Abu Talb and PFLP-GC in the frame

[What follows is excerpted from an article on the website of The Guardian dated 27 February 2000:]

Meckenheim, Germany, 14 September 1989 Swedish officials attending an international conference of Lockerbie investigators reported a lead that might implicate the PFLP-GC, the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Commando, a radical Palestinian splinter group that includes some of the most experienced bomb experts in the Middle East. In May 1989, the Swedish police arrested Mohammed Abu Talb, a PFLP-GC agent born in Egypt, for several attacks with explosives in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. What caught the attention of other investigators was the fact that Abu Talb had visited Malta twice, in October and November 1988. In apartments where the Egyptian had lived, investigators found pieces of clothing that had been bought in Malta and also a calendar on a kitchen table on which the date of 21 December 1988 - the day of the crash - had been circled.

Could the PFLP-GC have been responsible for Lockerbie? And what motive would the terrorist group have had? The investigators believed there might have been an easy answer for the second question: money and revenge. For years the PFLP-GC had received political and military support from the Soviet Union and Syria, but this came to a stop at the end of the 1980s when an Iran Air Airbus with 290 passengers onboard was shot down in the Persian Gulf by the US cruiser Vincennes on 3 July 1988. Ayatollah Khomeini demanded revenge. Might the bomb experts of the PFLP-GC have been working for Iran? According to the CIA, several million US dollars were transferred from Iran to the accounts of the PFLP-GC after the airbus strike. [RB: But see Lockerbie & The Legend of The Iranian Payment.]

But investigators were nevertheless sceptical about this lead. A number of technical details seemed contradictory and one would have thought the shopkeeper in Malta would have recognised Abu Talb's Egyptian accent. In addition, Abu Talb, who was sitting out a life prison sentence in Sweden, denied any involvement in Lockerbie.

[RB: Further details about the Meckenheim meeting can be found here (in German).]

Abu Talb

The website of the International Herald Tribune reports that the life sentence for terrorist offences being served in Sweden by Abu Talb, who was the subject of a special defence of incrimination lodged by the accused at the Lockerbie trial (ie a claim that he, not the accused, was the true perpetrator) has been reduced to one of thirty years. The article begins:

"A Swedish court ruled Wednesday that an Egyptian-born Palestinian found guilty of terror attacks against U.S. and Jewish targets in the 1980s can have his life sentence turned into a 30-year prison term.

"The decision means Mohammed Abu Talb could be released in two years because he started serving his term in 1990 and prisoners in Sweden are normally released after having served two-thirds of their sentences.

"Abu Talb was sentenced to life in prison for a Synagogue bombing and an attack against a U.S. airline office in Denmark that killed one person and left several injured in 1985.

"He was also found guilty of involvement in the bombing of an Israeli airline office in the Netherlands.

"Abu Talb, who came to Sweden in 1983, was an early suspect in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, that killed 270 people. But prosecutors abandoned the theory that Palestinians were responsible and turned their attention to Libya.

"He later testified in the trial in that case."

The full story can be read here.

Lockerbie Revealed: other key findings from 'secret' report

[This is the headline over a long article by John Ashton published today on the heraldscotland.com website.  It reads in part:]

During its four-year investigation, as well as finding six grounds why Megrahi may have suffered a miscarriage of justice, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission examined numerous other issues which, according to his lawyers, affected the safety of his conviction. (...)

The Libyan informant

A key witness against Megrahi was a former Libyan Arab Airlines colleague, Majid Giaka, who was also a junior intelligence officer and CIA informant. At trial the defence were provided with partially redacted CIA cables about him.

After two of the Crown team had viewed almost complete cables on 1 June 2000, the Lord Advocate assured the court that the blanked out sections were of no relevance.

However, when less redacted versions were eventually released they cast further doubt on Giaka’s credibility. In their application to the SCCRC, Megrahi’s lawyers, who were not those who represented him at trial, argued that the failure to release the full, unredacted cables breached Megrahi’s right to a fair trial.

Remarkably, the SCCRC was not allowed to view the full cables, but having read the partially redacted ones, it commented:

it is difficult to understand the Lord Advocate’s assurances to the court on 22 August 2000 that there was “nothing within these documents which relate to Lockerbie or the bombing of Pan Am 103 which could in any way impinge on the credibility of Mr Majid on these matters”. The matter is all the more serious given that part of the reason for viewing the cables on 1 June 2000 was precisely in order to assess whether information behind the redacted sections reflected upon Majid’s credibility.

The SCCRC nevertheless concluded that the failure to release the full cables had not resulted in a miscarriage of justice.  Twenty-two years on, Giaka’s full story remains unknown.

The terrorist whistleblower

Six months into Megrahi’s trial the Crown disclosed a transcript of a lengthy deathbed confession by Palestinian self-confessed terrorist Mobdi Goben. He  claimed that the bombing was the work of his own group, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), a Syrian and Iranian backed faction who were the original prime suspects in the bombing.

The defence interviewed a number of Goben’s relatives and associates who were seeking asylum in Norway, plus a man whom Goben had implicated in the bomb plot.

However, the court refused a defence motion to request further information from the Syrian, Iranian, American and Swedish governments, and the allegations were never raised at trial. Megrahi’s SCCRC submission argued that the Crown’s approach to the matter breached his right to a fair trial.

The SCCRC raised the matter with Megrahi’s junior counsel John Beckett, who said that the Goben evidence would have been difficult to use. It also had access to undisclosed Crown documents, which, in its view, contained nothing the defence didn’t already know. It concluded: the Commission does not consider that the Crown’s handling of matters concerning the Goben memorandum gave rise to a breach of the Crown’s obligations … Accordingly, the Commission does not consider that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred in this connection.

Goben’s claims remain unproven, but many who have studied the case, including the British Lockerbie relative Dr Jim Swire, continue to hold the PFLP-GC responsible for Lockerbie.

Prime suspect No.1: Abu Elias

Mobdi Goben and PFLP-GC member, bomb-maker Marwan Khreesat, each implicated another of group member, known as Abu Elias, in the bombing. (…)

A number of Megrahi’s unsuccessful submissions to the SCCRC referred to Abu Elias. Although the Commission could find no direct evidence of his involvement in the bombing, Abu Elias remains the prime suspect for many of those who doubt Megrahi’s guilt. 

Prime suspect No.2: Abu Talb

The most unusual Crown witness at Megrahi’s trial was convicted terrorist Mohamed Abu Talb, who was serving a life sentence in Sweden for fatal bombings in Northern Europe in the mid-eighties.

Previously a prime suspect in the Lockerbie bombing, he had visited Malta two months before Lockerbie, returning with clothes, and some of his associates had visited the German flat in which the PFLP-GC’s Marwan Khreesat made barometric bombs. (…)

The SCCRC uncovered no significant new evidence about Abu Talb, but was unable to properly investigate an airline ticket, which suggested that he possibly made a second trip to Malta at around the time that Tony Gauci said he sold the bomb suitcase clothing.

The report says: The Commission requested that D&G (Dumfries and Galloway Police) ask the police officers involved in enquiries relative to Abo Talb whether they had established that the position in respect of the return portion of the ticket. D&G confirmed in a letter dated 19 April 2006 that none of the officers could recall making enquiries in this connection … In the Commission’s view, although it is regrettable that the matter was not checked with Scandinavian Airlines at the time of the police investigation, there was no failure by the Crown to disclose material evidence about the return portion of Talb’s flight ticket.

There is no smoking gun to implicate Abu Talb, but his trip to Malta and his PFLP-GC connections continue to fuel suspicions of his involvement in Lockerbie.

The shopkeeper

Maltese shopkeeper Tony Gauci was the key witness against Megrahi, as it was he who sold the clothes that were supposedly packed into the bomb suitcase. In 1991 he made a tentative identification of Megrahi, which he repeated at an ID parade 8 years later and again during his trial evidence.

Although four of the SCCRC grounds of referral concerned Gauci, the Commission rejected a number of submissions contained in Megrahi’s original application.  Among these was the claim that Gauci had been taken to Scotland by the police, where he received treats and hospitality, which may have influenced his evidence.

The Commission confirmed that Gauci was taken to Scotland on a number of occasions, but considered that nothing improper had taken place. It says: … almost all of Mr Gauci’s visits to Scotland took place after he had given evidence. The only exception to this is his visit in 1999 when he attended Dumfries for precognition and was taken sight-seeing in Edinburgh the following day. However, in the Commission’s view any possible significance that might have been attached to this by the defence has to be seen in light of the other information contained in the reports described above. It appears from this that far from viewing his visits to Scotland and elsewhere as an incentive Mr Gauci was strongly opposed to his removal from Malta which he regarded as a source of inconvenience.

Large question marks remain over Gauci’s evidence. The SCCRC discovered that post-trial he received a reward of at least $2 million from the US Department of Justice.

The CIA agent

The only US investigator interviewed by the SCCRC, former CIA agent Robert Baer, reported intelligence indicating that the Iranian government had commissioned the PFLP-GC to bomb Pan Am 103. His sources suggested that two days after the bombing $11 million was transferred into a PFLP-GC Swiss bank account and a few months later $500,000 was paid into an account thought to belong to Abu Talb at the Degussa Bank in Frankfurt.

Overall, the SCCRC concluded: … the Commission has no reason to doubt [Mr Baer’s] credibility. However, as he himself acknowledged, he has no direct knowledge of any of the information in his possession, which came largely from CIA telexes. As with all intelligence, the validity of that information was very much dependent upon the reliability of its source which in many cases Mr Baer was unable to vouch.

The Baer chapter demonstrates the limited reach of the SCCRC’s inquiry and is probably the report’s most disappointing.  

‘The Golfer’

The Golfer was the cover name of a police officer who told Megrahi’s then legal team that key items of evidence had been manipulated to fit the prosecution case.

Subsequent submissions to the SCCRC by the lawyers, MacKechnie & Associates, highlighted anomalies in police documentation, which appeared to support these claims. (…)

The Commission did not consider the documentary anomalies to be sinister: while some of the allegations made in the submissions were based upon information said to have been provided by the Golfer, others were based purely on perceived irregularities in the recorded chain of evidence. The Commission’s approach to the latter was that in any police enquiry, let alone one as large scale and complex as the present one, human error is inevitable. Although apparent omissions, inconsistencies or mistakes in productions records may, after a long period of time, appear difficult to explain, or even suspicious, in the Commission’s view they do not, in themselves, support allegations of impropriety against those involved in the investigation.

The police will be relieved by the report’s conclusions. That relief won’t be shared by the Crown Office, which the SCCRC has left with some important questions to answer. (…)

Megrahi himself

Before referring Megrahi’s conviction to the appeal court, the SCCRC had to be satisfied that, regardless of the weaknesses in the Crown case, there was not overwhelming evidence of his guilt.

In practice this meant exploring the issues that would have been raised during cross-examination, if he had opted to give evidence.

These included his relationship with the JSO, his use of a false passport, large payments into his Swiss bank account and lies he had told in a US television interview. The Commission conducted lengthy interviews with Megrahi and studied 37 of his precognition statements.  

The report says: while at no time did the applicant admit that he was a “member” of [the JSO], in the Commission’s view he was so closely associated with it as to amount to the same thing … It is important to bear in mind in any assessment of the applicant’s accounts that each of them was given in English rather than in his native tongue. It is obvious … that on occasions the applicant had difficulty expressing himself clearly. Caution is therefore required in analysing his accounts … On the other hand, the applicant speaks English relatively well, having previously studied the subject in Cardiff, and he did not request the assistance of an interpreter at any stage in his interview with the Commission. In these circumstances the Commission does not consider the inconsistencies in his accounts are merely the result of communication difficulties … In particular, the Commission believes that there was a real risk that the trial court would have viewed his explanations for his movements on 20 and 21 December 1988, and his use of the [false] Abdusamad passport on that occasion, as weak or unconvincing.

It concluded: The Commission has also considered whether, notwithstanding its conclusion that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred, the entirety of the evidence considered by it points irrefutably to the applicant’s guilt. The Commission’s conclusion is that it does not.

Megrahi insists that he had nothing to hide from the SCCRC and that the inconsistencies in his accounts are all innocent. While he disputes some of its conclusions he has made clear that he is happy for them to be made public.

Finger of blame for Lockerbie pointed at American citizen

[This is the headline over an article by Derek Lambie published in the Sunday Express on this date in 2007.  It reads as follows:]

In a sensational twist, Abu Elias, currently living near Washington DC, will be named with others believed to be in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) as part of a terror cell behind the Pan Am disaster.

Lawyers claim the radical Palestinian organisation was hired for $10million to avenge the shooting down of an Iranian airliner by the US five months earlier.

Two weeks ago Libyan Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, 55, was given the right to appeal his conviction.  Elias - who has a new identity the Sunday Express cannot divulge - is the nephew of the terror group's leader, Ahmed Jibril, the man believed to be the mastermind of the bombing.

The Sunday Express understands new documents - likely to form the basis for al-Megrahi's appeal - show the American was described as "the primary target" early in the investigation.  They also state he conspired with Mohammed Abu Talb, an Egyptian named by Dumfries and Galloway Police as the initial chief suspect.

Lockerbie relatives last night said they are more convinced than ever that the PFLP-GC are the perpetrators of the atrocity. Dr Jim Swire, who lost daughter Flora in the disaster, said: "My view has always been that Abu Talb was involved but that he was not the actual bomber. This development is encouraging and opens new avenues."

Pan Am Flight 103 was just 38 minutes into its journey from London to New York when it was blown up.  Investigators concluded a Semtex bomb was in a cassette player rigged with a Swiss electronic timing device.  Al-Megrahi was convicted in 2002 following a £75million trial at a Scottish Court, at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands, although his co-accused Al-Amin Khalifa Fahima was cleared.

But the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) has identified six grounds where it believes a miscarriage of justice may have occurred, with its main focus on the evidence from Tony Gauci, who said  al-Megrahi had come into his shop in Malta and bought clothes found at the scene of the disaster.

With the decision, the finger of blame is once again being pointed at the PFLP-GC. Jibril was suspected of organising the bombing on behalf of Iran as revenge on the US for shooting down Iran Air 655 over the Persian Gulf in 1988.

Evidence submitted to the SCCRC named Jibril, now 79, as the mastermind, with his nephew working with Abu Talb, a member of a splinter group and later jailed for life in Sweden for a bomb attack that left one person dead.

The defence case included a US Defence Intelligence Agency cable from September 24, 1989, which states: "The bombing of the Pan Am flight was conceived, authorised and financed by Ali-Akbar (Mohtashemi-Pur), the former Iranian Minister of Interior.

"The operation was contracted to Ahmad Jabril (sic)... for $1million. The remainder was to be paid after successful completion of the mission."

Documents viewed by the Sunday Express allege the plot began when a man named Mobdi Goben supplied material for the bomb to Hafez Dalkamoni, the leader of the PFLP-GC's European cell. He was then introduced to the alleged bomb maker Marwan Khreesat, by Elias, who has both Syrian and American passports.

Very little is known about Elias, but the defence insists he was paid in travellers' cheques by terror leader Dalkamoni in Cyprus, before he took delivery of the bomb in Frankfurt.  Elias was identified as the key suspect although it was never explored in court, even after documents about his role suddenly emerged during the trial.

The Goben Memorandum, said to have been written by a dying member of the PFLP-GC, was handed to the Lord Advocate detailing the group's activities and a confession about Elias. Elias was concerning the FBI before the bombing and was quizzed about cheques deposited in his bank. In August 1988 he met with agents, who knew he was Jibril's nephew. While the SCCRC said there is dubiety over whether Gauci had correctly identified al-Megrahi, documents show the shopkeeper had no such problems identifying Abu Talb.

Despite the evidence, the investigation took an unexpected twist and the Syrian terror group's suspected role in the disaster was dropped. Meanwhile, it emerged Talb could be brought to trial in Scotland because he does not have lifetime immunity from prosecution as had been believed. During al-Megrahi's trial there was a widespread belief he had been given Crown protection for giving evidence. However, the Crown Office yesterday confirmed he does not have immunity.

Giaka's evidence ends

[On this date in 2000 the evidence of Libyan defector Abdul Majid Giaka mercifully came to a conclusion. What follows is taken from TheLockerbieTrial.com’s contemporary report:]

Today saw the Libyan informer Abdul Giaka, endure his third day of questioning at the trial.

Much of the questioning today centred on money, starting with the $30,000 Giaka claimed he had saved. Richard Keen suggested that this money was made in illegal black market currency deals.

When questioned about how he supported himself when his salary from the JSO (Libyan Intelligence service) was stopped, Giaka answered that it was cheap to live in Libya. He denied the suggestion put again by Keen that the Black market money deals were the source of his income.

When Keen asked him if he had been promised a $4 million dollar reward, Giaka denied this although he admitted that he was aware of it.

Keen moved on to ask Giaka if he read much American literature and specifically had he read The secret life of Walter Mitty. The witness said he could not recall.

The Crown's attempt to rehabilitate Giaka and salvage even a modicum of his credibility failed miserably and Giaka finally left the witness box.

Later the court heard from witness number 689, Harold Hendershot a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Hendershot agreed that he had interviewed Giaka on board a US warship on July 14 1991 and on a number of other dates in Tyson's Corner, near Washington DC and on other dates in July and August.

Hendershot confirmed that on board the warship on July 14 Giaka had given him information regarding a suitcase.

Much of the detail of this information relating to the suitcase was vague and Giaka had not been able to specify the month he had seen the suitcase. Over the next few months further details emerged, he said.

During cross-examination by William Taylor, Hendershot was asked about Mohammed Abu Talb.

Taylor asked if the witness had attempted to interview Abu Talb in connection with Pan Am 103. Hendershot said the interview had been conducted in a prison as Talb was incarcerated. He could not recall Talb refusing to be seen by any American and only agreeing to speak to Swedish Police. Taylor asked where his notes were and the witness said that his notes were in Washington. Taylor said that his evidence was valueless without the notes and confirmed to the Judge that he may require to recall the witness after taking instructions.

Richard Keen referred to a number of trips made by Hendershot to Sweden in 1989 in connection with the Lockerbie bombing. These investigations involved obtaining search warrants from the Swedish police and Talb was named on the warrant. The Swedish Police executed the search warrants with Hendershot in attendance and he was asked if he remembered the recovery of a quantity of clothing manufactured in Malta from the home of Abu Talb. Hendershot did not recall this and said he did not believe he had made notes in respect of the search. Keen suggested it was unusual to have attended such a search without taking notes. The FBI special agent said that in foreign countries there were procedures that could uncover this information. Hendershot was asked if he recalled the recovery of watches and other electrical items, which were in stages of being, dismantled but he could not recall.

Hendershot could not recall whether Talb was in police custody or had already been convicted when he met with him. He said he did know he was at some point convicted of bombing incidents but said he did not know these had occurred outside Sweden. He was asked if he recalled the seizure of a calendar from Talb's house, which was relevant to Pan Am 103. This calendar, Keen said, had December 21 ringed or marked. The witness said that he did not remember but would presumably have noted this if it had been brought to his attention.

Keen suggested another reason Hendershot was in Sweden was because he had been informed of links between Talb and PFLP in Germany and the witness said he recalled travel between Sweden and Germany, which was believed to have something to do with the movement of explosives and the PFLP. Hendershot said he would be able to answer more fully if he had his notes with him.

Taylor asked him if he recalled that a reward was available in connection with the bombing of Pan Am 103. He said yes but could not confirm the exact amount but knew it was more than $1 million. Bill Taylor then confirmed that he would not require to recall the witness.

The next witness from the FBI spoke to money recorded spent on Giaka. In total payments of $110,800 had been made up to the present. (...)

Comment

Now you see him now you don’t. By the time the trial resumes Friday, Giaka is likely to be well on his way back to his US hideaway.

We may never know his thoughts on his camp Zeist experience, but his name will live on in the annals of Pan Am 103 as the most expensive witness ever to testify at any trial. This might have been acceptable if the evidence he gave was even remotely persuasive, but only the most blinkered of observers could say anything positive about Giaka's testimony.

The Department of Justice, who have touted Giaka as the greatest thing since sliced bread, will undoubtedly have some explaining to do when the dust settles.

Whatever the outcome of the trial, Giaka's contribution has been described as "totally useless" by one family member and a "complete waste of time" by another.

But should we be blaming Giaka or those who promoted him. It was clear from the moment that the CIA wrote the cables suggesting that he was providing no useful information that the FBI should have taken that assessment into consideration before making a lifetime commitment to protecting Giaka and his family.

So desperate was the FBI for anything that resembled evidence in the Pan Am investigation they jumped at the chance of getting Giaka, warts and all. They denounced any journalist or commentator who dared suggest that Giaka would prove to be a witness whose testimony was shot full of holes. They sang his praises and talked in glowing terms of having "dinner with Majid."

Today they dismiss his testimony to family members as "never having been really important in the scale of things."

We understand that the recriminations are already underway and if "buck passing" was an Olympic event there are certain DOJ personnel at Zeist who would be stepping up to collect gold.

"Poorest excuse of the day" prize has to go to FBI Special Agent Harold Hendershot, a senior agent who came all the way to the trial of the century and was overcome with a case of "I cannot recall". (He was unsure of many issues relating to Talb, which is surprising, considering Talb was at one time, THE number-one suspect for this bombing.) On top of this our intrepid FBI agent claimed that he had left his notes in Washington. Obviously Special Agent Hendershot missed the class at Quantico which dealt with "preparation for a trial."

[A verbatim transcript of Giaka’s evidence can be found here.]

Abu Talb in witness box at Lockerbie trial

[On this date in 2000 the BBC News website carried a report headlined Palestinian denies Lockerbie bomb link. It reads as follows:]

A convicted Palestinian terrorist has told the Lockerbie trial that he was at home looking after his children on the night of the bombing.

Mohammed Abu Talb is one of the men alleged by the defence to have carried out the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over the Scottish town in December 1988.

But, giving evidence after a series of adjournments at the trial in the Netherlands, he denied any involvement.

Talb is in prison in Sweden for bomb outrages against Jewish and American targets.

His evidence has been described as a "spoiler" by the prosecution to destroy claims made by the defence teams.

In a special defence, counsel for Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi, and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah allege that the Syrian-backed Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the lesser-known Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) were responsible for the bomb attack.

Talb is mentioned in this special defence as having links with both groups.

Prosecutors allege the two Libyans planted a bomb in a suitcase at Malta's Luqa airport and routed it onto a plane bound for Frankfurt which was eventually transferred to the ill-fated flight to New York.

Talb's evidence had first been expected in August, but that was prevented by a series of objections and adjournments.

These followed the handing over of a dossier of new evidence.

Defence lawyers said they needed more time to carry out further inquiries, but Lord Sutherland dismissed their objections to Talb being called while investigations into new evidence were carried out.

During his 80 minutes in the witness box, Talb told the court that on the night of the Pan Am bombing he was at home caring for his two young children.

He said his wife was at a hospital with her sister-in-law who was giving birth.

The defence objected to Talb's testimony, calling him a "spoiler witness".

They said his sole purpose was to blunt the force of the defence's cross-examination, which would have more force once additional information was obtained.

Lawyer William Taylor told the court the defence would be recalling Talb for cross-examination "at such time as we procure the information we need."

Talb, whose testimony is due to resume on Tuesday, also told the court that he had been a member of the PPSF since 1976.

[A report in The Guardian can be read here.]

Lockerbie: Chronicle of a Death Foretold

Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer has today published a Lockerbie article under this headline on the OhMyNewsInternational website. It is concerned particularly with the warnings that were received before the destruction of Pan Am 103 and with how those warnings were responded to (or not, as the case may be). The article is a mine of useful information on the Lockerbie tragedy and will be required reading for all who have an interest in the affair. To read Dr Braeckeleer's article in full, go to http://english.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article_view.asp?menu=A11100&no=381652&rel_no=1&back_url=
I reproduce below the final section, headed Ockam's Razor:
'Not everything that is more difficult is more meritorious. -- St. Thomas Aquinas
'The 14th century English friar and logician William of Ockham is credited to have been the first to suggest the principle according to which the simplest explanation that fits all known facts is usually the right one. Allow me to review the facts.
'Following the Vincennes attack, the Iranian Ambassador at the UN told the world in no ambiguous terms that Iran will seek revenge. In Tehran, Mostashemi, the Iranian Minister of the Interior, promised that the skies will rain blood.
'Mostashemi, and top other Iranian officials, held a series of meetings in Beirut with several members of a well known organization, the PFLP-GC, led by Ahmed Jibril. Iran has colluded with the PFLP-GC before and after the Lockerbie bombing.
'The PFLP-GC was the logical choice for several reasons. The Palestinian group operated in Lebanon under Syrian protection and enjoyed a special relation with Mostashemi who had been the Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon in the 80s.
'The organization had the know-how to manufacture timing devices involving an air-pressure switch for bombs to detonate aboard airplanes. Jibril had operating cells in Europe, including in Germany and Sweden. Last, but not least, Syrian drug Barron al Kasaar, and former associate of Oliver North, could easily bypass the security of Frankfurt airport, thanks to several baggage handlers working for his organization.
'In September, Jibril sent Dalkamoni, his most trusted lieutenant, to Germany in order to organize a cell which, with the collaboration of another PFLP-GC cell from Sweden, had for mission to construct bomb specifically designed to destroy airliners. A few weeks later, Jibril ordered Khreesat, one of his two senior bomb-makers, to join Dalkamoni in Germany.
'In late October, the German authorities arrested most members of both cells. They found four devices built into domestic objects, such as radios and televisions, as well as Pan Am timetables. Several members of the terrorist organization escaped the raid, including Abu Ellias and Abu Talb. A CIA-BKA asset told the FBI that Dalkamoni had passed one bomb to Ellias. Two PFLP-GC members, Goben and Tunayb, have revealed that Ellias planted thebomb in Jafaar's luggage.
'Jafaar met Talb in Sweden and then Jibril in Germany, in mid December. It seems that Jibril convinced Jafaar to carry heroin to the US. A witness described Jafaar as suspiciously agitated as he was waiting to board on Pan Am 103.
'The Germans tested one of these bombs by taking it up in a 747. They established that a bomb detonated by these timers would go off between 32 and 42 minutes after take-off. Flight 103 was in the air for 38 minutes before it blew up, right in the middle of the time frame.
'Last October, former CIA operative Robert Baer told David Horovitz that the bomb that exploded on Pan Am 103 was one of Dalkamoni devices.
'A high ranking Iranian defector testified that Iranian agents planted the bomb parts in Frankfurt, and that the bomb was assembled in London. (See Confession of an Iranian Terror Czar) Jibril and Kasaar were seen having diner alone in a Paris restaurant just weeks before the bombing. The BKA concluded that the bomb started its journey in Frankfurt.
'During the first appeal, in 2002, it was revealed that there had been a break-in at Heathrow the night before the bombing. The Iranian Air facility was immediately adjacent to the baggage assembly area where transit luggage for Flight 103 was loaded.
'The chief baggage handler, John Bedford, testified that, when he returned from a coffee break, he saw two additional suitcases had been loaded into the relevant container for Flight 103.
'The crash investigators established that the explosion occurred precisely where those cases had been placed, above a single layer of baggage that Bedford had already packed into the container.
'The day prior to the bombing, various Intelligence Agencies intercepted communications informing Iranian Officials of the whereabouts of McKee and his rescue team.
'Two day after the bombing, communication intercepts indicate that Tehran ordered their Ambassador in Beirut to pay Jibril Organization for the successful operation. The transfer of the money is recorded and Dalkamoni was in possession of the Paris bank account number when he was arrested.
'Dalkamoni was rewarded for his services to the "Islamic revolutionary struggle against the West." The Iranian citation praises Dalkamoni for achieving the greatest-ever strike against the West.
'Moreover, $500,000 was transferred on April 25, 1989 to the Degussa bank of Frankfurt and deposited on the account of Mohammed Abu Talb. In his agenda, Talb had circled, the date of the Lockerbie bombing. In his apartment, police found clothes bought in Malta. Talb had met with Dalkamoni in Cyprus during October.
'Talb was in Malta on November 23 when clothes surrounding the bomb are believed to have been bought. The owner of the shop had initially identified him. He confessed his participation in the Lockerbie bombing and then retracted his confession without any explanation. His wife was heard telling in a phone conversation to Palestinian friends "to get rid of the clothes."
'Incidentally, Abu Talb likes his friends to call him by his nom de guerre, namely Abu Intekam, Father of Revenge, the very codename given by Mostashemi to the Lockerbie bombing operation.

'Si non e vero, e bene trovato.'

CIA evidence 'clears Libya' of Lockerbie

[This is the headline over an article published in the Sunday Herald on this date in 2002. It reads as follows:]

Megrahi's appeal team ignored 'evidence' from key CIA investigator that claims Iran was behind PanAm 103 bombing

One of the CIA's leading Lockerbie bomb investigators has come forward with compelling evidence that Libya was not behind the downing of PanAm 103 which killed 270 people.

Robert Baer, a retired senior CIA agent, offered to meet the defence team leading the appeal of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi, who was convicted last year of the bombing. However, his offer was not accepted and the new evidence never raised in court.

The new evidence, according to Baer, shows Iran masterminded and funded the bombing; implicates the Palestinian terrorist unit, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), as the group behind the plot; and reveals that just two days after the December 21 1988 bombing the PFLP-GC received $11 million (£7.6m), paid into a Swiss bank account by Iran.

Legal experts say the new evidence should have been brought before the court, and are asking why Megrahi's defence didn't take up the offer.

Megrahi's appeal, which took place at a special Scottish court sitting at Camp Zeist in Holland, adjourned on Thursday for judges to consider whether to overturn the original verdict.

Baer claims he is breaking his silence now because of growing disillusionment with the CIA's counter-terrorist operations and the war on terror.

Baer, an anti-terrorist specialist, was one of the key CIA officers investigating Lockerbie. He says the CIA received definitive evidence that the PFLP-GC struck a deal with Iranian intelligence agents in July 1988 to take down an American airliner.

Baer also has details of an $11m payment made to the PFLP-GC. On December 23 1988 the money was paid into a bank account used by the terror group in Lausanne, Switzerland. It was transferred to another PFLP-GC account at the Banque Nationale de Paris and moved to the Hungarian Trade Development Bank.

A terrorist linked to the PFLP-GC, Abu Talb, who was later jailed for terrorist offences in Sweden, was also paid $500,000 (£350,000). The money went into an account in Talb's name in Frankfurt four months after the bombing, on April 25 1989.

Germany was a key base for the PFLP-GC in the late 1980s. Baer has the number of at least one of these bank accounts.

Talb and the PFLP-GC were to have been implicated by lawyers working for Megrahi and his co-accused, Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, at the original trial, but little evidence was ever raised to show they were part of the Lockerbie plot.

On legal advice Baer is not disclosing his Lockerbie records, but the Sunday Herald has seen CIA paperwork that supports his claims. British and US intelligence have always publicly denied that the PFLP-GC played a part in the Lockerbie plot, saying raids by German police two months before the Lockerbie bombing took the terror group out of action.

Baer says, however, that these arrests were a mere hiccup in PFLP-GC plans as other members of the German unit rem ained at large. This theory also fits with claims that the bomb began its journey in Frankfurt, rather than Malta, where Megrahi was based.

PFLP-GC leader Hafez Dalkamoni and the group's chief bomb-maker, Marwan Khreesat, were arrested in Germany in October 1988 in possession of a Toshiba radio-cassette player containing a bomb. PanAm 103 flew from Frankfurt and was destroyed by a bomb built inside a Toshiba radio-cassette.

Timers matching the one used in the Lockerbie device were sold to both Libya and the East German secret service, the Stasi, which had close links to the PFLP-GC. 'I don't know what components the bomb contained,' Baer said, 'but there was very reliable information from multiple sources that (the PFLP-GC) were running around between East and West Germany and Sweden, trying to get the operation back on track. It's conceivable that the Stasi supplied components during a trip to East Germany.'

Baer said the components for the bomb were supplied by a terrorist known as Abu Elias, who was for a time the CIA's prime suspect but was never caught. 'He was the big centre of the investigation, but he was very elusive,' Baer said. Khreesat and Dalkamoni were on their way to meet Abu Elias when they were arrested in Germany. Abu Elias was a close associate of Abu Talb. Both lived in Sweden. [RB: More about Abu Elias can be found here and here.]

Talb had made a trip to Malta just weeks before the Lockerbie bombing. Clothes from a shop in Malta were packed in the suitcase which contained the PanAm 103 bomb.

Baer also claims the CIA has irrefutable intelligence that Talb and Dalkamoni were Iranian agents and were on a government roll of honour for their services to the 'Islamic revolutionary struggle against the west'. Baer added: 'Although it was not specific, Dalkamoni's citation praised him for achieving Iran's greatest- ever strike against the west'.

Iran had vowed 'the skies would rain with American blood' after a US battle cruiser, the USS Vincennes, accidentally shot down an Iranian Airbus over the Persian Gulf, killing 290 people, six months before the Lockerbie bombing.

'It doesn't take a genius to figure out where the $11m came from,' says Baer. He added that 'the information [would] be useful to the defence as much of it was of a type that would be admissible in court. Once the investigators had the timer evidence, which seemed to point to Libya, they stopped pursuing other leads -- that's the way most criminal investigations work. People sleep better at night if they think they have justice. Who wants an unsolved airplane bombing?'

Edinburgh University law professor Robert Black, the architect of the Lockerbie trial, said of Megrahi's defence not seeking to interview Baer: 'I don't know why they would act like this. Real hard evidence of a money transfer from Iran to the PFLP-GC is so supportive of the alternative theory behind the bombing that I'm at a loss to explain their actions.

'At the very least, you would interview the source of the information and make a decision once you have spoken to him. A lawyer's job is to provide a belt-and-braces defence for his client, so to refuse to even meet with Baer requires a lot of explaining.'