David Wolchover responds to a challenge

Barrister David Wolchover has returned to the Lockerbie case in a further article in the Criminal Law & Justice Weekly. It is a response to criticisms on this blog by Baz of one of his earlier articles. Unfortunately, access to Mr Wolchover's latest piece requires subscription to the magazine.  However, I shall provide further details once the full text becomes available and I have returned to South Africa from Namibia.

[Posted from an internet cafē in Lűderitz.]


I am grateful to David Wolchover for sending me a copy of the text of his article Lockerbie: The True Culprits - A Postscript on Proof. It can be read here.

English barrister demolishes Crown's Lockerbie Megrahi evidence

The indefatigable David Wolchover, barrister and Head of Chambers Emeritus at 7 Bell Yard, has recently returned to the charge over Lockerbie and the Megrahi conviction in three articles in the Criminal Law & Justice Weekly.  Synopses of the articles can be found here and here and here. 

Mr Wolchover has also produced a magnificent 26,000 word, 24-page, monograph entitled Culprits of Lockerbie: Gaddafi or the Extemists of Palestine in which he dissects the evidence led at Zeist against Megrahi and Libya and explores (a) the evidence for Heathrow (rather than Malta-Frankfurt) insertion of the bomb suitcase and (b) the evidence pointing towards PFLP-GC responsibility. The monograph can be read here. It has now been revised and expanded (see especially pages 6 and 7) to take account of comments by baz on this blog.

Previous Lockerbie articles by David Wolchover are referred to on this blog here.

An epistolary exchange (continued)

[On 6 September 2011 this blog featured a three-item correspondence between barrister and author David Wolchover and the Scottish Government under the heading An epistolary exchange. Here are two further items:]

4.  28 September 2011

Dear Mr Wolchover
‘Thank you for your further e-mails of 2 September and 12 September regarding earlier correspondence on the conviction of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi.

As we made clear in our earlier reply and you quoted in yours, "An independent judiciary is a cornerstone of Scottish justice. It would not be appropriate for Government to cast doubt on the decisions taken by judges who have listened to all the evidence and reached a decision in a case."

This should be taken to mean exactly what it says. The Scottish Government does not doubt the conviction of Mr al-Megrahi.

Insofar as Ministers have ever had a duty in respect of possible miscarriages of justice, that responsibility passed in 1999 to the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission. This development has been widely welcomed both for further removing Ministers from involvement in the decisions of the criminal courts and for allowing greater scrutiny of cases than was formerly possible. Since its inception the SCCRC has referred over 100 cases, including that of Mr al-Megrahi, to the High Court.

Thank you for writing to us with your views.’

Lockerbie Team
Scottish Government

5.  29 September 2011

Dear Mr [...]

I thank you for your message. It is gratifying to discover that it took a feature article by me in that internationally renowned weekly, the Jewish Chronicle - an article which has "gone viral" on the internet - to elicit a response to letters which I was led to suspect were deliberately and therefore discourteously going unanswered in the belief that I would not bother to pursue the correspondence. How wrong you would have been! In fact I was in the process of drafting a further chaser (by way of capitalising on the article) when your message came in and I note with some surprise that you make no mention of the article, as if your response was a pure coincidence.

It is with some justice therefore that I described the Scottish Government's position as "stonewalling." 

I do not wish to get caught up in semantics but I am afraid that I am bound to disagree with the implications of your reasoning.

With respect, contrary to what you aver the admittedly defensible (if pusillanimous) position that "[i]t would not be appropriate for Government to cast doubt on the decisions taken by judges who have listened to all the evidence and reached a decision in a case" does not equate to the statement that the Government "does not doubt the conviction of Mr al-Megrahi." 

Incidentally, I think you meant "the safety of Mr al-Megrahi's conviction." Few doubt he was convicted.

As I pointed out in my previous letter, there is a principled difference between on the one hand the executive studiously regarding itself as constitutionally debarred from making a public judgment on a judicial decision (whether to agree or disagree) and on the other hand collectively making a positive avowal of agreement with it. The statement "I do not doubt" a certain proposition unequivocally expresses a value judgment. 

However, I concede the possibility that such judgment may be arrived at either by a personal consideration of the facts or vicariously. Thus, you (and the unidentified earlier spokesperson/correspondent) may have been meaning to imply that the government have adopted the following position: "We as a cabinet implicitly trust the opinion of the judges on this matter. They have asserted such and such is the case, and by reason of our absolute confidence in their authority, expertise and wisdom we do not doubt they are right though we have not studied the facts ourselves."

So I modify my original questions to you. 

1. Have the cabinet considered the facts of the case in depth?

2. If not, have they collectively resolved to express a vicarious confidence in the judges' decision?

3. If the latter, when was that determination made?

4. If they have not made such a resolution was the decision to pronounce confidence in the verdict made on behalf of the government by certain cabinet members (eg the First Minister, the Minister of Justice, the Lord Advocate) without consulting the rest of the cabinet? 

5. Was there any discussion over the question whether to go beyond simply stating that it was not the cabinet's place to make a value judgment on the merits?

6. If the decision to pronounce confidence in the verdict was made by the cabinet collectively was there nonetheless any dissent?

Please forgive my inquisitiveness, but the destruction of Pan Am 103 is a matter of such considerable international importance and the trial verdict now so controversial, if not widely discredited, that it is surely right to seek an account of the process by which the Government of Scotland came to make a pronouncement of confidence in the verdict.
 

Perhaps when the Libyan National Transitional Council becomes a little more confident it will no longer feel the need to kowtow to official Scottish amour propre and may begin to apply the sort of pressures to which I referred in my article.

David Wolchover

Your assumption of Megrahi’s guilt is based on no more than the fact that he was convicted

[What follows is the text of a letter dated 21 May sent by David Wolchover to Prime Minister David Cameron:]

The Destruction of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988

I am a practising barrister, Head of Chambers Emeritus at 7 Bell Yard and an established legal author. Over the last year I have contributed a number of articles to Criminal Law and Justice Weekly on the destruction of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988, and I also maintain an on-line monograph on the issue, hosted at www.DavidWolchover.co.uk. The monograph is an expansion of the material set out in the CL&JW articles. I am enclosing herewith a bundle of the CL&JW articles, a print out of the current edition of the monograph, and a copy of an article I contributed last year to the Jewish Chronicle entitled “Lockerbie: time for us to reveal the true culprits”. All are commended for your attention. [RB: these documents can be found on David Wolchover's website, or through this blog's search facility.]

The drafting of this letter was already well advanced when news came through of the death of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. In substance his death changes nothing, save that large numbers of ill-informed people will be saying to themselves “not a moment too soon.”

On the 29 February this year, immediately prior to the launch of John Ashton’s book Megrahi: You are my Jury, 10 Downing Street issued a statement characterising the book as “an insult to the Lockerbie relatives.” It is understood that your office had not at that stage been treated to sight of the work. Then, on Monday, 14 May, referring to Abdelbaset al Megrahi’s release in 2009 by the Scottish authorities, you stated:

“One thousand days on, this is yet another reminder that Alex Salmond’s Government’s decision to free the biggest mass murderer in British history was wrong and an insult to the families of the 270 people who were murdered.”

Contrary to the supposition of some observers I do not believe that this was grandstanding inspired primarily by the perception of an opportunity to upstage Mr Salmond. The passionate tones of your statement demonstrate that you were (characteristically, if I may respectfully say so) speaking from the heart.

Today it is reported that in Chicago yesterday you dismissed the possibility of a new UK Lockerbie inquiry, stating that Megrahi’s trial was

“properly conducted . . . This has been thoroughly gone through. There was a proper process, a proper court proceeding and all the rest of it.”

With the greatest of respect, the fact that the trial may have been conducted with all due decorum and with all the niceties attendant upon safeguarding the defendant’s right to legal representation, strict observance of the rules of evidence and procedure, and with an apparent attention to detail, does not mean that the judges “got it right.” 

The fact is that not only did they not “get it right” but that, amazing as it might seem and notwithstanding their enormous authority and professional distinction, they made an utter hash of the evidence and accepted as reality a quite ludicrous series of propositions, as any sensible scrutiny of the evidence plainly reveals. As far as the Malta end of the story is concerned, their finding was based on nothing short of petitio principii, assuming what is to be proved as a component of the would-be proof, as you will see from my analysis. As to what is supposed to have taken place in Frankfurt they were actually led to overlook one vital piece of evidence which of itself and even if the rest of the evidence had been coherent and logical would have brought down the whole edifice like a house of cards (see Vol 175 CL&JW, Aug 27/Sept 3, p.510, enclosed). So even there it was not all “thoroughly gone through.”

Sadly, the verdict has become the king’s new clothes, a comforting illusion for those, including many bereaved relatives, who would rather seek refuge in apparent certainty than face the terrible realisation that the trail to the true culprits will long have gone cold, with the scent never likely to be picked up again by even the most dogged bloodhound.

In subscribing to the validity of Megrahi’s conviction you take a position which is opposed by what has now grown into a substantial body of authoritative and informed individuals of diverse shades of political opinion from the worlds of politics, journalism, medicine, the law and other professions. Importantly also, a great many if not most of the bereaved British families – tenaciously led of course by Dr Swire – and many of the American relatives now utterly reject the case for upholding Megrahi’s conviction.

In the face of that weight of opinion and having regard to the details of the case your outspoken position at first blush seems puzzling. But I feel convinced that your assumption of Megrahi’s guilt is based on no more than the fact that he was convicted at Zeist and that his conviction was upheld at the original appeal. It is hardly surprising that you would have had little time to assimilate for yourself the details of the case to a degree necessary to form a fully informed view, though it is perhaps unfortunate (as I assume to be the case) that someone at least among your staff was not briefed to make a detailed study of the details and to report back to you.

However, were you to get to grips with those details it is inconceivable that as a rational and independent thinker, if I may say so, you would not fail to come to appreciate that the Crown’s case quite simply flies in the face of common sense and is fundamentally and utterly unsustainable.

Libya was not involved. The true culprits were almost certainly the PFLP-GC led by the arch terrorist Ahmed Jibril. Such pointers to that proposition as are available are thoroughly analysed in the enclosed texts.

But my purpose in writing is not to take on the challenge of trying to squeeze into a page or two the essence of the argument disavowing Megrahi’s conviction, though I am sure that others more qualified than I might well succeed in making a powerful case in a few sentences.

My particular purpose in writing is to pose the following questions, the specific answers to which I feel sure a suitable official can answer.

1. In making your pronouncement were you expressing a purely personal opinion or were you articulating the coalition’s collective standpoint?

2. If you were expressing no more than a personal opinion, what was the depth of your study of the case? What materials did you consult?

3. If you were speaking for HM Government, rather than in a purely personal capacity, was it with the express approval of cabinet colleagues?

4. If you did not have their express approval, were you nonetheless purporting to speak for the Government using some form special authority as Prime Minister akin to an exercise of the royal prerogative?

5. If you did have the express approval of colleagues, please identify the forum in which that approval was registered.

6. If approval was given in cabinet please state

(a) whether approval was by majority or unanimous;

(b) whether cabinet members voted on the matter on the basis of being required to deliberate of the facts in the case,

(c) if so, what protocols were adopted for ensuring that they were briefed on the evidence and issues in the case to a level sufficient for them to make an informed and rational judgment, and

(d) whether the members were expected to acquaint themselves with the facts before voting on whether to give approval to your statement, to a degree sufficient to make a rational judgment,

7. If approval was given in cabinet but not on the basis of deliberation on the detailed facts by individual members please state whether it was given on the basis of a vote taken in cabinet to adopt the judgment of the Scottish trial and appeal court judges on the assumption that having respectively tried the case and heard the first appeal their view could not properly be gainsaid by lay politicans.

I would be most grateful to receive a substantive answer to these questions from your office.

An epistolary exchange

1.  1 August 2011

Dear Alex Salmond,

In its edition of April 9 the highly influential LexisNexis English law journal Criminal Law and Justice Weekly (vol 175, no.15, pp.221-228) carried an article I wrote about the Lockerbie trial entitled “Masking Justice With ‘Mercy’ ”.

Subsequently, in its numbers for July 16 and 23, CL&JW carried a two-parter by me entitled “Exploding Lockerbie” (sub-captioned “David Wolchover goes to the heart of why the trial court got it so wrong in the Lockerbie case”.)

I don’t know whether these articles have been brought to your attention but I am taking the liberty of attaching hereto the pdfs.

I should mention that I have been in practice at the English Bar for forty years and although now semi-retired I was for a number of years Head of Chambers at 7 Bell Yard, Temple Bar, London WC2A 2JR. I am the author of a number of legal text boooks and of numerous articles in a variety of law journals stretching back some 30 years. Please see my website for details (although the website text is five years old, is in need of updating and still includes no reference to the most recent text book of which I was a contributing co-editor, Witness Testimony, Oxford: OUP, 2006).

“Masking Justice with ‘Mercy’” mainly concentrated on the manifest deficiencies in the evidence of the Maltese witness Anthony Gauci, a topic I came to as an offshoot of my long term interest in the topic of witness interviewing by the police (see website for the titles of relevant articles).

Research for that article inspired a wider interest in the details of the case as a whole and “Exploding Lockerbie” was the result.

You will see that most of part 2 consists of an analysis of the evidence of what happened at Heathrow, focusing in particular on what flowed from the account by Pan Am baggage handler John Bedford of his encounter with the mysterious clone of the bomb-loaded Samsonite suitcase.

Obviously I assume that you are thoroughly familiar with much of the evidence in question but, at the risk of indulging in self-advertisement, I believe I am able to claim that my analysis of the Heathrow angle is unprecedented in its novelty and in the depth and breadth of its reasoning.

Although the judges accepted Mr Bedford’s evidence they treated it as irrelevant because they found that the bag noticed by him before the arrival of Pan Am feeder flight PA 103A was not in fact the bomb bag. They did so in spite of the fact that it was no more than about 3 inches from the position in the container AVE4041 in which the bomb bag was located when, according to the experts, the bomb exploded.  In determining that the bomb bag came from Luqa via Frankfurt they evidently lost sight of the fact that their finding implicitly depended on a series of improbable coincidences which in their totality amounted to nothing less than manifest absurdity. In the light of that central element in the whole trial al-Megrahi’s conviction is entirely unsustainable. 

I understand that you have been invited to institute an inquiry into the atrocity but that there may be procedural difficulties about this.

Might I respectfully suggest that your government would attract little criticism in the long run in releasing a detailed and reasoned pronouncement disavowing the conviction and repudiating the finding of the judges. Although I accept that this might involve difficult political ramifications I would hazard it would face no particular constitutional obstacles and in any event the circumstances are truly exceptional.

If, on the other hand, you are of the opinion that the judgment remains logically sustainable I would invite you to indicate to me the basis of your thinking, with hope making no reference to the mere ex officio authority of the trial judges and those presiding over the concluded appeal proceedings.

I am copying this to Kenny MacAskill and Frank Mulholland. 

I very much look forward to your personal response.

Yours sincerely, 
David Wolchover 

2.  30 August 2011 
Dear Mr Wolchover

Thank you for your e-mail of 1 August to Alex Salmond, First Minister. 

Regarding the conviction of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988.  I have been asked to reply. 

 

An independent judiciary is a cornerstone of Scottish justice.  It would not be appropriate for Government to cast doubt on the decisions taken by judges who have listened to all the evidence and reached a decision in a case.  Mr Al-Megrahi was tried and convicted by a Scottish court before three judges and his appeal against conviction, heard by a panel of five judges, was unsuccessful.  A second appeal, following a referral from the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, was abandoned by Mr Al-Megrahi.

  

The Scottish Government has always been as open and transparent as possible in this matter which is why, following the announcement last December that the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission has been unable to secure the necessary consents to release its statement of reasons in the Megrahi case due to the constraints of the current legislation, we now intend to bring forward legislation to overcome the problems presented by the current consent provisions.

This will allow the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission to publish a statement of reasons in cases where an appeal is abandoned, subject of course to legal restrictions applying to the Commission such as data protection, the convention rights of individuals and international obligations attaching to information provided by foreign authorities.

On the broader questions of an inquiry, the Scottish Government do not doubt the safety of the conviction of Mr Al-Megrahi.  Nevertheless, there remain concerns with regard to some of the wider issues relating to the Lockerbie atrocity.  The questions to be asked and answered in any such inquiry would be beyond the jurisdiction of Scots Law and the remit of the Scottish Government, and such an inquiry would therefore need to be initiated by those with the required power and authority to deal with an issue, international in its nature. The Scottish Government would be entirely happy to co-operate fully with any such properly constituted inquiry.

Thank you for contacting us with your views. 

Lockerbie Team 

Scottish Government

3.  2 September 2011 

Dear Sir or Madam

I find myself obliged to address you as such because, although your letter was expressed in the first person you omitted to identify yourself by name or position.

Suffixed to the text of your message was a notice that “[t]he views or opinions contained within this e-mail may not necessarily reflect those of the Scottish Government.” I shall take it that on this occasion you were writing on their behalf.

May I begin by thanking you – whoever you are – for your response to my e-mail of 1 August to Alex Salmond.

I further express my thanks to you for the time and effort which you have taken on behalf of the Government of Scotland in formulating their reply.

You will not be surprised to learn that as a commentator in depth on the Lockerbie case and a practising criminal advocate of some four decades standing I was well aware of the various procedural aspects of this matter to which you advert. However, I was particularly struck by one stark proposition contained in your letter and I am writing for clarification.

In your letter you state:

“An independent judiciary is a cornerstone of Scottish justice. It would not be appropriate for Government to cast doubt on the decisions taken by judges who have listened to all the evidence and reached a decision in a case.”

It might have been understandable if the Scottish Government had confined themselves to this position, albeit it is one which in the very special case of Lockerbie might be regarded as disappointing, not to say pusillanimous.

However, for the Scottish Government to declare, through your letter, that they “do not doubt the safety of the conviction of Mr Al-Megrahi” appears to be a very different proposition from tactfully abiding by a studied silence on the merits.

At the risk of being accused of pedantry, the self-effacing sentence “it is not for us to cast doubt” on such and such is qualitatively quite different from avowing “we do not doubt” that X is the case. On its most natural meaning the latter implies that the Government have formed a rational view of the case after due consideration of the relevant facts.

There will certainly have been no lack of opportunity to do so. The trial transcript, the trial and original appeal court judgements, and the court papers for the second, abandoned, appeal, are available for all to read and the Government’s copying arrangements will have facilitated easy access by cabinet members. It is difficult to believe that on such a vexed issue as Lockerbie some at least of the Scottish body politic have not made some effort to get to grips with the case details.

I would venture to claim that my two recent articles in Criminal Law and Justice Weekly (“Masking Justice with ‘Mercy’” and “Exploding Lockerbie”) which I attached with my August 1 e-mail, together offer a detailed, forensic, critique of the judgment warranting close attention. They will have been available to the Government for perusal for a whole month during the time that your response was in preparation. I must confess to some surprise therefore that your reply makes no reference whatsoever to either article. Criminal Law and Justice Weekly, formally known as Justice of the Peace, is one of England’s most venerable and distinguished law journals. The articles make serious and compelling points which surely deserve at the very least an acknowledgment.

For the purposes of this letter I shall assume that the phrase “do not doubt the safety of the conviction” was chosen with care and expresses a process of rational determination upon the facts. This provokes a number of questions, to which I would respectfully invite the Government’s response.

1.    Are you able to indicate whether the expression “Scottish Government do not doubt” means:

(a)     that all cabinet members individually studied the facts of the case, formed a view, and then came together to take a vote; or

(b)     that only certain members of the cabinet, for example the First Minister, the Minister of Justice and the Lord Advocate (assuming the latter was for present purposes a member of the cabinet), studied the case, and then formulated a summary for their colleagues with a recommendation which was then collectively accepted; or

(c)     that senior cabinet members dictated a view to their junior colleagues who then endorsed that view on command?

2.    In either case are you able to indicate

(a)     on what occasion the cabinet made their determination,

(b)     how much discussion there was on the factual issues,

(c)     whether any such discussion was minuted,

(d)     without indicating the views of individual ministers, the general nature of the points taken,

(e)     whether there was any conscientious dissent from expressing belief in the safety of the conviction,

(f)     whether any dissenting cabinet members have been directed by the First Minister to avoid airing their views publicly.

3.       If the answer to (1)(b) is in the affirmative the extent to which the First Minister, the Minister of Justice and the Lord Advocate have personally studied the evidence in the case.

For your information I am attaching the pdf of another article of mine, published in the current number of CL&JW, entitled “[A Postscript on Lockerbie].” (Regrettably there are two typographical errors which were introduced at a late stage through an electronic communication problem.) I would argue that the novel exposé of the narrow but devastating point focused on in the final section is one which, standing quite alone and apart from all the other problems with al-Megrahi’s conviction, might be met by some very serious soul-searching indeed on the part of judges and ministers alike and might make some men with a conscience very hesitant about declaring they have no doubts as to the safety of al-Megrahi’s conviction.

Your message to me carried the following pro forma warning:

“This e-mail (and any files or other attachments transmitted with it) is intended solely for the attention of the addressee(s). Unauthorised use, disclosure, storage, copying or distribution of any part of this e-mail is not permitted.” 

I am going to assume that this was a standard automatically generated appendage which was not intended to require the Government’s consent as a condition of quoting your message in any further excursus into journalism on which I might embark.

Yours faithfully

David Wolchover

The grim Lockerbie shadow over Iran’s new president

[This is the headline over an article by David Wolchover published yesterday evening on the Jewish News website.  It reads as follows:]

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly this month, Benjamin Netanyahu memorably described Hassan Rouhani, the recently elected president of Iran, as “a wolf in sheep’s clothing”, cautioning that we should not be taken in by his “charm offensive” on the West.

Is this any more than bombastic alarmism, cried out in desperation by a worried man in charge of an increasingly-beleaguered Israel or is there substance in the warning? Analysis of Rouhani’s biography will provide a clear answer and it is chilling. His ostensible career as a serious-minded and seemingly decent person begins promisingly enough.

Educated at the prestigious Qom seminary with a clerical career beckoning, he went on to obtain his doctorate in Constitutional Law from Glasgow Caledonian University in 1999 with a thesis worthily entitled “The Flexibility of Shariah (Islamic Law) with reference to the Iranian experience”. Yet Rouhani’s distinguished scholastic attainment contrasts with a rather less happy connection with Scotland a decade earlier.

On 3 July 1988 a jumpy radar analyst on board the US Navy’s Gulf-based missile cruiser Vincennes identified an approaching aircraft as an Iranian F-14 Tomcat. Two missiles were launched but the target proved to be an Airbus, IranAir Flight 655, making the short hop from Bandar Abbas to Dubai with 290 passengers and crew.

Instead of eating humble pie, the Reagan administration ineptly tried to justify the tragedy as the consequence of a legitimate measure of self-defence and rubbed salt in the wound by awarding the hapless “air warfare co-ordinator” a navy medal for “heroic achievement”. Absurdly, the Iranian government claimed the destruction of Flight 655 was intended to celebrate the Fourth of July and with its traditional penchant for “symmetry” determined on revenge in like measure.

Following his 1986 showdown with the Regan government, Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi made a show of “going straight”, including cutting off funds from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: General Command, whose founder, Ahmed Jibril, was forced to seek fresh sources of revenue. To Jibril, the Airbus incident seemed like manna from heaven and with its network of informants on the ground Israeli intelligence soon learnt he was serenading the Iranians with an offer to execute a contract of revenge. Using their combined technical resources, Mossad and the CIA obtained clear evidence of a deal between Jibril and Iran’s powerful hard-line interior minister, Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur, by which Iran agreed to pay the PFLP-GC a bounty running into millions of dollars if it managed to destroy a packed American airliner.

The upshot was the destruction over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988 of Pan American Flight 103, with the loss of only 20 souls fewer than went down with the Airbus. The US chose to accuse Libya instead of the PFLP-GC, but even a cursory reading of the evidence against the only man to be convicted of the bombing, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, shows the case against him, and by extension Gaddafi, was tosh. This article is not about retrying Megrahi, dead now for 18 months.

President Rouhani is the subject. But what has he to do with Lockerbie? For those who know their history of Iranian revolutionary power-politics, the answer is not difficult to infer.

We need to look at his connection with Mohtashemi, the Lockerbie deal-maker. As ambassador to Syria, Mohtashemi had a key role in the creation of Hezbollah in the Lebanon and although appointed interior minister in 1995 continued an active association with Syrian military intelligence in the Lebanon.

In that capacity, he was the natural choice to talk to Jibril and in agreeing to pay out millions of dollars for an act of war against the US we can be certain he was hardly engaging “on a frolic of his own,” as lawyers might put it. As a mainstream politician it is inconceivable that he was not plenipotentiary for his government and the Ayatollah Khomeini. The Supreme Leader had been quite prepared to sacrifice hundreds of thousands as cannon fodder in the Iran-Iraq war, demonstrating no aversion to the shedding of innocent blood, especially of citizens of the “great Satan,” the USA.

So to the supposedly-moderate figure of Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani, later to become president of the Republic. In June 1988, backed by Khomeini, who had at last seen the light, Rafsanjani was working on ending hostilities with Iraq. His star was in the ascendant but Mohtashemi saw the downing of the Airbus as a perfect opportunity to strike at Rafsanjani and discredit the rising influence of the moderates. Rouhani, born in 1948, was a contemporary of Mohtashemi’s, born in 1947, and had already been marked for high office, elected to the Majlis, the parliament, as early as 1980, and, importantly, a member of the Supreme Defence Council in the crucial period from 1982 to 1988. He held top military positions during the Iran-Iraq war, and was heavily involved in the Iran-Contra episode.

He held diverse positions of executive authority over Iran’s intelligence, security and clandestine operations establishment for a number of years straddling the fateful year 1988 and was plainly a significant player. As such it is inconceivable that he could have had no knowledge of the deal with Jibril.

Of course, exercising all due forensic restraint, it can be argued that knowledge of a plan is no proof of complicity in its execution or of having aided and abetted the instrumental perpetrators. Yet knowledge of the existence of a secret conspiracy is usually regarded as the best evidence of participation. The deal with Jibril can only have been authorised on the highest authority.

Rouhani was a high official in intelligence and security. He was a close ally of Mohtashemi in their opposition to Rasfanjani. Can he conceivably have played no role with others in formulating the terms of the contract and authorising his intimate associate to close the deal? Metaphorically speaking, the fingerprints of President Rouhani are all over the bomb that shattered Flight 103 over Lockerbie.

• David Wolchover is a barrister. He has written extensively on the Lockerbie bombing

Israeli Lockerbie warnings ignored

[What follows is excerpted from a report published in today’s edition of the Sunday Post:]

Israeli spies warned UK security services Britain would be targeted in a terror outrage weeks before the Lockerbie bombing.

David Wolchover, an eminent barrister and author, has made the claim in an updated report on the disaster.

In 2013, he published a 103-page examination of Lockerbie to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the bombing which claimed 270 lives. [RB: See http://www.davidwolchover.co.uk/docs/Culprits%20of%20Lockerbie.doc.]

He claims he’s since been contacted by “highly-placed” Israeli sources with fresh allegations, which he has used to update his work, Culprits of Lockerbie. The new allegations centre on claims the Israeli intelligence service – known as Mossad – warned MI6 that Heathrow Airport in London was being targeted by terror organisations because of lax security.

But the warnings were allegedly ignored by MI6, which dismissed them as an attempt by Israel to ingratiate itself back into the affections of security services here.

Mr Wolchover, a criminal defence barrister in London and author, said: “MI6 spurned the warnings. There was context to this.

“In the summer of 1988, British intelligence discovered Mossad were operating extensively across the UK without the authority of the UK. As punishment they kicked out a number of Israeli diplomats.”

Mr Wolchover said MI6 dismissed the November 1988 warning – a month before Lockerbie – as a “self-serving sham” for Mossad to “worm its way back into MI6’s good books”.

Similar claims were made in a book by an Israeli-American military historian Samuel Katz in a book in 1993.

He claimed Israelis had warned the UK an airliner departing from Europe in the run-up to Christmas would be targeted by a terror organisation. Dr Jim Swire, who lost his daughter Flora in the December 1988 atrocity, has hailed the claims.

He said: “It suggests that far from their duty of protecting the British public our authorities missed chances to stop it.”

[RB: This story was covered on this blog on 18 May 2016 in a post headed Why MI6 disastrously spurned Mossad’s Heathrow alert.]

Another opportunity to consider Lockerbie doubts

[This is the heading over a letter from Dr Jim Swire published in today’s edition of The Herald.  It reads as follows:]

Outside a recent presentation of the Scottish play The Lockerbie Bomber in Malta there was an installation with a rotating base carrying the words "Your Government and mine know exactly what happened but they're never going to tell".

These words were confided in 1989 to a British relative who, like me, had been invited to the US Embassy in London to hear the results of a US presidential inquiry into Lockerbie. No doubt the American who entrusted us with this knowledge was way outside his comfort zone, but so far his message has been vindicated.

The new and detailed analysis from the powerful legal mind of David Wolchover featured in your newspaper raises further well-supported doubts about the case led against the late Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi at Zeist ("Lawyer claims Rouhani knew of Iran's involvement in atrocity", The Herald, November 13). [RB: I cannot find this article on the newspaper’s website or through Google, but the gist is likely to be similar to this article by Mr Wolchover.] They mesh with and reinforce the devastating evidence contained in the book Megrahi: You are my Jury written by John Ashton and published by Birlinn in Edinburgh in 2012.

Early on the morning of publication of that book No 10 Downing Street issued an allegation that it was "an insult to the relatives". Simple inquiries suggest that there was no legal way that Downing Street could have obtained access to the book's content in advance of its launch.

Twenty-three years lie between these two utterances and I fear they define a great deal about why the truth is being hidden, it is indeed not to do with truth or justice but international politics.

What a shame that Scotland has yet to exhibit the resolution to discover by honest inquiry whether she has been drawn into a maelstrom not of her making. It is to be hoped that this time critics of a powerful new treatise will read it through objectively before describing us as conspiracy theorists or the work as an insult to us.

Exploding Lockerbie

[This is the title of a two-part article in the Criminal Law & Justice Weekly by David Wolchover, barrister and Head of Chambers Emeritus at 7 Bell Yard, London. It examines in detail the evidence led at Camp Zeist about the ingestion of the bomb that destroyed Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie. Part I of the article can be read here and Part II here. The conclusion of the two-part article reads as follows:]

It will have become apparent from the analysis of the evidence before the court offered here that wherever the bomb which destroyed Pan Am 103 was built the Samsonite hardshell bag in which it was packed could not have come from Luqa as an anonymous item of baggage on KM180, or from Frankfurt on PA103A. It should have been as “plain as a pikestaff” that it was smuggled into the system at Heathrow.

Why the Judges lost sight of the wood for the trees is not a matter which warrants conjecture. That they did so is beyond doubt. When asked by Lord MacLean to confirm that al-Megrahi’s Abdusamad passport was never used again after December 21, 1988, William Taylor QC said “We don’t know that”, to which Lord Maclean riposted “Yes I do” and gave the reference. The Judge got the acerbic reply he truly deserved: “Thank you. I am corrected. So your Lordship has asked me a question to which your Lordship already had the answer.” The application of a sight more judicial cleverness and rather less too cleverness by half might have delivered a truer verdict.

[An earlier Lockerbie article by Mr Wolchover "Masking justice with 'mercy'" can be accessed here.]

A Postscript on Lockerbie

[This is the title of an article published in today's edition of the Criminal Law & Justice Weekly by David Wolchover, barrister and Head of Chambers Emeritus at 7 Bell Yard. It forms a postscript to Mr Wolchover's earlier Lockerbie articles which are referred to here and here. One section reads as follows:]

The Smoking Gun of Injustice: X-rays at Frankfurt

We have seen how the court’s reliance on a wildly improbable series of coincidences and a circularity of assumptions might have justified describing the trial as a merry farce had it not amounted to such an unfunny disgrace. But quite aside from all that, there was one very simple error of fact which alone irrevocably destroys the basic premise on which the Crown and the Judges relied, the premise that the suitcase containing the radio-cassette player bomb was flown from Malta on the morning of December 21, 1988 and was interlined at Frankfurt on to Pan Am feeder flight PA103A. Although the error might aptly be described as Lockerbie’s smoking gun of injustice it appears to have been almost entirely overlooked in the critical literature.

A discrepancy in the baggage tally points to the possibility that an item which may have come from Air Malta flight KM180 from Luqa may not actually have ended up on the feeder flight at all. But if it did, it would certainly have been screened by Frankfurt x-ray operator Kurt Maier.

The main article mentioned that giving evidence the US civil proceedings against Pan Am and their insurers in 1992 Maier stated that he would certainly have alerted his supervisor had he seen a radio or radio-cassette player on his screen. It also mentioned that he was not called as a witness at Zeist owing to serious illness. Unfortunately, what it did not also mention was that the judges, incredibly, were never referred to his 1992 evidence but only to the notes of his January 1989 interview (conducted in English) by US Federal Aviation Administration investigators (Zeist Production 1792; Zeist transcript, pp1866-7). The notes record that if “he found something unusual ... he would call his supervisor if necessary,” and that “he could say without question that there was no explosives” [sic] in any of the bags. But the notes also purport to attribute to him the odd notion that an external plug on an electrical device “clears his doubt about any explosive device.” The judges accordingly observed that Maier’s “of what he looked for does not suggest that he would necessarily have claimed to be able to detect explosives hidden in a radio cassette player.” Since this declaration evidently formed the basis of their finding that Maier must have let the bomb through it is clear that they misconceived the nature of his duty in the context of the “Toshiba warning.” That duty was not to “detect explosives” in a radio-cassette player but to look out for and report any radio-cassette player in luggage.

This would have become apparent from what he asserted in the 1992 civil trial. Closely cross-examined on his FAA interview, he insisted that if he had seen a radio-cassette player he would have called his supervisor for the very good reason that in view of the Toshiba warning he had specific instructions to do so (see transcript JA 1099-1100). The crucial point he was making was that in accordance with those instructions he would have called the supervisor regardless of his personal opinion of what made a radio-cassette player suspicious. That he would have followed his instructions is supported by the fact that he was described as a careful and serious-minded employee (Zeist transcript, p1848). He did not call his supervisor. Therefore none of the bags he screened contained a radio-cassette player. QED. It was and remains as simple as that.

Although there was said to be some doubt about the quality of the US court’s German-English translation, it is arguable that any uncertainty is more likely to have originated from the interview, which was conducted in English, a language Maier plainly found difficult else he would hardly have needed an interpreter for court. In contrast with the court video record the interview notes did not represent a verbatim minute and moreover, although the FAA investigator (Saunders) who was called at Zeist to produce the notes stressed that she and her colleague (Tiedge) had signed them, significantly she made no reference to Maier himself having done so.

Because the Zeist judges relied exclusively on the notes and remained blissfully unaware of his sworn courtroom testimony they were precluded from making a valid assessment of the totality of his evidence on the crucial point. It was an elementary and fundamental error of process that was completely avoidable, went to the heart of the allegation and proved catastrophic.

Why MI6 disastrously spurned Mossad’s Heathrow alert

[This is the headline over an article by barrister David Wolchover that was published on the Jewish News website on 16 May 2016. It reads as follows:]

In my recent article on the part played by President Hassan Rouhani of Iran in the bombing of PanAm 103 over Lockerbie on December 21, 1988, I stated that Israeli intelligence had warned MI6 that Heathrow was the likely target for planting a bomb on a passenger aircraft but the warning was ignored because of a major rift between British and Israeli intelligence services. A number of readers have expressed curiosity about the episode.

During tensions in the Gulf earlier that year the US Navy had negligently shot down a packed Iranian Airbus. Israel and American intelligence soon learnt that for a multi-million dollar bounty Ahmed Jibril’s Syrian-based “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command” – experts in planting bombs on passenger planes – had been contracted by Iran to destroy an American airliner in revenge. Infiltrated Israeli agents also learnt that Heathrow was the prime target for the planting of a bomb on a US plane and British intelligence was duly alerted.

The significance of that warning was its prescience. Detailed scrutiny of the totality of the Lockerbie evidence proves conclusively that, contrary to the official story, the suitcase containing the bomb was placed by a terrorist in a portable luggage bin in Heathrow’s “interline” shed before the bin was taken out to the doomed Jumbo Jet. But Iran was not merely the paymaster. As reported in my earlier article, an Israeli intelligence source has confirmed that Iran in fact provided key logistical support. The bomb was flown into Heathrow on board an IranAir cargo jet which docked 200 yards from the Interline shed and was taken across to the shed by a PFLP-GC terrorist, named by my source as Jibril’s nephew, Marwad Bushnaq.

To learn why MI6 spurned the warning we must go back to the summer of 1988 when MI5 and Special Branch officers arrested a suspected member of the Palestinian Fatah Force 17 faction. But their captive turned out to be a Mossad double agent and in the light of other intelligence about Mossad’s activities in the UK the British Government concluded that the Israelis had been running an extensive network of operatives throughout the realm, engaging in the infiltration of various Fatah and PFLP cells. Since it was accepted that a number of Palestinian activist groups were cultivating close links with Irish republican terrorist bands it might have been supposed that British intelligence would have relished the chance to pool resources with their Israel counterparts. But other considerations prevailed. Whitehall was bound to show its outrage that Mossad had unilaterally made the UK Israel’s own private intelligence fiefdom.

Older readers may recall the dramatic outcome. On 17 June 1988 Mossad’s London station chief Arieh Regev and four other agents with diplomatic cover were sensationally expelled.

According to the late Samuel Katz’s 1993 book Israel Versus Jibril (Paragon, p205) Mossad alerted MI6 in late November 1988 that a Middle Eastern terrorist gang, probably one of the Syrian-sponsored anti-Arafat groups, would try to sabotage an airliner departing from Europe in the run-up to the Christmas holidays. Katz noted that the British dismissed the warning as no “hot tip” but a purely self-serving sham by which Mossad supposed they could worm their way back into MI6’s good books. He gave no further details of the warning and simply referenced an article by Yisrael Rosenblat in Ma’ariv Sofshavu’a (the Israeli newspaper’s weekend magazine) for November 22, 1991.

In fact my source confirmed that the warning was much more specific than that described in Rosenblat’s report. MI6 were very definitely told that because of the appalling shambles in Heathrow’s security (with airside passes easily obtained under the counter, hundreds having gone missing during the rebuilding of Terminal 3) the airport was Number One target to get a bomb into the hold of a wide-bodied plane operated by one of the premier American carriers.

Whitehall’s hostile attitude was conveyed back to Israel by an exasperated British intermediary and Mossad washed its hands of the whole business. The catastrophic aftermath may explain the desperate efforts to show that the bomb was not infiltrated at Heathrow. Doubtless the response of the joint intelligence chiefs to this revelation will be silence rather than denial but it is enough to hope that these days our security services are more pragmatic and less Israel-averse.