Kofi Annan and Lockerbie

The obituary of Kofi Annan in today's edition of The Guardian contains the following paragraph: 

'He was by nature a conciliator, a “diplomat’s diplomat”. But he also had the courage of his convictions and stuck to his guns even when powerful UN members urged retreat. A notable example was his intervention in Baghdad in 1998 to defuse a crisis over UN arms inspections in Iraq, where he went ahead with negotiations, against strong pressure from Washington to stay away; and he spoke out against the US invasion of 2003. Similarly, he defied Britain and the US when he negotiated with Libya to end a security council stalemate over the Lockerbie bombing.'

My own perception of that period, as someone peripherally involved, is that Kofi Annan's office found the negotiating with the United Kingdom and the United States much more difficult and taxing than negotiating with Libya. Here is something that I wrote some years ago:

'Although the British proposal [for a Scottish non-jury court to sit in the Netherlands] was announced in late August 1998, it was not until 5 April 1999 that the two suspects actually arrived in the Netherlands for trial before the Scottish court.  Why the delay?  The answer is that some of the fine print in the two documents [that set out the details of the proposal] was capable of being interpreted, and was in fact interpreted, by the Libyan defence team (now chaired by Mr Kamel Hassan Maghur as successor to Dr Legwell) and the Libyan government as having been deliberately designed to create pitfalls to entrap them.  And since the governments of the United Kingdom and United States resolutely refused to have any direct contact with either the Libyan government or the Libyan defence lawyers -- their attitude being that the scheme had been advanced on a “take it or leave it basis” and that no negotiations would be entered in to -- these concerns could be dealt with only through an intermediary, namely the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (or, in practice, the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Hans Corell).   This meant that issues that could have been thrashed out and settled in a matter of a few hours in a face-to-face meeting took weeks and months to resolve.  The US government, particularly the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, took every available opportunity to accuse the Libyan government and lawyers of stalling and trying to wriggle out of the assurances they had given over the years to support a “neutral venue” trial.  My own clear impression, however, through my continuing contacts with the Libyans, was that if anyone was looking for pretexts to avoid a trial ever taking place, it was the US and UK governments.'

"We are not creating any obstacles"

[On this date in 1998 a lengthy interview with Dr Ibrahim Legwell, the then lawyer for the two Libyan Lockerbie suspects, was published on the website of the Dutch NRC Handelsblad newspaper. Google Translate provides a comprehensible English language version of the article. The following are the headline and first sub-heading, courtesy of Google Translate assisted by me:]

Lockerbie suspects’ Libyan lawyer: 'We are not creating any obstacles'

Libyan lawyer Ibrahim Legwell, who is representing the suspects in the Lockerbie attack, denies imposing any conditions for their trial in accordance with Scottish law in the Netherlands. However, the trial process must be rounded off with "legal guarantees" for a fair trial.

[RB:  Dr Legwell was replaced as the suspects’ lawyer shortly after this interview was published (though there was no connection). What follows is something written by me some years ago about this stage in journey towards a Lockerbie trial:]

Although the British proposal [for a Scottish non-jury court to sit in the Netherlands] was announced in late August 1998, it was not until 5 April 1999 that the two suspects actually arrived in the Netherlands for trial before the Scottish court.  Why the delay?  The answer is that some of the fine print in the two documents [that set out the details of the proposal] was capable of being interpreted, and was in fact interpreted, by the Libyan defence team (now chaired by Mr Kamel Hassan Maghur as successor to Dr Legwell) and the Libyan government as having been deliberately designed to create pitfalls to entrap them.  And since the governments of the United Kingdom and United States resolutely refused to have any direct contact with either the Libyan government or the Libyan defence lawyers -- their attitude being that the scheme had been advanced on a “take it or leave it basis” and that no negotiations would be entered in to -- these concerns could be dealt with only through an intermediary, namely the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (or, in practice, the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Hans Corell).   This meant that issues that could have been thrashed out and settled in a matter of a few hours in a face-to-face meeting took weeks and months to resolve.  The US government, particularly the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, took every available opportunity to accuse the Libyan government and lawyers of stalling and trying to wriggle out of the assurances they had given over the years to support a “neutral venue” trial.  My own clear impression, however, through my continuing contacts with the Libyans, was that if anyone was looking for pretexts to avoid a trial ever taking place, it was the US and UK governments.

Between 20 and 22 September 1998, Dr Jim Swire and I were again in Tripoli and were able to provide to the Libyan government and the Libyan defence team a measure of reassurance regarding some of the points that concerned them.  However, it was we who had to inform the Libyan government that the chosen location in the Netherlands for trial was Kamp van Zeist, a former NATO base to which the air force of the United States still had extant treaty rights of access.  This information was faxed to me (in Dutch, which I can read  -- with difficulty -- through my knowledge of Afrikaans) at my hotel in Tripoli by a Dutch journalist who had developed an interest in Lockerbie and who had heard it from an official at The Hague.  Dr Swire and I discussed whether we should inform our Libyan government contacts of the intended venue and came to the conclusion that we should do so.  One compelling reason for doing so was to preserve the trust that the Libyan government appeared to have developed in us.  Another was our assumption – which may or may not have been justified -- that all our communications in Libya were monitored and that the Libyan authorities would have the information anyway as soon as they could arrange for a copy of the fax to be translated from Dutch into Arabic.

I anticipated that the news about the proposed location would cause the Libyans to renounce the "neutral venue" concept in high dudgeon and complain of the lack of good faith demonstrated by the British Government in selecting, or agreeing to, such a site.  But they did not do so.  When we raised the issue at our next meeting, the Libyan officials were remarkably relaxed about the matter.  This, more than anything else, convinced me that the Libyan government and the Libyan defence lawyers genuinely wished a trial to take place and that the concerns they had expressed regarding details of the scheme now on offer were genuine concerns, not merely a colourable pretext for evading their earlier commitment to such a solution.

On 22 September Dr Swire and I had a further meeting with the Leader of the Revolution.  On this occasion the meeting took place not in Tripoli but 400 kilometres to the east in a genuine (not reinforced concrete) Bedouin tent in a desert location inland from the town of Sirte. (...)

Surrounded by the sand dunes and by noisily ruminating camels, Colonel Gaddafi, Dr Swire and I discussed the details of the British scheme.  He accepted my assurance that at least some of the concerns that Libyan government lawyers had raised were unwarranted and that it would be worthwhile to continue to seek clarifications and reassurances through the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the remaining issues. (...)

I returned to the UK after this visit to Libya reasonably confident that a trial would take place.  It was clear to me that the Libyan authorities at the highest level wanted it to happen and that the accused men wanted their families and themselves to be able to get on with their lives, something that could never happen, even within the boundaries of Libya, while the charges against them remained unresolved and UN sanctions remained in place.

Lockerbie trial sabre-rattling

[What follows is the text of an article that appeared in The New York Times on this date in 1998:]

On the 10th anniversary of the bombing of a Pan Am jet over Scotland, the United States told Libya today that it will face more sanctions if two Libyan suspects are not turned over for trial by a Scottish judge in the Netherlands by February.

''Ten years is much too long to wait for justice,'' said Peter Burleigh, the American representative on the Security Council, which discussed the issue today.

In Libya, however, Col Muammar el-Qaddafi only widened the breach today, apparently rejecting the compromise plan for a trial in the Netherlands by saying that he wanted an international tribunal to hear the case. Earlier this month, Libya's National Assembly seemed to endorse the plan for a Scottish trial after a personal appeal to Colonel Qaddafi from Secretary General Kofi Annan.

''An international court is the solution,'' Colonel Qaddafi told a Dutch television interviewer in a program taped last week and broadcast in the Netherlands today, ''with judges from America, Libya, England and other countries.''

Today, however, at a ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery marking the bombing, President Clinton said the plan to hold the trial in the Netherlands was a ''take it or leave it'' deal. ''We will not negotiate its terms,'' he added.

For years Libya refused to allow American or British courts to try the suspects in the bombing, which killed 270 people, including 11 on the ground in Lockerbie, the Scottish town where the plane came down. In August Britain and the United States offered the compromise of a trial in a third country, and the Netherlands agreed to allow a Scottish court to be set up for that purpose in Utrecht.

But Libya, under United Nations sanctions since 1992, continued to stall, raising questions about the treatment of the suspects and where they would be imprisoned if convicted. British officials and the Secretary General's legal counsel, Under Secretary General Hans Corell, replied exhaustively to the Libyans.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's representative at the United Nations, said today that all the questions raised by Libya had been answered.

Arab diplomats say Libya is concerned that the two suspects, Abdel Basset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, could be pressed by Western intelligence agencies or trial prosecutors to talk about more than Lockerbie.

Mr. Annan said again today that he remains optimistic that Libya will eventually comply with the request to send the suspects to the Netherlands. But the signs from Libya seem to be pointing in another direction.

In February the Security Council will review the sanctions, which would be suspended immediately if the suspects were handed over.

By February, Mr Burleigh said today, ''the Libyan Government will have had six months to accept the offer it long said it would accept.''

[RB: My neutral venue trial proposal, accepted by Libya, was on the table for four years and seven months before the United Kingdom and United States reluctantly put forward a scheme along the same lines. US criticism of Libya for taking six months to consider the ramifications of that scheme seems somewhat petty.]

The Lockerbie agreement between UK and Netherlands

[On this date in 1998 a treaty was concluded at The Hague between the governments of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands providing for a Scottish court to sit in the Netherlands to try the two Libyans accused of the Lockerbie bombing. The treaty can be read here. What follows is from an article written by me some years ago:]

The details of the arrangement -- the fine print -- are to be found in two documents: a British Order in Council (SI 1998 No 2251), made on 16 September 1998, conferring the necessary legal authority for Scottish criminal proceedings against the two Libyan suspects to be conducted in the Netherlands, and an international agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the United Kingdom, concluded on 18 September 1998, making the diplomatic arrangements necessary for the "neutral venue" trial to take place. (...)

Although the British proposal was announced in late August 1998, it was not until 5 April 1999 that the two suspects actually arrived in the Netherlands for trial before the Scottish court.  Why the delay?  The answer is that some of the fine print in the two documents was capable of being interpreted, and was in fact interpreted, by the Libyan defence team (now chaired by Mr Kamel Hassan Maghur as successor to Dr Legwell) and the Libyan government as having been deliberately designed to create pitfalls to entrap them.  And since the governments of the United Kingdom and United States resolutely refused to have any direct contact with either the Libyan government or the Libyan defence lawyers -- their attitude being that the scheme had been advanced on a “take it or leave it basis” and that no negotiations would be entered into -- these concerns could be dealt with only through an intermediary, namely the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (or, in practice, the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Hans Corell).   This meant that issues that could have been thrashed out and settled in a matter of a few hours in a face-to-face meeting took weeks and months to resolve.  The US government, particularly the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, took every available opportunity to accuse the Libyan government and lawyers of stalling and trying to wriggle out of the assurances they had given over the years to support a “neutral venue” trial.  My own clear impression, however, through my continuing contacts with the Libyans, was that if anyone was looking for pretexts to avoid a trial ever taking place, it was the US and UK governments.

Between 20 and 22 September 1998, Dr Jim Swire and I were again in Tripoli and were able to provide to the Libyan government and the Libyan defence team a measure of reassurance regarding some of the points that concerned them.  However, it was we who had to inform the Libyan government that the chosen location in the Netherlands for trial was Kamp van Zeist, a former NATO base to which the air force of the United States still had extant treaty rights of access.  This information was faxed to me (in Dutch, which I can read  -- with difficulty -- through my knowledge of Afrikaans) at my hotel in Tripoli by a Dutch journalist who had developed an interest in Lockerbie and who had heard it from an official at The Hague.  Dr Swire and I discussed whether we should inform our Libyan government contacts of the intended venue and came to the conclusion that we should do so.  One compelling reason for doing so was to preserve the trust that the Libyan government appeared to have developed in us.  Another was our assumption -- which may or may not have been justified -- that all our communications in Libya were monitored and that the Libyan authorities would have the information anyway as soon as they could arrange for a copy of the fax to be translated from Dutch into Arabic.

I anticipated that the news about the proposed location would cause the Libyans to renounce the "neutral venue" concept in high dudgeon and complain of the lack of good faith demonstrated by the British Government in selecting, or agreeing to, such a site.  But they did not do so.  When we raised the issue at our next meeting, the Libyan officials were remarkably relaxed about the matter.  This, more than anything else, convinced me that the Libyan government and the Libyan defence lawyers genuinely wished a trial to take place and that the concerns they had expressed regarding details of the scheme now on offer were genuine concerns, not merely a colourable pretext for evading their earlier commitment to such a solution.

On 22 September Dr Swire and I had a further meeting with the Leader of the Revolution.  On this occasion the meeting took place not in Tripoli but 400 kilometres to the east in a genuine (not reinforced concrete) Bedouin tent in a desert location inland from the town of Sirte.  We drove most of the way in the usual government black Mercedes, transferring into a 4 x 4 only for the last few off-road miles.  When at the tent nothing could be seen but sand and sky; but out of sight just beyond the nearest dunes was a lengthy convoy of communications vehicles, ambulances, canteen vehicles and troop carriers. 

Surrounded by the sand dunes and by noisily ruminating camels, Colonel Gaddafi, Dr Swire and I discussed the details of the British scheme.  He accepted my assurance that at least some of the concerns that Libyan government lawyers had raised were unwarranted and that it would be worthwhile to continue to seek clarifications and reassurances through the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the remaining issues. 

Unfulfilled hopes

[On this date in 2000 an article headlined Dr Jim Swire: My hopes was published on the BBC News website. It reads as follows:]

Since the Lockerbie disaster, Dr Jim Swire has led a high-profile campaign for justice on behalf of UK relatives. Here, he explains his motivation and reveals what he hopes the trial will achieve.

My daughter, Flora wanted to fly to the US to spend Christmas with her American boyfriend.

The week before Christmas is a busy time for transatlantic flights. Twenty-four hours before the fatal flight, Flora was able to get a seat - on Pan Am Flight 103.

Why was that, and why was the 103 only two-thirds full that night?

Our group has sought truth and justice throughout the last 11 years since our loved ones perished so horribly.

We want to know why the intelligence warnings were ignored, why UK aviation security was so inept that its head, who had seen a warning about a bomb in a tape recorder specifically designed to work in the hold of an aircraft in-flight, actually informed his staff, just before Lockerbie, that if they were unsure about a tape recorder: "Any device about which a searcher is unable to satisfy himself/herself must, if it is to be carried in the aircraft, be consigned to the aircraft hold."

No explanation or apology has been forthcoming, for this or for the apparent torpor of the intelligence services.

All attempts to persuade the Conservative Government to hold an objective inquiry were dismissed, even though the doomed aircraft "Maid of the Seas" had been loaded from empty, (and therefore the bomb itself had been loaded) at Heathrow Airport, under the "Host State Protection" of the UK.

Indictments issued

In November 1991, the UK and US Governments suddenly issued indictments against two named Libyans, claiming that there was no evidence for the involvement of any other country, and demanding their immediate surrender for trial in the UK or US.

In 1971, the Libyans, the UK and the US had all been parties to the Montreal Convention, which stated that under these circumstances the accused could be tried under the law of their own country, that is Libya.

I am two-thirds Scottish and my daughter died in Scotland. I wanted the accused tried under Scottish law, with its excellent reputation for impartiality.

Against the background of such demands at international level, and the existence of such a treaty, it seemed very unlikely that an independent state, such as Libya, would ever comply.

It was difficult as a small-town GP in England to see what could be done, but with the help of an Egyptian journalist, Nabil Nagemeldin, who was able to arrange the logistics, I decided I must try to persuade Libya to allow her citizens to be tried under Scots law.

Sealed letters

I had to see Colonel Gaddafi. Leaving sealed letters with a solicitor, in case I could not return, I found myself finally making the nerve-racking trip down the concrete path to the colonel's tent in Tripoli.

I shall never forget that dark cold December night. Fear sharpens the senses.

Unfortunately, his aides did not allow me to bring in my briefcase which contained one or two small presents for him, so my opening gambit was, that while I was very grateful to him for agreeing to see me, I thought he must be almost as scared of me as I was of him.

After that the briefcase was brought and the ice was broken.

The Arabs have a rich tradition of courtesy to travellers, which was honoured that night. The colonel was determined that I should hear that he believed that his citizens were innocent and that he did not know how the disaster had been caused.

His adopted daughter had been killed in the 1986 bombing of Tripoli by the US, and he agreed that in the preserved ruined bedroom, where she had been mortally wounded, a photograph of her and of Flora should be put up side by side, with the message beneath in Arabic and English: "The consequence of the use of violence is the death of innocent people."

So far as I know it is still there.

West sanctions

As I left he allowed me to pin a badge to his robe. It read "Pan Am 103 - the truth must be known".

Western demands remained, and were backed by Security Council sanctions. The Libyans could not try the two because the West would not supply them with the evidence.

In January 1994 Professor Robert Black QC, a native of Lockerbie, had proposed a trial under Scottish criminal law, but in a neutral country. In addition he proposed that such a court have a panel of judges instead of a jury.

Under Scottish law, jurors should not come to a case having already formed opinions as to the guilt or innocence of those upon whom they are to give a verdict.

Where would 15 such Scots be found after the media coverage of the preceding years?

Professor Black had also obtained the agreement of the Libyans to such a solution. With the refusal of the US or UK Governments to consider such a "neutral country" trial, in April 1998 Prof Black and I decided to lobby internationally for support of his proposal.

Cairo trip

With the help of loyal friends we flew to Cairo and obtained the support of HE Esmat Abdel-Meguid, secretary-general of the League of Arab States.

The Organisation of African Unity had gone as far as to threaten to break Security Council sanctions imposed on Libya, unless the west found a solution to the Lockerbie deadlock.

With this encouragement we visited Libya again and obtained renewed and stronger support from both Colonel Gaddafi and the Libyan People's Congresses for the "neutral country" trial solution.

The following month, May 1998, I met Donald K Bandler, special adviser to President Clinton, and member of the National Security Council at the Whitehouse in Birmingham, England.

When asked why the US still refused to consider the concept of a "neutral country trial", his reply was that the Libyans "would never hand them over".

Change of government

Following the 1997 general election in the UK, the new foreign secretary, Robin Cook, while initially taking the line that a neutral country trial was not possible under Scots law, met our group and, with tremendous support from President Nelson Mandela, (who had been lobbying the UK Government during the Conservative years also), had the grace to agree to promote this solution.

How he and Prime Minister Tony Blair persuaded America to join them I do not know.

One piece was missing: the venue itself. That missing piece was supplied by the Netherlands.

The Dutch Government, in line with its magnificent past record in support of international justice, offered a choice of possible sites.

In the end Zeist was chosen to become Scottish territory for the duration of the criminal proceedings.

There remained the delicate task of clearing up remaining difficulties raised by the Libyan defence team.

'Fair verdict'

This was entrusted to the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, and his team led by Hans Corell, legal counsel to the UN.

Our group has always worked for truth and justice and now we expect to see Scottish criminal justice deliver a fair verdict on the guilt or innocence of two individuals.

After that is done many questions will still remain unanswered.

In December 1998, for the first time since the disaster, a British prime minister (Tony Blair) met us to discuss these issues.

He supported the need to follow up any new avenues opened up by the trial.

He also said that "we had thought that the Lockerbie situation was set in stone and then we heard the voice of the relatives".

I think Flora would have been proud to hear that and that it goes some way to atone for the fearful price that this campaign has exacted from all of us.

That price for me includes the loss of my medical partnership together with much of my pension rights.

But it has also revealed the loyalty of my wife Jane, who has understood that this was something I had to do. Any alternative would have been infinitely worse.

Others in our group have suffered likewise Some have died from stress-related diseases.

Despite all that, we shall still be seeking truth and justice after this trial is over - those we loved were too important for their fate to be pushed under any political carpet.

'Criminal investigation'

The verdict of this court on the guilt or innocence of these two accused will however have removed one of the most potent weapons used to frustrate our search for the truth - the mantra: "You can't have an inquiry because it might impinge on the criminal investigation."

Other major international political issues also hang upon the verdict. Perhaps this unprecedented legal solution may help point the way for future victims of international crime.

Despite deliberations stretching all the way back to Nuremburg, there is still no satisfactory route for the trying of those accused of international terrorist crimes such as Lockerbie.

President Mandela has said that no one country should be complainant, prosecutor and judge.

I would be proud if this trial contributes to fair and just resolution of future terrorist cases.

Lockerbie suspects head for trial

[This is the headline over a report published on the BBC News website on this date in 1999. It reads as follows:]

The two men suspected of the Lockerbie airline bombing more than 10 years ago have arrived in the Netherlands to face trial.

As a result the UN Security Council has suspended sanctions against Libya.

The men were finally handed over into the custody of United Nations officials at Tripoli airport on Monday morning.

During the handover ceremony, suspected bomber Abdel Baset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi told Libyan television that he and his co-accused, Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah, were going to prove their innocence to the world.

The two men gestured with victory signs as they boarded the plane bound for the Netherlands, escorted by the UN's chief legal adviser, Hans Corell.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has welcomed the surrender of the suspects.

"I am looking forward to the earliest possible resumption of Libya's relations with the rest of the international community," Mr Annan told a news conference in New York.

The UN imposed sanctions on Libya for its refusal to surrender the two men.

United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Robin Cook described the handover of the suspects as "an historic moment".

"It is the end of a 10-year diplomatic stalemate, and it justifies the initiative we launched last year for a trial in a third country."

The US described the handover as a "positive step."

"This is clearly welcome news, although long overdue," White House Press Secretary Joe Lockhart said.

The two suspects are expected to be tried before Scottish judges, in a specially-convened court at the Camp Zeist airbase near Utrecht.

Pan Am flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie in 1988, and a large piece of the fuselage fell onto the Scottish town.

The crash killed 259 people on board the plane, and another 11 on the ground.

The handover of the two men is the culmination of a decade of diplomatic efforts to find a solution which would satisfy the governments of Libya, the UK and the United States.

Western governments and the families of those killed in the bombing have maintained that a Libyan trial would not ensure a fair hearing.

Tripoli did not want the suspects to be sent to the UK.

Setting up a temporary Scottish court on the soil of a third country was put forward as a compromise solution.

The deal was eventually clinched with the intervention of leaders from South Africa, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Jane Swire, whose daughter Flora died in the bombing, said she was "very relieved" at the news of the handover.

"Obviously nothing can bring back the precious people that we have lost and that still hurts," Mrs Swire said.

"At least this is a good message for the world. People who are accused of wicked crimes like this are brought to justice."

The trial arrangements are said to be unprecedented in legal history, since they involve the establishment of a temporary court under the jurisdiction of one country, within the borders of another country.

After the suspects arrive in the Netherlands, they will have to be extradited from Dutch to Scottish custody, and the Zeist airbase has temporarily been declared Scottish territory.

The suspects must face a preliminary hearing within two days.

The trial should begin within 110 days, but given the complexities of the case, the defence is bound to request a postponement meaning the trial may not start for many months.

[RB: The above report was accompanied by another, headlined Analysis: Legal firsts for Lockerbie trial.]

Dignitaries invited to Libya to witness handover of suspects

[What follows is the text of a report (based on material from The Associated Press news agency) published on the CNN website on this date in 1999:]

Arab dignitaries have been invited by Libya to witness the handover of two suspects in the 1988 Pan Am bombing, a further sign their promised extradition is imminent, an Arab League official said Sunday.

However, in Libya, secrecy has surrounded the operation and officials contacted by telephone have refused to divulge details about the much anticipated handover.

Arab diplomats said on Saturday that Libyan leader Col Moammar Gadhafi has ordered the passports of the two suspects returned to them.

Ahmed Ben Heli, the Arab League's Assistant Secretary-General said his delegation would fly later Sunday to the Tunisian airport of Jerba, from where they would be driven to the Libyan capital, Tripoli. Representatives from six Arab countries also would attend the handover to a United Nations representative, he said.

"It is good news for the Libyans -- indeed, for all Arabs -- that this quandary is finally over," Ben Heli told The Associated Press before leaving Cairo, site of the League's headquarters.

The move followed reports that the chief UN legal counsel, Hans Corell, had left for Europe on Friday on his way to Libya to arrange for the handover.

Lamen Khalifa Fhimah and Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi are to be tried under Scottish law in the Netherlands.

The December 21, 1988, bombing of the Pan Am jet over Lockerbie, Scotland, killed 270 people -- mostly Americans and Britons -- in the air and on the ground.

The two Libyans, allegedly former intelligence agents, were suspected of planting a suitcase bomb on the plane.

Ben Heli said he would represent the League's secretary-general, Esmat Abdel-Meguid, who could not make the trip because of other commitments.

The Algerian diplomat said the Libyan government also has invited foreign ministers of six Arab countries that formed a contact group set up by the League in 1992 to help negotiate an end to the crisis with the United States and Britain.

Egypt, a member of the group, has announced it is sending a senior minister. The other countries expected to send high-ranking officials were Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania.

Arab diplomats in Cairo said that Libya also has asked South Africa and the Organization of African Unity to send representatives.

After a decade of insistence that Fhimah, 42, and al-Megrahi, 46, be extradited to the United States or Britain for trial, the United States agreed in August to a trial in the Netherlands.

Libya said last month it would turn the men over on or before Tuesday.

Terms of the deal call for the UN Security Council to suspend sanctions imposed in 1992, including an air embargo, as soon as the suspects arrive in the Netherlands.

Steps on the path towards Zeist

[What follows is a short excerpt from an article written by me some years ago:]

Although the British proposal [for a trial in the Netherlands] was announced in late August 1998, it was not until 5 April 1999 that the two suspects actually arrived in the Netherlands for trial before the Scottish court.  Why the delay?  The answer is that some of the fine print in the two documents* was capable of being interpreted, and was in fact interpreted, by the Libyan defence team (now chaired by Mr Kamel Hassan Maghur as successor to Dr [Ibrahim] Legwell) and the Libyan government as having been deliberately designed to create pitfalls to entrap them.  And since the governments of the United Kingdom and United States resolutely refused to have any direct contact with either the Libyan government or the Libyan defence lawyers -- their attitude being that the scheme had been advanced on a “take it or leave it basis” and that no negotiations would be entered in to -- these concerns could be dealt with only through an intermediary, namely the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (or, in practice, the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Hans Corell).   This meant that issues that could have been thrashed out and settled in a matter of a few hours in a face-to-face meeting took weeks and months to resolve.  The US government, particularly the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, took every available opportunity to accuse the Libyan government and lawyers of stalling and trying to wriggle out of the assurances they had given over the years to support a “neutral venue” trial.  My own clear impression, however, through my continuing contacts with the Libyans, was that if anyone was looking for pretexts to avoid a trial ever taking place, it was the US and UK governments.

Between 20 and 22 September 1998, Dr Jim Swire and I were again in Tripoli and were able to provide to the Libyan government and the Libyan defence team a measure of reassurance regarding some of the points that concerned them.  However, it was we who had to inform the Libyan government that the chosen location in the Netherlands for trial was Kamp van Zeist, a former NATO base to which the air force of the United States still had extant treaty rights of access.  This information was faxed to me (in Dutch, which I can read  -- with difficulty -- through my knowledge of Afrikaans) at my hotel in Tripoli by a Dutch journalist who had developed an interest in Lockerbie and who had heard it from an official at The Hague.  Dr Swire and I discussed whether we should inform our Libyan government contacts of the intended venue and came to the conclusion that we should do so.  One compelling reason for doing so was to preserve the trust that the Libyan government appeared to have developed in us.  Another was our assumption – which may or may not have been justified -- that all our communications in Libya were monitored and that the Libyan authorities would have the information anyway as soon as they could arrange for a copy of the fax to be translated from Dutch into Arabic.

I anticipated that the news about the proposed location would cause the Libyans to renounce the "neutral venue" concept in high dudgeon and complain of the lack of good faith demonstrated by the British Government in selecting, or agreeing to, such a site.  But they did not do so.  When we raised the issue at our next meeting, the Libyan officials were remarkably relaxed about the matter.  This, more than anything else, convinced me that the Libyan government and the Libyan defence lawyers genuinely wished a trial to take place and that the concerns they had expressed regarding details of the scheme now on offer were genuine concerns, not merely a colourable pretext for evading their earlier commitment to such a solution.

*(1) Order in Council (SI 1998 No 2251), made on 16 September 1998, conferring the necessary legal authority for Scottish criminal proceedings against the two Libyan suspects to be conducted in the Netherlands, and (2) an international agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the United Kingdom, concluded on 18 September 1998, making the diplomatic arrangements necessary for the "neutral venue" trial to take place.