The Crown and the CIA cables

[On this date in 2000, members of the prosecution team at the Lockerbie trial at Camp Zeist were given access at the United States embassy in the Netherlands to the unredacted cables sent by Abdul Majid Giaka’s CIA handlers to headquarters in Langley, Virginia. What follows is taken from an account of the trial by David Morrison which was published in March 2001:]

On 1 June last year [2000] after the trial in Camp Zeist had started the prosecution at last saw uncensored versions of CIA cables about Giaka and became aware of the awful truth of Giaka’s history, which if revealed to the defence would mean that his credibility as a prosecution witness would be undermined.  When the defence applied to the Court for the same access to the cables, desperate to protect their key witness, the prosecution lied to the Court that the censored material would [not] be useful to the defence (see below). The person who told this enormous whopper was the Lord Advocate, the chief law officer of Scotland, who led for the prosecution at Camp Zeist.

As we have said, the key prosecution witness at the trial in Camp Zeist was Abdul Majid Giaka.  Without him, the two Libyans, Megrahi and Fhimah, would never have been indicted.  Whenever, in the intervening years, journalists and others questioned the soundness of the case against them, the prosecuting authorities in Edinburgh and Washington always responded by boasting that they had a witness who could connect the accused directly with the Lockerbie bomb.  The witness in question was Giaka.

Giaka was a member of the Libyan intelligence service, the JSO, who in August 1988 a few months before the Lockerbie bombing offered his services to the CIA.  In July 1991 he gave the CIA startling eyewitness evidence connecting Megrahi and Fhimah with the Lockerbie bomb (whereupon he was taken to the US and put on a witness protection programme, where he has remained ever since).  A few months later in November 1991, they were charged with the bombing in Scotland and the US.  Without Giaka’s evidence, they would never have been charged.

The credibility of any witness should be of concern to prosecuting authorities.  The more so when he is the key witness in the biggest murder trial in British history with profound geopolitical implications.  Even more so when he is a former member of Libyan intelligence who has defected to the CIA and who stood to receive $4 million of reward money from the US government if his evidence was instrumental in securing a conviction for the Lockerbie bombing.

Plainly, it was incumbent upon the Scottish prosecuting authorities to look upon Giaka’s evidence with a very sceptical eye and to assess his credibility as a witness thoroughly before charging the two Libyans.  This they failed to do.  Crucially, they failed to get sight of uncensored versions of the regular cables about him sent by his CIA handlers in Malta to CIA headquarters in Langley in the period from August 1988 onwards, which contained the CIA’s own assessment of his credibility.  It seems that prior to the charges being laid in November 1991 the CIA had allowed them to see censored versions of the cables with large parts blacked out.  But it wasn’t until 1 June 2000, after the trial in Camp Zeist had begun, that they saw uncensored versions of these cables.

It was, unsurprisingly, the blacked out parts which were relevant to an assessment of Giaka’s credibility.  They revealed that, as of 1 September 1989 when he had been working for the CIA for over a year (and months after the destruction of Pan Am 103), Giaka’s CIA handlers were highly critical of him and of the lack of important information supplied by him.  He is described as a man in the business of selling information for his own benefit; as someone who will never have the penetration of Libyan intelligence services that had been anticipated; as someone who had never been a true member of Libyan intelligence; and as someone whose CIA salary of $1000 per month should be cut off if he supplied no significant information.  The clear inference from this is that by 1 September 1989 Giaka had still not given his CIA masters the crucial eyewitness “evidence” incriminating Megrahi and Fhimah, otherwise these criticisms of his value and of the worth of the information supplied by him could not have been made.

Had the Scottish prosecuting authorities done their job in 1991 and made it their business to acquaint themselves with the CIA’s experience of Giaka then Megrahi and Fhimah would never have been charged – and Libya would not have had economic sanctions imposed on it for most of the 90s for refusing to extradite them.  Clearly, the CIA deliberately kept vital information about Giaka’s lack of credibility as a witness from the Scottish prosecuting authorities.  But it was their job to make sure their key witness was credible, to demand a full account of Giaka’s history with the CIA and to bring charges against the two Libyans only if that history revealed him to be credible. (...)

The prosecution saw the uncensored versions of the CIA cables about Giaka on 1 June last year at the US embassy in The Hague, having promised to keep the censored parts confidential.  How this came about is not clear.  Presumably, the prosecution made a request to the CIA.  If so, it was not obviously a sensible thing to do from their point of view.  There is a clear obligation in Scottish law that the prosecution has a duty to disclose to the defence any information which supports the defence case or casts doubt upon the prosecution case.  In principle, therefore, information from the uncensored cables which undermined Giaka’s credibility would have to be disclosed to the defence, and a confidentiality agreement with the CIA could not override that principle.  So, on the face of it, from the prosecution point of view it would have been far better if they had remained in ignorance.

(Why the CIA consented to the prosecution seeing the uncensored cables is also a puzzle, since they must have known that there was a grave danger that as a result Giaka would be discredited and the trial would collapse.  At the time there was some public controversy about the CIA failing to make information available for the trial and at one point the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, made a statement to the victims’ families saying that the CIA was committed to making every relevant piece of evidence available to the Court.  Perhaps that’s why the CIA felt obliged to give the prosecution unrestricted access of the cables for the first time.)

When the prosecution saw uncensored versions of the cables on 1 June 2000, they must have been panic stricken since their key witness had being revealed to be utterly unreliable.  They kept quiet about their sight of the uncensored cables for three months until 21 August, the day before the trial was due to resume after its summer recess.  When the defence applied to the Court next day for access to the uncensored cables, the prosecution objected strenuously and simply lied to the Court that the censored material would be useful to the defence.

The Lord Advocate of Scotland, who led for the Crown at the trial, told the Court that the members of the prosecution team who saw the uncensored CIA cables were fully aware of the obligation upon them to make available to the defence teams material relevant to the defence of the accused and, to that end, considered the contents of those cables with certain principles in mind.

He said:

“First of all, they considered whether or not there was any information behind the redactions [the censored material] which would undermine the Crown case in any way.  Secondly, they considered whether there was anything which would appear to reflect on the credibility of Mr Majid [Giaka]. They also considered whether there was anything which might bear upon the special defences which had been lodged and intimated in this case. On all of these matters, … [they] reached the conclusion that there was nothing within the cables which bore on the defence case, either by undermining the Crown case or by advancing a positive case which was being made on may be made, having regard to the special defence... I emphasise that the redactions have been made on the basis of what is in the interests of the security of a friendly power... Crown counsel was satisfied that there was nothing within the documents which bore upon the defence case in any way.”

One of the trial judges, Lord Coulsfield, then intervened:

“Does that include, Lord Advocate ... that Crown counsel, having considered the documents, can say to the Court that there is nothing concealed which could possibly bear on the credibility of this witness?”

To which the Lord Advocate replied:

“… there is nothing within these documents which relates to Lockerbie or the bombing of Pan Am 103 which could in any way impinge on the credibility of Mr Majid [Giaka] on these matters”.

That is a barefaced lie by the chief law officer of the Crown in Scotland.  The uncensored cables revealed, amongst other things, that the CIA believed Giaka to be in the business of selling information for his own benefit.  One doesn’t have to be a lawyer, let alone the chief law officer in Scotland, to recognise that this “impinges upon the credibility” of Giaka as a witness, as did other matters from the uncensored cables.  A witness in court who is caught out lying can be charged with perjury and even gaoled, but the chief law officer of the Crown in Scotland can apparently lie with impunity.

However, the Lord Advocate’s lies were in vain.  The Court did not accept that the defence should be denied access to the uncensored cables and he was instructed by the Court “to use his best endeavours to ensure that the information in the unedited cables was disclosed to the defence”.  The CIA conceded that the defence could see the unedited cables – they had to, otherwise the case would most likely have collapsed – and for the first time in history CIA internal documents were made available to foreign court.

With the aid of the unedited cables, the defence destroyed Giaka’s credibility as a witness when he gave evidence on 26-28 September.

US gagging orders in Lockerbie case

[On this date in 2000, Lamin Fhimah’s solicitor wrote to Dr Richard Fuisz. The account that follows is excerpted from an item on John Ashton’s website Megrahi: You are my Jury. The documents which are referred to can be read here.]

Dr Richard Fuisz was an international businessman and deep-cover CIA spy,  who worked in the USSR and across the Middle East during the Eighties and Nineties. As well as having a very successful medical technology company, he ran training programmes for the Saudi military, supplied computers with a secret spying capability to the unwitting Soviets (via Raisa Gorbachev) and had a model agency that supplied the first Miss USSR.

In May 2000, not long after the start of the Lockerbie trial, the defence lawyers got wind of Fuisz, via an associate of his, Susan Lindauer, who said that he had been based in Syria in 1988 and had irrefutable intelligence that Lockerbie was the work of the PFLP-GC. Lindauer also said that he was the subject of a gagging order, a breach of which would result in a significant prison sentence.

On 31 May [2000], defence solicitor Eddie MacKechnie wrote to the US department of justice’s Lockerbie prosecutor Brian Murtagh to ask if Fuisz was indeed prevented from speaking (Document 1). Six weeks later Murtagh wrote back. He confirmed that Fuisz was the subject of a gagging order in relation to another case, which involved the supply of military equipment to Iraq by a company called Terex, however, he claimed that Fuisz was free to talk about Lockerbie, writing: “I found no factual basis to the allegation that any representative of the US Government has taken any action to deter Dr Fuisz from talking to anyone about the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.” (See Document 2)

Fuisz insisted that this was not true and that he was the subject of another gagging order that was quite independent of the Terex litigation. Furthermore, he claimed that Murtagh and another DoJ lawyer had advised him that he was not in fact free to talk about Lockerbie. (See Document 3)

Murtagh again denied it, telling MacKechnie: “You ask whether or not you can assume that the defense is at liberty to ask Dr Fuisz any questions in relation to Pan Am 103, and further whether he is fully at liberty to answer any questions relating to Pan Am 103? The answer to both questions as far as I am concerned is “yes”. The problem here is with Dr Fuisz himself, and not with any court order or attempt by the Government to keep him from talking to the defense about the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103.” (See Document 4)

MacKechnie replied: “Dr Fuisz insists that it is not the Department of Justice or even the Attorney General herself which possess the authority to release him from what he refers to as his statutory obligations of secrecy.  It has been suggested to us that the President himself, but perhaps more sensibly the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet, would be able to release him from any possible remaining inhibitions so that he could provide a statement in relation to Pan Am 103 and the alleged perpetrators of the bombing.” (See Document 5)

CIA lawyer Robert Eatinger then wrote to Murtagh: “Dr Fuisz has been informed that neither the CIA nor the DoJ pose any objection to his discussing with the defense, or anyone else for that matter, his knowledge of the Pan Am flight 103 bombing. There is and has been no impediment to his being interviewed on this matter… As you and I have discussed, there simply is no court order of which we are aware that in any way limits Dr Fuisz from revealing his knowledge of who bombed Pan Am flight 103. (See Document 6)

The following day, 13 October 2000, Eatinger wrote to Fuisz. Although the letter downplayed Fuisz’s knowledge of Lockerbie, it is highly significant, because it acknowledged de facto that Fuisz was, indeed, involved with the CIA. Moreover, it conceded that he had been briefed by the CIA about Lockerbie and that they had told him that Jibril was to blame. It also tacitly admitted that, contrary to earlier assurances, he was restricted in what he could say. The key passage read:

“Now that you have clarified that you have no personal knowledge of who is responsible for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, we can provide you more specific guidance. You may freely identify the number of briefings you received by CIA officials the dates on which you received them. You may identify whom the CIA briefers said was responsible for the bombing of Pan flight 103. However, you may not reveal the identities of the CIA officers, nor the purpose for which you were receiving these security briefings.” (See Document 7)

Finally, on 6 December 2000, Fuisz was deposed. As well as his own lawyer, a DoJ lawyer and two unnamed CIA officials were also present at the first depositio and three at the second. Fuisz’s story was covered briefly in a few media reports, which suggested that he had been effectively prevented from saying anything that he knew about Lockerbie. However, earlier this year I learnt that this was not true. I came across a lawyer’s note of the first of his two depositions (Document 8) and a transcript of the second (Document 9). Although he was very restricted in what he could say, he nevertheless went on the record with two extraordinary revelations. Firstly, he confirmed that he received multiple briefings from CIA agents in 1989 in which they told him, inter alia, that the PFLP-GC was responsible for Lockerbie. Secondly, and even more significantly, he said that between 1990 and 1995 he was told separately by around 10-15 high level Syrian officials that the group was to blame.  These officials, he said, interacted with the group’s leader, Ahmed Jibril “on a constant basis”.

Insurers sue US Government for blocking Pan Am 103 payout claim

[What follows is excerpted from a report published yesterday on the Insurance Business America website:]

A $96 million lawsuit filed against the US government by Lloyd’s, New York Marine and General Insurance Co and Aviation & General Insurance Co went forward this week after the Court of Federal Claims failed to dismiss the suit as the government requested.

The plaintiffs are seeking remuneration from the government after it allegedly blocked certain underwriters from recovering $96 million from Libya for sponsoring two terrorist attacks in the 1980s – the Lockerbie bombings that affected EgyptAir 648 in 1985 and Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988. The insurers had filed suits against Libya before US officials stepped in and terminated the proceedings.

In denying the government’s motion to dismiss, the court held that Lloyd’s and the other plaintiffs had a legitimate property interest on which to base their claims. (...)

Lloyd’s originally sued Libya in 1988, looking for reimbursement for their coverage of the attacks, which cost more than $41 million for the EgyptAir flight and $55 million for the Pan Am flight. The other insurers filed a similar suit in 2006.

However, Congress passed the Libyan Claims Resolution Act in 2008, which took the right to oversee suits against Libya away from federal courts’ jurisdiction. Shortly afterward, the government stopped all suits pending against Libya.

After the plaintiffs filed suit against the US government, governmental officials sought a dismissal on the grounds that the insurers do not possess a valid property interest on which they can base their claims.

The court, however, ruled that plaintiffs demonstrated sufficient facts to establish a “property interest in the insurance contracts they sought to protect with a legal claim against Libya, which the United States subsequently extinguished.”

Keeping timer documents secret

[What follows is excerpted from a report published on this date in 2008 in the Daily Record:]

Secret documents at the centre of a costly courtroom row are unlikely to help Libyan agent Abdelbaset al-Megrahi overturn his conviction for the Lockerbie bombings, it was claimed on Wednesday.

Al-Megrahi, 56, is serving a minimum of 27 years of a life sentence for bringing down a United States-bound Pan Am flight in December 1988 with the loss of 270 lives – regarded as Scotland’s worst mass murder.

His claims of innocence have been referred to appeal judges by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission which investigates possible miscarriages of justice.

The SCCRC say that before the trial started al-Megrahi’s defence team should have been shown papers which an unknown foreign government handed over to UK authorities – believed to be about the bomb’s electronic timer.

But defence lawyers cannot get their hands on the documents because the Westminster Government say that revealing their contents will harm foreign relations and hamper the war on terror.

The Court of Criminal Appeal in Edinburgh is now locked in a three day debate about how to conduct a hearing into whether or not the documents can be kept secret under a “public interest immunity certificate”.

As well as the three appeal judges there are nine advocates in the Edinburgh courtroom – five of them QCs.

Advocate General Lord Davidson of Clova QC – who represents Westminster of legal issues in Scotland – has suggested a procedure never before seen in Scotland.

Judges would be allowed to read the secret papers then decide – behind closed doors – whether they should be handed over.

But al-Megrahi’s lawyers would be kept out and replaced by a security-vetted advocate to try to ensure fair play.

Today it was the turn of advocate depute Ronald Clancy QC to give the view of prosecutors.

He told the judges in Edinburgh that Lord Advocate Elish Angiolini QC, responsible for criminal prosecutions in Scotland, would hand over the documents if Foreign Secretary David Miliband had not objected.

“They are not likely to be important to any undermining of the Crown case or cast doubt on it”, he said.

Mr Clancy also suggested that a possible way round the difficulty might be for defence lawyers to see an edited version of the controversial documents.

Margaret Scott QC, senior counsel for al-Megrahi, insisted that without sight of the document she could not properly prepare for the Libyan’s appeal – which is still months away, at least.

“Al-Megrahi’s position here is that he wants disclosure of these documents in order to exercise his right of appeal,” she said.

The papers were “material” because the SCCRC had said so, she added.

Ms Scott also criticised the proposals for a special security-vetted lawyer to encroach on her job.

“My main concern is any proposed procedure which determines the substance of the appeal taking part in the absence of al-Megrahi or his defence counsel”, she said.

[RB: Will we have to go through all this again if the current application to the SCCRC results in a reference of the case back to the Appeal Court, but with Richard Keen QC (whose appointment as Advocate General for Scotland was announced yesterday) seeking to keep the documents out of the hands of the lawyers arguing the appeal on behalf of the late Abdelbaset Megrahi?]

The Blair-Gaddafi deal in the desert

[It was on this date in 2007 that the “deal in the desert” was concluded between Prime Minister Tony Blair and Colonel Gaddafi at a meeting in Sirte. This was embodied in a “memorandum of understanding” that provided, amongst other things, for a prisoner transfer agreement to be drawn up. In later years UK Government ministers, particularly Justice Secretary Jack Straw, sought to argue either (i) that the prisoner transfer element of the deal was not intended to apply to Abdelbaset Megrahi or (ii) that if it was intended to cover him, all parties appreciated that the decision on transfer would be one for the Scottish Government not the UK Government. Here is what I wrote about that on this blog:]

According to Jack Straw "the Libyans understood that the discretion in respect of any PTA application rested with the Scottish Executive." This is not so. In meetings that I had with Libyan officials at the highest level shortly after the "deal in the desert" it was abundantly clear that the Libyans believed that the UK Government could order the transfer of Mr Megrahi and that they were prepared to do so. When I told them that the relevant powers rested with the Scottish -- not the UK -- Government, they simply did not believe me. When they eventually realised that I had been correct, their anger and disgust with the UK Government was palpable. As I have said elsewhere:

"The memorandum of understanding regarding prisoner transfer that Tony Blair entered into in the course of the "deal in the desert" in May 2007, and which paved the way for the formal prisoner transfer agreement, was intended by both sides to lead to the rapid return of Mr Megrahi to his homeland. This was the clear understanding of Libyan officials involved in the negotiations and to whom I have spoken.

"It was only after the memorandum of understanding was concluded that [it belatedly sunk in] that the decision on repatriation of this particular prisoner was a matter not for Westminster and Whitehall but for the devolved Scottish Government in Edinburgh, and that government had just come into the hands of the Scottish National Party and so could no longer be expected supinely to follow the UK Labour Government's wishes. That was when the understanding between the UK Government and the Libyan Government started to unravel, to the considerable annoyance and distress of the Libyans, who had been led to believe that repatriation under the PTA was only months away.

“Among the Libyan officials with whom I discussed this matter at the time were Abdulati al-Obeidi, Moussa Koussa and Abdel Rahman Shalgam.”

Lockerbie, Iran and USS Vincennes

[On this date in 2008, an article by Dr Ludwig de Braeckeleer headed Former Iranian President Blames Tehran for Lockerbie was published by OhmyNews International. The first few paragraphs read as follows:]

In an interview conducted on May 16, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the former president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, told me that Tehran, not Libya, had ordered the bombing of Pan Am 103 in revenge for the downing of an Iranian civilian airliner by the USS Vincennes a few months earlier.

On July 3, 1988, the navy cruiser USS Vincennes, also known as "Robocruiser," shot down Iran Air Flight 655 over the Persian Gulf. The civilian airliner was carrying mostly Muslims on their pilgrimage to Mecca -- 290 died, most Iranians.

According to Bani-Sadr, in the immediate aftermath of the Lockerbie tragedy, [Ali Akbar] Mohtashami-Pur, the then minister of the interior, acknowledged in an interview that he had contracted Ahmad Jibril, the leader of a Palestinian organization [PFLP-GC], to bomb an American airliner. The interview was scheduled for publication the following day. Hours before distribution, the newspaper was shutdown.

[The remainder of the long and detailed article consists of the fruits of Dr De Braeckeleer’s search for evidence supporting or rebutting Bani-Sadr’s contention. He found quite a lot of the former and not much of the latter. The article merits close attention.]

From Birmingham to Lockerbie?

[This is the headline over an item posted today on Lockerbietruth.com, the website of Dr Jim Swire and Peter Biddulph:]

Jim Swire and relatives of some of the Lockerbie victims are pursuing a posthumous third appeal on behalf of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. They believe that he suffered a miscarriage of justice.

In June 2014 - almost one year ago - they requested that the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) ask the Scottish appeal court to rule on whether it is authorised to continue an investigation into the trial findings. The SCCRC requires a ruling on whether the relatives have “a legitimate interest”.

While in prison Al-Megrahi was visited by many well-wishers. In John Ashton's 2012 book Megrahi: You are my Jury Al-Megrahi tells of visits by Paddy Joe Hill, one of the "Birmingham Six" wrongly convicted for the 1974 IRA Birmingham pub bombings. He says of Hill, "He was the visitor who best understood my plight".

Megrahi explains: "Hill knew better than anyone the innate reluctance of the criminal justice system to right its wrongs. Following their first unsuccessful appeal, the Six attempted to press charges against the West Midlands Police. The case eventually reached the High Court and was rejected by a panel of three judges led by England's most senior civil judge, the Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning.

"In one of the most notorious judgements of recent times he opined: 'Just consider the course of events if their [the Six's] action were to proceed to trial... If they failed it would mean that much time, money and worry would have been expended by many people to no good purpose.'

"'If they won ... [it would mean] that the convictions were eroneous. That would mean that the Home Secretary would either have to recommend that they be pardoned or to remit the case to the Court of Appeal. That [would be] such an appalling vista that every sensible person would say "It cannot be right that these actions should go any further."'"

Baset Al-Megrahi continues: "By the time I was convicted 21 years later, no judge would dare so nakedly place the reputation of the justice system before the interests of justice. But the common ancestry of judicial myopia was all too obvious."

Let us hope that Mr Al-Megrahi is correct and that the sentiments expressed by Lord Denning will never be allowed to influence the current application for a third, posthumous appeal.

National security and security-vetted advocates

[What follows is taken from a report published on the BBC News website on this date in 2008:]

A plea has been made to Lockerbie bombing appeal judges to hold a hearing to discuss a confidential document behind closed doors.

The Advocate General has suggested a security-vetted advocate could represent Abdelbasset Ali al-Megrahi in place of his usual legal team.

The UK Government claims releasing the document would harm national security.

However, Al Megrahi's lawyers have said it could assist his appeal against his conviction for the 1988 atrocity.

The Advocate General - who represents the UK Government - has lodged a public interest immunity plea to keep the document secret.

A three-day procedural hearing at the Appeal Court in Edinburgh is now meeting to decide how to address the issue.

The court previously heard Foreign Secretary David Miliband had signed the public interest immunity certificate.

Judges were told he believes releasing the secret document would cause "real harm" to the national interest.

Advocate General Lord Davidson [of Glen Clova] QC told the court there should be a public interest immunity hearing, and he suggested judges should have access to the document in advance of that hearing.

He said a special representative, if appointed, would be able to represent Al Megrahi's interests.

The Libyan's defence team have not yet given their views in the hearing but Lord Davidson said it appeared that they contest the use of a special representative in this case.

Al Megrahi was not present at the hearing in Edinburgh.

[RB: Incidentally, Prime Minister David Cameron has not yet appointed an Advocate General for Scotland in his new administration. The strong rumour is that it is to be Richard Keen QC who was senior counsel for Lamin Fhimah at the Lockerbie trial, subsequently Dean of the Faculty of Advocates and is currently chairman of the Scottish Conservative Party.]

UK Government rejects neutral venue Lockerbie trial scheme

[What follows is the text of a report published in The Herald on this date in 1994:]

Scottish Secretary Ian Lang yesterday rejected a plea by Tory MP Sir Teddy Taylor for the law to be changed to enable two Libyans suspected of carrying out the 1988 Lockerbie bombing to be tried abroad.

Sir Teddy (Southend East) said leading and respected Scottish advocates had stated clearly and publicly that a fair trial before a Scottish jury was simply not possible because of recent press coverage.

He added that the Libyan Government had said it willingly would send the two accused to any other country.

Sir Teddy urged: ''In fairness to the relatives of the victims of this appalling disaster, it would be better for the Government to consider legislation, for example for a trial in The Hague, so the truth on this dreadful issue could at last come forward, rather than the present situation where nothing is happening for years.''

Mr Lang replied: ''But the investigation took place under Scots law and the charges are being brought on that basis.''

He insisted there was no evidence to support the contention the Libyan Government would be any more amenable to holding a trial in any other country, even if that were possible, ''which would be extremely difficult in the circumstances''.

Mr Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow -- Lab) claimed the Lord Advocate had not taken account of all the evidence in the case, and accused the Crown Office of being ''a bit lazy''.

Mr Lang retorted: ''You persist in setting yourself up as some kind of amateur sleuth in this matter.''

He pressed Mr Dalyell to support the Lord Advocate and the Government ''in seeking to enable this trial to take place''.

[In January 1994, I had secured the agreement of the suspects’ Libyan lawyer and the Libyan Government to a neutral venue trial. This had not been made public, but was known to Teddy Taylor MP, Tam Dalyell MP, the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Crown Office. It took more than four more years (and a change of government) before the UK eventually saw the light.]

Pan Am 103 and the mach stem effect

[What follows is excerpted from a report published on the BBC News website on this date in 2000:]

An air accident investigator has told the Lockerbie trial there was a significant mathematical error in the official report on the disaster.

In highly technical but potentially crucial evidence, Christopher Protheroe said he informed prosecution lawyers in a meeting on Monday that a complex formula used to calculate blast wave effects after an initial explosion had been incorrectly applied in the 1990 report.

He admitted that correct calculation of the so-called "mach stem" phenomenon would indicate that the bomb which destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland went off closer to its fuselage skin than originally thought.

The effect is created when a bubble of super-heated gases expands violently after explosives are detonated.

The report by the UK's Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) indicated that damage discernible in debris from the forward cargo hold showed that the distance would have been about 25 inches (63 cm).

On evidence on Thursday, Mr Protheroe said the distance, if calculated correctly, would be about 12 inches (30 cm).

The prosecution alleges that Abdel Basset al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fahima, working as Libyan intelligence agents, planted a bomb in an unaccompanied suitcase in Malta which was eventually loaded onto the doomed aircraft in London.

Earlier, Mr Protheroe held up a model of the jumbo jet, with red, green and yellow patches showing how the plane had disintegrated in mid-air. (...)

He described how the blast initially blew a 20 by 20 inch (50 cm) hole in the fuselage and created further "starburst fractures" and "petalling" of the plane's metal skin from the subsequent explosion of hot gases.

AAIB photographs produced in court of a partial three- dimensional reconstruction of the smashed plane showed clear evidence, Mr Protheroe said, of a "shatter zone" in the left front cargo bay almost directly under the second "A" in the Pan Am logo on the side of the jet's giant forward cabin.

The trial was adjourned again, this time to allow a baggage container from the aircraft to be brought into court.

Air accident investigators have reconstructed the metal container, which is too big to be brought through the courtroom doors.

It may have to be taken apart and rebuilt again in front of the three judges in a process which could take a whole day.