyen and Nimmo Smith.

Professor Robert Black, QC, of Edinburgh University, who helped to pave the way for the Lockerbie trial to be held in a neutral country, believes that Megrahi should win his appeal.

He added: "I did not believe either of the accused should have been convicted, and it is pretty plain my view is that the appeal should succeed, simply because Megrahi should never have been convicted in the first place on the evidence that was led.

"I believe that conclusions drawn by the court, that Megrahi bought clothing on Malta on a day when he was known to be on the island, went against the weight of the evidence.

"These conclusions were absolutely vital to his conviction. But it is very difficult for five judges to turn round and say, ‘Our three very senior colleagues at the trial got it wrong and they were not entitled to convict.’ I’m not oozing confidence that my view will turn out to be correct."

RB: My lack of confidence in the outcome of the appeal was regrettably justified. The reasons for its failure are set out here, in the section headed “The Appeal”. My view that the trial court’s conclusion, that the clothes that surrounded the bomb were bought in Malta on a day when Megrahi was present on the island, was contrary to the weight of the evidence is shared by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission:

“… the Commission formed the view that there is no reasonable basis in the trial court's judgment for its conclusion that the purchase of the items from Mary's House took place on 7 December 1988. Although it was proved that the applicant was in Malta on several occasions in December 1988, in terms of the evidence 7 December was the only date on which he would have had the opportunity to purchase the items. The finding as to the date of purchase was therefore important to the trial court's conclusion that the applicant was the purchaser. Likewise, the trial court's conclusion that the applicant was the purchaser was important to the verdict against him. Because of these factors the Commission has reached the view that the requirements of the legal test [RB: that no reasonable court could have reached that conclusion on the evidence] may be satisfied in the applicant's case.”

New legal team for Megrahi and Fhima

[On this date in 1998 there were media reports about a change in the Libyan legal team representing the Lockerbie accused, Megrahi and Fhima. What follows is taken from Asharq al-Awsat:]

Dr Ibrahim al-Ghuwayl [Legwell] lawyer of 'Abd-al-Basit al-Miqrahi and al-Amin Khalifah Fahimah, the two Libyans accused in connection with the Lockerbie case, has refused to join a new team formed by the Libyan Government to defend the two Libyans suspected of blowing up a PanAm plane over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.  In a statement to Al-Sharq al-Awsat yesterday Al-Ghuwayl attributed his refusal to disagreements over "strategy."

Dr al-Ghuwayl added that the new team is headed by Kamil Maqhur, a former foreign minister, and includes lawyers from a number of law practices in Libya.

Asked about the reasons for this official Libyan action, al-Ghuwayl said:  "I do not know the reasons; you should ask those who made the decision."  Dr al-Ghuwayl stressed that it was al-Miqrahi and Fahimah who chose him as a lawyer to defend them, "and I am still safeguarding their interests and will continue to do so until they decide otherwise." Al-Ghuwayl had objected to the US-British initiative for his clients to stand trial in the Netherlands.

[RB: A few days later a letter from me was published in The Scotsman in response to that newspaper’s report on the matter. The letter reads as follows:]

Your report  ("Lockerbie suspects' lawyers sacked", 24 September)  claims the new Libyan defence team had been appointed by the Libyan Government (or by Colonel Gaddafi). What evidence is there for this?

I met five members of the team in Tripoli last Monday. The chairman, Kamel Hassan Maghur, said he and his colleagues (who include the present President of the Tripoli Bar Association and the most senior past-President) had been appointed by the two suspects themselves; that their sole concern was with representing the interests of their clients;  that those interests did not necessarily coincide with the wishes or interests of the Libyan Government; and that if the Government sought to interfere in their work or to influence in any way the advice which the lawyers might render to their clients, they would not hesitate to publicise this fact in the international media.

Mr Maghur (who as well as being a former Foreign Minister, is also a retired Libyan Supreme Court judge) said nothing to indicate that his team wished to dispense with the services of Alistair Duff, the Edinburgh solicitor who for many years has represented the two suspects in Scotland: indeed, quite the reverse.

If, as you state, Dr Ibrahim Legwell is claiming (a) still to represent the suspects and (b) that the new team has been foisted on them without their consent, then this conflict should be speedily resolved by direct consultation with the accused themselves. I was deeply impressed by the professionalism, commitment and independence of the Libyan lawyers. If they do indeed now represent the suspects, I am convinced that their interests are in capable hands.

Libya confirms support for proposed neutral venue trial

[On this date in 1998 Dr Jim Swire and I were in Libya. During our discussions in Cairo on 16 April 1998 at the headquarters of the Arab League, it was suggested that it would be useful for us to make a visit to Tripoli. This we did. What follows is from a press release issued following that visit:]

A meeting to discuss issues arising out of the Lockerbie bombing was held in the premises of the Libyan Foreign Office in Tripoli on the evening of Saturday 18 April 1998. Present were Mr Abdul Ati Obeidi, Under-Secretary of the Libyan Foreign Office; Mr Mohammed Belqassem Zuwiy [or Zwai], Secretary of Justice of Libya; Mr Abuzaid Omar Dorda, Permanent Representative of Libya to the United Nations; Dr Ibrahim Legwell, head of the defence team representing the two Libyan citizens suspected of the bombing; Dr Jim Swire, spokesman for the British relatives group UK Families-Flight 103; and Professor Robert Black QC, Professor of Scots Law in the University of Edinburgh and currently a visiting professor in the Faculty of Law of the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

At the meeting, discussion focused upon the plan which had been formulated in January 1994 by Professor Black for the establishment of a court to try the suspects which would: operate under the criminal law and procedure of Scotland; have in place of a jury an international panel of judges presided over by a senior Scottish judge; and, sit not in Scotland but in a neutral country such as The Netherlands.

Among the issues discussed were possible methods of appointment of the international panel of judges, and possible arrangements for the transfer of the suspects from Libya for trial and for ensuring their safety and security pending and during the trial.

Dr Legwell confirmed, as he had previously done in January 1994, that his clients agreed to stand trial before such a court if it were established. The representatives of the Libyan Government stated, as they had done in 1994 and on numerous occasions since then, that they would welcome the setting up of such a court and that if it were instituted they would permit their two citizens to stand trial before it and would co-operate in facilitating arrangements for that purpose.

Dr Swire and Prof Black undertook to persist in their efforts to persuade the Government of the United Kingdom to join Libya in accepting this proposal.

Gaddafi expresses support for neutral venue trial

[On this date in 1998 Dr Jim Swire and I had a meeting in Tripoli with Colonel Gaddafi. What follows is the text of a press release issued following our trip to Libya:]

A meeting to discuss issues arising out of the Lockerbie bombing was held in the premises of the Libyan Foreign Office in Tripoli on the evening of Saturday 18 April 1998.  Present were Mr Abdul Ati Obeidi, Under-Secretary of the Libyan foreign Office; Mr Mohammed Belqassem Zuwiy [Zwai], Secretary of Justice of Libya; Mr Abuzaid Omar Dorda, Permanent Representative of Libya to the United Nations; Dr Ibrahim Legwell, head of the defence team representing the two Libyan citizens suspected of the bombing; Dr Jim Swire, spokesman for the British relatives group UK Families-Flight 103; and Professor Robert Black QC, Professor of Scots Law in the University of Edinburgh and currently a visiting professor in the Faculty of Law of the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

At the meeting discussion focused upon the plan which had been formulated in January 1994 by Professor Black for the establishment of a court to try the suspects which would:

* operate under the criminal law and procedure of Scotland

* have in place of a jury an international panel of judges presided over by a senior Scottish judge

* sit not in Scotland but in a neutral country such as The Netherlands.

Among the issues discussed were possible methods of appointment of  the international panel of judges, and possible arrangements for the transfer of the suspects from Libya for trial and for ensuring their safety and security pending and during the trial.

Dr Legwell confirmed, as he had previously done in January 1994, that his clients agreed to stand trial before such a court if it were established.  The representatives of the Libyan Government stated, as they had done in 1994 and on numerous occasions since then, that they would welcome the setting up of such a court and that if it were instituted they would permit their two citizens to stand trial before it and would co-operate in facilitating arrangements for that purpose.

Dr Swire and Professor Black undertook to persist in their efforts to persuade the Government of the United Kingdom to join Libya in accepting this proposal.

On Sunday 19 April 1998, Professor Black met the South African ambassador to Libya and Tunisia, His Excellency Ebrahim M Saley, and discussed with him current developments regarding the Lockerbie bombing.  He also took the opportunity to inform the ambassador of how much President Mandela's comments on the Lockerbie affair at the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in October 1997 in Edinburgh had been appreciated.

On Monday 20 April, Dr Swire and Professor Black had a meeting a lasting some 40 minutes with the Leader of the Revolution, Muammar al-Qaddafi.  Also present were the Libyan Foreign Secretary, Mr Omar al-Montasser, and Mr Dorda.  The Leader was informed of the substance of the discussions held on Saturday 18 April, and expressed his full support for the conclusions reached.

'Tiny' Rowland got Lockerbie lawyer

[This is the headline over a report that was published in The Independent on this date in 1993 (the date attached to the article on the newspaper’s website is erroneous). It reads as follows:]

Roland 'Tiny' Rowland, head of Lonrho, the international conglomerate, has intervened to speed moves to bring two Libyans accused of the Lockerbie bombing to trial.

Mr Rowland, who has close links with Libya's leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, helped to secure a Scottish lawyer for the men. The appointment of Alistair Duff, an Edinburgh solicitor-advocate, has raised hopes that they may go on trial in Scotland over the downing of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988, which left 270 people dead.

The news of Mr Rowland's involvement comes as the United Nations is due to consider tougher sanctions against Libya. Last year Mr Rowland condemned sanctions in an article in The Observer, which he then owned.

Lonrho has extensive business links with Libya. Last year Libya bought one third of the shares in Lonrho's Metropole Hotel chain for pounds 177.5m through the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company.

UN sanctions imposed after Colonel Gaddafi refused to hand over the men - in particular the ban on air traffic - has made doing business with Libya difficult.

John Cama, former senior partner at Lonrho's City solicitors, Cameron Markby Hewitt, and a consultant to Lonrho, revealed Dr Ibrahim Legwell, the Libyan leading the legal team, asked Mr Rowland to help to find a laywer to advise on Scottish law. He said: 'Tiny consulted me, as his legal adviser, after Dr Legwell approached him. I recommended Alistair Duff.'

Mr Rowland's intervention was not a surprise, he added. 'Tiny has been a friend of Colonel Gaddafi for over 24 years.'

Although Mr Cama is not an official member of the legal team, he and Peter Hewes, a Cameron Markby partner, met the suspects - Abdel Baset Ali Mahmed al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fhima - in Tripoli, the Libyan capital, this weekend. They also attended a meeting of the legal advisers.

Mr Cama, Mr Hewes, Mr Duff and Lord Macaulay of Bragar, an Edinburgh QC, flew home from Tunisia on a private jet thought to have been chartered by Lonrho.

'The whole truth..'?

[This is the headline over a report in Al-Ahram Weekly Online from this week in 2001:]

A conference on Lockerbie organised by the Arab League this week concluded that the verdict was politically motivated, reports Gamal Nkrumah

Last Saturday, a two-day international conference on the trial at Kamp van Zeist in the Netherlands of two Libyan nationals accused of bombing a PanAm flight over the Scottish village of Lockerbie began at the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo. Several luminaries, including a former Algerian president, attended the conference, which condemned the Scottish court's decision to convict former Libyan intelligence agent Abdel-Basset Al-Megrahi and acquit his co-defendant Amin Khalifa Fhima. A UN trial observer from Austria, also at the conference, denounced the trial as unfair and the verdict as irrational.

"Lockerbie was a sham trial. The whole purpose of that farcical but tragic exercise in legal acrobatics was to punish the Libyan regime. The United States and the United Kingdom wanted to make an example of Libya. They want to deter other Third World countries from daring to stand up for the rights of the downtrodden and dispossessed," Dr Said Hafyana, Libya's assistant secretary for legal affairs, told Al-Ahram Weekly.

"To this day, US sanctions have not been lifted," Hafyana said. "The trial was simply a means to penalise Libya and cripple the Libyan government by forcing it to pay hefty compensation fines to the families of the victims," Hafyana argued. "It was mainly a political trial," he added.

The conference on Lockerbie was officially opened by Dr Esmat Abdel-Meguid, the outgoing secretary-general of the Arab League. Abdel-Meguid emphasised in his keynote address that the Arab world and the international community have an obligation to lift completely the sanctions against Libya. He also reminded his audience that the United Nations security council resolution, which imposed sanctions against Libya in 1992, linked ending the sanctions to the extradition of the two suspects. The resolution did not stipulate other conditions. But after the two suspects were extradited to the Netherlands, the Security Council only suspended sanctions, leaving open the door for the US to set more conditions before total withdrawal of the sanctions. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, the independent sanctions regime unilaterally imposed by the US outside the authority of the UN, is still in force, though due to expire in August. Washington now insists that Libya accept full responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and compensate the families of the victims before it will lifts its sanctions. Official Libyan sources say that sanctions have cost Libya over $26 billion to date.

Former Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella was one of the conference guests. Ben Bella has been an outspoken critic of the Lockerbie trial and a tireless champion of the Libyan cause. He joined with former South African President Nelson Mandela to lead the international campaign to lift sanctions from Libya.

Ibrahim Legwell, Al-Megrahi's Libyan lawyer when the case first started, was also present in Cairo. "Historically, there have always been miscarriages of justice," he said. "But there have been no precedents to such a case by which proceedings can be compared and evaluated," he added. "Al-Megrahi insists that this is a case of mistaken identity and that he has been falsely accused. He says that he is innocent and cannot accept a situation where the families of the victims believe him to be the murderer," Legwell said.

Farouk Abou-Eissa, head of the Cairo-based Arab Lawyers Union was a panelist at the opening session. With the results of the appeal process still pending, Abou-Eissa appealed to the judges not to give in to the whims of world powers.

Some of the most damning criticisms of the trial came from Dr Hans Köchler, an official UN observer at Kamp van Zeist. Köchler told the Weekly that British and especially American pressure and political influence was brought to bear on the judges and that the trial was unfair. Köchler, a member of the International Progress Organisation, was nominated to his post by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1192. He is a professor at Innsbruck University in Austria.

Köchler upbraided the court for holding the suspects for an unseemly length of time. "The extraordinary length of detention of the two suspects from their time of arrival in the Netherlands until the beginning of the trial in May 2000 is a serious problem in regard to their basic human rights under European standards, in particular those of the European Convention on Human Rights," he said. The two Libyans were indicted in 1999.

Köchler also ridiculed the prosecution's grip on legal procedure. He noted the curious role played by the Libyan double agent Abdul-Majid Giaka. "The serious problem of process at Kamp van Zeist became evident when it transpired that CIA cables concerning one of the Crown's key witnesses, Giaka, were initially dismissed by the prosecution as 'not relevant.' Only later were they partially released thanks to pressure from the defence. Such incidents seriously damaged the integrity of the entire procedure. In the end, only a select few of the cables sent by the CIA to Giaka were released. Most were never made available," Köchler said. He also claimed that politics intruded into the court. The presence of government representatives of both sides in the courtroom gave the trial a highly political aura. But the official reporting of the court failed to declare this. "The presence of foreign nationals on the side of the defence team was not mentioned in any of the Scottish Court Service's official briefing documents," Köchler said.

Köchler was also concerned by the prosecution's witnesses. According to him, virtually everyone presented by the prosecution as a key witness lacked credibility, some having openly lied to the Court. Köchler was also worried about which information was released. It was officially stated by the Lord Advocate that substantial new information was received from an unnamed foreign government relating to the defence's case. But the content of this information was never revealed. "Foreign governments or secret government agencies may have been allowed, albeit indirectly, to determine which evidence was made available to the Court," Köchler said.

Many questions are still unanswered. It is unclear, for example, why the defence team suddenly dropped its "special defence" and cancelled the appearance of nearly all defence witnesses. Köchler says that defence lawyers were unavailable for comment on this crucial matter. Summing up his views of the trial, Köchler said, "The verdict was based on circumstantial evidence and on a series of highly problematic inferences. There is not one single piece of material evidence linking the two accused to the crime." Finally, Köchler called the court's decision that Al-Megrahi was guilty, "arbitrary and irrational." In conclusion Köchler had grave misgivings about the trial. He thought that it was unfair; that it was not conducted objectively; that the legal process was opaque and that evidence may have been withheld for political reasons.