The Lockerbie case is not closed

[This is the heading over an article by US author and historian William Blum that was published on this date in 2005 on the Aldeilis website:]

The newspapers were filled with pictures of happy relatives of the victims of the December 21, 1988 bombing of PanAm 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.  A Libyan, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi, had been found guilty of the crime the day before, January 31, 2001, by a Scottish court in the Hague, though his co-defendant, Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, was acquitted.  At long last there was going to be some kind of closure for the families.

But what was wrong with this picture?

What was wrong was that the evidence against Megrahi was thin to the point of transparency.  Coming the month after the (s)election of George W. Bush, the Hague verdict could have been dubbed Supreme Court II, another instance of non-judicial factors fatally clouding judicial reasoning.  The three Scottish judges could not have relished returning to the United Kingdom after finding both defendants innocent of the murder of 270 people, largely from the UK and the United States.  Not to mention having to face dozens of hysterical victims’ family members in the courtroom.  The three judges also well knew the fervent desires of the White House and Downing Street as to the outcome.  If both men had been acquitted, the United States and Great Britain would have had to answer for a decade of sanctions and ill will directed toward Libya.

One has to read the entire 26,000-word "Opinion of the Court", as well as being very familiar with the history of the case going back to 1988, to appreciate how questionable was the judges’ verdict.

The key charge against Megrahi — the sine qua non — was that he placed explosives in a suitcase and tagged it so it would lead the following charmed life:

1) loaded aboard an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt without an accompanying passenger;

2) transferred in Frankfurt to the PanAm 103A flight to London without an accompanying passenger;

3) transferred in London to the PanAm 103 flight to New York without an accompanying passenger.

To the magic bullet of the JFK assassination, can we now add the magic suitcase?

This scenario by itself would have been a major feat and so unlikely to succeed that any terrorist with any common sense would have found a better way.  But aside from anything else, we have this — as to the first step, loading the suitcase at Malta: there was no witness, no video, no document, no fingerprints, nothing to tie Megrahi to the particular brown Samsonite suitcase, no past history of terrorism, no forensic evidence of any kind linking him or Fhimah to such an act.

And the court admitted it: "The absence of any explanation of the method by which the primary suitcase might have been placed on board KM180 [Air Malta] is a major difficulty for the Crown case."{1}

Moreover, under security requirements in 1988, unaccompanied baggage was subjected to special X-ray examinations, plus — because of recent arrests in Germany — the security personnel in Frankfurt were on the lookout specifically for a bomb secreted in a radio, which turned out to indeed be the method used with the PanAm 103 bomb.

Requiring some sort of direct and credible testimony linking Megrahi to the bombing, the Hague court placed great — nay, paramount — weight upon the supposed identification of the Libyan by a shopkeeper in Malta, as the purchaser of the clothing found in the bomb suitcase.  But this shopkeeper had earlier identified several other people as the culprit, including one who was a CIA agent.{1a}  When he finally identified Megrahi from a photo, it was after Megrahi’s photo had been in the world news for years.  The court acknowledged the possible danger inherent in such a verification: "These identifications were criticised inter alia on the ground that photographs of the accused have featured many times over the years in the media and accordingly purported identifications more than 10 years after the event are of little if any value."{2}

There were also major discrepancies between the shopkeeper’s original description of the clothes-buyer and Megrahi’s actual appearance.  The shopkeeper told police that the customer was "six feet or more in height" and "was about 50 years of age." Megrahi was 5’8" tall and was 36 in 1988.  The judges again acknowledged the weakness of their argument by conceding that the initial description "would not in a number of respects fit the first accused [Megrahi]" and that "it has to be accepted that there was a substantial discrepancy."{3}  

Nevertheless, the judges went ahead and accepted the  identification as accurate. Before the indictment of the two  Libyans in Washington in November 1991, the press had reported  police findings that the clothing had been purchased on  November 23, 1988.{4}  But the indictment of Megrahi states  that he made the purchase on December 7.  Can this be because  the investigators were able to document Megrahi being in Malta  (where he worked for Libya Airlines) on that date but cannot  do so for November 23?{5}

There is also this to be considered — If the bomber needed some clothing to wrap up an ultra-secret bomb in a suitcase, would he go to a clothing store in the city where he planned to carry out his dastardly deed, where he knew he’d likely be remembered as an obvious foreigner, and buy brand new, easily traceable items?   Would an intelligence officer — which Megrahi was alleged to be — do this?  Or even a common boob?  Wouldn’t it make more sense to use any old clothing, from anywhere?

Furthermore, after the world was repeatedly assured that these items of clothing were sold only on Malta, it was learned that at least one of the items was actually "sold at dozens of outlets throughout Europe, and it was impossible to trace the purchaser."{6}

The "Opinion of the Court" placed considerable weight on the suspicious behavior of Megrahi prior to the fatal day, making much of his comings and goings abroad, phone calls to unknown parties for unknown reasons, the use of a pseudonym, etc. The three judges tried to squeeze as much mileage out of these events as they could, as if they had no better case to make. But if Megrahi was indeed a member of Libyan intelligence, we must consider that intelligence agents have been known to act in mysterious ways, for whatever assignment they’re on.  The court, however, had no idea what assignment, if any, Megrahi was working on.

There is much more that is known about the case that makes the court verdict and written opinion questionable, although credit must be given the court for its frankness about what it was doing, even while it was doing it.  "We are aware that in relation to certain aspects of the case there are a number of uncertainties and qualifications," the judges wrote.  "We are also aware that there is a danger that by selecting parts of the evidence which seem to fit together and ignoring parts which might not fit, it is possible to read into a mass of conflicting evidence a pattern or conclusion which is not really justified."{7}

It is remarkable, given all that the judges conceded was questionable or uncertain in the trial — not to mention all that was questionable or uncertain that they didn’t concede — that at the end of the day they could still declare to the world that "There is nothing in the evidence which leaves us with any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of [Megrahi]".{8}

The Guardian of London later wrote that two days before the verdict, "senior Foreign Office officials briefed a group of journalists in London.  They painted a picture of a bright new chapter in Britain’s relations with Colonel Gadafy’s regime.  They made it quite clear they assumed both the Libyans in the dock would be acquitted.  The Foreign Office officials were not alone.  Most independent observers believed it was impossible for the court to find the prosecution had proved its case against Megrahi beyond reasonable doubt."{9}

Alternative scenario

There is, moreover, an alternative scenario, laying the blame on Palestinians, Iran and Syria, which is much better documented and makes a lot more sense, logistically and otherwise.

Indeed, this was the Original Official Version, delivered with Olympian rectitude by the U.S. government — guaranteed, sworn to, scout’s honor, case closed — until the buildup to the Gulf War came along in 1990 and the support of Iran and Syria was needed.

Washington was anxious as well to achieve the release of American hostages held in Lebanon by groups close to Iran.  Thus it was that the scurrying sound of backtracking became audible in the corridors of the White House.

Suddenly — or so it seemed — in October 1990, there was a New Official Version: It was Libya — the Arab state least supportive of the U.S. build-up to the Gulf War and the sanctions imposed against Iraq — that was behind the bombing after all, declared Washington.  The two Libyans were formally indicted in the US and Scotland on Nov. 14, 1991.

"This was a Libyan government operation from start to finish," declared the State Department spokesman.{10}

"The Syrians took a bum rap on this," said President George H W Bush.{11}

Within the next 20 days, the remaining four American hostages were released along with the most prominent British hostage, Terry Waite.  The Original Official Version accused the PFLP-GC, a 1968 breakaway from a component of the Palestine Liberation Organization, of making the bomb and somehow placing it aboard the flight in Frankfurt.  The PFLP-GC was led by Ahmed Jabril, one of the world’s leading terrorists, and was headquartered in, financed by, and closely supported by, Syria.  The bombing was allegedly done at the behest of Iran as revenge for the U.S. shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane over the Persian Gulf on July 3, 1988, which claimed 290 lives. The support for this scenario was, and remains, impressive, as the following sample indicates:  In April 1989, the FBI — in response to criticism that it was bungling the investigation — leaked to CBS the news that it had tentatively identified the person who unwittingly carried the bomb aboard.  His name was Khalid Jaafar, a 21-year-old Lebanese- American.  The report said that the bomb had been planted in Jaafar’s suitcase by a member of the PFLP-GC, whose name was not revealed.{12}    In May, the State Department stated that the CIA was "confident" of the Iran-Syria-PFLP-GC account of events.{13}    On Sept. 20, The Times of London reported that "security officials from Britain, the United States and West Germany are ‘totally satisfied’ that it was the PFLP-GC" behind the crime.    In December 1989, Scottish investigators announced that they had "hard evidence" of the involvement of the PFLP-GC in the bombing.{14}    A National Security Agency electronic intercept disclosed that Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, Iranian interior minister, had paid Palestinian terrorists $10 million dollars to gain revenge for the downed Iranian airplane.(15)  The intercept appears to have occurred in July 1988, shortly after the downing of the Iranian plane.  Israeli intelligence also intercepted a communication between Mohtashemi and the Iranian embassy in Beirut "indicating that Iran paid for the Lockerbie bombing."{16}   Even after the Libyans had been indicted, Israeli officials declared that their intelligence analysts remained convinced that the PFLP-GC bore primary responsibility for the bombing.{17}   In 1992, Abu Sharif, a political adviser to PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, stated that the PLO had compiled a secret report which concluded that the bombing of 103 was the work of a "Middle Eastern country" other than Libya.{18}

In February 1995, former Scottish Office minister, Alan Stewart, wrote to the British Foreign Secretary and the Lord Advocate, questioning the reliability of evidence which had led to the accusations against the two Libyans.  This move, wrote The Guardian, reflected the concern of the Scottish legal profession, reaching into the Crown Office (Scotland’s equivalent of the Attorney General’s Office), that the bombing may not have been the work of Libya, but of Syrians, Palestinians and Iranians.{19}    We must also ask why Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, writing in her 1993 memoirs about the US bombing of Libya in 1986, with which Britain had cooperated, stated: "But the much vaunted Libyan counter-attack did not and could not take place.  Gaddafy had not been destroyed but he had been humbled.  There was a marked decline in Libyan-sponsored terrorism in succeeding years."{20}

Key Question

A key question in the PFLP-GC version has always been: How did the bomb get aboard the plane in Frankfurt, or at some other point?  One widely disseminated explanation was in a report, completed during the summer of 1989 and leaked in the fall, which had been prepared by a New York investigating firm called Interfor.  Headed by a former Israeli intelligence agent, Juval Aviv, Interfor — whose other clients included Fortune 500 companies, the FBI, IRS and Secret Service{21} — was hired by the law firm representing PanAm’s insurance carrier. The Interfor Report said that in the mid-1980s, a drug and arms smuggling operation was set up in various European cities, with Frankfurt airport as the site of one of the drug routes.  The Frankfurt operation was run by Manzer Al-Kassar, a Syrian, the same man from whom Oliver North’s shadowy network purchased large quantities of arms for the contras.  At the airport, according to the report, a courier would board a flight with checked luggage containing innocent items; after the luggage had passed all security checks, one or another accomplice Turkish baggage handler for PanAm would substitute an identical suitcase containing contraband; the passenger then picked up this suitcase upon arrival at the destination.    The only courier named by Interfor was Khalid Jaafar, who, as noted above, had been named by the FBI a few months earlier as the person who unwittingly carried the bomb aboard.   The Interfor report spins a web much too lengthy and complex to go into here.  The short version is that the CIA in Germany discovered the airport drug operation and learned also that Kassar had the contacts to gain the release of American hostages in Lebanon.  He had already done the same for French hostages.  Thus it was, that the CIA and the German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA, Federal Criminal Office) allowed the drug operation to continue in hopes of effecting the release of American hostages.   According to the report, this same smuggling ring and its method of switching suitcases at the Frankfurt airport were used to smuggle the fatal bomb aboard flight 103, under the eyes of the CIA and BKA.    In January 1990, Interfor gave three of the baggage handlers polygraphs and two of them were judged as being deceitful when denying any involvement in baggage switching.  However, neither the U.S., UK or German investigators showed any interest in the results, or in questioning the baggage handlers.  Instead, the polygrapher, James Keefe, was hauled before a Washington grand jury, and, as he puts it, "They were bent on destroying my credibility — not theirs" [the baggage handlers].  To Interfor, the lack of interest in the polygraph results and the attempt at intimidation of Keefe was the strongest evidence of a cover-up by the various government authorities who did not want their permissive role in the baggage switching to be revealed.{22}

Critics claimed that the Interfor report had been inspired by PanAm’s interest in proving that it was impossible for normal airline security to have prevented the loading of the bomb, thus removing the basis for accusing the airline of negligence.

The report was the principal reason PanAm’s attorneys subpoenaed the FBI, CIA, DEA, State Department, National Security Council, and NSA, as well as, reportedly, the Defense Intelligence Agency and FAA, to turn over all documents relating to the crash of 103 or to a drug operation preceding the crash.  The government moved to quash the subpoenas on grounds of "national security", and refused to turn over a single document in open court, although it gave some to a judge to view privately.

The judge later commented that he was "troubled about  certain parts" of what he’d read, adding "I don’t know quite  what to do because I think some of the material may be  significant."{23}

Drugs Revelation

On October 30, 1990, NBC-TV News reported that "PanAm flights from Frankfurt, including 103, had been used a number of times by the DEA as part of its undercover operation to fly informants and suitcases of heroin into Detroit as part of a sting operation to catch dealers in Detroit."

The TV network reported that the DEA was looking into the possibility that a young man who lived in Michigan and regularly visited the Middle East may have unwittingly carried the bomb aboard flight 103.  His name was Khalid Jaafar.  "Unidentified law enforcement sources" were cited as saying that Jaafar had been a DEA informant and was involved in a drug-sting operation based out of Cyprus.  The DEA was investigating whether the PFLP-GC had tricked Jaafar into carrying a suitcase containing the bomb instead of the drugs he usually carried.

The NBC report quoted an airline source as saying: "Informants would put [suit]cases of heroin on the PanAm flights apparently without the usual security checks, through an arrangement between the DEA and German authorities."{24}

These revelations were enough to inspire a congressional hearing, held in December, entitled, "Drug Enforcement Administration’s Alleged Connection to the PanAm Flight 103 Disaster".

The chairman of the committee, Cong. Robert Wise (Dem., W. VA.), began the hearing by lamenting the fact that the DEA and the Department of Justice had not made any of their field agents who were most knowledgeable about flight 103 available to testify; that they had not provided requested written information, including the results of the DEA’s investigation into the air disaster; and that "the FBI to this date has been totally uncooperative".

The two DEA officials who did testify admitted that the agency had, in fact, run "controlled drug deliveries" through Frankfurt airport with the cooperation of German authorities, using U.S. airlines, but insisted that no such operation had been conducted in December 1988.  (The drug agency had said nothing of its sting operation to the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism which had held hearings in the first months of 1990 in response to the 103 bombing.)

The officials denied that the DEA had had any "association with Mr. Jaafar in any way, shape, or form."  However, to questions concerning Jaafar’s background, family, and his frequent trips to Lebanon, they asked to respond only in closed session.  They made the same request in response to several other questions.{25}  

NBC News had reported on October 30 that the DEA had told law enforcement officers in Detroit not to talk to the media about Jaafar.

The hearing ended after but one day, even though Wise had promised a "full-scale" investigation and indicated during the hearing that there would be more to come.  What was said in the closed sessions remains closed.{26}

One of the DEA officials who testified, Stephen Greene, had himself had a reservation on flight 103, but he canceled because of one or more of the several international warnings that had preceded the fateful day.  He has described standing on the Heathrow tarmac, watching the doomed plane take off.{27}

There have been many reports of heroin being found in the field around the crash, from "traces" to "a substantial quantity" found in a suitcase.{28}  Two days after the NBC report, however, the New York Times quoted a "federal official" saying that "no hard drugs were aboard the aircraft."

The film

In 1994, American filmmaker Allan Francovich completed a documentary, "The Maltese Double Cross", which presents Jaafar as an unwitting bomb carrier with ties to the DEA and the CIA.  Showings of the film in Britain were canceled under threat of law suits, venues burglarized or attacked by arsonists.  When Channel 4 agreed to show the film, the Scottish Crown Office and the U.S. Embassy in London sent press packs to the media, labeling the film "blatant propaganda" and attacking some of the film’s interviewees, including Juval Aviv the head of Interfor.{29}   Aviv paid a price for his report and his outspokenness.  Over a period of time, his New York office suffered a series of break-ins, the FBI visited his clients, his polygrapher was harassed, as mentioned above, and a contrived commercial fraud charge was brought against him.  Even though Aviv eventually was cleared in court, it was a long, expensive, and painful ordeal.{30}    

Francovich also stated that he had learned that five CIA operatives had been sent to London and Cyprus to discredit the film while it was being made, that his office phones were tapped, that staff cars were sabotaged, and that one of his researchers narrowly escaped an attempt to force his vehicle into the path of an oncoming truck.{31}

Government officials examining the Lockerbie bombing went so far as to ask the FBI to investigate the film.  The Bureau later issued a highly derogatory opinion of it.{32}

The film’s detractors made much of the fact that the film was initially funded jointly by a UK company (two-thirds) and a Libyan government investment arm (one-third).  Francovich said that he was fully aware of this and had taken pains to negotiate a guarantee of independence from any interference.

On April 17, 1997, Allan Francovich suddenly died of a heart attack at age 56, upon arrival at Houston Airport.{33}  His film has had virtually no showings in the United States.

Abu Talb

The DEA sting operation and Interfor’s baggage-handler hypothesis both predicate the bomb suitcase being placed aboard the plane in Frankfurt without going through the normal security checks.  In either case, it eliminates the need for the questionable triple-unaccompanied baggage scenario.  With either scenario the clothing could still have been purchased in Malta, but in any event we don’t need the Libyans for that.

Mohammed Abu Talb fits that and perhaps other pieces of the puzzle.  The Palestinian had close ties to PFLP-GC cells in Germany which were making Toshiba radio-cassette bombs, similar, if not identical, to what was used to bring down 103.  In October 1988, two months before Lockerbie, the German police raided these cells, finding several such bombs.  In May 1989, Talb was arrested in Sweden, where he lived, and was later convicted of taking part in several bombings of the offices of American airline companies in Scandinavia.  In his Swedish flat, police found large quantities of clothing made in Malta.  

Police investigation of Talb disclosed that during October 1988 he had been to Cyprus and Malta, at least once in the company of Hafez Dalkamoni, the leader of the German PFLP-GC, who was arrested in the raid.  The men met with PFLP-GC members who lived in Malta.  Talb was also in Malta on November 23, which was originally reported as the date of the clothing purchase before the indictment of the Libyans, as mentioned earlier.

After his arrest, Talb told investigators that between October and December 1988 he had retrieved and passed to another person a bomb that had been hidden in a building used by the PFLP-GC in Germany.  Officials declined to identify the person to whom Talb said he had passed the bomb.  A month later, however, he recanted his confession.

Talb was reported to possess a brown Samsonite suitcase and to have circled December 21 in a diary seized in his Swedish flat.  After the raid upon his flat, his wife was heard to telephone Palestinian friends and say: "Get rid of the clothes."

In December 1989, Scottish police, in papers filed with Swedish legal officials, made Talb the only publicly identified suspect "in the murder or participation in the murder of 270 people"; the Palestinian subsequently became another of the several individuals to be identified by the Maltese shopkeeper from a photo as the clothing purchaser.{34}  Since that time, the world has scarcely heard of Abu Talb, who was sentenced to life in prison in Sweden, but never charged with anything to do with Lockerbie.

In Allan Francovich’s film, members of Khalid Jaafar’s family — which long had ties to the drug trade in Lebanon’s notorious Bekaa Valley — are interviewed.  In either halting English or translated Arabic, or paraphrased by the film’s narrator, they drop many bits of information, but which are difficult to put together into a coherent whole.  Amongst the bits … Khalid had told his parents that he’d met Talb in Sweden and had been given Maltese clothing … someone had given Khalid a tape recorder, or put one into his bag … he was told to go to Germany to friends of PFLP-GC leader Ahmed Jabril who would help him earn some money … he arrived in Germany with two kilos of heroin … "He didn’t know it was a bomb.  They gave him the drugs to take to Germany.  He didn’t know.  Who wants to die?" …

It can not be stated with certainty what happened at Frankfurt airport on that fateful day, if, as seems most likely, that is the place where the bomb was placed into the system.  Either Jaafar, the DEA courier, arrived with his suitcase of heroin and bomb and was escorted through security by the proper authorities, or this was a day he was a courier for Manzer al-Kassar, and the baggage handlers did their usual switch.  Or perhaps we’ll never know for sure what happened.  

On February 16, 1990, a group of British relatives of Lockerbie victims went to the American Embassy in London for a meeting with members of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism.  After the meeting, Britisher Martin Cadman was chatting with two of the commission members.  He later reported what one of them had said to him: "Your government and our government know exactly what happened at Lockerbie.  But they are not going to tell you."{35}

Comments about the Court verdict

"The judges nearly agreed with the defense.  In their verdict, they tossed out much of the prosecution witnesses’ evidence as false or questionable and said the prosecution had failed to prove crucial elements, including the route that the bomb suitcase took." — New York Times analysis.{36}

"It sure does look like they bent over backwards to find a way to convict, and you have to assume the political context of the case influenced them." — Michael Scharf, professor, New England School of Law.{37}

"I thought this was a very, very weak circumstantial case.  I am absolutely astounded, astonished.  I was extremely reluctant to believe that any Scottish judge would convict anyone, even a Libyan, on the basis of such evidence." — Robert Black, Scottish law professor who was the architect of the Hague trial.{38}

"A general pattern of the trial consisted in the fact that virtually all people presented by the prosecution as key witnesses were proven to lack credibility to a very high extent, in certain cases even having openly lied to the court." "While the first accused was found ‘guilty’, the second accused was found ‘not guilty’. … This is totally incomprehensible for any rational observer when one considers that the indictment in its very essence was based on the joint action of the two accused in Malta." "As to the undersigned’s knowledge, there is not a single piece of material evidence linking the two accused to the crime.  In such a context, the guilty verdict in regard to the first accused appears to be arbitrary, even irrational. … This leads the undersigned to the suspicion that political considerations may have been overriding a strictly judicial evaluation of the case … Regrettably, through the conduct of the Court, disservice has been done to the important cause of international criminal justice." — Hans Koechler, appointed as an international  observer of the Lockerbie Trial by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.{39}

So, let’s hope that Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi is really guilty.  It would be a terrible shame if he spends the rest of his life in prison because back in 1990 Washington’s hegemonic plans for the Middle East needed a convenient enemy, which just happened to be his country.

NOTES

1. "Opinion of the Court", Par. 39

1a. Mark Perry, Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA  (Wm. Morrow, New York, 1992), pp.342-7.

2. "Opinion of the Court", Par. 55

3. "Opinion of the Court", Par. 68

4. See, e.g., Sunday Times (London), Nov. 12, 1989, p.3.

5. For a detailed discussion of this issue see, "A Special Report from Private Eye: Lockerbie the Flight from Justice", May/June 2001, pp.20-22; Private Eye is a magazine published in London.

6. Sunday Times (London), December 17, 1989, p. 14.  Malta is, in fact, a major manufacturer of clothing sold throughout the world.

7. "Opinion of the Court", Par. 89

8. Ibid.

9. The Guardian (London), June 19, 2001

10. New York Times, Nov. 15, 1991

11. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 15, 1991

12. New York Times, April 13, 1989, p.9; David Johnston, Lockerbie: The Tragedy of Flight 103 (New York, 1989), pp.157, 161-2.

13. Washington Post, May 11, 1989, p. 1

14. New York Times, December 16, 1989, p.3.

15. Department of the Air Force — Air Intelligence Agency intelligence summary report, March 4, 1991, released under a FOIA request made by lawyers for PanAm.  Reports of the intercept appeared in the press long before the above document was released; see, e.g., New York Times, Sept. 27, 1989, p.11; October 31, 1989, p.8; Sunday Times, October 29, 1989, p.4.  But it wasn’t until Jan. 1995 that the exact text became widely publicized and caused a storm in the UK, although ignored in the U.S.

16. The Times (London), September 20, 1989, p.1

17. New York Times, November 21, 1991, p. 14.  It should be borne

in mind, however, that Israel may have been influenced because of

its hostility toward the PFLP-GC.

18. Reuters dispatch, datelined Tunis, Feb. 26, 1992

19. The Guardian, Feb. 24, 1995, p.7

20. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York, 1993),

pp.448-9.

21. National Law Journal, Sept. 25, 1995, p.A11, from papers filed in a New York court case.

22. Barron’s (New York), December 17, 1990, pp.19, 22.  A copy of

the Interfor Report is in the author’s possession, but he has been unable to locate a complete copy of it on the Internet.

23. Barron’s, op. cit., p. 18.

24. The Times (London), November 1, 1990, p.3; Washington Times, October 31, 1990, p.3

25. Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee

of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, December 18, 1990, passim.

26. Ibid,

27. The film, "The Maltese Double Cross" (see below).

28. Sunday Times (London), April 16, 1989 (traces); Johnston, op. cit., p.79 (substantial).  "The Maltese Double Cross" film mentions other reports of drugs found, by a Scottish policeman and a mountain rescue man.

29. Financial Times (London), May 12, 1995, p.8 and article by John Ashton, leading 103 investigator, in The Mail on Sunday (London), June 9, 1996.

30. Ashton, op. cit.; Wall Street Journal, December 18, 1995, p.1, and December 18, 1996, p.B2

31. The Guardian (London), April 23, 1994, p.5

32. Sunday Times (London), May 7, 1995.

33. Francovich’s former wife told the author that he had not had any symptoms of a heart problem before.  However, the author also spoke to Dr. Cyril Wecht, of JFK "conspiracy" fame, who performed an autopsy on Francovich.  Wecht stated that he found no reason to suspect foul play.

34. Re: Abu Talb, all 1989: New York Times, Oct. 31, p.1, Dec. 1, p.12, Dec. 24, p.1; Sunday Times (London), Nov. 12, p.3, December

5; The Times (London), Dec. 21, p.5.  Also The Associated Press, July 11, 2000

35. Cadman in "The Maltese Double Cross".  Also see The Guardian, July 29, 1995, p.27

36. New York Times, Feb. 2, 2001

37. Ibid.

38. Electronic Telegraph UK News, February 4, 2001

39. All quotations are from Koechler’s report of February 3, 2001, easily found on the Internet.

Justice was never done, says top US international law professor

[What follows is excerpted from an article entitled “We Came! We Saw! He Died!”: Reflections On Libya by Professor Francis A Boyle published yesterday on the Countercurrents website:]

After the Bush Senior administration came to power, in late 1991 they opportunistically accused Libya of somehow being behind the 1988 bombing of the Pan American jet over Lockerbie, Scotland. I advised Libya on this matter from the very outset. Indeed, prior thereto I had predicted to Libya that they were going to be used by the United States government as a convenient scapegoat over Lockerbie for geopolitical reasons.

Publicly sensationalizing these allegations, in early 1992 President Bush Senior then mobilized the US Sixth Fleet off the coast of Libya on hostile aerial and naval maneuvers in preparation for yet another military attack exactly as the Reagan administration had done repeatedly throughout the 1980s. I convinced Colonel Qaddafi to let us sue the United States and the United Kingdom at the International Court of Justice in The Hague over the Lockerbie bombing allegations; to convene an emergency meeting of the World Court; and to request the Court to issue the international equivalent of temporary restraining orders against the United States and the United Kingdom so that they would not attack Libya again as they had done before. After we had filed these two World Court lawsuits, President Bush Senior ordered the Sixth Fleet to stand down. There was no military conflict between the United States and Libya. There was no war. No one died. A tribute to international law, the World Court, and its capacity for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

Pursuant to our World Court lawsuits, in February of 1998 the International Court of Justice rendered two Judgments against the United States and the United Kingdom that were overwhelmingly in favor of Libya on the technical, jurisdictional and procedural elements involved in these two cases. It was obvious from reading these Judgments that at the end of the day Libya was going to win its World Court lawsuits against the United States and the United Kingdom over the substance of their Lockerbie bombing allegations. These drastically unfavorable World Court Judgments convinced the United States and the United Kingdom to offer a compromise proposal to Libya whereby the two Libyan nationals accused by the US and the UK of perpetrating the Lockerbie bombing would be tried before a Scottish Court sitting in The Hague, the seat of the World Court. Justice was never done. (...)

Colonel Qaddafi ruled Libya like the traditional Arab Shaikh of a Bedouin tribe. Indeed, Libya as a state consisted of an amalgamation of disparate Arab and Tuareg tribes that Qaddafi had melded together into his Jamahiriya system, a state of the masses. The jury is still out on whether or not this now discombobulation of tribes living in Libya can ever be reconstituted as a functioning state after the US/NATO war. Libya stands on the verge of a statehood crack-up, as was the US/NATO intention from the get-go.

"Libya has no alternative but to pay the compensation"

[What follows is a Reuters news agency report quoted on the Libya: News and Views website on this date in 2002:]

A son of Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has been quoted as saying Libya is negotiating compensation for the families of victims of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. The Arabic-language Asharq al-Awsat on Thursday quoted Seif al-Islam as saying the talks between representatives of the Libyan government and the victims' families were taking place in Paris. He expected the talks to be wrapped up within five months, but said Libya would not pay any money before the verdict on an appeal in the Lockerbie trial was delivered. A Scottish court sitting in The Netherlands is expected to rule next month on an appeal by former Libyan agent Abdel-Baset al-Megrahi. "Libya has no alternative but to pay the compensation, even if Megrahi was acquitted," Asharq al-Awsat quoted Seif al-Islam as saying. "Libya must deal with the situation that the United States is a dominant power," he added.

Trust and the Lord Advocate

CONTROVERSY IN THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT

Controversy looks likely to grow following the February 23rd meeting of the Justice Committee when the convenor Christine Grahame wrote to the Lord Advocate expressing criticism of his late response to correspondence.

‘It is a matter of concern that, despite numerous reminders, your response to the Deputy Convenor’s letter did not arrive until…..around ten minutes before the meeting…..no explanation for the late arrival of the letter was offered. Such tardiness is to only a discourtesy to the committee…..it also serves to inhibit the Committee from carrying out one of its core tasks; the timeous and effective consideration of public petitions…..which is particularly regrettable , given that dissolution is now less than a month away.’ http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_JusticeCommittee/General%20Documents/20160224_CG_to_Lord_Advocate.pdf

Her comments referred to the Lord Advocate’s failure to respond to questions about Justice for Megrahi’s (JfM’s) petition calling for a public inquiry into the 2001 conviction of Abdelbasset al Megrahi for the Lockerbie Pan Am bombing and the related Police Scotland report on the major investigation into 9 criminal allegations made by JfM which is expected shortly.

The Justice Committee’s concerns highlight the growing criticism of the Lord Advocate and the Crown Office over what a growing band of commentators consider to be their consistently exhibited bias and prejudice in relation to these 9 criminal allegations. Legal and political sources have challenged them to explain how it would be constitutionally acceptable for them to consider the police report given this bias and prejudice. It is clear that a lack of trust in the Lord Advocate and Crown Office is becoming a serious issue and is only likely to grow as the Lord Advocate resists taking action.

LOCATION AND TIME

Tuesday 1st March at 10.00hrs: Scottish Parliament, David Livingstone Room (CR6) – Justice Committee meets to consider, among other matters, Petition PE1370 submitted by Justice for Megrahi. Meeting agenda can be found at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_JusticeCommittee/Meeting%20Papers/Papers20160301Web.pdf

Ten members of the ‘Justice for Megrahi’ Committee and its signatory membership will be available for interview in the Parliament’s main reception after the meeting. Among those present will be: James Robertson author of The Professor of Truth; solicitor Len Murray; Dr Jim Swire and the Rev’d John Mosey who both lost daughters at Lockerbie; Dr Morag Kerr author of the Lockerbie exposé Adequately Explained by Stupidity?; JfM Secretary Robert Forrester and justice campaigner Iain McKie.

We owe it to the victims of Lockerbie to get as close to ... truth as possible

What follows is an item originally posted on this blog on 29 February 2012:

Lockerbie reward claim

[This is the headline over an article by Lucy Adams in today’s edition of The Herald, in which she expands upon the “Lockerbie reward” revelations made yesterday in John Ashton’s article in the Scottish Review. It reads as follows:]

A letter, seen for the first time, claims the Crown Office was aware of an application for reward money paid out to key Lockerbie witnesses.

The letter, from Detective Chief Superintendent Tom McCulloch – the senior investigating officer in the later stages of the case – to the US Justice Department, asks for a reward of $2 million for Tony Gauci and $1m for his brother Paul.

Most significantly, though, it states the Crown Office was aware of the plan to pay two of its key witnesses and had been consulted about it.

The revelation comes after an official biography of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi alleged Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill encouraged the Libyan to drop his appeal.

Mr MacAskill has denied the claims and will today mount a strong rebuttal before MSPs at Holyrood.

The letter was sent on April 19, 2002, after Megrahi's unsuccessful first appeal, but documents unearthed by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission discovered financial rewards had been discussed with the Gauci brothers even before they gave their first statements. [RB: my italics]

However, the Crown Office has denied that they were complicit in any payments to witnesses.

Paying witnesses is not considered acceptable practice in Scotland – although it is common in the US.

If a witness was paid for giving evidence, the Crown would be expected to disclose the fact to allow for cross-examination by the defence.

The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission report says Mr Gauci's "alleged interest in financial payment" was capable of "affecting the course of the evidence and the eventual outcome of the trial".

The Crown denies payments were made before the outcome of the appeal, but arguably any information on Mr Gauci's alleged interest in financial payment should have been made available to the defence.

In the letter, Mr McCulloch states: "I am writing to confirm the submission by Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary for payment of a reward to Anthony and Paul Gauci.

"At the meeting on April 9, I proposed that $2m should be paid to Anthony Gauci and $1m to his brother Paul.

"Given the exceptional circumstances of this case, which involved the destruction of a United States aircraft with the loss of 270 innocent lives and the subsequent conviction of a Libyan intelligence agent for this crime, I would invite those charged with approving the reward to ensure the payments made to Anthony and Paul Gauci properly reflect not only the importance of their evidence, but also their integrity and courage.

"I have consulted with Crown Office about this application for payment of a reward.

"The prosecution in Scotland cannot become involved in such an application.

"It would therefore be improper for the Crown Office to offer a view on the application, although they fully recognise the importance of the evidence of Tony and Paul Gauci to the case."

A spokesman for the Crown Office said: "It is nonsense to suggest the Crown was complicit in the payment of rewards to witnesses or that it turned a blind eye to such matters.

"The letter from DCS McCulloch was sent to the US authorities after the conclusion of appeal process in 2002 and sets out clearly the Crown's position. No witness was offered any inducement by the Crown or the Scottish police before and during the trial and there is no evidence that any other law enforcement agency offered such an inducement."

A Government spokesman said Mr MacAskill was "extremely happy" to make a parliamentary statement to MSPs.

[In an article headlined Big question that needs answered on Abdalbaset al-Megrahi in today's edition of The Scotsman, columnist Brian Wilson writes:]

What everyone should be seeking in this matter is the truth and not its concealment. Elected parliamentarians should be the spearhead of that ambition, rather than acting as a political shield against it.

As a society, we owe it to the victims of Lockerbie to get as close to that truth as possible – an obligation that is not diminished by the passage of time. The Court of Appeal would have been by far the best place for the completion of that process. We were denied that outcome. The questions are – why and by whom?

Lockerbie relatives welcome trial progress

[This is the headline over a report published in The Independent on this date in 1998. It reads as follows:]

British relatives of those killed in the 1988 Lockerbie bombing yesterday welcomed a ruling which could lead the way to the trial of the two Libyans accused of the murders.

At a hearing in The Hague, the judges at the World Court, the United Nation's highest judicial authority, ruled that it had the right to settle the deadlock between the United States, Britain and Libya over where the trial should be held.

Libya says it will not release the two suspects for trial in Britain or the US claiming they will not get a fair trial. A total of 270 people died when a bomb exploded on Pam Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland on 21 December 1988.

To the frustration of many relatives, Britain and the US have repeatedly insisted that the accused men, Abel Basset Mohammed Al-Megrahi and Al- Amin Khalifa Fhima, must be tried either in Scotland or the US.

Yesterday Jane Swire, from Bromsgrove, Worcestershire, who lost her daughter Flora in the bombing, said she hoped it would be "the first step towards our goal of truth and justice."

Mrs Swire, whose husband Jim travelled to The Hague for the ruling, said: "If it will expedite a trial on a neutral country basis - which is what we want, I think it will be a good thing.

"I hope this will now mean there will be a trial in a neutral country, and I hope it will not take too long. The legal wheels seem to turn very slowly, and I hope they will turn a little more quickly. It is now nearly 10 years since that awful crime,".

Dr Swire, who is involved in the campaign for a trial on a neutral country and has worked as spokesman for the British families who lost relatives in the bombing, welcomed the court's decision. "I feel, probably unjustifiably, over the moon about it, very elated. To hear a learned court of this sort look at something so objectively and independently of the relative power of the two sides represented, it's really very refreshing," he said.

He agreed with the Libyan government on having a trial in a neutral country, even though "for all I know the Libyan government may well have played a part in murdering my daughter", he said. Libya did not trust the jury system and UN inspectors called in to examine the Scottish judicial system in December had expressed "very severe reservations" about it, Dr Swire said, adding: "They said the Scottish judiciary depends on the jurors entering the jury box with no preconceived ideas or knowledge of the case they are to try."

He did not think it possible to find a jury without "many preconceived notions" about the disaster. "We want truth and justice," he told BBC Radio 4's The World at One programme.

"It isn't just about the question of who killed our loved ones but also why they weren't prevented from doing it. There are a multitude of unanswered questions about the performance of British aviation security and intelligence which remain unanswered."

Responding to the ruling, the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, said: "This is neither a victory nor a defeat. The court has decided that it wishes to consider these complex issues in more detail at a full hearing. Meanwhile, the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council stand: Libya must surrender those accused of the Lockerbie bombing for trial in Scotland or the United States."

The Labour MP Tam Dalyell, who supports the calls for a trial in a neutral country, also hailed the ruling, saying: "I will attempt to raise the court ruling in the House of Commons on Monday urging that the British and American governments agree with the judges that a trial should be held in a third country, preferably the Netherlands."

"The town itself has moved on"

[What follows is excerpted from a report in today’s edition of the Daily Record headlined BBC Breakfast presenter Bill Turnbull returns to scene of Lockerbie bombing for final show:]

BBC Breakfast’s Bill Turnbull marked his final day on the show by returning to Lockerbie - where he made his name as a young reporter with a series of bulletins on the Pan Am 103 disaster.

Turnbull was a BBC correspondent in Scotland when Pan Am 103 was blown up over Lockerbie on December 21, 1988.

And to mark his departure after 15 years on the sofa the presenter returned to Lockerbie for the first time since the atrocity, which claimed 270 lives.

Archive footage included a piece to camera by a young Turnbull.

He said at the time: “This may have been one of the shortest days on the calendar year but for Lockerbie it has been the longest in its history.”

During his return Turnbull, 60, recalled “a scene of ordered chaos” as he arrived in the town more than a quarter of a century ago.

His report included new interviews with retired newsagent Alister Moffat and ex-councillor Marjorie McQueen.

On Sherwood Crescent, where the plane’s wings and the part of the fuselage left a 47m crater, McQueen told him: “It does change your whole perception in life.

“Maybe my husband wouldn’t agree but I thought I was quite house proud and breaking a dish was the end of the world.

“And now, it doesn’t matter.”

Walking in the town centre Turnbull recalled: “When I was last here in December 1988 it was an almost surreal experience.

“There were hundreds of people here from the world’s press and it was as if the town had been rained upon by pieces of metal.

“There were rivets and fragments of debris all over the street.

“And today, while the world still associates Lockerbie with that appalling event the town itself has moved on.”

Turnbull also spoke to pupils at Lockerbie Academy about an exchange scheme set up with Syracuse University in New York, which lost 35 students in the bombing.

His report concluded: “After 27 years the Lockerbie disaster remains the deadliest terrorist attack on British soil but just looking around today you would not know what happened here.

“Perhaps that’s as it should be.”

Libya wins major Lockerbie victory in ICJ against UK and US

[What follows is an excerpt from the text of a press release issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on this date in 1998:]

The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, found today that it has jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case brought by Libya against the United Kingdom concerning the aerial incident at Lockerbie. It also found that the Libyan claims are admissible.

Libya, which submitted the case to the Court on 3 March 1992, contends that the United Kingdom does not have the right to compel it to surrender two Libyan nationals suspected of having caused the destruction of Pan Am flight 103 over the town of Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21 December 1988, in which 270 people died (all 259 passengers and crew, as well as 11 people on the ground). Libya argues that the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation signed at Montreal in 1971 authorizes it to try the suspects itself.

In June 1995, the United Kingdom raised two preliminary objections: one to the jurisdiction of the Court, and the other to the admissibility of the Libyan Application. In dealing with admissibility, the United Kingdom also asked the Court "to rule that the intervening resolutions of the (United Nations) Security Council have rendered the Libyan claims without object".

Jurisdiction of Court

The United Kingdom maintained that there was no legal dispute with Libya with regard to the Convention, because the question to be resolved had to do with "the ... reaction of the international community to the situation arising from Libya's failure to respond effectively to the most serious accusations of State involvement in acts of terrorism".

In its Judgment, the Court, however, finds that the Parties differ on the question whether the destruction of the Pan Am aircraft over Lockerbie is governed by the Montreal Convention. A legal dispute of a general nature concerning the Convention thus exists between the Parties. The Court adds that specific disputes also exist concerning the interpretation and application of article 7 of the Convention (relating to the place of prosecution), and article 11 (relating to assistance in connection with criminal proceedings).

The United Kingdom also maintained that, even if the Montreal Convention did confer on Libya the rights it claims, they could not be exercised in this case because they were superseded by Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) which, by virtue of Articles 25 and 103 of the United Nations Charter, have priority over all rights and obligations arising out of the Montreal Convention.

The Court does not uphold this line of argument. Security Council resolutions 748 and 883 were, in fact, adopted after the filing of the Application on 3 March 1992. In accordance with its established jurisprudence, if the Court had jurisdiction on that date, it continues to do so. The Court concludes, by 13 votes to 3, that it has jurisdiction to hear the disputes between Libya and the United Kingdom as to the interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention.

Admissibility of Libyan Application

The United Kingdom contended that the Libyan Application was inadmissible because the so-called issues in dispute "are now regulated by decisions of the Security Council".

The Court finds that it cannot uphold this conclusion. The date, 3 March 1992, on which Libya filed its Application, is, in fact, the only relevant date for determining the admissibility of the Application. Security Council resolutions 748 and 883 cannot be taken into consideration in this regard, since they were adopted at a later date. As to resolution 731 (1992), adopted before the filing of the Application, it could not form a legal impediment to the admissibility of the latter, because it was a mere recommendation without binding effect, as was recognized, moreover, by the United Kingdom. The Court concludes, by 12 votes to 4, that Libya's Application is admissible.

Objection That Council Resolutions Rendered Claims of Libya without Object

Finally, regarding the request of the United Kingdom for a ruling "that the intervening resolutions of the Security Council have rendered the Libyan claims without object", the Court finds that if it were to rule on that objection at this stage of the proceedings, it would inevitably be ruling on the merits and affecting Libya's rights. The Court rejects, by 10 votes to 6, the objection raised by the United Kingdom, but will be able to consider it when it reaches the merits of the case.

Further Proceedings

Having established its jurisdiction and concluded that Libya's Application is admissible, the Court will now, after consultation with the Parties, fix time-limits for the further proceedings. The proceedings consist of two parts: written and oral. During the written phase, written pleadings are exchanged.

[RB: On the same date the court delivered a similar decision in the case brought by Libya against the United States of America.

I have previously written about this chapter in the Lockerbie affair as follows:]

On 27 November 1991 the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States each issued a statement calling upon the Libyan Government to hand over the two accused to either the Scottish or the American authorities for trial.  Requests for their extradition were transmitted to the Government of Libya by diplomatic channels.  No extradition treaties are in force between Libya on the one hand and the United Kingdom and United States on the other.

Libyan internal law, in common with the laws of many countries in the world, does not permit the extradition of its own nationals for trial overseas.  The Government of Libya accordingly contended that the affair should be resolved through the application of the provisions of the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, to which all three Governments are signatories.  Under article 7 of that Convention a state in whose territory persons accused of terrorist offences against aircraft are resident has a choice aut dedere aut judicare, either to hand over the accused for trial in the courts of the state bringing the accusation or to take the steps necessary to have the accused brought trial in its own domestic courts.  In purported compliance with the second of these options, the Libyan authorities arrested the two accused and appointed a Supreme Court judge as examining magistrate to consider the evidence and prepare the case against them.  Not entirely surprisingly, perhaps, the UK and US Governments have refused to make available to the examining magistrate the evidence that they claim to have amassed against the accused who, to this day, remain under house arrest.

The United Nations Security Council first became involved in the Lockerbie affair  on 21 January 1992 when it passed Resolution 731 strongly deploring the Government of Libya's lack of co-operation in the matter and urging it to respond to the British and American requests contained in their statements of 27 November 1991.  This was followed by Security Council Resolution 748 (31 March 1992) requiring Libya to comply with the requests within a stipulated period of time, failing which a list of sanctions specified in the Resolution would be imposed.  Compliance was not forthcoming and the sanctions duly came into  effect.  On 11 November 1993 the Security Council, by Resolution 883, further extended the range and application of the sanctions.  The imposition of sanctions under the last two Resolutions was justified by the Security Council by reference to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations on the basis that Libya's failure to extradite the accused constituted a threat to peace.

On 3 March 1992 (after the passing of Security Council Resolution 731, but before Resolutions 748 and 883), Libya presented applications to the International Court of Justice in The Hague for declarations that she was entitled under Article 7 of the 1971 Montreal Convention to put the accused on trial in Libya and that the United Kingdom and the United States were in breach of their obligations under that Convention in insisting upon trial in the UK or the USA.  The Governments of the United Kingdom and United States sought to have these applications dismissed without a hearing on the merits on the grounds inter alia that (1) the ICJ had no jurisdiction to consider them and (2) the Security Council Resolutions of 31 March 1992 and 11 November 1993, imposing upon Libya an international obligation contended by the UK and the USA to be superior to that embodied in Article 7 of the Montreal Convention, had rendered the applications pointless.  On 27 February 1998 the judges of the ICJ by substantial majorities [RB: 13 to 3] (and with the American and British judges dissenting) rejected the submissions of the UK and the USA, thereby clearing the way for decisions at some time in the future on the merits of Libya's applications. (...)

This judgement was followed within six months by the UK and US volte face whereby they agreed to a neutral venue trial. (...)

Once the trial and appeal at Camp Zeist were concluded, the World Court case brought by Libya was quietly dropped, to the enormous relief of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, who were in fear and trembling that the court was going to recognise what would, in effect, have been a form of judicial review of the legality of the acts of the Security Council. And that would never do. Good heavens, it might have judicially prevented the invasion of Iraq!