The date of the Malta purchases

[What follows is excerpted from a long article headed Evidence reconsidered: date of clothing purchase posted in January 2010 on Caustic Logic’s blog The Lockerbie Divide:]

1) A choice of two days

Tony Gauci's initial recall of the date of purchase was vague - late November or perhaps early December, or a few weeks before the bombing. It was a football game played on the day (see below) that really narrowed it down to 23 November or 7 December 1988. He recalled the purchse as on a weekday, and specifically "mid-week." In his 2000 testimony, Gauci clarified this meant, exactly, Wednesday. [Day 31, pp 4820-21] Both possible dates were Wednesdays, so that's no help, but the distinction is crucial; as Marquise points out, Megrahi was on Malta on the 7th and so could possibly be the buyer (or to some minds, he clearly is).

If, on the other hand, this supposed purchase occurred two weeks earlier, it had to be someone else; Maltese immigration records and all sources on all sides agree Megrahi had a solid alibi for 23 November. We know the official decision - the purchase happened the 7th. And we know how that helps the prosecution case. But what does the actual evidence offered by Tony, and his brother Paul for that matter, and others, actually say on the subject?

2) Christmas lights

Paul Foot's amazing 2000 booklet "Lockerbie: The Flight From Justice" reports:

On 19 September, 1989, Gauci asserted in a statement to police: “At Christmas time we put up the decorations about 15 days before Christmas. The Christmas decorations were not up when the man bought the clothes.” On 10 September, 1990, Mr Gauci told DCI Bell of the Scottish police: “I’ve been asked to try again and pinpoint the day and date I sold the man the clothing. I can only say it was a weekday; there were no Christmas decorations up, as I have already said, and I believe it was at the end of November.” [p 21 - emphasis mine]

But ultimately another day was needed, a day by which the town would normally have its halls partly decked. By the time Mr. Gauci made it to trial in 2000, judging from the stretches of Q and A I’ve been going over, he was taking every opportunity to fudge the two versions closer together, on this issue and others. The Court’s summarized final opinion document (31/1/01) stated:

“In his evidence in chief, Mr Gauci said that the date of purchase must have been about a fortnight before Christmas. He was asked if he could be more specific under reference to the street Christmas decorations. Initially he said “I wouldn’t know exactly, but I have never really noticed these things, but I remember, yes, there were Christmas lights. They were on already. I’m sure. I can’t say exactly.” [paragraph 56]

Of course among the first things he remembered, that helped mark the memory, was the decorations “were not up when the man bought the clothes.” After this contradiction “had been put to him” by the defense, the Court continued, “he said “I don’t know. I’m not sure what I told them exactly about this. I believe they were putting up the lights, though, in those times.” [para 56]

Clearly the earlier version, before he became muddled with an awareness of contradiction, is more trustworthy, and the Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission, announcing a possible “miscarriage of justice” in 2007, found support for this. Among other alarming problems, they unearthed additional specific evidence giving a start date for the Christmas light erection – the 6th of December:

New evidence not heard at the trial concerned the date on which the Christmas lights were illuminated in the area of Sliema in which Mary’s House is situated. In the Commission’s view, taken together with Mr Gauci’s evidence at trial and the contents of his police statements, this additional evidence indicates that the purchase of the items took place prior to 6 December 1988. In other words, it indicates that the purchase took place at a time when there was no evidence at trial that the applicant was in Malta.

3) Weather records vs Gauci's evidence

Gauci’s first statements to the police cited the weather as a clue to the day of the purchase. When the mystery shopper came in, it was raining enough for him to buy, in addition to the memorably random assortment of clothing, a single item of utility; an umbrella. From his first statement, 1 September 1989:

“I even showed him a “Black coloured (umbrella?) and he bought it. … The man said he had other shops to visit and he picked up the “umbrella” and he said he would come back shortly … [and] walked out of the shop with the “Umbrella” which he opened as it was raining.”

Remnants of a black umbrella were found in Scotland and presumed to be from the bomb bag. This looks like a good connection, but the items bought are covered in a separate post. For this post it establishes that Gauci’s story, however true or relevant it really was, featured significant rainfall.

During the 2000 trial, the issue was raised by defense for the first accused (Megrahi). They called as a witness one Major Joseph Mifsud, a Maltese meteorologist who gave evidence on 5 December 2000. He discussed rainfall records kept at the airport. Every three hours (usually), there was a measurement taken, entered in the "Rainfall" on the charts, showing as some entries discussed:

6 Dec 21.00 GMT - "Nil"

7 Dec 00:00 GMT – “Nil”

7 Dec 06.00 GMT – “Nil”

7 Dec 09:00 GMT – “T/R” Mifsud explained the mark “TR” as “a trace of rainfall, less than 0.5 of a millimetre.” This reading refers apparently to a one minute light shower recorded from 8:44 to 8:45 am GMT, ten hours prior to the alleged December 7 purchase. The closest time to that, for 18.00 GMT, Mifsud clarified, showed “a nil entry” for the airport. [Transcripts, Day 76, p 9192-93] All other samples aside from 09:00 were equally dry.

Above: Police records for Malta, December 1988. From Foot, Flight from Justice, p21. Maj. Mifsud testified to records the airport at Luqa (highlighted) and recorded TR (trace rainfall) Dec 7. Rain in Silema (highlighted) Dec 7 is the issue and it, like all others aside from the airport, was left blank. December 6 is similarly dry-looking - these blanks mean either “nil," or everyone else just took these day off.

Note in the chart how these are daily totals, and do not reflect changes in rainfall at points during the day, so the “TR” at Luqa could be used to argue for light rain at Silema around 7pm, even though its daily total shows as blank, or nil. In fact, Foot noted how some did argue “the blank referred to the period from noon on the previous day (6 December) to noon on the 7th. So it could still have been raining at the time the clothes were sold – at about 6.30pm on the 7th.” But this is obfuscation. The As foot noted, Mifsud was quite clear on what the hourly returns meant:

"Q. Just confirm with me, please, apart from the trace of rain that we discussed that fell or was measured at 9.00 in the morning of Wednesday December 7, did any rain fall at Luqa?

A. No, no rain was recorded. No, no rain was recorded.

Q. Up to midnight?

A. Up to midnight." [Day 76, p 9201]

The prosecution asked the witness it could rain in Silema, which is right on the coast, but not the airport, approximately four miles inland (southwest). He admitted “I do not altogether exclude the possibility that there could have been a drop of rain here and there,” and estimated “the possibility that there would be some drops of rain, about ten per cent possibility.” [Foot 21] It’s precipitously less likely to have been enough to warrant buying an umbrella, and only a major screw-up in records-keeping could explain such a rain on the 7th not being recorded.

It can’t be ruled out that Gauci was eventually made aware of this disconnect and pressured to shift his story. One can observe subtle changes in the witness' recall of rainfall over subsequent statements made to DCI Harry Bell, who was leading the Scottish police effort on Malta and was Gauci’s usual contact. Two of these later read in court include:

21 February 1990: “I have been thinking about the day the man bought the clothes, November, December 1988. He left the shop after having made the purchases and turned right down Tower Road. At that time, he had the umbrella raised and opened. When he returned to the shop, he came from the same direction, but the umbrella was down because it had almost stopped raining, and it was just drops coming down.” [p 4815]

10 September 1990: “I have been asked about the weather conditions that night the man made the purchase of the clothing. Just before the man left the shop, there was a light shower of rain just beginning. The umbrellas were hanging from the mirrors in the shop, and the man actually looked at them, and that is how I came to sell him one. He opened it up as he left the shop, and he turned right and walked downhill. There was very little rain on the ground, no running water, just damp.” [emphasis mine] [p 4817]

A decade later Gauci tried valiantly to minimize rainfall further in his pivotal trial testimony. The Court summarized his take into this finding, from paragraph 56 of their final opinion: [OoC 56] “When asked about the weather he said “When he came by the first time, it wasn’t raining but then it started dripping. Not very -- it was not raining heavily. It was simply dripping...” What the actual transcripts show is a little weirder. It was delivered in his native Maltese, and translated for the court.

”Q Do you remember what the weather was like when the man came to the shop?

A When he came by the first time, it wasn't raining, but then it started dripping. Not very -- it was not raining heavily. It was simply -- it was simply dripping, but as a matter of fact he did take an umbrella, didn't he? He bought an umbrella.” [Day 31, P 4741]

“Q … on the 1st of September of 1989 your memory was that the man purchased the umbrella, he didn't leave it for you to bundle up with the other things he had bought in the shop, but he left with the umbrella and put it up outside the door of the shop because it was raining?

A Exactly.” [p 4815]

"A It wasn't raining. It wasn't raining. It was just drizzling.

Q We'll come to --

A I can't remember the dates. I don't want to say -- I don't want to give out dates if I am not that sure, sir.

Q Indeed. What I am endeavouring to do, Mr. Gauci, with your help, is to illustrate --

A I always thank you, sir. I am here to help you, sir." [p 4816]

"A I don't want to cause confusion. I don't know dates." [p 4820]

It was barely raining, had just started, just stopped, drizzling, ground barely wet, etc. None of it fits well with December 7, when rain on Sliema would be described as “maybe a few drops, but not that I noticed.” The records for November 23, not surprisingly, are a direct fit for his freshest memories. Major Mifsud, again, from the transcripts: [Day 76, Pp 9207-09] “Light intermittent rain at noon” was recorded, a condition that “persist right down the column until 16.15,” onto the next page to at least 18.00 GMT, 19:00 local, almost the minute of any alleged 6:50 purchase that day. This slot measurement shows .6 of a millimeters of rain was taken at the airport.

Results in Sliema, a bare four miles distant, were likely the same - light but notable. And the buyer noticed enough to buy and use an umbrella. What this evidence shows then, is the unknown purchaser of 23 November, if he really existed, was a bit of a pansy regarding rain. (...)

5) Why doesn’t November 23 work, aside from Megrahi not being there?

I almost left this section blank, to emphasize that I’ve seen no reasonable excuse yet offered as to how these clues add up to 7 December. Paul Foot’s 2000 booklet brilliantly outlined the evidence for 23 November, which I've drawn heavily from, and summarized:

But this evidence was no use at all to the prosecution of Abdelbasset Megrahi, who was certainly not in Malta on 23 November. Was there any other day he was in Malta and could have bought the clothes? Yes, he was staying in the Holiday Inn in Sliema on 7 December, 1988. So the thrust of the prosecution inquiries about the sale of clothes shifted from 23 November to 7 December. [p 21]

This may sound cynical, but in point of fact, DCI Bell, head of the Scottish police investigation in Malta, tacitly admitted as much in a 2006 interview. Speaking with the Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission, these excerpts were found in the Megrahi defense team’s grounds of appeal [pdf link  - p 229]

DI Bell SCCRC interview (25-26/7/06)

"...The evidence of the football matches was confusing and in the end we did not manage to bottom it out..."

"...I am asked whether at the time I felt that the evidence of the football matches was strongly indicative of 7th December 1988 as the purchase date. No, I did not. Both dates 23rd Nov & 7th Dec 1988 looked likely.

"...It really has to be acknowledged how confusing this all was. No date was signficant for me at the time. Ultimately it was the applicant's [Megrahi’s] presence on the island on 7th December 1988 that persuaded me that the purchase took place on that date. Paul specified 7th December when I met with him on 14th December 1989 and I recorded this..."

“Applicant” here refers to Megrahi, applying for his second try at appeal, which the SCCRC wound up granting. Note two aspects of his citation of Paul's 12/89 statement: it's mentioned immediately after the admission that it was Megrahi that decided it, as a supporting afterthought. Also this being an oral interview, he had the date of that meeting memorized, ready to call up. This is interesting, but inconclusive, evidence of a memorized and rehearsed spin. Paul’s “specifying” the 7th on that particular day conflicts with his own words, from two months earlier, that "the 23rd November 1988 was the date in question.” Do note that Mr. Bell deceptively places the days as equals, creating some unwarranted “confusion,” when the 23rd is clearly the better fit in all the regards addressed above. But whatever “fog of war” effect he may have suffered on the investigative front lines, Bell admitted he saw no good reason, aside from Megrahi’s absence and one mention by Paul, to dismiss the earlier purchase. And he and the investigation and ultimately the Zeist Court all dismissed the earlier purchase.

Further, Paul's apparent story change between mid-October and mid-December hints at - but far from proves - an intention somewhere to shift the scope onto Megrahi (and thus the date to 7 December), an intention that had somehow influenced Paul to report the other day despite everything. (...)

7) Harry Bell's First Reason

Considering the quote above by DCI Harry Bell, the date 7 December was clearly chosen to fit Megrahi. One must presume this decision was made prior to his citing it, in his police diary, as reason #1 to identify Megrahi. On the day of Tony's "ID," February 15 1991, Bell wrote in support that "He arrived in Malta on 7th December '88. This was the date of the purchase of the clothing." Nabbed. Bell that is, using criminally circular logic he thought would never be exposed. (This is explained in a separate post.)

Still amazed that al-Megrahi was convicted

[What follows is an item that was originally posted on this blog on this date in 2008:]

Unjust Verdict

As a former student of Professor Robert Black, QC, who arranged for the Lockerbie bomber's trial to be held at Camp Zeist, and having researched the case myself, I am still amazed that al-Megrahi was convicted.

It made a mockery of the Scottish judiciary. What happened at Lockerbie was undoubtedly murder, but the tragedy does not sanction the imprisonment of a potentially innocent man to appease American prosecutors and some of the families of the victims.

G M, by email

[A letter from today's Daily Record. I hasten to add that the Lockerbie case did not feature in my lectures during my tenure as Professor of Scots Law. But I did, I hope, help to turn out students who are capable of recognising a miscarriage of justice when they see one.]

Closing of prosecution case

[What follows is excerpted from a report that appeared on the BBC News website on this date in 2000:]

The Lockerbie trial has been adjourned for a week to allow the defence teams to prepare their cases.

On Monday the prosecution case ended after more than six months of evidence.

When the trial resumes, one of the two accused, Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, is expected to ask the judges to throw out the case against him.

It is expected that the legal argument concerning that matter could take up to three days.

The lawyer for Mr Fhimah will argue at the Scottish court in the Netherlands that insufficient evidence has been presented against his client.

The hearing, which was opened 71 days ago by Scotland's most senior law officer, Lord Advocate Colin Boyd, has featured 250 witnesses and several lengthy adjournments.

The Crown is seeking to show that a huge amount of circumstantial evidence, when taken together, proves Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah carried out the bombing, in which 270 people died.

Next week the court will hear a motion that there is no case to answer against Mr Fhimah.

The judges will be asked to decide on the weight of evidence against him, rather than the quality of the Crown case. [RB: This is inaccurate:  a “no case to answer” submission is not about the weight of the evidence led by the prosecution. It is simply about whether corroborated evidence has been led of the essential facts (that the crime charged was committed and that the accused committed it).  The credibility and reliability of that evidence are not considered at this stage.]

There has been no similar move from Megrahi, and there is now speculation he will be the first witness when the defence case begins next week. [RB: Fhimah’s no case to answer submission was rejected by the court. Neither Megrahi nor Fhimah gave evidence.]

Nothing to gain and much to lose yet he chose compassion

[What follows is the text of an article by Lucy Adams that appeared on the website of The Herald on this date in 2009. It reads as follows:]

Officials in Westminster and the Crown Office are still arguing about what information should or should not be shared with the public and politicians are fighting over each other to say I told you so.

Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi is still alive. The man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing is still sharing in the world’s oxygen supply and there are many who wish he were not. Later this week or this month those politicians are bound to call for the resignation of the minister who released Megrahi exactly three months ago.

Kenny MacAskill, the Justice Secretary, released Megrahi on August 20 on compassionate grounds because he is dying. The guidelines suggest that those prisoners with a life expectancy of three months or less should be considered for such a move.

Mr MacAskill had nothing to gain and much to lose yet he chose compassion over retribution. The UK Government had a great deal to gain from the Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA) signed off between Westminster and Libya earlier this year. When I interviewed Saif Gaddafi in August he made clear that the deal was all about oil and money.

Although Mr MacAskill rejected the PTA, scores of people in the US threatened to boycott Scotland and its exports.

Those with a sense of perspective praised the decision of Scotland in the face of condemnation from the US and a chilling silence from Westminster.

Even they may now question the decision of Mr MacAskill, but where is the consistency in praising compassion for a man with only three months to live, and criticising compassion for a man who lives for three months and two weeks?

Megrahi is desperately ill but he is still alive. Imagine that now he is back with family in Tripoli he may live for four or five months. Should our patience with compassion run out so quickly that we begin to wish him dead?

Would it not be more constructive at this stage to support the living in finding answers to what happened to their loved ones?

Rather than calling for the resignation of the Justice Secretary, should we not focus on the way forward. Without knowing the truth about the past the path forward will always seem uncertain.

We must allow the relatives a public inquiry to deal with the questions from the past and leave the ghoulish spectacle of a man dying in Libya alone to allow him to spend his few remaining days in peace.

Vying to be the most outspoken, punitive, secretive or draconian does nothing for Scotland’s international reputation. We need to show that compassion is not just for Christmas and that openness and transparency from those still refusing to share vital information, will not be tolerated.

Path towards neutral venue trial not smooth

[The following are two snippets from the Libya News and Views website on this date in 1998:]

Britain said on Wednesday it would not wait indefinitely for Libya to reply to its proposals for the trial of two men accused of the 1988 Lockerbie airliner bombing. But Foreign Office minister Tony Lloyd told parliament that Tripoli had not been given a deadline for its response to London's suggestion of a trial in the Netherlands for the pair, accused of planting the bomb that exploded aboard a Pan Am jet over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people. Lloyd was speaking in a debate initiated by Conservative Sir Teddy Taylor, who said reports from the United States suggested Washington wanted Libya to respond to the plan by December 21, the 10th anniversary of the bombing. [Reuters]

Libya is still adamant that sentences for two suspects, if convicted in the 1988 mid-air bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, cannot be served in Britain, as London and Washington insist, diplomats said on Wednesday. A team of Libyan lawyers left New York over the weekend after their second round of talks, which began on November 9, and may return again in the next few weeks. They are consulting with senior UN legal officials, who field queries to the United States and Britain. However, the diplomats said no headway had been made in Libya's demand that the two accused, if convicted, be imprisoned in the Netherlands, rather than in the Scottish prison at Barlinnie, a position the United States and Britain say is not negotiable. [Reuters]

Dr Morag Kerr speaking on Lockerbie case in Moffat tonight

A reminder that Dr Morag Kerr will be speaking on the subject Lockerbie, luggage and lies at 7pm today in Moffat Town Hall. What follows is an article that appears in Moffat News.

Hostage release part of deal to switch Lockerbie blame to Libya?

[Could the release of Terry Waite and Thomas Sutherland on this date in 1991 by Islamic Jihad have been part of a deal with Iran to switch the blame for the Lockerbie bombing from Iranian surrogates to Libya? This hypothesis is explored in the following excerpt from Dr Davina Miller’s important article Who Knows About This? Western Policy Towards Iran: The Lockerbie Case (citations omitted):]

A deal between the US and Iran that involved the issue of Pan Am 103 is not an unreasonable hypothesis, given previous US behaviour and British and French ‘deals’ with Iran for the release of hostages. For example, on 21 March 1991, the CIA criticized Britain for having deported Mehradad Kokabi, an Iranian charged in connection with a bomb attack. While this would, “help Rafsanjani by using an issue used by hardliners to argue against the release of hostages”, it would also reinforce the view in Tehran that, “Washington, like London, will strike a deal favourable to Iran”. Equally, the CIA complained that the French government had earlier done a deal with Iran for the release of nine hostages between 1986 and 1988.

Even as the US was contemplating in early 1989 that Iran had a hand in the bombing of Pan Am 103, it was still signalling the hope for a deal with Iran on the hostage issue as expressed in President Bush’s inaugural address. As he said, “There are today Americans who are held against their will in foreign lands and Americans who are unaccounted for. Assistance can be shown here and will be long remembered”. (...)

US/UK indictments of the two Libyan suspects were announced on 13 November 1991. On 16 November 1991, Iranian radio declared that the indictments of Fhima and al-Megrahi represented, “the start of a new psychological and propaganda war by Washington against Libya”. A DIA report on 23 November, from intelligence acquired from Fort Meade, (that is, from Foreign Signals Intelligence) noted, however, that the “Iranian President voiced his pleasure in seeing the recent press attribute the blame to Libya for the 1988 Pan Am flight 103 bombing”.

On 18 November 1991, the American, Thomas Sutherland, and the Briton, Terry Waite, were freed by Islamic Jihad in Beirut. Later that month, there was a comprehensive exchange of hostages and human remains on one side and, on the other, prisoners in Israeli jails. On 2 December, the US also paid compensation to Iran some $278,000,000 for weapons confiscated in 1979. On 10 December, a UN report found that Iraq’s invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980, and the occupation of Iranian land that followed, were unjustified and illegal.

While many elements comprised the hostages deal, it could be argued that Pan Am 103 was necessarily part of the comprehensive settlement that involved, inter alia, money, prisoners, and international judgments about the Iran-Iraq War. It was necessary because, as the CIA commented on 1 June 1989, the Iranians “believe that the presence of Western hostages in Lebanon will help deter retaliation” for the bombing of Flight 103. It follows that Iran could not feel safe from US retaliation for Pan Am 103 (whether the retaliation was justified or not) if the hostages were freed without some guarantee. Thus, the eventual indictment of a rival state, it could be argued, provided that guarantee and was thus the necessary condition for the deal that followed.

Even before the final settlement, it is possible to argue that the US and Iran reached a tentative agreement about Pan Am 103. If Mohtashemi were the architect, as US intelligence seemed firmly to believe, using the back channels already established through ‘Irangate’, and relying on the policy of searching for moderates with whom to do business, it is possible that the US sought the isolation of Mohtashemi in exchange for a policy of non-retaliation. (...)

A news reporter at Lockerbie

[This is the headline over an article by Alan Dron that was published yesterday on the website of Air and Space Magazine. It reads in part:]

People who lived in Lockerbie, Scotland, said the sound was like a roll of thunder that swelled into a deafening roar. Then a flame-trailing chunk of wreckage from what two minutes earlier had been a Boeing 747-121 smashed into the ground like a meteorite.

Seconds later, the wings, containing almost 200,000 pounds of fuel, crashed vertically into Sherwood Crescent, a row of bungalows, and ignited upon impact. Some residents’ bodies were never found, obliterated by the conflagration. The time was shortly after 7 pm GMT, December 21, 1988.

When Pan Am 103 exploded, I was a reporter in the Glasgow office of The Scotsman. (...)

I was writing about an impending strike in a Clyde shipyard when the Glasgow editor—a 40-year veteran of the news business named Iain Duff—appeared beside my desk.

“We’re getting reports of an explosion in Lockerbie,” he said. “There’s a suggestion an aircraft may have crashed. Can you check it out? Maybe just get in the car and get down there.”

Lockerbie lay some 70 miles south of Glasgow, down a road that was one long accident blackspot. The thought of driving down there in our tiny pool car, in pitch dark and half a gale, did not appeal. My first thought was to call the “crash cell,” a small Royal Air Force contingent based at Prestwick Airport, about 35 miles southwest of Glasgow. Staff there were invariably helpful in providing information about any aviation incident. As usual, someone answered on the first ring.

“Duty officer, please.”

“He’s a bit tied up at the moment, sir. Can you call back later?”

They’d never been too busy to talk to me before. Duff was back at my desk, looking anxious. “Alan, I think you should just go,” he said.

I headed for the pool car. My growing suspicion was that two RAF aircraft had collided over the town. Lockerbie was in a zone for ultra-low military flight training, in which fast jets were allowed to operate at altitudes down to 100 feet. At low altitude and high speed, a tiny miscalculation could spell disaster. And two aircraft colliding could account for the garbled reports of multiple fires in the town now coming into the newsroom.

Driving out of Glasgow, I tuned the car radio to the BBC news. I was getting onto the southbound motorway when a program ended and the announcer broke in: “And now, before our next program, we’re going across to the BBC newsroom.” I swore to myself. Obviously this was serious.

“A Boeing 747 of Pan Am…” was all I heard before I swore again, rather less quietly this time, and floored the accelerator.

Two hours later, after evading police roadblocks and breaking several traffic laws, I pulled to a halt in Lockerbie. What I saw recalled photos from the London Blitz of 1940. The main road was covered in slate that had been blown off the roofs of buildings. Fire hoses snaked down the center of the street. There were strangely few people around. Military helicopters had been scrambled for what quickly became clear was a forlorn search for survivors. The sky was so crowded with Sea Kings that another crash seemed frighteningly plausible.

Almost exactly one hour before the explosion, the aircraft had pushed back at London Heathrow, bound for John F. Kennedy Airport in New York City. Pan Am Flight 103 carried 16 crew and 243 passengers, including 35 students from Syracuse University returning home after a semester abroad.

The 747 had climbed northwest over the United Kingdom, reaching a cruising altitude of 31,000 feet at 6:56 pm. Seven minutes later, an air traffic controller at Shanwick Oceanic Control transmitted PA103’s oceanic clearance. There was no acknowledgment. At the same moment, the radar blip denoting the aircraft split into multiple returns. Pan Am 103, Clipper Maid of the Seas, had disintegrated.

An explosive device containing an estimated 12 ounces of Semtex hidden inside a Toshiba radio–cassette player had detonated in the forward cargo hold. The report released by the Air Accident Investigation Branch of the British government calculated that the explosion took less then three seconds to separate the forward fuselage from the rest of the airplane. Debris trails stretched almost 70 miles.

About two hours after I arrived in Lockerbie, Duff and photographer Donald MacLeod joined me. They were among the first to discover the 747’s cockpit section, which had come to rest close to a tiny church outside the town. The cockpit, lying on its side, became the iconic image of the tragedy.

Only in the light of day did the full scale of the devastation become apparent. One end of Sherwood Crescent was scarred by a huge, smoldering, wing-shaped pit. The houses that had not simply disappeared were gutted by fire, their roofs missing. Elsewhere, a 60-foot section of fuselage lay atop the flattened remains of houses. Remarkably, only 11 people on the ground had been killed.

I spent the next two days reporting on the grim recovery. Everyone in the aircraft had died. Bodies had fallen on the town, mainly on farmland and the golf course. Christmas Day at the town’s Dryfesdale Parish Church brought a hushed, intensely moving religious service. In the sky over the town, an RAF Canberra reconnaissance aircraft carrying infrared line scan equipment could be seen slowly wheeling, searching for wreckage.

Meanwhile, the townspeople opened their doors to the next of kin who had already begun to arrive from the United States and elsewhere. Those bereaved family members provided my most lasting memory of PA103—more than a year later, at the consecration of a memorial in Dryfesdale Cemetery, outside the town. It was a foul January day, gray cloud merging seamlessly with fog and drizzle. The visitors had spent the day thanking the locals for their succor, and by the time they reached the memorial in mid-afternoon the ceremony was behind schedule.

In Scotland at that time of year, dusk begins shortly after 3 pm. The light was fading as the relatives placed flowers or quietly touched the newly carved names on the gray granite triptych. One man who had lost his daughter walked away from the group, head down, hands thrust into pockets, ignoring the rain and looking neither left nor right as he walked toward the cemetery gate. My mental image of Lockerbie is of that man slowly being swallowed by the gloom and swirling mist.

Why does the appeal have to wait so long?

[What follows is an item first posted on this blog on this date in 2008:]

A dilemma more moral than legal

Keeping a dying man in jail pending appeal is unnecessary on the part of the Scottish court of criminal appeal

The refusal of the Scottish court of criminal appeal to free Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi on bail while he awaits his appeal against his conviction as the Lockerbie bomber, has added unease to unease. It was not edifying to see lawyers quibble about when Megrahi, who has prostate cancer, is expected to die, then have the judge base his bail decision on that prediction.

At the Scottish court of criminal appeal, Lord Hamilton concluded that he might have a few more years left and therefore should not be released pending appeal. By way of consolation, he ruled that should his condition deteriorate more rapidly than expected, he could renew his application. What concerns me is that his appeal is unlikely to be heard before the summer. Why?

There has, for years, been a feeling among lawyers and others who have studied the case that Megrahi was not responsible for the bombing. Even Dr Jim Swire, the most prominent campaigner on behalf of Lockerbie victims, whose daughter died in the bombing, does not believe in his guilt; nor do the relatives of many other victims.

It has been alleged that because of the desire to have sanctions lifted against Libya, Muammar Gadafy delivered him to the Scottish authorities rather than the principal perpetrator. [RB: I am not aware of anyone having suggested that Megrahi was handed over in substitution for some other Libyan perpetrator.] The evidence against Megrahi has always seemed slightly deficient although, of course, the jury had convicted him [sic; he was in fact convicted by a court of three judges], and an appeal court in 2002 had turned down his first appeal.

Last year, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission studied new evidence and decided it was enough to justify Megrahi being granted another appeal. That does not mean the commission necessarily believes he is innocent, nor that the appeal court will necessarily overturn his conviction. But it does mean that he has a strong case.

Here's the dilemma - more moral than legal. If he is innocent, keeping a dying man in jail pending his appeal is a particularly cruel injustice to add to that of his years in prison. So why does the appeal have to wait so long? There can be no logistical reason.

[From an article by Marcel Berlins in The Guardian.]

Dr Jim Swire’s first meeting with Megrahi

[On this date in 2005, Dr Jim Swire had his first meeting with Abdelbaset Megrahi in Greenock Prison. A report in The Scotsman two days later reads as follows:]

A leading figure in the group representing British victims of the Lockerbie bombing has met the man convicted of the bombing for the first time.

Dr Jim Swire, 69, who lost his 24-year-old daughter Flora in the 1988 bombing, met Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi at Greenock Prison on Wednesday.

The Gloucestershire-based leader of the campaign group UK Families Flight 103 (UKF103) does not believe the Libyan is responsible for the attack.

Last night Dr Swire said the purpose of the meeting was to ask Megrahi whether he would still press for the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) to continue its review of his case if rumours of his repatriation proved to be correct.

"Megrahi was happy for me to make it known that he is determined to pursue a review of the case, no matter what might evolve concerning his future detention.

"It is very important to the members of UKF103 campaign group that there be a full review of the entire Lockerbie scenario through an appropriately empowered and independent inquiry, but absence of a further review of the court case would also damage our search for truth and justice."

Dr Swire said that even if Megrahi did not continue with his appeal bid, the campaign group would press the SCCRC to review the case as interested parties.

Thurman and the circuit board fragment

[On this date in 1991, Tom Thurman of the FBI appeared on television claiming to have been the person who identified the fragment of circuit board that linked Libya to the bombing of Pan Am 103. What follows is excerpted from Gareth Peirce’s article The framing of al-Megrahi:]

The key features needed to prosecute al-Megrahi successfully were the scientific identification of the circuit-board fragment, which would in turn establish its origin, and the identification of the purchaser of the clothes in Malta. The timers, the indictment stated, were made by a firm in Switzerland; their circuit board matched the fragment retrieved from Lockerbie, and they sold the timers exclusively to Libya. Everything, essentially, hinged on those links.

Who found the fragment? And who understood its relevance? Thomas Hayes of the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment (RARDE) claimed the find (with his colleague Alan Feraday) and Thomas Thurman of the FBI claimed the analytical victory. All were swiftly hailed (or hailed themselves) as heroes. Thurman appeared on television on 15 November 1991, the day after indictments were issued against the two Libyans, boasting that he had identified the piece of circuit board as part of a timing device that might have been sold to Libyan Airlines staff. ‘I made the identification and I knew at that point what it meant. And because, if you will, I am an investigator as well as a forensic examiner, I knew where that would go. At that point we had no conclusive proof of the type of timing mechanism that was used in the bombing of 103. When that identification was made of the timer I knew that we had it.’ This was the claim – the hard evidence – that linked Libyans to the crime. If the claim was false the bereaved Lockerbie families have been deceived for 20 years.

On 13 September 1995 the FBI’s forensic department was the subject of a programme broadcast in the US by ABC. At its centre was a memorandum from the former head of explosive science at the FBI, Dr Frederic Whitehurst. It was a devastating indictment of a former colleague. The colleague was Thomas Thurman and the accusations related to his investigation of a terrorist attack in which a judge was killed by pipe bombs. Two years later, as a result of a review by the US inspector general, Michael Bromwich, into a large number of criminal investigations, Thomas Thurman was barred from FBI labs and from being called as an expert witness. Bromwich had discovered that he had no formal scientific qualifications and that, according to a former colleague, he had been ‘circumventing procedures and protocols, testifying to areas of expertise that he had no qualifications in ... therefore fabricating evidence’.

[Also on this date in 1991, Libya delivered to the United Nations Security Council a letter “categorically denying that Libya had any association” with the Lockerbie bombing.]

Sturgeon faces uphill battle with Donald Trump over his Lockerbie bomber fury

This is the headline over an article by Siobhan McFadyen published in today’s edition of the Daily Express. It reads in part:]

It was revealed that Ms Sturgeon plans to pen a letter to the billionaire and has not received a phone call despite the fact the Scottish Government was once on amiable terms.

The SNP leader and her predecessor, who called on Mr Trump to be banned from the UK, were once so close he was lobbied over plans to release the Lockerbie bomber.

And a drafted statement was even created that said the billionaire had supported the obtuse plan, a move that backfired extraordinarily, leading to an absolute break down in relations.

Millions of people in Scotland and the United States were revolted when former Justice Secretary Kenny MacKaskill allowed Abdel Basset Al Megrahi to go free following the Pan Am 103 bombing.

A total of 270 men, women and children died when the aircraft which was on route to the United States exploded over Scottish airspace.

And as the Scottish saltire flag flew on the tarmac of the airport in Tripoli the decision infuriated Mr Trump who was later stripped of an honorary Scottish business ambassador title. (...)

Mr [Donald] Trump Jnr said: “Once we refused to support the ridiculous notion of letting an international terrorist out of jail, the entire approach of Alex Salmond’s administration and the entire way he has treated us changed drastically for the worse.”

An e-mail which was sent to the billionaire businessman by Geoff Aberdein, Mr Salmond’s senior adviser, who now works for Aberdeen Asset Management, showed just how off the mark the SNP were.

Mr Trump Jnr said: “As New Yorkers, we are not unfamiliar with terrorists. We had planes fly into the World Trade Centre. And for us to support the release of an international terrorist, we would be run out of New York City, if not America.” (...)

In January Mr Trump reiterated his irritation at Salmond whose deputy through-out his tenure was 46-year-old Sturgeon.

He fumed: "Megrahi and others were laughing out loud at what a stupid man Alex Salmond is. Why would a terrorist that blew up an airliner with so many lives lost be released under any circumstances?

"Alex Salmond is an embarrassment to Scotland.”

[RB: President-elect Trump is the man who compared the development of wind farms in Scotland to the Lockerbie disaster. Some of his other interventions on Lockerbie and Megrahi can be read here. As regards Scots being “revolted” by the release of Megrahi, a public opinion poll commissioned by the Express itself two years after his repatriation and before his death showed a majority in favour.]