The record must be set straight once and for all and justice delivered

[What follows is the text of an editorial headlined Libya and Lockerbie published today in the Daily Times of Pakistan:]

Three decades have passed since the Lockerbie tragedy. And it seems that increased doubt surrounds the Libyan role in the worst terrorist attack on American civilians; the events of 9/11 notwithstanding.

Back in 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was travelling from London to New York when it was brought down by explosives. The plane crashed in the Scottish town of Lockerbie; killing all 270 aboard. What happened next would be the biggest investigation in British history.

There have long been claims that Iran gave the order to strike and paid a ‘middle-man’ the hefty sum of $10 million to do the needful: the Syria-based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). [RB: Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer contends that the document alleged to show a $10m payment from Iran to the PFLP-GC does not in fact do so and has no connection with Lockerbie.] This was reportedly a tit-for-tat move. For a few months earlier, the Americans had, in their own words, mistakenly, downed an Iran Air plane; killing 290. Moreover, the daughter of a former PFLP operative  — in the run-up to the thirty-year anniversary of the disaster — repeated allegations of Tehran’s involvement. According to popular theories, London and Washington sought to frame Col Gaddafi of Libya for Lockerbie over his support for Saddam Hussein in Iraq. It has been argued that the UK and US were keen to keep Iran on side during the first Gulf War.

If true, there has been a terrible miscarriage of justice. First and foremost for purported Libyan intelligence officer Abdelbaset el-Megrahi who was convicted in 2001 on all 270 counts of murder and had always professed his innocence. And also for the entire nation. For once Gaddafi publicly carried the can for the terror attack some two years later — an unfortunate sequence of events put the country firmly in the eye of the American storm. El-Megrahi, who was suffering from cancer, was returned to Tripoli on compassionate grounds. And some political pundits believe that this provided the impetus for Barrack Obama to push for NATO intervention in the country. For at the time of the Benghazi offensive there were reports of JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command) being on standby to try and pick up el-Megrahi and fly him to Washington to stand trial before American courts.

To avoid further speculation, therefore, an international tribunal must be set up to re-open the Lockerbie case. After all, spooks working on both sides of the Atlantic have in the past spoken of likely Iranian involvement. The world — particularly the Libyan people — deserve to know the truth. For important questions remain. Namely, why, if at all, would Gaddafi allow himself to be framed in this way? What was the payback he was hoping to secure from the West? This is not to rule out Iranian absolution. The point here is that the record must be set straight once and for all and justice delivered.

If nothing else, a re-investigation may afford a better understanding of the underlying dynamics that are currently fanning Middle Eastern flames. While affording the victims’ families long overdue closure.

Reaction to the transfer application

Today's edition of Scotland on Sunday carries three articles on the Lockerbie case: a news report, a lengthy opinion piece by the Scottish Political Editor and a leader.

The news report is headed "FBI agent slams review of Lockerbie conviction" and records the views of Richard Marquise. It reads in part:

'The Scottish legal body which cast doubt on the safety of the Lockerbie bomber's conviction has been condemned for carrying out a "woefully inadequate" investigation by the American FBI agent in charge of the case.

'Richard Marquise claimed that the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission did not make thorough enough inquiries before it concluded that there were grounds for Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi to appeal against his conviction.

'Marquise criticised the three-year investigation conducted by the SCCRC, the body responsible for looking into potential miscarriages of justice, because they failed to speak to him or other key people involved in the case.

'"Their 'investigation' was woefully inadequate because they never spoke with me or many others who could have shed some light on how we reached certain conclusions in the case," Marquise told Scotland on Sunday.

'"As a 31-year investigator, I could never had gotten away with conducting such an incomplete inquiry."'

I do not quite understand how talking to Mr Marquise could have led the SCCRC to form different conclusions on the evidence that they uncovered, the materials that were not disclosed to the defence, and the factual conclusions reached by the court that no reasonable tribunal could have reached. Interested readers can find details here and may also care to consult the most recent article "Lockerbie: J'accuse" by Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer on OhMyNews International which provides an in-depth crtique of the crucial evidence that led to the wrongful conviction of Abdelbaset Megrahi.

The Scotland on Sunday opinion piece by Tom Peterkin is headed "Should this man, jailed for life for the Lockerbie bombing, be freed to die with his family?" It reads in part:

'The CCTV link that connects [Megrahi's] cell with the Court of Appeal in Edinburgh lies unused as he languishes on his bed resting between hospital appointments.

'The pain also distracts him from the satellite television that keeps him in touch with the political developments that will determine what remains of his future.

'It is perhaps a strange paradox that while the Lockerbie bomber himself has been forced to avert his eyes from his own fate, the rest of the world is once again focusing on the man convicted of the murder of 270 people when Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie 20 years ago.

'But the world's gaze is not solely fixed on the former Libyan intelligence agent, who, depending on your point of view, is considered to be Britain's biggest mass-murderer or the victim of a gross miscarriage of justice.

'International eyes are also trained on Alex Salmond, the First Minister, and his Justice Secretary, Kenny MacAskill.

'The latest twist in the tortuous Lockerbie legal saga has provided Salmond with the most taxing dilemma that he has faced since he became First Minister two years ago.

'For it is now down to Salmond and MacAskill to decide whether Megrahi, 57, should remain in Scotland or go home to Libya to die. (...)

'Last week's application by the Libyan authorities to have Megrahi transferred from Scotland can be traced back to the so-called "deal in the desert" that was struck between Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and Tony Blair, the then Prime Minister.

'The deal, in June 2007, led to Salmond's first serious row with the UK Government when the First Minister protested that the Scottish authorities had not been consulted and warned that it could lead to Megrahi being transferred back to Libya.

'Ironically, it is now Salmond who has 90 days to make up his mind about Megrahi's future under the terms of the Prisoner Transfer Agreement agreed by Blair and Gaddafi. (...)

'It is perhaps easy to see how some in London and Edinburgh would view the repatriation of Megrahi as a convenient way of solving the long-standing Lockerbie problem.

'Should Megrahi agree to drop his appeal in order to go home, a question mark would always remain over whether there had been a miscarriage of justice by the Scottish courts in the original trial. But his return would cement the improving relationship between Britain and Gaddafi – a controversial tie that could bring great economic benefits to Britain in the oil fields of Libya. (...)

'The safety of Megrahi's conviction has been a subject of huge controversy ever since he was found guilty of killing 259 aircraft passengers and 11 people on the ground in 2001 in a specially convened Scottish court in the Netherlands.

'Professor Robert Black QC, one of the architects of the Camp Zeist court in The Hague, is one legal expert who believes in Megrahi's innocence.

'"So many concerns have been expressed that for all this to be swept under the carpet is not in the public interest," Black said.

'"In my view, it is in the Scottish public interest that the appeal proceeds, because it is a test of Scots Law. But I fully understand that, given Abdelbaset's state of health, his personal point of view is that he might want to return home to spend his last months with his family – that must be a very attractive proposition."

'Black's view is shared by Jim Swire, the retired GP who lost his daughter Flora when the aircraft came down.

'"At a human level, I am in favour of him being transferred because he is seriously ill," Swire said. "But it would be a bitter blow to drop the appeal, because I would like to see this evidence examined in public."

'Swire believes that the case against Megrahi is fatally flawed.

'He disputes the Camp Zeist court's view that Megrahi placed his bomb in a suitcase, wrapped in clothes he'd purchased from a shop in Malta, loaded it on to an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt, where it was transferred to a second flight to London before being eventually loaded on to the doomed aircraft.

'Instead, Swire claims that there was a break-in at Heathrow Airport on the morning of the flight, which resulted in the bomb boarding the plane in London – a theory that he claims has been covered up. (...)

'There is also a belief in some quarters that the appeal could reveal details about the politics of the Lockerbie investigation that could cause embarrassment in Washington, London and Edinburgh.

'But those who led the investigation are absolutely confident that the conviction is safe.

'"I am convinced of the evidence," said Richard Marquise, the FBI agent who led the US side of the investigation.

'"I am convinced the conviction is true, accurate and correct. I keep reading all these suggestions that evidence was planted, that it was manipulated, twisted and changed. But I got that evidence ready for the trial and I am absolutely convinced of its veracity and that what we collected was all accurate and correct.

'"There is so much information in the public domain that's just wrong. If you took everything published as fact, you would certainly think there was doubt. But a lot of things are published as fact that are just not true."

'Salmond will no doubt be keenly aware that many of the American victims agree wholeheartedly with Marquise's view. And there is no doubt that sending Megrahi back to Libya would trigger a huge amount of American anger and a massive diplomatic problem for both Scotland and the UK as a whole.

'"I think it would be outrageous if Megrahi was sent home," said Frank Duggan, a Washington lawyer who is president of Victims of Pan Am Flight 103.

'"The trial in the Hague was set up, because our Government and the British Government made statements saying that if anybody was found guilty, they would serve their prison sentence in Scotland. President Clinton and Tony Blair said that. The only way for him to be sent home would be for his miserable little carcase to go back to Libya in a pine box. The man is an unrepentant murderer."

'Megrahi's supporters also acknowledge the strength of feeling in America and the impact that could have on the Scottish ministers' decision. As Black said: "I suspect that Alex Salmond and Kenny MacAskill's civil servants are advising them that they should grant him the repatriation. There is nothing they would like better than this to go away quietly. But they are politicians and they have to weigh up the reaction."

'Mischievously, he added: "Given that we want lots and lots of Americans to come to Scotland for the Homecoming and this would have the American media up in arms – could that have adverse consequences?" That, it has to be said, may turn out to be the least of Alex Salmond's worries.'

The SoS leader is headed "Lockerbie bomber must stay" and reads in part:

'The case of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, the man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing, poses a serious dilemma for Alex Salmond. But the First Minister must stand firm. Megrahi is a convicted mass murderer and must not be released unless he is cleared on appeal.

'It is difficult not to feel some empathy for the Libyan, who is seriously ill and dying of cancer. Jim Swire, whose daughter Flora died in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103, is just one of those who would not begrudge him the right to die in his homeland.

'There are, too, geopolitical consequences to consider. (...)

'Yet justice should be blind to all those extraneous issues, and it is the reputation of Scottish justice that should be at the forefront of Salmond's mind as he ponders his decision on whether Megrahi should stay or go. Any decision to free the prisoner at this stage would be seen in some quarters as an attempt to avoid evidence being presented in court that could embarrass the Scottish, UK and US authorities.

'Were Megrahi to be released before the appeal process had run its course, then a question mark would forever hang over Scottish justice. That is too high a price to pay to assuage our discomfort at a dying man's desire to die in the country of his birth.'

Abu Nidal and Lockerbie

[On this date in 2008 a long article entitled Lockerbie: The Man Who Was Not There by Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer was published on the OhmyNews International website. It contains lots of interesting material, including extensive quotes from Richard Marquise, the FBI’s chief Lockerbie investigator. The following is just one short excerpt from the article:]

Atef Abu Bakr is a former spokesman for the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) and one of Nidal's closest aides between 1985 and 1989. In a series of interviews published in the Arabic Al Hayat newspaper Bakr said that Abu Nidal told him that his organization was behind the explosion on Pan Am flight 103*.

"Abu Nidal told a meeting of the Revolutionary Council leadership: I have very important and serious things to say. The reports that attribute Lockerbie to others are lies. We are behind it."

"If any one of you lets this out, I will kill him even if he was in his wife's arms,"' Abu Nidal added, according to Bakr.

Having become persona non grata in Syria, Abu Nidal started his move from Syria to Libya in the summer of 1986. His operations, and those he falsely claimed, were bringing discomfort to Damascus. His move to Libya was completed by March 1987.

Settling in Tripoli, Abu Nidal and Libya's leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi, allegedly became close friends sharing, according to some observers, "a dangerous combination of an inferiority complex mixed with the belief that they were men of great destiny."

In the aftermath of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, Gaddafi, seeking to distance himself from Nidal, expelled him in 1999**.

* "Abu Nidal Behind Lockerbie, Says Aide."

** Abu Nidal Organization

The Abu Nidal Organization and Lockerbie

[On this date in 2008 a long article entitled Lockerbie: The Man Who Was Not There by Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer was published on the OhmyNews International website. It is full of interesting material, including extensive quotes from Richard Marquise, the FBI’s chief Lockerbie investigator. The following is just one short excerpt from the article:]

Atef Abu Bakr is a former spokesman for the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) and one of Nidal's closest aides between 1985 and 1989. In a series of interviews published in the Arabic Al Hayat newspaper Bakr said that Abu Nidal told him that his organization was behind the explosion on Pan Am flight 103*.

"Abu Nidal told a meeting of the Revolutionary Council leadership: I have very important and serious things to say. The reports that attribute Lockerbie to others are lies. We are behind it."

"If any one of you lets this out, I will kill him even if he was in his wife's arms,"' Abu Nidal added, according to Bakr.

Having become persona non grata in Syria, Abu Nidal started his move from Syria to Libya in the summer of 1986. His operations, and those he falsely claimed, were bringing discomfort to Damascus. His move to Libya was completed by March 1987.

Settling in Tripoli, Abu Nidal and Libya's leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi, allegedly became close friends sharing, according to some observers, "a dangerous combination of an inferiority complex mixed with the belief that they were men of great destiny."

In the aftermath of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, Gaddafi, seeking to distance himself from Nidal, expelled him in 1999**.

* "Abu Nidal Behind Lockerbie, Says Aide."

** Abu Nidal Organization

The Maltese shopkeeper

Part 82 of Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer's series "Diary of a vengeance foretold" on the events leading up to the destruction of Pan Am 103 tells the story of Tony Gauci's part in the Lockerbie investigation and trial. It also explores the related question of payments by the US authorities to witnesses.

The full article can be read here.

Nonsense, utter nonsense

"The case against Megrahi is nonsense, utter nonsense. Despite its complexity, the absurdity of the Lockerbie case is rather obvious for anyone who is willing to approach this affair with an open mind."  So writes Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer on his blog Intel Today on the sixth anniversary of Abdelbaset's death today. He goes on to give his explanation of just why. Read it here. 

The genesis of the dodgy circuit board fragment

[According to the official version of events, the debris that contained the fragment of circuit board that became PT35b and which linked the bomb to Libya was retrieved from the Pan Am 103 crash site on this date in 1989. What follows is taken from paragraph 13 of the Opinion that accompanied the Lockerbie trial court’s verdict:]

On 13 January 1989 DC Gilchrist and DC McColm were engaged together in line searches in an area near Newcastleton. A piece of charred material was found by them which was given the police number PI/995 and which subsequently became label 168. The original inscription on the label, which we are satisfied was written by DC Gilchrist, was "Cloth (charred)". The word 'cloth' has been overwritten by the word 'debris'. There was no satisfactory explanation as to why this was done, and DC Gilchrist's attempts to explain it were at worst evasive and at best confusing. We are, however, satisfied that this item was indeed found in the area described, and DC McColm who corroborated DC Gilchrist on the finding of the item was not cross-examined about the detail of the finding of this item. This item was logged into the property store at Dextar on 17 January 1989. It was suggested by the defence that there was some sinister connotation both in the alteration of the original label and in the delay between the finding of the item and its being logged in to Dextar. As we have indicated, there does not appear to be any particular reason for the alteration of the label, but we are satisfied that there was no sinister reason for it and that it was not tampered with by the finders. As far as the late logging is concerned, at that period there was a vast amount of debris being recovered, and the log shows that many other items were only logged in some days after they had been picked up. Again therefore we see no sinister connotation in this. Because it was a piece of charred material, it was sent for forensic examination. According to his notes, this item was examined, initially on 12 May 1989, by Dr Hayes. His notes show that it was found to be part of the neckband of a grey shirt, and when the control sample was obtained it appeared similar in all respects to the neckband of a Slalom shirt. It was severely explosion damaged with localised penetration holes and blackening consistent with explosive involvement. Embedded within some of the penetration holes there were found nine fragments of black plastic, a small fragment of metal, a small fragment of wire, and a multi-layered fragment of white paper (subsequently ascertained to be fragments from a Toshiba RT-SF 16 and its manual). There was also found embedded a fragment of green coloured circuit board. The next reference to that last fragment occurs in a memorandum sent by Mr Feraday to CI Williamson on 15 September 1989 enclosing a Polaroid photograph of it and asking for assistance in trying to identify it. Again the defence sought to cast doubt on the provenance of this fragment of circuit board, for three reasons. In the first place, Dr Hayes' note of his examination was numbered as page 51. The subsequent pages had originally been numbered 51 to 55, but these numbers had been overwritten to read 52 to 56. The suggestion was put to Dr Hayes that the original pages 51 to 55 had been renumbered, the original page 56 had been removed, and that thus space was made for the insertion of a new page 51. Dr Hayes' explanation was that originally his notes had not been paginated at all. When he came to prepare his report based on his original notes, he put his notes into more or less chronological order and added page numbers at the top. He assumed that he had inadvertently numbered two consecutive pages as page 51, and after numbering a few more pages had noticed his error and had overwritten with the correct numbers. Pagination was of no materiality, because each item that was examined had the date of examination incorporated into the notes. The second reason for doubt was said to be that in most cases when a fragment of something like a circuit board was found in a piece of clothing, Dr Hayes' practice was to make a drawing of that fragment and give it a separate reference number. There was no drawing of this fragment on page 51, and the designation of the fragment as PT/35(b) was not done until a later date. Finally it was said that it was inexplicable that if this fragment had been found in May 1989 and presumably photographed at the time, his colleague Mr Feraday should be sending a memorandum in September 1989 enclosing a Polaroid photograph as being "the best I can do in such a short time". Dr Hayes could not explain this, and suggested that the person to ask about it would be the author of the memorandum, Mr Feraday, but this was not done. While it is unfortunate that this particular item which turned out to be of major significance to this enquiry despite its miniscule size may not initially have been given the same meticulous treatment as most other items, we are nevertheless satisfied that the fragment was extracted by Dr Hayes in May l989 from the remnant of the Slalom shirt found by DC Gilchrist and DC McColm.

[RB: Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer’s website devoted to PT35b can be accessed here.]

Further reports on, and reactions to, day one of the appeal

The Scotsman's report on the first day's proceedings, and on the differing views expressed by relatives of those killed in the disaster, can be read here. The report in The Times can be accessed here. Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer's account on OhMyNews International can be seen here.

The Dutch television film that had a private showing in the Scottish Parliament on 23 April has now been broadcast in The Netherlands. It can be viewed by accessing this website (click on "video" at the top right corner of the screen). Most of the film is in English.

Spielberg to direct Lockerbie bombing movie

Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer has a lengthy article under this headline on OhMyMews International. He gives details of the project and of the views of Juval Aviv, on whose book (and Interfor Report) the film is to be based.

The Senegal timer

[What follows is the text of a report published on the BBC News website on this date in 2000:]

A Libyan secret service agent alleged by the prosecution to have gathered explosives and detonators used to bomb Pan Am Flight 103 has been questioned at the Lockerbie trial.

Mansour Omran Ammar Saber is named as one of the "others" in the indictment against the two Libyans accused of carrying out the bombing in December 1988.

The Crown says Mr Saber and other Libyan agents provided the explosives, detonator and timer.

Alan Turnbull, for the prosecution, referred in particular to one incident in February 1988, when Saber was arrested at Dakar airport in Senegal.

He was said to have been beaten unconscious and held in custody for four months after explosives and timers were discovered, allegedly in his baggage.

The witness denied all knowledge of the explosives.

The prosecution says the timer was made by Swiss firm Mebo on the orders of the head of the Libyan Secret Service in 1985.

Mr Turnbull showed the court photographs of explosives, timers, wires and a gun, believed to have been confiscated from him on his arrival at Dakar Airport.

He questioned Mr Saber on how the timer had ended up at Dakar Airport at the same time as him.

"It's none of my business and I don't know anything about it," he replied.

Later, the focus moved to the so-called Autumn Leaves investigation by the BKA German police unit which resulted in the arrest of several Palestinians and the discovery of weapons, ammunition and explosives at a Frankfurt flat in October 1988.

Three members of the BKA unit appeared and defence lawyers sought to show that Palestinian groups were active and gathering weapons and explosives in Germany shortly before the Pan Am 103 explosion.

The defence has suggested the Syrian-backed Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) were involved in the attack on the Pan Am plane.

The prosecution continues its case on Friday and is expected to conclude on Monday or Tuesday.

Presiding Judge Lord Sutherland granted the defence a one-week adjournment for lawyers to consider their position and prepare arrangements for the appearance of defence witnesses.

The trial, at the Scottish Court in the Netherlands, is now in its 70th day.

[The report on the proceedings of 16 November 2000 from Glasgow University’s Lockerbie Trial Briefing Unit can be accessed here. The story of the Senegal timer can be followed here, on Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer’s PT35B website.]

CIA's rôle in the Pan Am 103 investigation and trial

This is the title of a document from the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence Oral History Program which has very recently been disclosed under the United States federal Freedom of Information Act (5 USC § 552). It is heavily redacted but nevertheless provides a fascinating insight into the part played by the CIA in the investigation of the Lockerbie disaster, in the building of the prosecution case against Abdelbaset al-Megrahi and Lamin Fhimah and at the trial. The document is a very lengthy one but is nonetheless required reading for anyone interested in the Lockerbie trial débacle.

I am grateful to Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer for drawing this document to my attention.

The dark past of special prosecutor Robert Mueller

[This is part of the headline over an article published today on Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer's Intel Today website. What follows is the section of the article devoted to the Lockerbie case:]

Robert Mueller was assistant attorney general in the United States in 1991 when indictments were issued for the two Libyan suspects, Megrahi and Al-amin Khalifa Fimah. At the Zeist trial in 2001, Fimah was found NOT guilty but Megrahi was found guilty.

During the indictment speech, Mueller explained the importance of PT/35(b), a small fragment of a circuit timer that was allegedly found among the debris of Pan Am 103 near the town of Lockerbie.

RELATED POST: PT/35(b): “A RIDDLE, WRAPPED IN A MYSTERY, INSIDE AN ENIGMA.”

PT/35(b) was the key piece of evidence of the Lockerbie Case. As Richard Marquise (FBI Agent who led the US side of the investigation and reported directly to Mueller) himself said:  “Without PT/35(b), there would have been no indictment.”

This fragment was eventually matched to a timer (MST-13) discovered among the weapons and material seized from rebels after an attempted coup in Togo on 23rd September 1986.

RELATED POST: Lockerbie — The Fairy Tale of the Togo Timers

RELATED POST: Blast From The Past — Reagan and the 1986 “Libyan Terrorism” Disinformation Op

This MST-13 had been manufactured by the Swiss company MEBO and supplied “solely” to Libya.

Today, we know that PT/35(b) is a forgery. We also know that at least one witness was well aware that PT/35(b) could not have been part of the MST-13 timers delivered to Libya and that this witness deliberately withheld  this information from the court.

But back in 1992, it would appear that some folks at the Crown office had their own doubts…

RELATED POST: PT/35(b) TIMELINE PART V: Scientific Inquiries in 1992

Following submission of the Police Report (section 30.0 dealing with PT/35b to the Crown), it was requested that certain further tests which had earlier been carried out on the fragment also be performed on the control sample [ DP/347(a)] of MST-13 circuit board.

Five tests were carried out in the period from 28 February 1992 to 6 March 1992. The conclusion of the report states that none of the scientists would say conclusively that PT/35(b) and DP/347(a) were specifically the same material or from the same source.

In fact, all these scientists had pointed out correctly various methods to establish that PT/35(b) was NOT similar to the control sample of the timers delivered to Libya.

RELATED POST: PT/35(b) — How was the Lockerbie Key Evidence Forged? [UPDATE & Comments]

At that point in time, it would have been scientifically straightforward to demonstrate that PT/35(b) — the key piece of evidence linking Libya to Lockerbie — was a forgery.

But nothing was done and a few weeks later — on 31 March 1992 — the UN Security Council passed resolution 748 imposing mandatory sanctions on Libya for failing to hand over Megrahi and Fhimah.

Lockerbie — appeal decision delayed until 2020

[This is the headline over an article published today on Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer's Intel Today website. It reads in part:]

The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) is reviewing the case of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, the only man ever convicted for the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Previously, it had been indicated that the SCCRC’s decision would be handed down by the end of summer 2019. But the SCCRC just announced that a decision is not expected before 2020. (...)

On May 3 2018, The  Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission announced it would examine the case to decide whether it would be appropriate to refer the matter for a fresh appeal.

Christine Grahame — a Member of the Scottish Parliament since its inception in 1999 — has been outspoken in her view that the conviction of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi for the 1988 Lockerbie tragedy is unsafe and represents a miscarriage of justice.

According to Grahame, the commission was expected to report by summer 2019.

RELATED POST: Lockerbie — Christine Grahame MSP: “Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied”

However, the SCCRC has just announced that a decision is not expected before 2020.

Obviously, this new delay will cause frustration in some circles.

In an email to Intel Today, a long-time reseacher of the Lockerbie case wrote:

“It should come as no surprise that the SCCRC report is to be delayed: just about every other action by the Scottish, UK and US authorities has been delayed, sometimes by years.

It is a tactic to frustrate hope and retain control of events in the hands of those people who fabricated the Lockerbie false narrative.”

But some people remain optimistic. Megrahi family’s Scottish lawyer Aamer Anwar said:

“We presented significant material which requires robust investigation and a number of inquiries have unfolded after issues we raised.

The family want to insure every avenue is looked at and that no short cuts are taken. We have one chance and we expect this to go back to the appeal court.”

In an email to Intel Today, Robert Black QC FRSE – Professor Emeritus of Scots Law in the University of Edinburgh and best known as the “Architect of the Lockerbie Trial” wrote:

“While it is disappointing that the SCCRC will not be reporting by the end of the summer, the fact that their investigations are taking longer than anticipated is, in some ways, a hopeful sign.

My worry always has been that the Commission might find that, although there might have been a miscarriage of justice, it was not in the interests of justice that there be a third appeal (Megrahi having lost the first one and abandoned the second one in order to return home to die).

If this was going to be the ultimate decision of the Commission, I do not believe that they would be conducting such rigorous and lengthy investigations.

I’m reasonably confident therefore that the SCCRC will find that there may have been a miscarriage of justice, for the six reasons specified by their predecessors in 2007 and also on at least some of the further additional grounds advanced since then.

And, as I say, I think it unlikely that, having so concluded they would then say that it was not in the interests of justice for there to be a further appeal.”

Most Intel Today readers (90%) believe that the Lockerbie verdict is a spectacular miscarriage of justice.

I understand that a similar poll among Scotland lawyers would be even more devastating.

Truth never dies.

Pan Am Flight 103 - Lockerbie bombing CIA files

[The CIA has released 262 pages of files relating to the Lockerbie bombing.  They can be downloaded from the Paperless Archives website or directly here.  The following are excerpts from that website's introduction to the documents:]

The files date from 1984 to 1999. This set of files is unique because it includes memos on the direct handling of an intelligence source. This type of information is exempt from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and is not often released by the Agency. (...)

An article appearing in the May 11, 1989 issue of The Washington Post reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had concluded that the Iranian government was responsible. The CIA believed that Iran hired a Palestinian group operating in Syria to perform the bombing. Eventually responsibility would be attributed to Libya.

On November 14, 1991 the United States and Britain announced criminal charges against two Libyan intelligence officers, Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah. In August of 1998, Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi announced that his country would accept the United States and British plan to put the two suspects on trial by a Scottish court convened in the Netherlands. On April 5th, 1999 the two suspects were transported from Libya to the Netherlands. After a 40 week trial, on January 31, 2001, a three judge panel returned a guilty verdict against Abdel Baset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi. The panel acquitted Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah.

This set of files covers the practice of Libya supplying weapons to terrorist groups. The files contain CIA reports created in the years before the Pan AM 103 bombing, covering Libya's methods of sponsoring terrorism. The files contain information on the assassinations of Libyan dissidents living abroad. One document contains a chronology of Libyan-sponsored assassination attempts from 1980 to 1985.

Memos outline contacts with a Libyan intelligence agent working for Libyan Arab Airlines in Malta. He first contacted the CIA on August 10, 1988. He described Malta as "a primary launching point" for Libyan intelligence and terrorist teams en route to and from Europe. Two months before the bombing, a CIA memo mentions information from the informant about a Libyan intelligence officer, Abdelbaset Mohmed Ali al-Megrahi, and the recent removal of explosives from storage in Malta. Al-Megrahi was eventually convicted of bombing Pan Am Flight 103.

[The "Libyan intelligence agent working for Libyan Arab Airlines" is Abdul Majid Giaka, who gave evidence at Zeist and whose evidence was dismissed by the judges as wholly lacking in credibility.  The documents in the current collection contain the CIA cables relating to Giaka that were (eventually) placed in evidence before the court.  The remaining documents (which are heavily redacted) mainly consist of general background information about Libyan invovement in terrorist activities.


Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer informs me that these documents have not been newly released, but have been declassified and in the public domain since 2008. However that may be, a press release was issued only today.]

Lockerbie secret files

[What follows is a section headed Lockerbie Secret Files from an article published today on Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer's Intel Today website:]

Until this week, we knew of two secret sets of Lockerbie files. The first is the so-called Lockerbie X file. This set of docs deal with Major McKee, CIA Matt Gannon — and others US personal — who died on Pan Am 103. IT probably also deals with the large amount of cash and drugs recovered from the crash site as well as the presence of US explosives illegally carried by the civilian airliner. It is unlikely that this file was updated in 1992-93.

RELATED POST: FBI PSA : “Think Before You Post” — FLASHBACK : “The Helsinki Warning”

We also knew from the SCCRC Report that the two secret letters (under PII) were sent by the King of Jordan to John Major in September 1996.

I have already explained that the SCCRC findings clearly suggest the content of this letter. The reasoning of the SCCRC implies  that these “SECRET Letters” point to the PFLP-GC having received – one way or another – at least one MST-13 timer. (Whether this allegation is true or false is yet another story.)

The SCCRC concluded that if these documents had been made available to the defence, the judges could not have reached some of the conclusions that were necessary to convict Megrahi.

RELATED POST: LOCKERBIE SECRET DOC – What Do We Know?

RELATED POST: The Lockerbie Secret Doc: Khreesat and the Swiss

The undisclosed 1992-93 Lockerbie file from the Prime Minister almost certainly deals with yet another aspect of this extraordinary scandal.

[RB: The introduction preceding the section reproduced above, and the remaining sections of the article, headed Dr Richard Fuisz & the TEREX Affair and Why Hiding the 1992 Lockerbie File? should also be read.]

Thurman and the FBI laboratory

[On this date in 1995 the FBI crime laboratory was the subject of a highly critical television programme broadcast on the ABC network. It followed disclosures by one of the laboratory’s scientists, Dr Frederic Whitehurst, about the methods adopted by some of his colleagues, including Tom Thurman. The scandal later became the subject of a book, Tainting Evidence, by John Kelly and Phillip Wearne. The relevance of this to the Lockerbie case becomes apparent in this extract from a 2008 article by Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer:]

Thomas Thurman worked for the FBI forensics laboratory in the late 80s and most of the 90s. Thurman has been publicly credited for identifying a tiny fragment as part of a MST-13 timer produced by the Swiss company Mebo.

“When that identification was made, of the timer, I knew that we had it,” Thurman told ABC in 1991. “Absolute, positively euphoria! I was on cloud nine.”

Again, his record is far from pristine. The US attorney general [RB: through the Department of Justice’s Inspector General] has accused him of having altered lab reports in a way that rendered subsequent prosecutions all but impossible. He has been transferred out the FBI forensic laboratory. Thurman has since left the FBI and joined the faculty at the School of Criminal Justice, Eastern Kentucky University.

The story sheds some light on his formation. The [Inspector General’s] report says “Williams and Thurman merit special censure for their work. It recommends that Thurman, who has a degree in political science, be reassigned outside the lab and that only scientists work in its explosives section.”

“For what it’s worth the best information on Lockerbie came long after Zeist, when the investigation was closed. I’ve always been curious about this case and never stopped looking into it, until the day I left the CIA in December 1997,” Robert Baer told me.

“The appeals commission posed the question to me about someone planting or manipulating evidence only to cover all the bases. I told them I did not think there was an organized attempt to misdirect the investigation, although I was aware that once it was decided to go after Libya, leads on Iran and the PFLP-GC were dismissed. Often in many investigations of this sort, the best intelligence comes out long after the event,” Baer added.

“I’m fascinated to know precisely why the Scots referred the case back to the court, although they did tell me the FBI and Scotland Yard have manipulated the evidence for the prosecution,” Baer told me.

Forensic analysis of the circuit board fragment allowed the investigators to identify its origin. The timer, known as MST-13, is fabricated by a Swiss Company named MeBo, which stands for Meister and Bollier.

The company has indeed sold about 20 MST-13 timers to the Libyan military (machine-made nine-ply green boards), as well as a few units (hand-made eight-ply brown boards) to a Research Institute in Bernau, known to act as a front to the Stasi, the former East German secret police. (...)

The CIA’s Vincent Cannistraro is on the record stating that no one has ever questioned the Thurman credentials. Allow me.

“He’s very aggressive, but I think he made some mistakes that needed to be brought to the attention of FBI management,” says Frederic Whitehurst, a former FBI chemist who filed the complaints that led to the inspector general’s report.

“We’re not necessarily going to get the truth out of what we’re doing here,” concluded Whitehurst who now works as an attorney at law and forensic consultant.

Dr Whitehurst has authored something like 257 memos to the FBI and Justice Department with various complaints of incompetence, “fabrication of evidence” and perjury of various examiners in the FBI Laboratory (primarily Explosives Unit examiners).

“What I had to say about Tom Thurman and the computer chip was reported to the US attorney general’s inspector general during the investigation of wrongdoing in the FBI lab in the 1990s. I acquired all that information and the inspector general’s report from a law suit under the Freedom of Information Act and therefore the information provided under that FOIA request is in the public sector,” Whitehurst told me.

“I reported to my superiors up to and including the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the US attorney general, members of the US Congress and US Senate as well as the Office of the President of the United States that FBI Supervisory Special Agent Thomas Thurman altered my reports for five years without my authorization or knowledge. This is public information. Thurman holds an undergraduate degree in political science and I hold a PhD in chemistry.”

“Thurman was not recognized by the FBI or anyone else as having expertise in complex chemical analysis and I was. When confronted with this information Thurman did not deny it but argued that my reports could and/or would hurt prosecutors’ cases. I was very concerned about the fact that wrong information in the final reports could hurt individuals and deny citizens of this country right to a fair trial. When I raised my concerns with my managers at the FBI laboratory, all except for one of them reminded me that Thurman was the “hero” behind determining the perpetrators of the Pan Am 103 disaster.”

“I understood from that that the FBI would not expose these issues for fear that the investigation into the Pan Am 103 bombing would be seen as possibly flawed and this would open the FBI up to criticism and outside review.”

No government body has found that Mr. Thurman has done anything illegal. However he was relieved from his post in the FBI’s Explosives Unit and placed in charge of the FBI’s Bomb Data Center.

“Did Mr Thurman find the integrated circuit chip about which you have referred? After leaving the FBI, I was interviewed by Scottish defense attorneys for one of the individuals accused of bombing Pan Am 103. At that interview were two of my attorneys, two FBI attorneys and two Scottish attorneys and me. I was asked what I knew about the circuit chip. I can say that I was not interviewed because I agreed with the official version of the discovery of that integrated circuit chip,” Whitehurst wrote to me. (...)

In the world of Forensic Sciences, former FBI [special agent] William Tobin is a legend. To name but a few of his achievements, Tobin demonstrated, along with his NTSB colleagues, that TWA 800 had been destroyed by mechanical failure at the time when virtually the rest of the world strongly believed a terror act. Both the NTSB and the CIA subsequently presented compelling evidence demonstrating the scientific validity of Tobin’s conclusion.

After retiring, Tobin demonstrated that the Lead content bullet identification technique, used by the FBI for more than four decades, was flawed. Tobin was not allowed to work on this matter while at the FBI.

Tobin knows a few things about superhero Thomas Thurman. Tobin told me that, in his opinion, Thurman and other Explosives Unit examiners were prone to confirmation bias, an observer bias whereby an examiner is inclined to see what he is expected to see. Tobin’s opinion is based on “numerous interactions whereby Thurman and other examiners rendered conclusions supporting the prevailing investigative or prosecutorial theory but which were unsupported by scientific fact.

It was not uncommon to determine that items characterized as ‘chrome-plated’ were nickel-plated, ‘extrusions’ turned out to be drawn products, ‘castings’ turned out to be forgings, white residues characterized as explosive residue turned out to be corrosion products (generally Al2O3 or a non-stoichiometric form), bent nails claimed to be indicative of an explosion, and a truck axle was characterized as having fractured from an explosion (a conclusion rendered solely from an 8-1/2” x 11” photograph where the axle was a small fraction of the field of view and the fracture surface itself was not observable).

“I put no credence into any scientific or technical conclusions rendered by anyone without a suitable scientific background for that matter, until I can make an independent evaluation. Thurman was a history or political science major to my recollection,” Tobin added

“His habit, as with most Explosives Unit examiners with whom I interacted and based on numerous court transcript reviews and ‘bailout’ requests I received on several occasions (to ‘bail out’ an examiner who not only misrepresented an item of evidence but also was confronted with more accurate representations of the evidence in trial), was to seek someone else’s expertise and then present it as his own in a courtroom without attribution.”

“He would frequently come into my office, ask for a ‘quick’ assessment of something (but I would always indicate that my opinion was only a preliminary evaluation and that I would need to conduct proper scientific testing of the item(s)), then weeks later I would see the assessment in a formal FBI Laboratory report to the contributor (of the evidence) as his own ‘scientific’ conclusion,” Tobin remembers.

“I cannot imagine that he was acting alone. He was a mid-level manager without a great deal of authority and with severely limited credentials of which the FBI was fully aware,” Whitehurst answered when I asked him if he thought that Thurman had acted alone.

“The problem with having a scientific laboratory within an intelligence gathering organization is that scientists traditionally are seeking truth and at times their data is in direct contradiction to the wishes of a government that is not seeking truth but victory on battle fields.”

“The problem with the scientific data is that when one wishes to really determine what the government scientists or pseudo scientists could have known, one need only look at the data. So few citizens ever ask for or review that data. So few scientists wish to question the government that feeds them and gives security to their families.”

“Was Thurman ordered to do what he did? No one acts alone without orders in the FBI. We had clear goals which were clearly given to us in every document we received from anyone. If a police organization wished for us to provide them “proof” of guilt then they told us in many ways of their absolute belief that the perpetrators were those individuals they had already arrested. If the president of the United States tells the country in the national news that Dandeny Munoz Mosquera is one of the most fear assassins in the history of the world then every agent knows that he must provide information to support that statement. If leaders decide without concern for foundation of truth then most people will follow them,” Whitehurst said.

“Thurman did not act alone. The culture at the FBI was one of group think, don’t go against the flow, stay in line, ignore that data that does not fit the group think,” Whitehurst added.

His former colleague agrees. “I’ve seen so often where an individual who was at one time an independent thinker and had good powers of reasoning acquires the ‘us vs them,’ circle-the-wagons, public-relations at all costs mentality at the FBI,” Tobin says.

“As much as I loved the institution, I have never seen a worse case of spin-doctoring of any image-tarnishing facts or developments as I had at the FBI. Never! It seemed the guiding principle was ‘image before reality’ or ‘image before all else’ (including fact). Whatever you do, ‘don’t embarrass the Bureau’ and ‘the Bureau can do no wrong.’”