In the path of terrorists

[This is the heading over an article published on this date in 2000 on The Lockerbie Trial website, curated by Ian Ferguson and me during the Zeist trial and Megrahi's first appeal. The author is Joe Mifsud, a journalist and writer who covered the trial for various Maltese news media and who is now a judge in Malta. It reads as follows:]

A terrorist, like any other criminal, will do what he can to cover his tracks.  The Maltese origin of clothing in the bomb suitcase does not establish that either the suitcase or the bomb was once in Malta.

The clothing in the bomb suitcase, which was identifiable as having been manufactured in Malta, bore labels to this effect, enabled Royal Armament Research and Development (RARDE) to determine the country of origin as Malta.  So these labels had not been removed by the terrorists.

The Lockerbie investigators established that six items of the clothing and an umbrella, which originated in Malta were new and had been purchased new from the same shop in Malta on the same occasion.

These items of clothing had been purchased from Mary’s House in Sliema, weeks not day's before 21 December 1988.  The prosecution is claiming that the clothes were bought on  7 December, while the defense is suggesting 23 November 1988 as the date.

In my opinion the facts and matters set out above are consistent with an attempt by the terrorists to distract the attention of the investigating authorities away from Frankfurt or Heathrow to Malta in the event of the bomb being detected or as in fact happened of the bomb exploding above land and debris from the bomb and the bomb suitcase being recovered.

It is inherently unlikely that terrorists would have tried to place the bomb suitcase on board Air Malta KM 180 on 21 December 1988 for the following four reasons.

1.  Terrorists do not expose themselves and their plans to any unnecessary risk of detention or of error;

2.  Accordingly the terrorists responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103 would not have routed the bomb suitcase through Frankfurt and chosen to run the risk of it passing undetected through the security systems of three different airports on two different airlines when Air Malta during that period flew only three flights each week to Frankfurt but ten flights each week to Heathrow.

3.  Further if the bomb consisted of a timer device, terrorists would not have run the unpredictable risk of the passage of the bomb suitcase being delayed in one or more of the following ways:

a)  on the ground at Luqa as a result of mechanical failure, poor weather, security alert, air traffic control or any other reason;

b)  by being diverted away from Frankfurt for any of the reasons at above;

c)  above Frankfurt as a result of air traffic control delays for incoming flights (as in fact happened);

d)  by missing the interline connection at Frankfurt as a result of the bomb suitcase being lost, mishandled or detected in the course of x-ray or baggage reconciliation procedures;

e)  on the ground at Frankfurt for any of the reasons at (a) above;

f)  by being diverted away from Heathrow for any of the reasons at (a) above;

g)  above Heathrow as a result of air traffic control delays for incoming flights;

h)  by missing the interline connection at Heathrow for any of the reasons at (d) above;

i)   on the ground at Heathrow as a result of the connecting transatlantic aircraft being delayed, mechanical failure, poor weather, security alert or any other reason.

4.  Further if the bomb consisted of a barometric pressure device triggered by altitude which itself triggered a timer, terrorists could not have avoided (alternatively would not have risked) the bomb being prematurely triggered on board KM 180 or on board PA 103A from Frankfurt to Heathrow, and then detonating on board either of these flights or on the ground at Frankfurt or at Heathrow.

No terrorist could have predicted in advance the exact altitude at which either flight would have flown or, if such a prediction had been made, no terrorist could have guaranteed that the aircraft would have remained at that altitude and would not have been ordered away from it by air traffic control.  The bomb on board Pan Am 103 exploded approximately 35 minutes after take-off from Heathrow.

It is not clear for me why the Lockerbie investigators choose to blame Malta and Air Malta in this case, when it is so clear that we are the scapegoats for others that lacked security at their airports.

In the path of terrorists

[This is the heading over an article by Maltese journalist (now magistrate) Joe Mifsud published on TheLockerbieTrial.com website on this date in 2000, during the course of the trial at Camp Zeist. It reads as follows:]

A terrorist, like any other criminal, will do what he can to cover his tracks.  The Maltese origin of clothing in the bomb suitcase does not establish that either the suitcase or the bomb was once in Malta.

The clothing in the bomb suitcase, which was identifiable as having been manufactured in Malta, bore labels to this effect, enabled Royal Armament Research and Development (RARDE) to determine the country of origin as Malta.  So these labels had not been removed by the terrorists.

The Lockerbie investigators established that six items of the clothing and an umbrella, which originated in Malta were new and had been purchased new from the same shop in Malta on the same occasion.

These items of clothing had been purchased from Mary’s House in Sliema weeks, not days, before 21st December 1988.  The prosecution is claiming that the clothes were bought on the 7th December, while the defense is suggesting the 23rd November 1988 as the date.

In my opinion the facts and matters set out above are consistent with an attempt by the terrorists to distract the attention of the investigating authorities away from Frankfurt or Heathrow to Malta in the event of the bomb being detected or as in fact happened of the bomb exploding above land and debris from the bomb and the bomb suitcase being recovered.

It is inherently unlikely that terrorists would have tried to place the bomb suitcase on board Air Malta KM 180 on the 21st December 1988 for the following four reasons.

1.  Terrorists do not expose themselves and their plans to any unnecessary risk of detention or of error;

2.  Accordingly the terrorists responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103 would not have routed the bomb suitcase through Frankfurt and chosen to run the risk of it passing undetected through the security systems of three different airports on two different airlines when Air Malta during that period flew only three flights each week to Frankfurt but ten flights each week to Heathrow.

3.  Further if the bomb consisted of a timer device, terrorists would not have run the unpredictable risk of the passage of the bomb suitcase being delayed in one or more of the following ways:

a)  on the ground at Luqa as a result of mechanical failure, poor weather, security alert, air traffic control or any other reason;

b)  by being diverted away from Frankfurt for any of the reasons at above;

c)  above Frankfurt as a result of air traffic control delays for incoming flights (as in fact happened);

d)  by missing the interline connection at Frankfurt as a result of the bomb suitcase being lost, mishandled or detected in the course of x-ray or baggage reconciliation procedures;

e)  on the ground at Frankfurt for any of the reasons at (a) above;

f)  by being diverted away from Heathrow for any of the reasons at (a) above;

g)  above Heathrow as a result of air traffic control delays for incoming flights;

h)  by missing the interline connection at Heathrow for any of the reasons at (d) above;

i)   on the ground at Heathrow as a result of the connecting transatlantic aircraft being delayed, mechanical failure, poor weather, security alert or any other reason.

4.  Further if the bomb consisted of a barometric pressure device triggered by altitude which itself triggered a timer, terrorists could not have avoided (alternatively would not have risked) the bomb being prematurely triggered on board KM 180 or on board Pan Am 103A from Frankfurt to Heathrow, and then detonating on board either of these flights or on the ground at Frankfurt or at Heathrow.

No terrorist could have predicted in advance the exact altitude at which either flight would have flown or, if such a prediction had been made, no terrorist could have guaranteed that the aircraft would have remained at that altitude and would not have been ordered away from it by air traffic control.  The bomb on board Pan Am 103 exploded approximately 35 minutes after take-off from Heathrow.

It is not clear for me why the Lockerbie investigators choose to blame Malta and Air Malta in this case, when it is so clear that we are the scapegoats for others that lacked security at their airports.

Joe Mifsud is currently following the Lockerbie trial at Camp Zeist for ONE News and Kullhadd.

Inherent implausibility of official Lockerbie scenario

[The Lockerbie trial at Camp Zeist was covered for Maltese news media by journalist Joe Mifsud. What follows is an article that he wrote in September 2000 for The Lockerbie Trial website:]

A terrorist, like any other criminal, will do what he can to cover his tracks.  The Maltese origin of clothing in the bomb suitcase does not establish that either the suitcase or the bomb was once in Malta.

The clothing in the bomb suitcase, which was identifiable as having been manufactured in Malta, bore labels to this effect, enabled Royal Armament Research and Development (RARDE) to determine the country of origin as Malta.  So these labels had not been removed by the terrorists.

The Lockerbie investigators established that six items of the clothing and an umbrella, which originated in Malta were new and had been purchased new from the same shop in Malta on the same occasion.

These items of clothing had been purchased from Mary’s House in Sliema, weeks not days before 21 December 1988.  The prosecution is claiming that the clothes were bought on 7 December, while the defense is suggesting 23 November 1988 as the date.

In my opinion the facts and matters set out above are consistent with an attempt by the terrorists to distract the attention of the investigating authorities away from Frankfurt or Heathrow to Malta in the event of the bomb being detected or as in fact happened of the bomb exploding above land and debris from the bomb and the bomb suitcase being recovered.

It is inherently unlikely that terrorists would have tried to place the bomb suitcase on board Air Malta KM 180 on 21 December 1988 for the following four reasons.

1.  Terrorists do not expose themselves and their plans to any unnecessary risk of detention or of error;

2.  Accordingly the terrorists responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103 would not have routed the bomb suitcase through Frankfurt and chosen to run the risk of it passing undetected through the security systems of three different airports on two different airlines when Air Malta during that period flew only three flights each week to Frankfurt but ten flights each week to Heathrow.

3.  Further if the bomb consisted of a timer device, terrorists would not have run the unpredictable risk of the passage of the bomb suitcase being delayed in one or more of the following ways:

a)  on the ground at Luqa as a result of mechanical failure, poor weather, security alert, air traffic control or any other reason;

b)  by being diverted away from Frankfurt for any of the reasons at above;

c)  above Frankfurt as a result of air traffic control delays for incoming flights (as in fact happened);

d)  by missing the interline connection at Frankfurt as a result of the bomb suitcase being lost, mishandled or detected in the course of x-ray or baggage reconciliation procedures;

e)  on the ground at Frankfurt for any of the reasons at (a) above;

f)  by being diverted away from Heathrow for any of the reasons at (a) above;

g)  above Heathrow as a result of air traffic control delays for incoming flights;

h)  by missing the interline connection at Heathrow for any of the reasons at (d) above;

i)   on the ground at Heathrow as a result of the connecting transatlantic aircraft being delayed, mechanical failure, poor weather, security alert or any other reason.

4.  Further if the bomb consisted of a barometric pressure device triggered by altitude which itself triggered a timer, terrorists could not have avoided (alternatively would not have risked) the bomb being prematurely triggered on board KM 180 or on board PA 103A from Frankfurt to Heathrow, and then detonating on board either of these flights or on the ground at Frankfurt or at Heathrow.

No terrorist could have predicted in advance the exact altitude at which either flight would have flown or, if such a prediction had been made, no terrorist could have guaranteed that the aircraft would have remained at that altitude and would not have been ordered away from it by air traffic control.  The bomb on board Pan Am 103 exploded approximately 35 minutes after take-off from Heathrow.

It is not clear for me why the Lockerbie investigators choose to blame Malta and Air Malta in this case, when it is so clear that we are the scapegoats for others that lacked security at their airports.

[After a distinguished career at the Maltese Bar, Dr Mifsud was earlier this year appointed as a magistrate (a full-time judicial appointment roughly equivalent to a judge of the Outer House of the Court of Session in Scotland or a puisne judge of the High Court in England).]

Lockerbie investigators "abused our friendship and infringed Maltese law"

[What follows is an item originally posted on this blog on this date in 2009:]

Pan Am 103: The unanswered questions

[This is the headline over a long interview with Joe Mifsud published in the midweek edition of maltatoday. Mr Mifsud has followed, and written about, the Lockerbie case for many years. The following are excerpts from the interview.]

“Malta is still portrayed as the place where the terrorists met and executed their plan to kill 270 innocent people. Our national airline Air Malta was unjustly implicated. I have suffered silently as a Maltese citizen, listened patiently to the allegations but fought with pride to clear Malta’s name.”

So saying, Joe Mifsud reiterates a point he has been making for almost 20 years. But with Megrahi now released on compassionate grounds, and a growing chorus of voices demanding an independent inquiry into the 1988 disaster, Mifsud still has mixed feelings about the entire affair.

“Vindicated? No,” he says when asked for his reaction to the release. “I thought about the relatives and friends of the victims who perished in the Pan Am tragedy. I thought about the time that was wasted and the truth that has not emerged. There are some who might be happy with financial compensation or a guilty verdict. The latter will not take away the pain and anguish caused by the fact that they still do not know the cruel hand behind the planning and the execution of their dear ones...”

Mifsud argues that foreign investigators had abused our friendship and infringed Maltese law. They illegally tapped telephones and even offered money for evidence to strengthen their case.

“I still remember two particular occasions. During proceedings the court was told that the whereabouts of a husband and wife, mentioned as members of a Palestinian terror team responsible for the Lockerbie bombing, were unknown, when I knew that there were living openly with their three young children in Gaza. Everyone was surprised when I interviewed the couple and the story was published on the front page of Scotland on Sunday. When Scottish police first came to Malta in 1989, it was to investigate a Lockerbie connection because clothes originating on the island had been in the bomb suitcase. On their second visit, Palestinian terrorists were suspected. At that time the Palestinian man was living in Malta with his family. His phone was illegally tapped by Scottish police operating in partnership with the American and German investigators. The Maltese authorities protested when the clandestine operation was discovered and the whole investigation was immediately suspended. The investigators were asked to leave Malta and were only allowed to return several weeks later when the Maltese government had been guaranteed that there would be no repeat of illegal investigations.”

The second occasion was when Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, the second suspect, was acquitted on 31 January, 2002.

“I visited Fhimah one week after the end of the trial when festivities to celebrate his acquittal were still in full swing in his home area Suq il-Gimgha. I still remember Fhimah’s words: ‘I had tears in my eyes when I bid him farewell, I was very sad and left with a broken heart knowing that my friend Basset was still there. I kept contact with him. As you believed that I was innocent, believe that Basset is innocent too.’”

But what, apart from instinct, originally led Mifsud to doubt the prosecution’s version of events?

“I personally knew Fhimah as he used to live in Mosta, my home town. When his name was mentioned in the investigations I was surprised, and my initial reaction was that I was witnessing a frame up in the making. I was very suspicious regarding Abdul Majid Jiacha, a Libyan defector married to a Maltese. At that time he was being considered as the star witness. I investigated further and obtained classified documents from the USA, claiming that he was in the Witness Protection Programme and he had met US agents more than 10 times before the Lockerbie bombing! So if he knew what was happening he should have supplied all necessary warnings so that the terror act would have been prevented.” (...)

But if the Libya connection is in doubt, what other explanation could there be for a terrorist act claiming 270 lives?

“Secret service sources suggest that the Pan Am disaster was an act of revenge for another air disaster. On 3 July 1988 a United States warship, the USS Vincennes, shot down an Iran Air civilian airliner killing 290 people. As a result of this action and of increased tension in the Middle East it was generally expected that the United States would be the subject of reprisals. There was widespread concern about the threat to United States civilian aircraft at the time.”

As for the insistence on prosecuting Libyan suspects, Mifsud suspects a case of “blame shifting”:

“Pointing fingers to the bad guys of the moment – Libya was known for their support to movements linked to terror, including the IRA, Abu Nidal and others.”

In view of the doubts now cast on the trial proceedings, Mifsud believes the time has come for an independent enquiry.

“During the past years I have spoken to Jim Swire who lost his daughter in this tragedy. He always urged the British government to appoint an inquiry to investigate the case. This should have been done immediately after the tragedy. I agree with his suggestion; better late than never. I still remember the representatives of British victims telling me that questions about the tragedy went unanswered in the trial. They said the trial had not answered the huge number of questions asked over the last years. In my opinion the trial only served to add to this list of questions. A United Nations initiative in the form of a tribunal can act as an independent inquiry...”

What further details could such an inquiry reveal that have so far not come to light?

“The bomb which caused the Pan Am 103 tragedy on Lockerbie did not start its journey from Malta, as the Crown suggested during the trial and during the early stages of the investigations, but from another destination. Where? This is the first question that needs to be answered.

“The bomb device could have been introduced into the working area of Frankfurt by being flown on board any airline, interline tagged or on-line tagged for PA 103. The luggage could have been sent from the Damascus airport in Syria.

“Regarding Heathrow airport, where it is certain that the bomb was loaded onto the Pan Am flight, the three-judge panel itself said that there was also a possibility that an extraneous suitcase could have been introduced by being put onto the conveyor belt outside the interline shed, or introduced into the shed itself or into the container when it was at the built-up area...”

The second unanswered question concerns who mandated the act of terror and who executed the plan. To answer this, Mifsud argues we have to go back to the shortcomings of the initial investigations – among them, the process that led Tony Gauci to identify Megrahi as the person who bought the incriminating clothes from his shop.

“Two points that should have been noted in Tony Gauci’s testimony are: If the person who bought the items from his shop was living at the Holiday Inn Hotel as the prosecution claimed, and this is less than five minutes away from the shop, was it wise for the person who bought the items to walk to the taxi stand which is the same distance from the hotel and in the opposite direction? If Megrahi was the head of the security service and planning a terrorist attack, would it be wise for him to go and buy the clothes himself? This point is very puzzling and confusing. Scottish judges came to a conclusion even without coming to Malta and conducting an on-site inquiry in order to become acquainted with places mentioned in the trial.”

In the final analysis, Mifsud suggests it may have been in the interest of other countries to implicate Malta, albeit indirectly.

“At that time the German authorities were highly criticised for the fact that just some time before the tragedy they had in custody a number of persons involved in terrorist acts, who were very close to the Palestinian faction of Ahmed Jibril, the PFLP-GC, whose base is in Syria. (...)

“Germany was also criticised by security services as how a person suspected of involvement in the Lockerbie case, Hafez Kasem Dalkamoni, was allowed to depart from Germany to Syria without being interrogated about the Lockerbie case.”

Joe Mifsud on Malta and terrorism, including Lockerbie

[What follows is an article that appeared in today’s edition of the Malta Independent:]

Beyond the EgyptAir hijack, Lockerbie, and the killing of Shqaqi: Terror’s footprints, by Joe Mifsud

Terror's footprints - Shadows of International Terrorism over Malta was officially launched yesterday. The book, authored by lawyer and veteran journalist Joe Mifsud sheds new light not only on three of the most well-known terroristic events related to Malta - the 1985 Egypt Air hijacking, the assassination of Islamic Jihad leader Fathi Shqaqi and the Lockerbie boming - but also delves on other possible terrorism attempts with a Malta connection.

It is loaded with key information, supported by documents and photographs, about events which all left their mark on Malta. The publication delves beyond the headlines and the published stories bringing facts from out of the shadows into the light.

Dr Mifsud recollects the time he visited the Islamic Jihad headquarters in Syria after his request to interview Fathi Shqaqi's family was accepted. He was the first foreign journalist to be allowed in the camp.

He also travelled to Libya and spoke to the family of one of the two men accused of carrying out the Lockerie bombing and was the the only Maltese journalist to follow the trial at The Hague.

Apart from the three prominent cases, the author speaks about "other shadows, indicating the possibility and even probability of other occasions when Malta was shamelessly used by other countries, even so called friends, for their nefarious ends."

The book was edited by Martin Bugelli and published by Kite Group. A book signing event will be held on 14 November at MCC in Valletta.

[Further references to Dr Joe Mifsud on this blog can be found here.]

Inherent improbability of Malta ingestion of Lockerbie bomb

[What follows is an article by Maltese journalist, author and lawyer Joe Mifsud published in September 2000, while the Zeist trial was in progress, on TheLockerbieTrial.com, a website edited by Ian Ferguson and me. In it he points out the inherent improbability of Malta’s being the place of ingestion of the Lockerbie bomb.]

A terrorist, like any other criminal, will do what he can to cover his tracks.  The Maltese origin of clothing in the bomb suitcase does not establish that either the suitcase or the bomb was once in Malta.

The clothing in the bomb suitcase, which was identifiable as having been manufactured in Malta, bore labels to this effect, enabled Royal Armament Research and Development (RARDE) to determine the country of origin as Malta.  So these labels had not been removed by the terrorists.

The Lockerbie investigators established that six items of the clothing and an umbrella, which originated in Malta were new and had been purchased new from the same shop in Malta on the same occasion.

These items of clothing had been purchased from Mary’s House in Sliema, weeks not days before 21st December 1988.  The prosecution is claiming that the clothes were bought on the 7th December, while the defence is suggesting the 23rd November 1988 as the date.

In my opinion the facts and matters set out above are consistent with an attempt by the terrorists to distract the attention of the investigating authorities away from Frankfurt or Heathrow to Malta in the event of the bomb being detected or as in fact happened of the bomb exploding above land and debris from the bomb and the bomb suitcase being recovered.

It is inherently unlikely that terrorists would have tried to place the bomb suitcase on board Air Malta KM 180 on the 21st December 1988 for the following four reasons.

1.  Terrorists do not expose themselves and their plans to any unnecessary risk of detention or of error.

2.  Accordingly the terrorists responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103 would not have routed the bomb suitcase through Frankfurt and chosen to run the risk of it passing undetected through the security systems of three different airports on two different airlines when Air Malta during that period flew only three flights each week to Frankfurt but ten flights each week to Heathrow.

3.  Further if the bomb consisted of a timer device, terrorists would not have run the unpredictable risk of the passage of the bomb suitcase being delayed in one or more of the following ways:

a)  on the ground at Luqa as a result of mechanical failure, poor weather, security alert, air traffic control or any other reason;

b)  by being diverted away from Frankfurt for any of the reasons at above;

c)  above Frankfurt as a result of air traffic control delays for incoming flights (as in fact happened);

d)  by missing the interline connection at Frankfurt as a result of the bomb suitcase being lost, mishandled or detected in the course of x-ray or baggage reconciliation procedures;

e)  on the ground at Frankfurt for any of the reasons at (a) above;

f)  by being diverted away from Heathrow for any of the reasons at (a) above;

g)  above Heathrow as a result of air traffic control delays for incoming flights;

h)  by missing the interline connection at Heathrow for any of the reasons at (d) above;

i)   on the ground at Heathrow as a result of the connecting transatlantic aircraft being delayed, mechanical failure, poor weather, security alert or any other reason.

4.  Further if the bomb consisted of a barometric pressure device triggered by altitude which itself triggered a timer, terrorists could not have avoided (alternatively would not have risked) the bomb being prematurely triggered on board KM 180 or on board Pan Am 103A from Frankfurt to Heathrow, and then detonating on board either of these flights or on the ground at Frankfurt or at Heathrow.

No terrorist could have predicted in advance the exact altitude at which either flight would have flown or, if such a prediction had been made, no terrorist could have guaranteed that the aircraft would have remained at that altitude and would not have been ordered away from it by air traffic control.  The bomb on board Pan Am 103 exploded approximately 35 minutes after take-off from Heathrow.

It is not clear for me why the Lockerbie investigators choose to blame Malta and Air Malta in this case, when it is so clear that we are the scapegoats for others that lacked security at their airports.

Joe Mifsud is currently following the Lockerbie Trial at Camp Zeist for ONE News and Kullhadd.

Lockerbie relatives to appeal Megrahi conviction

[This is the headline over a report in today’s edition of The Herald.  It reads as follows:]

British relatives of victims of the Lockerbie atrocity are planning another attempt to overturn the conviction of the only person found guilty of the attack after a former Iranian spy went public with his claims that Syrian-based extremists recruited by Iran carried out the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.

Former Iranian intelligence officer Abolghassem Mesbahi told a TV documentary, screened last night and repeated tonight, that the December 1988 bombing was undertaken by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) on behalf of Tehran.

He claimed it was carried out in revenge for the mistaken shooting down in July 1988 of an Iran Air Airbus by the USS Vincennes, a US Navy cruiser in the Gulf.

Iran's then leader Ayatollah Khomeini had pledged the skies would "rain blood" in revenge.

During Al Jazeera's Lockerbie: what really happened? documentary, Mr Mesbahi said: "Iran decided to retaliate as soon as possible. The decision was made by the whole system in Iran and confirmed by Ayatollah Khomeini.

"The target of the Iranian decision makers was to copy exactly what happened to the Iranian Airbus. Everything exactly same, minimum 290 people dead."

Campaigner Dr Jim Swire said yesterday that UK relatives of the victims, including himself, are preparing to apply to the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) for the conviction of Libyan Abdelbaset al Megrahi to be overturned. Megrahi died in 2012 protesting his innocence.

Mr Swire, whose daughter Flora, 23, was on board Flight 103 said: "Some British relatives have decided that enough is enough and we will be applying within weeks for a further appeal against the Megrahi verdict. We have a right to know who killed our families and why the British Government and authorities responsible for the safety of the aircraft failed in their duty. We are not going away."

A successful SCCRC application could start the third appeal into Megrahi's conviction.

The Al Jazeera documentary fingered Ahmed Jibril, secretary-general of the PFLP-GC, as the key figure behind the attack, which was led by Hafez Dalkamoni. The bomb itself is alleged to have been made by Jordanin Marwan Khreesat.

In December 1988, an anonymous man took responsibility for the crash in the name of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution and in retaliation for the downing of the Iran Air flight.

Earlier that year, German police raided a PFLP-GC cell and found Toshiba cassette recorder bombs, and arrested Khreesat and Dalkamoni. The bombs were later found to be almost identical to the one used to blow up Flight 103.

But during the Lockerbie investigation, the spotlight turned from Iran to Libya when forensic examination of the suitcase that carried the bomb found it had contained a Maltese-made babygrow. Maltese shopkeeper Tony Gauci identified Megrahi, a Libyan intelligence officer, as the man who bought the baby clothes and other items found in the suitcase.

In 1991 an indictment for murder was issued against Megrahi and Malta airport manager Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah. The pair were handed over to Scottish authorities in 1999. Fhimah was later cleared of any involvement in the bombing.

Egyptian-born Abu Talb had also previously emerged as a key suspect, with his accusers alleging he had smuggled the bomb onto the flight. However, when Megrahi went on trial in 2000, Talb was called as a prosecution witness.

New information about Talb and his activities in Europe was sent to the SCCRC during an earlier investigation. It claimed he was paid millions of dollars by Iran following the bombing. In 1989, a Swedish court convicted Talb of bombing a synagogue in Denmark and gave him a life sentence. He has since been released.

John Ashton, Megrahi's biographer, said: "There is very little that is new here. For about 18 months after the bombing Tehran got the blame, before attention focused on Libya. I am glad [Al Jazeera's] report has put the focus back on Iran."

A Crown Office spokesman said: "Mesbahi's claim that Iran was responsible was first reported in the media in the late 1990s and was available to the defence before the trial but they did not call him as a witness.

"The wider alleged involvement of the PFLP-GC has been repeatedly reported over many years but was addressed in full and rejected at the original trial."

He added that Megrahi was convicted and that the verdict was upheld following an appeal.

[The Scotsman also today runs an article headlined New Lockerbie appeal to be launched ‘within weeks’.

An interesting article appears today in the Maltese newspaper The Times.  It contains the following:]

The latest documentary sheds light on events in Malta months  before the actual bombing. According to documentation gathered for the film, in March 1988, intelligence officers from Iran, Syria and Libya met at the Miska Bakery, in Qormi. The place was used by a cell of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) that operated in Malta.

Foreign intelligence agencies knew of the cell’s presence on the island and were monitoring the bakery.

However, the information was not accurate enough for action to be taken.

The Iranian, Syrian and Libyan intelligence officers had agreed to a general campaign “against Israeli and American targets” but Pan Am 103 was not yet in the picture. Things changed three months later when, on July 3, the USS Vincennes, a military ship patrolling the Persian Gulf, shot down an Iranian passenger plane killing all 290 people on board, including 66 children.

The ship mistook the airliner for a fighter jet but the US refused to issue an apology even after the tragedy was revealed. Iran wanted revenge and a plan was hatched to destroy an American aircraft. In October 1988, terrorists from the PFLP-GC met in a St Julian’s apartment to discuss the final details of its execution.

Information on this meeting came from a source who was present. The source was tracked down by Jessica de Grazia, a former Manhattan District Attorney working for Mr al Megrahi’s defence. Her findings would have formed the basis of his appeal hearing, which he abandoned on being released in 2009 from Greenock prison in Scotland on compassionate grounds.

One of those present for the Malta meeting was Mohammed Abu Talb, who headed the Swedish cell of PFLP-GC, and would later become one of the prime suspects in the case before the probe shifted to Libya and Mr al Megrahi.

Journalist Joe Mifsud had reported on the meeting in the wake of the Lockerbie attack. Speaking to Times of Malta yesterday, Dr Mifsud was not surprised by the findings of the documentary. “It confirms what I had reported on, even before the Lockerbie trial, that Abu Talb was the prime suspect in the case,” he said.

Dr Mifsud, who was present for Mr Abu Talb’s testimony at the trial, said the Swedish police had found clothes from Malta in the Palestinian’s apartment in Sweden and a calendar with December 21 circled.

In fact, the theory that the Lockerbie bombing was executed by the PFLP-GC on behalf of Iran was in line with the original leads pursued by Scottish and American investigators.

Al Jazeera tracked down the alleged bomb maker, Marwan Khreesat, to Amman in Jordan, where he is kept under surveillance by Jordanian intelligence. He refused to discuss the affair on camera but a source close to him later told Al Jazeera the attack had indeed been commissioned by Iran and the bomb was put on board at Heathrow.